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Abstract 
The end of the Cold War has brought both uncertainty and opportunity for states interested in 
designing their own security policies. Alternative methods, other than military solutions, 
should be exploited to prevent insecurity and instability. 
This study is concerned with South Korea's security approach towards North Korea in the 
post-Cold War era and in particular how South Korea can use non-military tools to prevent 
military conflict in the Korean Peninsula and to build mutual confidence between the two 
Koreas in the long-run. This thesis also presents an analysis of both the need and the 
opportunity for South Korea to adopt a comprehensive economic engagement strategy 
towards North Korea in the post-Cold War era in order to achieve these goals. 
It argues that South Korea's implementation of economic engagement with North Korea 
requires its policy-makers' strong policy-making will for an active and consistent engagement 
posture. Then, this study demonstrates the important role of President Kim Dae-jung's strong 
causal beliefs about the necessity of engagement measures to address the post-Cold War 
North Korean security problems on the Kim Dae-jung government's policy-making in favour 
of comprehensive engagement with North Korea. 
This study presents the model of 'business-track diplomacy' to test a state's utilisation of 
economic engagement strategy as security policy. This model provides ways to think around 
security issues and alternative security options which go beyond the traditional military 
containment approach to security in international relations (IR). Moreover, this study presents 
a new belief perspective that illuminates the South Korea's North Korea policy-making 
process, which had previously been dominated by military issues and essentially required an 
international structure perspective, centred on US influence. Thus, the belief approach 
contributes to the field of foreign policy analysis (FPA) for South Korea by proving the 
importance of its decision-makers' policy beliefs and by going beyond the conventional 
international structure approach. 
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Introduction 
Security in the post-Cold War period 
One of the most important and basic responsibilities of all states in world politics has been to 
ensure the safety of their populations. Hence, national security has always been at the centre 
of the policy-making agenda of a state and among states, with the state policy-makers aiming 
to create a viable security policy. 
During the 20th century, the Second World War and the Cold War caused states and 
the international system to experience both the failure of preventing tragic wars, and the great 
destructive risks from, not least of all, nuclear weapons. This helped to consolidate the status 
of Realism as the dominant guideline for state security policy. In the absence of a higher 
authority in the international system, according to Realism, sovereign states had no alternative 
but to assume responsibility for ensuring their own security. Thus, the pursuit of national 
security compels states to maximise their military capability, often through forming alliances 
which are weighed against one another in a "balance of power" configuration. In fact, the 
Cold War era, in which the bi-polar world order was created, was based on a balance of 
comparable US and Soviet power blocs. This led to an effective system of deterrence and also 
gave state policy-makers guidelines - whether misguided or not - that they could use to 
identify enemies, threats, and strategies for the prevention of conflict. 
South Korea was at the frontline of US containment policy, and also was engaged 
directly in Cold War conflict through the Korean War (1950-1953). South Korea's security 
environment after the Korean War was well-defined by this Cold War security structure. The 
source and type of threats to the national security of South Korea were considered very clear. 
Since the national division in 1945, North Korea has been an explicit enemy. Military threats 
from the North have been real from the South Korean perspective, and tension has run 
constantly high. After the Korean War, the severe memory of it has shaped Seoul's tense and 
even emotional perception of threats from the North. Moreover, the nature of South Korea's 
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security environment and threat structure also evolved in line with the US-USSR rivalry. In 
coping with North Korea's military threat, which was compounded by its military alliances 
with the Soviet Union and China, South Korea relied heavily on the US for patronage and 
protection within the framework of the bilateral defence treaty. The presence of American 
troops in, and Washington's security commitment to, South Korea have served as a reliable 
security mechanism to counter North Korea's military aggression. In short, the conventional 
logic of containment and military deterrence has conditioned the direction of South Korea's 
security policy. 
The end of the Cold War, however, has challenged policy-makers across the globe, 
and South Korea, as well as academics in the field of International Relations (IR), to rethink 
their approach to security. The demise of the Cold War and the bi-polar structure has created 
both uncertainty and opportunity in relation to security issues. Although the likelihood of 
nuclear war between superpowers and of low-intensity conflicts in the developing world 
through their intervention has diminished, the post-Cold War era has witnessed the 
occurrence of conventional war in the Gulf region, of ethnic and intra-state conflicts in 
Europe and Africa, and the threat of conflicts in the Far East, including those stemming from 
North Korea's nuclear and missile development programme. As will be shown in chapter 1, 
many of the traditional military approaches used to prevent or solve conflicts have been 
challenged. They have proved ineffective largely because of the emergence of new sources of 
international insecurity after the end of the Cold War. State policy-makers began to 
reconsider their conception of security and to rethink policy options when dealing with the 
post-Cold War security agenda. 
South Korean policy-makers also became increasingly aware of the changing nature 
of the security environment surrounding the Korean Peninsula. The Soviet Union has 
dissolved, the bi-polar logic that governed Far Eastern security dynamics has also faded, and 
thus threat perception among regional actors has very much diluted. Taking advantage of this 
changing regional security landscape, South Korean policy-makers began to think about the 
prospect of Korean unification and more independent security options. 
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For example, following the '7 July declaration' by the President Roh Tae-woo, in 
1988, South Korea has undertaken a series of policies designed to improve the precarious 
security environment: the reconciliation with North Korea through various inter-Korean 
cooperation initiatives and exchanges, and the nordpolitik that aimed at the development of its 
diplomatic ties with socialist states, especially the Soviet Union and China, former enemies 
and superpowers in this region. These policy initiatives were designed to create a regional 
environment in which North Korea would be forced to come to the table of inter-Korean 
dialogue and it would thus be possible to achieve a peaceful unification on South Korea's 
terms. 
Moreover, the current Kim Dae-jung government of South Korea firmly believes that 
its consistent and active engagement measures, including economic and social activities and 
cooperation with North Korea, would bring North Korea into the international community and 
they would also help it to embrace the market system in the long run. Thus, the so-called 
'sunshine policy' towards North Korea adopted by the Kim Dae-jung government is the core 
of its long-term security approach with regard to North Korean problems, though it 
understands the importance of military deterrence at the same time. Thus, the changing 
security environment in the Korean Peninsula gave the South Korean policy-makers the 
opportunity to create new and appropriate approaches to deal with the North Korean security 
problems and with the possible Korean unification. 
The field of IR also needs to change in response to the post-Cold War security 
agenda. The existing approach, which tends to look predominantly, if not exclusively, at 
military issues, has been insufficient and often inappropriate to deal with the post-Cold War 
security agenda. Particularly, despite the advent of the post-Cold War era, the politics of 
power balancing between great powers, such as the US, Japan and China still coexists in the 
Northeast Asia region along with their competitive increases of military capability. Moreover, 
Korean Peninsula remains one of the most serious spots of instability in the world due to 
North Korea's suspected nuclear and ballistic missile activities, and also its possible collapse 
caused by economic hardship. However, neither a solid system of collaboration nor any 
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multilateral collective security is in existence in this region. In this context, the continuation 
of military power politics and the lack of regional security cooperation might increase the 
possibility of conflicts and the use of force. 
Thereby, the field of JR should make a contribution to the understanding of the post-
Cold War security problems and solutions; it should not be just an analytical tool for 
explaining international events, but also a resource for policy-makers seeking security 
policies designed to prevent post-Cold War security crises. In this sense, the post-Cold War 
era is an opportunity to enlarge the scope of security studies in JR, and to establish new and 
comprehensive approaches relevant for policy-makers in the formulation of their security 
policies. 
Questions 
These observations about the new environment for security policy-making in the post-Cold 
War period, the South Korea's role in creating a security policy for North Korea, and the role 
of JR in understanding security policy are the basic context for the questions that will be 
/ 
examined in this thesis. First, after the Cold War, the international security environment 
// 
changed; the whole issue of security policy-making has been made more complex by the 
emergence of low-intensity, ethnic and internal instability within states, and by terrorist 
security threats. As chapter 1 will show, many of these threats cannot be adequately handled 
by means of military power alone, and instead require more comprehensive approaches, 
including, possibly, economic engagement based security policy. Therefore, this thesis is 
concerned with investigating the future implications of global security policy, and is based on 
the belief that comprehensive and innovative approaches will be required to deal with the 
post-Cold War security· agenda. It will examine the arguments for economic-based 
interdependence policy as one of the ways to tackle international insecurity. 
The second question is concerned with the viability of economic engagement as a 
security policy for South Korea given the inter-Korean security problems in the post-Cold 
War period. This thesis analyses the policy-making debate in South Korea to reveal what is 
4 
likely to be this state's future security policy with regard to the North Korean security 
problems in the post-Cold War era. Thus chapter 2 considers whether, after the end of the 
Cold War, there have been changes in the nature of the North Korean security issues that can 
be addressed by South Korea's economic engagement with North Korea, and whether this 
would be a viable long-term security policy. 
Moreover, as discussed in chapter 3, this study looks at whether there has been an 
actual security policy change in South Korea, from a military-maximising approach in the 
Cold War, to an active and consistent security policy based on economic engagement with 
North Korea. This question will be answered by looking at the record of the South Korean 
governments (Roh Tae-woo, Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung) to see whether they 
actually utilised a type of business-track diplomacy that uses inter-Korean economic 
interactions and cooperations for long-term security strategy towards North Korea in the post-
Cold War era. However, this does not necessarily mean that the South has abandoned its faith 
in the utility of military power in dealing with the North Korean security problem. This thesis 
explores if, and to what extent, South Korean policy-makers could instrumentalise economic 
engagement policy as a long-term security policy vis-a-vis North Korea. 
The third question, connected to the second, goes even further by asking if there has 
been policy change towards economic engagement with North Korea by the South Korean 
governments, and what factors are important for the instrumentalisation of business-track 
diplomacy. Here, this thesis assumes that the policy-makers' strong policy-making will is an 
important requirement for the utility of business-track diplomacy towards North Korea to be 
realised, and this is the case for the Kim Dae-jung government (1998-current). 
Then, to fmd out the crucial factors that have encouraged the Kim Dae-jung 
government to devote greater policy-making energies to the active and consistent economic 
engagement policy towards North Korea, the thesis will examine the international and 
domestic environments during the Kim Dae-jung government in chapter 4. However, in 
chapter S, this study will show that the President Kim Dae-jung's strong beliefs about the 
positive effect of engagement policy towards North Korea was a crucial factor for South 
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Korea's North Korea policy change under his government. Finally, the thesis also looks at 
what the constraints are for South Korean policy-makers in creating a new economic 
engagement or business-track diplomacy with North Korea for the purpose of enhanced 
security in the Korean Peninsula. 
Framework and contribution 
In order to explore the overall questions about South Korea's use of business-track diplomacy 
towards North Korea, both theoretical and empirical approaches are required. Despite the 
importance of post-Cold War security and economic engagement, and of economic 
interdependence on the Korean Peninsula as an alternative security approach, the IR literature 
does not contain studies of these issues which explain them with sufficient and 
comprehensive theoretical and empirical analysis. For instance, as indicated in chapter 1, 
there are excellent studies which offer a useful theoretical framework for economic 
interactions and economic-based security policy. However, while these studies do offer 
insights into the role of economic engagement in the post-Cold War period, and will be an 
important part of the theoretical framework in the thesis, they are rarely applied to specific 
security case studies and lack empirical evidence. These analyses rarely make clear the 
specific connections between economic engagement and security issues. 
With regard to the case of South Korea and IR studies, there have been a number of 
studies that have pointed to South Korea's economic and social engagement with North Korea 
as a viable security policy with regards to North Korean problems in the Korean Peninsula. 
Most Korean specialists are aware of the importance of various engagement measures 
between the two Koreas for decreasing military tensions and for creating a peaceful 
environment on the Peninsula. For example, Shin Dong-ik (1997) points out the importance 
of cooperation among big powers on multilateral engagements towards North Korea, while 
Beck (1999) suggested that the South Korean government take an active role in inter-Korean 
economic cooperation. 
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However, in many ways, the impression is that, in IR, the Korean Peninsula is still 
regarded as a subject amenable to Cold War style analysis of military relations among big 
powers, such as US, China, Japan, and Russia, in which the importance of alliance politics 
and military capability in Northeast Asia features prominently (Jeon 1998; Niksch 1998). 
Hence, the case of the Korean Peninsula has not been treated as one whose study could help 
to deepen the understanding of the relations between economic engagement and security. As 
will be seen in chapter 2, the North Korean security problems, such as North Korea's 
development of nuclear and long-range missile, are still very much defined in terms of its 
military threats by the academic and policy-making community.· 
Moreover, the studies regarding South Korea's economic-based security policy 
towards North Korea in the 1990s have not produced adequate theoretical and empirical 
analyses of the relation between South Korea's economic engagement with North Korea and 
its security policy after the Cold War. In fact, few scholars2 have tried to produce a 
comprehensive theoretical and empirical overview of the connections between South Korea's 
economic engagement and North Korean security problems. Many Korean security studies in 
the post-Cold War era have been characterised by brief descriptions of South Korean 
economic cooperation with North Korea with regard to specific events, periods, or situations, 
such as humanitarian and food assistance towards North Korea and the KEDO project; they 
lacked an appropriate theoretical framework. 
\ 
Also, most of the analyses of South Korean economic engagement policy towards 
North Korea have been based on the analysis of the policies of surrounding, powerful, states 
such as the US, Japan, China and Russia towards the Korean Peninsula.3 Thus, attention 
focuses on the variation in the external constraints faced by South Korea. To be sure, the 
reason for focusing on the international environment rather than the domestic environment is 
I Hughes (1999) is a notable exception in this regard, because he takes into account the security 
dimensions of North Korea's internal economic difficulties. 
2 The most notable work in this regard is Kim Dae-jung (1997a). 
3 Hahn Bae-ho (1999: 2-3) pointed out that throughout the Cold War and post-Cold War eras, both 
South and North Korea were most concerned with decisions and actions beyond their control that had 
originated from their external environments, specifically actions by the superpowers. 
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that the inter-Korean relations have been much affected by international variables since the 
division of the two Koreas. However, to deepen the understanding of South Korea's economic 
engagement policy towards North Korea, a detailed analysis of domestic policy-making 
process is required, as well as an analysis of international variables. Through the empirical 
examination of the South Korean policy-making process, this thesis can outline the 
opportunities and constraints of its use of business-track diplomacy in the service of security 
purposes. 
This thesis, in seeking to answer the questions about South Korea's engagement 
approaches with North Korea in Korean Peninsula security, and about the necessary 
prerequisites for the use of economic security policy, will build upon much of the existing 
work in IR and Korean Peninsula security studies outlined above. However, in line with the 
need to avoid restrictive security approaches and to find alternative security policies, the aim 
of the thesis is to produce a structural model of 'business-track diplomacy' that can be used to 
analyse empirically both the need and opportunity of South Korea's policy of engagement 
towards North Korea in the post-Cold War era. As will be shown in chapter 1, this model 
assumes that both South Korea's economic capacity and policy-making will are two prime 
requirements for the economic engagement policy towards North Korea. However, this thesis 
asks not so much whether South Korea possesses sufficient economic power for utilising 
business-track diplomacy, but whether South Korea has the policy-making will to implement 
the business-track diplomacy towards North Korea as a long-term security approach. 
Thus, one contribution of the thesis to the IR and security studies is that the concept 
of business-track diplomacy, used to deal with the North Korean security problem, can have 
practical policy implications, for example, in understanding the importance of policy-making 
will in the utilisation of economic-based security policy for handling post-Cold War security 
problems. This model will provide ways to think about security problems and to explore 
alternative security approaches beyond the military-centred security policy. Another 
contribution is that by looking at various factors that can influence South Korean decision-
makers' policy-making will of business-track diplomacy, this thesis explores the impact of 
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beliefs held by decision-makers on the South Korean policy-making process and also on 
policy outcome. 
This beliefs approach could contribute to the field of foreign policy analysis (FP A) 
for South Korea by proving the importance of its decision-makers' political beliefs, which has 
been a variable largely absent from the field of South Korean FPA. According to Kim Hak-
joon's (1990) classification of IR studies with regards to South Korea, most studies of South 
Korean foreign policy have been based on analyses of its relationship with the United States 
or Japan, and there is a serious lack of domestic level analysis. 
Thereby, this is the first study to explore, in depth, the importance of domestic 
variables in South Korean security policy-making, and thus to give a new perspective on 
South Korea's security policy beyond the conventional international structure approach. The 
thesis also hopes that the analysis of the political leader's beliefs (President Kim Dae-jung's 
beliefs about the positive effect of active engagement with North Korea, in particular) as an 
important factor in the South Korean foreign policy-making process would widen the scope of 
the study not only of South Korea but also of the whole FP A field. 
The inter-Korean security relation has been chosen for the case study not only 
because of the enhanced theoretical and empirical understanding of South Korean security 
policy that it offers, but also because it is an important security problem in itself. As chapter 2 
will show, an initial look at the post-Cold War North Korean security problems reveals the 
persistence to a certain extent of military driven security issues in line with the Cold War 
security structure; on this basis, the Korean Peninsula is still called the 'last remaining place 
of the Cold War' in the world. In fact, the continuing threat of military aggression by North 
Korea and the tension on the Korean Peninsula, as shown in the North Korea's nuclear 
threats, brought the a real danger of triggering a Second Korean War in mid-1994. These and 
other threats seem to support South Korea's traditional containment policy toward North 
Korea, in the form of military alliance with the US, even after the Cold War. 
However, the North Korean security problem is one which incorporates the key post-
Cold War and global security issues, such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
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including nuclear and missile technology, and also North Korea's internal instability and thus 
possible collapse due to economic and diplomatic crises. This may lead to guerrilla warfare 
and social disorder between and within the two Koreas. Thus, North Korea illustrates the 
entirety of the post-Cold War security problems, and it is of vital importance to security 
policy-makers in South Korea, the Asia-Pacific region, and globally. For these reasons, inter-
Korean security relations in the post-Cold War era are a test case for the limitation of the 
military containment approach and the need of more comprehensive engagement strategies, 
including business-track diplomacy. 
Structure 
Chapter 1 examines the increasing need for economic engagement security policy rather than 
military power in the post-Cold War world, and outlines a model of business-track diplomacy, 
as an economic security policy to be tested in the case of post-Cold War South Korean 
security policy with regard to North Korea. Moreover, the role of leaders in policy-making, 
and especially their belief that business-track diplomacy is necessary for security, will be 
introduced as important factors for the utilisation of this type of security policy. Chapter 2 
presents the case study of the North Korean security problem in the post-Cold War era, and 
also demonstrates that the post-Cold War North Korean security problem cannot be handled 
by military power alone; an economic engagement policy by surrounding states, including 
South Korea, is necessary to address the security problems. Chapter 3 examines whether there 
have been policy changes towards a more active and consistent business-track diplomacy in 
South Korea in the post-Cold War period, by comparing three South Korean governments' 
security policies toward North Korea. It will be shown that the Kim Dae-jung government 
displayed a more active economic engagement with North Korea. Related to chapter 3, 
chapter 4 and 5 examine possible variables that may have influenced policy changes under the 
Kim Dae-jung government. While chapter 4 looks at various international and domestic 
variables that may influence policy change, chapter 5 looks at the South Korean decision-
making process under the Kim Dae-jung government with special focus on the effect of 
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beliefs held by President Kim Dae-jung on policy outcomes regarding post-Cold war North 
Korean security problems as a crucial factor for policy change. Chapter 6 examines the 
business activities with North Korea of the South Korean Hyundai Group corporation, as an 
example that provides some insights on the current utilisation by South Korea's business-
track diplomacy toward North Korea in the Post-Cold War era. The Conclusion will then 
summarise the main arguments of the thesis and spell out the implications of the empirical 
and theoretical discussions for the questions outlined in this Introduction: the role of 
comprehensive engagement as a security policy in the post-Cold War era, the South Korea's 
policy-making will for economic engagement with North Korea in 1990s, and the 
requirements, especially the importance of the leaders' belief systems, and the emerging 
obstacles for the utilisation of economic engagement policy. Thus, answers for the above 
questions will provide valuable contributions to security issues in the IR and FPA field. 
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Chapter 1. The theoretical framework: Beliefs and economic 
engagement policy 
This chapter investigates a set of theoretical frameworks that can be used to analyse the 
evidence on South Korea's economic engagement with North Korea as a security strategy to 
address post-Cold War North Korean security problems. This study will show both the 
limitation of traditional military and containment security approaches and the need to look at 
economic engagement or interdependence as viable long-term security means to address the 
post-Cold War international security agenda. 
Then, firstly, the concept of "business-track diplomacy" will be introduced as an 
analytical tool to investigate whether a state actually utilises economic based engagement 
with the target state for its security purpose. This model will be employed to examine whether 
South Korea's policy-makers have a strong policy-making will of economic engagement and 
also whether they instrumentalise the economic engagement approach towards North Korea 
as a viable security policy to address North Korea's security problems in the 1990s. 
Secondly, because the investigation of policy-making will itself is dependent upon 
the internal policy-making processes of states and upon the nature of the interaction between 
their main external and internal actors, this thesis will review the Foreign Policy Analysis 
(FPA) literature. In order to avoid a partial view and to conduct more objective analysis ofthe 
South Korean foreign policy-making, this chapter will adopt several FPA theories such as the 
international system approach, the domestic level approaches, and the beliefs held by 
decision-makers approach. This comprehensive analysis will help to fmd out possible factors 
that might influence South Korea's policy-making will towards economic engagement with 
North Korea regarding the post-Cold War North Korean security problems. 
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1.1 Global security conceptions 
l.1.i Political realism and the Cold War era 
The term 'security' can be generally defined as the protection of values and wealth from 
various threats. In IR, it can be used at the levels of the international system, the state, and the 
individuals as wel1.4 However, it has been mainly used to mean the 'national security' at the 
state level in the field of IR; security has been the basic and important responsibility of an 
individual state towards population in the context of an international system. Like with 
security at any level, national security concerns arise when vital national interests are 
perceived as being threatened by external or internal actions or events. National security 
systems are often directed towards other states and are focused on the political and military 
sectors, where the state is most strongly established. Therefore, the goal of national security 
for a state is to ensure the survival and the protection of its vital interests. What is regarded as 
the 'vital interest' is, however, a matter of subjective judgement, depending on the nation's 
hierarchy of interests. 
However, after two World Wars, political realism has been the dominant paradigm 
for national security and states' security policy, dictating that the "vital interest" should be 
protected through military power. In this view, states are locked into a power struggle, and 
security is the pursuit of power or a balance of power, essentially military power, among 
states. In terms of threats, other states' possible military attacks are regarded as a primary 
threat to national security. Therefore, national survival has been regarded as the highest 
interest for a state and the deterrence of attacks by other states has been the key means to 
preserve this core value, mainly through acquiring military capabilities. 
Certain realists and neo-realists have provided justifications for this view of state 
security policy. They describe the world as always a potential, and often an actual, 
battleground. There are two basic assumptions that support this argument. First, human nature 
is basically self-interested and even aggressive in some cases. Certain classical realists are 
4 According to David Baldwin (1997: 5), security takes the form of proposals for giving high priority to 
such issues as human rights, the economy, the environment, epidemics, crime, or social injustice, in 
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pessimists about human nature. Many realists were influenced in this regard by the political 
philosopher Thomas Hobbes. In his famous work, Leviathan, he argues that "if any two men 
desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and 
in the way to their end, endeavour to destroy, or subdue one another" (Quoted in Williams, 
Goldstein and Shafritz 1994: 28). Second, in the international structure, there is an absence of 
appropriate problem-solving mechanisms. The neo-realist Kenneth Waltz (1959: 232) tells us 
that "wars occur because there is nothing to prevent them". Therefore, a combination of 
negative biological determinism and a lack of appropriate problem-solving mechanisms are 
the reasons for violence and wars between states. A state's decision-makers must therefore do 
anything and everything they can to defend their basic interests, and to maintain the survival 
of the state. In this view, the world is clearly a black and white one. Deutsch (1973) refers to 
it as being characterised by 'competitive' processes of conflict resolution and power-based, 
adversarial, confrontational, zero-sum, approaches to dealing with security. 
During the Cold War era, conceptions of national security were relatively clear and 
easy to define. In line with the realist argument, military capabilities have been the main 
requirements for a state confronting a harsh international environment. In fact, the bipolar-
system, divided along East-West line, gave states clear enemies as well as clear policy 
strategies and objectives. For instance, the U.S. security strategy in the Cold War period was 
the containment of communism, based on the balance of military power with the USSR, while 
many less powerful states followed U.S. security guidelines and were brought under its 
umbrella. Waltz (1979: 170-6) has argued that the bipolar-structure meant simplicity, 
predictability, manageability, stability and, consequently, less war. In this international 
environment, national security studies were produced mostly by scholars interested in military 
statecraft. Thus, "if military force was relevant to an issue, it was considered a security issue. 
However, if there was no military aspect involved, that issue was categorised as low 
politics"(Baldwin 1997: 9). 
addition to the traditional concern with security from external military threats. 
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1.Ui International security agenda after the Cold War 
The end of the Cold War has brought great changes in the international security environment, 
and thus brought a policy debate among political leaders and IR academics around world as to 
the meaning of national security and the appropriate means to deal with various security 
issues. Because of the collapse of the USSR and global communism, the importance for 
national security of the conventional military alliance system based on the division between 
East and West has diminished. Buzan (1991), for instance, argues that the term security is an 
'underdeveloped concept', and the idea of national security should be conceptualised within a 
more comprehensive approach, including societal problems at the domestic level, and also 
non-military factors such as the economy, identity and environment. Baldwin (1997) also 
points to the necessity to specify the security conception. When discussing a national security 
policy objective, specific definitions of national security should be used. For example, this 
would include criteria as to what threats, what means, what cost, and in what period of time 
should be shown to be present in order to explain certain policy choices and objectives of 
states. Thus, this thesis looks at what are the implications of the new international security 
environment in the post-Cold war era by specifying the security conception. 
1.Ui.a Domestic instability and the limitations of military power 
The sources of insecurity in the new global environment are quite different from those 
identified by in the traditional conception of national security during the Cold War era. 
Former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1995: 2), for instance, asserted that 
"the problems presented by conflicts such as those in former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, 
Rwanda, and Somalia are in many ways unprecedented". Put differently, the most prevalent 
signal in the 1990s, since the end of the cold war is the occurrence of civil wars and local and 
regional conflicts. Here, Buzan's (1991: 112-6) concept of 'weak states' can be used to 
explain the emergence of new security threats. In his view, since the Cold War order, which 
required the strong cohesion of a state as a condition for national survival, was diminished, 
the weak states that lack social and political cohesion could become a source of intrastate 
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disputes and conflicts in the post-Cold War period. Domestic disruption may be triggered by, 
for example, political, ethnic, religious or economic sources. 
Lake and Rothchild (1996) present an interesting argument to explain the spread of 
intrastate conflicts in the post-Cold War period. They argue that the reason for ethnic violence 
within a state is not historical hatreds among inter-groups that have been suppressed by 
repressive regimes or by the harsh Cold War international environment. Rather, intrastate 
conflicts are caused by collective fears of the future. Domestic uncertainty and thus insecurity 
is caused by fear and economic difficulties are the most fundamental source for the spread of 
conflicts within states (Lake and Rothchild 1996: 41-3). Thus, the domestic instability of a 
country, rather than traditional external threats from other states, become the significant and 
urgent problem for international and national security. Flynn and Farrell (1999), for instance, 
point out that the end of the Cold War has impacted significantly on Europe's security 
situation because the most immediate threats to Europe's security in the 1990s have 
originated not from traditional interstate relations but from instability and conflict within 
states that have threatened to further exacerbate interstate security issues. 
With new global security threats, there has been a growing realisation that traditional 
military capability does not prevent or deter many international conflicts. The situation during 
the cold war was marked by a relationship between higher military power and higher stability. 
However, the current international security environment is characterised by lower external 
military threats and higher internal instability. Hence, scholars in IR and IPE began to 
reconsider the notions of national security and threats, and to seek innovative means to deal 
with the post Cold War security agenda. For instance, given the current trend of globalisation, 
some argue that the focus on military security has both narrowed the range of security studies, 
and delimited the sphere ofIR itself. Clark (1999: 126) argues that "security is a construct not 
of a historically frozen realm of power-hungry states but of a dynamic process of interaction 
among individual, groups, states, and international institutions all of which are capable of 
adopting their sense of self-interest". 
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In terms of means to pursue national security, the decreasing effectiveness of military 
power in dealing with security issues can be found in several aspects of the post-cold war 
period. First, major powers seem to be less interested in the use of military power in 
international conflicts. For instance, Carter and Perry (1999) pointed out that there is no 
imminent threat to the survival of the United State like the threat from the former Soviet 
Union in the Cold War period. Rather, the post-Cold War period holds many indirect threats 
to US interests, but no real military threats to America's survival. Post-Cold War intrastate 
and ethnic conflicts zones, such as Kosovo, Bosnia, or Somalia, do not affect directly US 
interests. These events are regarded as "C list"(Carter and Perry 1999: 11-4) for US security 
concern. However, these 'C-list' events seem to be the frequent source of post-Cold War 
international security problems. Even when major powers agree to restore regional and 
international stability and to support humanitarian efforts, the growing cost of interventions, 
including resources for military and humanitarian operations and possible human casualties, 
is too high in terms of the maj or powers' national security interests. Therefore, domestically, 
major powers and their leaders are not eager to intervene and to use military means in these 
intrastate conflicts. 
Moreover, the major powers are not willing to use military measures against each 
other. This can also be found· in the international security environment in the Korean 
Peninsula as enhanced by the end of East-West power blocs and the normalisation of 
relationships between South Korea and Russia and China respectively. Rotfeld (1997) points 
out that one of the characteristics of the post-cold war security order is that no major power is 
eager to engage in conflict with another; they are willing to cooperate and decrease the 
tension amongst them. The US security strategy of promoting democratisation and the spread 
of open markets, China's economic progress, and Russia's economic reforms are vivid 
aspects of the decrease of the political significance of the military dimension, and also of the 
growing importance of the economic dimension in national security structure (Rotfeld 1997: 
4-6). Moreover, under conditions of globalisation, the emerging international security agenda 
is more focused on individual well-being issues rather than on issues which were prevalent 
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under the bipolar system (Rothfeld 1997: 13-4). For instance food, health, human rights and 
environmental protection become important issues for the international security agenda along 
with the growing cooperation among non-governmental organisations across national borders. 
Second, the limited effectiveness of military action is also reflected in fact that the 
international norm of sparing use of military force to resolve disputes between states is 
becoming important. In fact, "the use of force by one major power against another power is 
either politically unthinkable, or very expensive, with costs that include the danger of 
escalation to the use of unconventional weaponry. Moreover, for some the challenge is to 
make any such use of force between major powers even more unlikely and to forge agreement 
about when using force is legitimate"(Haass 1999: 40). 
This trend is also growing due to the perceived need for multilateralism in the 
international security structure in international relations. Nowadays it is difficult to use force 
without consulting other states that have stakes in the event of conflict. For example, Mazarr 
(1995: 183-8) argues in his research on the North Korean nuclear crisis in 1990s that coercive 
military and economic punishment were neither likely be selected nor likely to be an effective 
means of addressing North Korea's nuclear development because of the complexity of the 
multilateral security framework among states and international institutions that had stakes in 
this event. Thus, Mazarr indicates that just as the bipolarity of military power was the 
essential geographical framework for the cold war, so diplomatic multilateralism seems to be 
becoming framework for the post cold war period, as discussed later in chapter 2. Given these 
limitations of the traditional military power approaches, the next sections of the chapter 
explore alternative security approaches regarding post-Cold War security problems. 
1.1.ii.h Economic engagement as an alternative security approach 
Economic engagement, as one of the alternatives for tackling international insecurity, could 
contribute to establishing stability and peace around world. This means that the range of 
appropriate means in the service of security objectives can be extended from mainly military 
measures towards comprehensive methods which combine with economic measures and 
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military power. In fact, the importance of the economic aspect of security policy is not a new 
phenomenon and it was evident even in the Cold War era. Throughout the Cold War period, 
economic power was the core foundation of military power, which was regarded as the main 
means for pursuing national security. In order to fight wars, states needed to be concerned 
with their industrial capacity, steel production, access to energy, technological capability and 
other factors required to support a defence establishment (Knorr 1977). President Nixon's 
New Economic Policy of 1971 reflected the concern over the high cost of military actions and 
the importance of economic power for the national security capability. With growing concern 
over the primacy of economics and economic capability for building-up military power, a 
country's economic stability and growth become central national security priorities. 
However, economic interactions and interdependence among states has in itself a 
potential for being a tool in the service of security objectives. For instance, US President 
Clinton tried to articulate his foreign policy agenda by offering the concept of 'democratic 
enlargement' with military power after he took the oval office in 1993. He argued that 
"democracies rarely wage war against each other"(The White House 1994: 3). This was 
further developed as the national security strategy of 'Engagement and Enlargement'. US's 
grand security strategy was about spreading democracy through promoting free trade. The 
importance of economic measures in the Clinton administration's foreign policy is quite 
different from that of the Reagan and Bush administrations. Economic power not only served 
as the foundation of national security capabilities but also as the instrument of national 
security. 
For instance, Friedman (1993: A3) identified the core of the Clinton administration's 
enlargement strategy as "Big Mac I: no two countries that both have a McDonald's have ever 
fought war against each other". Moreover, in terms of Europe's security situation in the post-
Cold War period, Flynn and Farrell's (1999) concept of the 'democratic peace' indicate that 
European states are making collective efforts to promote democratic regimes in the continent 
as the long-term security strategy. They also acknowledge that most European countries 
believe that conventional military capacity alone cannot provide a long-term answer for post-
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Cold War security problems, and that the spread of democratic government throughout the 
European states will generate sufficient legitimacy in each state, and thus defuse conflicts 
caused by domestic instability. In sum, the post- Cold War era shows the emergence of new 
means to preserve international stability and peace. These measures include the creation of 
democratic regimes in states, and economic and social interdependence among states. 
This thesis also looks at economic engagement, and so interdependence, as a possible 
means to reach desired security objectives in the post-Cold War period. As will be discussed 
in Chapter 2, North Korea's security problems in the post-Cold War era cannot be prevented 
by military capability alone, and the states involved such as US, Japan, and South Korea, 
might require active engagement approaches, including economic interactions with North 
Korea, in order to address the post-Cold War North Korea security problems and to ultimately 
achieve peaceful Korean unification in the long-term. 
1.2 Economic interdependence and national security 
1.2.1 Literature review on the relationships between economic interdependence and 
national security 
The relationship between economic interdependence and national security has been a crucial 
subject for debate among different schools in international politics. The idea of economic 
interdependence has important implications for security issues. It is certainly not a new or 
difficult notion; that two or more units are dependent on one another in economic benefit. 
However, the question of the connection between economic interdependence and national 
security is not an easy one to answer. Economic interdependence is to many pluralists what 
the balance of power is to realists and what dependency is to many neo-Marxists or globalists. 
The following section reviews some of these ideas of the different schools of thought in the 
field of IR and IPE. 
According to the dependency theorists, international economic interdependence 
means that the nation-state is more vulnerable to crises originating in other parts of the 
system. If state is dependent on other for investment, trade, or raw materials, the incentive to 
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intervene in foreign conflicts that threaten the availability of these supplies will be very high. 
Such economic interdependence could either exacerbate the conflict by encouraging other 
outside powers to exploit it, or minimize the conflict by increasing the effectiveness of 
deterrence. Also, the wealthy states are structurally and actively exploiting the less developed 
states in an effort to keep them economically dependent. Galtung (1968) has called attention 
to the structural inequality that forces the Less Developed Countries (LDCs), or what he calls 
the 'periphery', to concentrate on the production of raw materials for export. This means that 
such states are denied the added value that would come from processing their own products 
and are also forced to pay the transportation costs required to import the processed goods. 
Thus, dependency theorists articulated the negative consequences of asymmetrical trade 
relations for the less developed states. 
Neo-realists found some common ground with dependency theorists in their 
skepticism towards the positive effects of economic interdependence. It mayor may not 
enhance prospects for peace. Conflict and not cooperation could just as easily result because 
interdependence involves vulnerability. In other words, because of the different degree of 
dependence among different states, some states feel more vulnerable towards other states. 
Hence, for neo-realists, the way to establish peace is to eliminate or minimize contact among 
opponents or potential adversaries. Separation from other units, if that were possible, would 
mean less contact and thus less conflict, since "close interdependence means closeness of 
contact and raises the prospects of occasional conflict"(Waltz 1979: 138). Grieco (1988) 
supported Waltz's argument through his conception of 'relative gains'. He argued that 
neoliberalism has been preoccupied with actual or potential absolute gains from international 
cooperation or interdependence and has overlooked the importance of relative gains. He 
suggested that "the fundamental goal of states in any relation is to prevent others from 
achieving advances in their relative capabilities"(Grieco 1988: 498). 
Thus, some argued for the necessity of hegemonic power in international politics in 
order to establish international stability. Gilpin (1987), for instance, argued for the importance 
of hegemony in enhancing international cooperation on nonmilitary issues. According to the 
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theory of hegemonic stability, the absence of hegemony, or leadership, may result in chaos 
and instability, as happened in the 1930s when the United States was unwilling to assume 
leadership of the world economy and Britain, given its weakened position, was unable to do 
so. The hegemon influences states to cohere and establishes the rules by which international 
relations are to be conducted in various issue areas. In sum, the realist view of 
interdependence challenges many conventional ideas associated with the concept of 
interdependence: (1) Interdependence is not necessarily a good thing for anyone particular 
state if interdependence is defined in terms of vulnerability; (2) Increasing interdependence 
may produce conflict as opposed to peace; and (3) in an interdependent world, there are 
certain virtues in having a hegemonic power capable of enforcing stability in a number of 
different issue areas. 
However, pluralists take economic interdependence to be the core of international 
relations. There are three basic ways in which economic interdependence between states can 
help to reduce conflict and promote peace. First, free trade supporters (Oneal and Russett 
1997; Polachek 1997) envision a peaceful world evolving from economic interdependence 
and economic interests, in which each state produces the products in which it has a 
comparative advantage. Such a system would work to the economic benefit of all, but more 
importantly, it would generate such interdependence that conflict between states would have 
to be reduced for fear of disrupting important external sources of supply and thus economic 
growth. Economic interests would force political leaders to seek peace in order to maintain 
economic prosperity in an interdependent and specialized world. 
Second, in the cultural explanation of trade and conflict, functionalists and neo-
functionalists point out that collaborations in the non-political and functional sectors provide 
for a more peaceful world. According to functionalists, involvement in economic transactions 
across states will tend to generate common ways of looking at issues and new loyalties in 
which individuals begin to recognize the interests they share with people in other societies. 
David Mitrany's (1966) 'ramification' and Ernst Haas's (1964) 'spill-over' effect indicated 
that the development of collaboration in one sector leads to comparable behaviour in other 
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sectors as a result of learning from cooperation. Hence, power-oriented governments can 
redefine their self-interest and can adopt welfare-oriented actions rather than military-oriented 
actions. These forms of cooperation lead to international institutions and other economic or 
social linkages between states that make military measures in conflicts more unacceptable. 
Similarly, Keohane and Nye (1977) proposed the idea of complex interdependence, a 
situation in which one state cannot take advantage of an other state because of evenly 
balanced mutual dependence between them. Keohane and Nye (1977: 99-112) present three 
main structures which decrease a country's dependency on another country. First, multiple 
channels, such as non-governmental activities and ties as well as formal foreign office 
arrangements, should be established. Second, the agenda of interstate relationships, which 
consists of multiple issues, should not be arranged in a clear hierarchy. This means that 
military security does not consistently dominate the agenda. Third, military force should not 
be used for resolving disagreements. In sum, economic interdependence is deepened by non-
military activities including economic exchanges that can change another state's behaviour 
and make it act more peacefully through its redefinition of common interests and through 
domestic pressure from multiple channels and linkages in the interstate system. 
Third, some argue that peace can result from democratic practices between states 
(Gleditsch and Hegre 1997; Oneal and Russett 1997). Coordination and bargaining are so 
embedded within democratic societal norms that democracies are able to solve disputes 
peacefully, especially with other democracies. Another explanation is that there are so many 
checks and balances in the democratic decision process that making the decision to fight is 
difficult and not taken easily. Non-<iemocracies, such as dictatorships, need less justification 
to go to war. In terms of 'democratic peace,' trade and economic interactions can contribute 
to the transformation towards democracy: Democracies usually are free-market or mixed 
economies open to the world economy (Russett and Starr 1996: 344-8). Therefore, economic 
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openness and interactions can contribute to the development of a democratic society, although 
questions remain about the causal relationships between democracy and international peace.s 
As discussed above, there are various arguments for economic interdependence in 
terms of its role in international peace. Dependency theorists and neo-realists are skeptical 
about economic interdependence as a possible mechanism for international peace, and 
emphasize the vulnerability of dependent states and their exploitation by dominant states. 
However, following the pluralists' view about economic interdependence, this research 
explores the positive aspects of economic interdependence as South Korea's policy means in 
the service of its national security objectives: peacefully resolving the post-Cold War North 
Korean security problems and the Korean unification in the long-term. Therefore, the next 
section will introduce various types of state economic security policies, and will clarify the 
notion of economic security policy that this study seeks to evaluate for the Korean case. 
1.2.ii Types of economic security policy 
If the state is taken as the main player in economic security policy, there are four different 
conceptions of economic security policy in terms of state goals and means. The first type of 
economic security policy is referred to as a policy intended to increase or preserve the wealth 
and welfare of the citizens. Buzan (1991: 241) referred it as a way "to equate security with the 
economic conditions necessary for survival". States require ready access to the means 
necessary for their survival. For example, there are basic needs such as agricultural and 
resources for essential industries. For instance, South Korea and Japan do not possess 
sufficient resources, so trade becomes an essential part of their basic economic security 
policy. Murdock (1977: 69) points out that this type of economic security sees the "economic 
issue as the security issue itself'. This type of economic security policy is related to economic 
efficiency and the decrease of vulnerability, and it is developed along much same line as the 
S According to John Rourke (1991: 118-9), democracy is not always a force for peace. The 
concentration of executive power and also public pressure towards war might lead a government to 
wage war. The US Johnson administration's intervention in Vietnam, the Carter administration's 
attempted hostage rescue in Iran, and the Reagan administration's sale of weapons to Iran are 
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realists argument. Knorr (1977) points out that economic vulnerability that stems from 
interdependence should be regarded as a security problem. The concept of 'national coping 
mechanism' (Murdock 1977: 75-6) can be seen as this type of economic security policy. The 
mechanism is characterised as either 'defensive' or 'offensive.' The defensive mechanism 
refers to reducing vulnerability by internal adjustment, such as domestic monetary control 
policy and regulations on exports and imports. The offensive mechanism refers to the use of 
national capability to prevent external actors from exploiting national vulnerability, for 
instance by creating rival trading blocs within a multilateral framework. Thus this type of 
economic security policy aims to secure the economic well-being of a state through the types 
of measures discussed above. 
The second type of economic security policy is concerned with instruments of 
economic power that enable a state to punish another state and thus affect the latter's 
behaviour before and during a political, military or economic conflict. This type of foreign 
policy is often called "stick." There are many techniques for using this policy: trade embargo, 
boycott, freezing assets, aid suspension and so on. Knorr's (1977: 99) conception of 'coercive 
economic power', Baldwin's (1985: 40-42) 'negative sanction' Strange's (1997: 24-6) 
'relational power' point to this type of economic security policy. This type of economic 
security policy is a short-term and conditional economic pressure through the denial of 
economic resources to a target state in return for the target state's favourable political or 
military reactions. However, this type of policy can be unsuccessful. It is arguable that this 
policy can increase the risk of war, by sending such a strong signal to a target state that this 
might respond through warfare (Baldwin 1985: 111-4). Other negative results of this policy 
are ineffectiveness and immorality. Some argued that in the case of sanctions toward Iraq 
after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 failed to determine Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait and 
only hurt the Iraqi people and contributed to consolidating Saddam Hussein's regime. (Said 
and Lerche 1995: 75-6). Because of the unpredictability of the results and the unintended 
effects of these relations, this type of policy is only of limited usefulness. 
examples. 
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The third type of economic security policy uses economic means to force other states 
to change their behaviour in the face of potential or actual conflict in political, economic, or 
military matters. Also, economic disputes between states and economic hardship in a 
particular state can generate domestic and international instability and may promote military 
conflicts. Thus, the aim of this policy is to preserve a peaceful environment and to prevent 
conflict between states by both offering economic benefits to a target state in return for its 
desired behaviour and by decreasing the source of conflict in terms of economic problems. 
The opposite of the "stick", the third type of economic security policy is often called "carrot". 
Said and Lerche's (1995: 74) idea of 'persuasive economic technique' and Baldwin's (1985: 
40-2) concept of 'positive sanction' can be seen to refer to this type of policy. The usual 
technique of for implementation of this policy is economic aid: direct grants or favourable 
loans, development assistance, investment and so on. Examples of this type of policy include 
the US Marshall plan after World War II, which supplied capital for the redevelopment of the 
European economies, and the financial and technical assistance of industrialised countries 
toward Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union to prevent the re-emergence of 
communism. Also, the construction of a light-water reactor (L WR) in North Korea by KEDO 
(Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation) in return for North Korea's abandon of 
the nuclear weapon programme as a solution for the 1994 North Korea' nuclear crisis is also 
an instance of this type of policy, which will be discussed in Chapter 2. However, this type of 
policy is also used like the second type of economic security policy when short-term conflict 
can be prevented in a peaceful manner, or to prevent future potential international instability. 
Finally, the forth type of economic security policy is making peace and cooperation 
between states through economic and social interdependence. Economic and social 
interdependence through trade and other economic activities are the basic means to promote 
security objectives. What is different from the second and third types of policy is the longer-
term commitment: policy-makers perceive the long-term impact of economic and social 
interdependence on peace and stability. Strange's (1997: 31) concept of 'structural power' 
also applies where "the range of options open to others will be extended by giving them 
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opportunities without direct pressure they would not otherwise have had". Also, 'complex 
interdependence', which consists of multiple channels and an absence of hierarchy among 
issues, provides for the establishment of less use of military force, and the use of nonviolent 
means to resolve disputes (Keohane and Nye 1977). This type of policy aims to help establish 
economic and social linkages that are mutually beneficial to states. Economic interactions 
among states will increase the 'sense of community' (Deutsch 1957: 5) through economic ties 
and social communication between them. The 'liberal peace' thesis, which is used to explain 
peace among industrialised countries, also makes reference to this type of policy (Russett and 
Starr 1996: 325-48). 
As discussed above, the first type of economic security is designed to decrease a 
state's economic vulnerability by using several mechanisms discussed earlier. However, this 
is not the type of economic security this thesis focuses on. The second type of economic 
security policy is to use economic power in order to push target states to behave more 
favourably towards a state, and it uses economic "sticks". However, this policy often 
increases the risk of war and is often used as a pressure in combination with military power. 
Thus, the first and second types of economic security policies are similar to the realist 
arguments which see economic interdependence as a possible cause for escalating conflicts. 
However, the third and forth types of policy are based on the premise of the liberalist 
arguments. In order to explore the positive aspects of economic engagement and 
interdependence in the case of the inter-Korean security relations in the post-Cold War era, 
this thesis looks at the third and forth types of economic security policies as South Korea's 
possible security approaches in the service of its security goals with regard to North Korea. 
Although the third type of economic security policies make use of the short-term impact of 
economic measures to affect the target state's behavior in the event of conflict, they can be 
important as a stepping-stone to economic interdependence in the long-run. In this thesis, the 
economic interdependence strategy refers to a long-term commitment and thus to the 
promotion of an environment of economic linkages and other social relations in which a 
target state is less likely to resort to coercive strategies to resolve disagreements. 
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1.3 Business-track diplomacy 
The previous section identified the types of economic security policy which this study will 
focus on. This section will introduce the concept of 'business track diplomacy' based on the 
above third and forth types of economic security policy which will be employed to investigate 
the case of South Korea's policy-making towards North Korea in the post-Cold War era. 
As discussed in the Introduction, the end of the Cold War, followed by the German 
unification, have caused policy-makers in South Korea to consider approaches for a 
breakaway from South Korea's military and containment security policy towards North 
Korea. The need for new security approaches by South Korea has also been enhanced by the 
fact that North Korea's economy has come near to collapse, at least from the perspective of 
the outside world, in the 1990s; there is the possibility that it will implode or explode due to 
economic hardship. 
Thus, the question of how South Korea can best deal with the post-Cold War security 
threat posed by North Korea has been raised. One of the new approaches to ease tensions on 
the Korean Peninsula and lower the security threat to the region is to engage North Korea 
economically. However, South Korea's difficulty in the promotion of inter-Korean economic 
cooperation is the fact that North Korea has tried to avoid direct contacts with South Korean 
government due to fear of absorption by the South. Instead, the North has made continuous 
efforts to engage with the US, Japan, and even South Korea's private sector, especially the 
business community, for its survival. Thus, certain South Korean political leaders, especially 
President Kim Dae-jung and his supporters, began to realise the need for an active role for the 
private sector in regards to inter-Korean economic cooperation. 
One of the notable avenues for resolving conflicts and making peace based on the 
above third and fourth types of economic security policy and the important role of the private 
sector in those economic security policies is expressed in the concept of "business-track-
diplomacy" (Diamond and McDonald 1996). In fact, business-track is one of nine tracks in 
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their model of 'multi-track diplomacy'. 6 They outline nine different tracks, which comprise a 
system for creating international peace. The nine tracks are: government, non-governmental 
conflict resolution professionals, business, private citizens, research and education, activism, 
religion, funding and the media. 
Track three, business-track diplomacy is related to the notion of liberal economic 
security policy discussed earlier. Peacemaking through commerce operates by enhancing the 
economic health of peoples and nations, thereby relieving some of the economic pressures of 
poverty and unsatisfied human needs that can lead to domestic disorder, and possibly conflict. 
Moreover, it is the exchange mechanism of the system that opens the doors to social 
relationships between the states and also between the private and public sectors. These 
interactions, through goods, services, or information, create mutual confidence among them 
(Diamond and McDonald 1996: 52-6). 
Trade is a major vehicle through which global interdependence is actualized, so it can 
be a doorway to bonds of mutual trust and benefit that strengthen ties between states. Thus, 
the concept of business-track diplomacy is concerned not only with common economic 
interests but also social and cultural bonding through continuing contacts and exploring 
common interest. It is closely associated with Deutsch's (1957) notion of a 'sense of 
community.' He argued that trade and other forms of intercultural exchange would help foster 
the development of a common identity, which makes resorting to violent forms of conflict 
resolution increasingly unlikely. 
This model was developed as a reaction to the frustration that formal, official, 
government-to-government interactions between representatives of states were not necessarily 
effective methods for securing international security, and often resulted in states' use of 
coercive power to resolve conflicts. Thus the role of non-state actors in international peace is 
6 It has evolved from the concept of 'Track Two diplomacy,' which focused mainly on the work of non-
governmental professionals to help formal negotiation between states in the field of conflict resolution. 
Track-two operation is design to assist official leaders by compensating for the psychological 
constraints such as tension, anger, fear or misunderstanding imposed on them and by improving 
communication, understanding and relationships among them. Montville (1987: 7) described it as "a 
process designed to assist official leaders to resolve or to manage conflict exploring possible solutions 
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an important feature of this system. Diamond and Mcdonald (1996: 2) point out the 
contributions of non-state actors to international peace: "to reduce tension and conflict 
between groups or nations by improving communication, understanding, and relationships; to 
decrease tension, anger, or misunderstanding by giving people direct personal experience of 
one another; and to affect the thinking and actions of governments by addressing the root 
causes, feelings, and needs which have caused the conflict". 
Thereby, non-state actors carrying out their goals are an important premise of 
business-track diplomacy. The business community, such as Multinational Corporations 
(MNCs), will be the essential forces driving this business-track diplomacy in the service of 
security purposes. As will be discussed in chapter 6, Hyundai Group's strong interest in 
pursuing business with North Korea greatly helped to enhance Kim Dae-jung government's 
engagement efforts towards North Korea. 
However, this does not mean that the government is not an important actor in this 
model, because it is still where ultimate decisions are made concerning war, peace, and the 
commitment of national resources. Diamond and Mcdonald (1996) still see government as the 
most important actor in operating 'multi-track diplomacy'. They point out the importance of 
intra-systemic cooperation between the government and the private sector, and argue that 
governments are the only part of the multi-track system that can conclude formal agreements 
and treaties with other nations. As will be discussed throughout this research, because there 
are continuing political and military tensions between the two Koreas even in the post-Cold 
War era, South Korean governments' political energy would be necessary to create a 
favourable environment for the private sectors to engage in business in North Korea. 
In fact, private sector diplomacy will not be successful without an alliance with the 
government. Thus, cooperation between the private sector and states is needed to use 
business-track diplomacy in the service of security objectives. When the relationships 
between the private and the public sector are adversarial or undeveloped, the multi-track 
activity operates with unfulfilled or distorted potential. Therefore, a "natural alliance" 
out of public view and without the requirement to formally negotiate or bargain for advantage". 
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between the government and the private sector is the most important requirement for the 
success of this diplomacy (Diamond and McDonald 1996: 156-61). 
The concept of business-track diplomacy therefore provides a vision for the security 
policy of South Korea regarding the post-Cold War North Korean security problem. This 
concept is based on the notion of liberal economic interdependence, and this study hopes that 
it may be applicable to the wider post-Cold War security agenda. However, at present 
business-track diplomacy can be considered as an ideal rather than a set of concrete 
prescriptions for South Korea's security policy. Thereby, the following sections will focus on 
the tasks of building a model that is applicable to the inter-Korean case. 
1.3.i Prerequisites of business-track diplomacy 
If a state as a whole is to pursue and actually implement business-track diplomacy towards a 
target state for its security objectives, it needs to possess two important prerequisites: 'policy 
capability' and 'policy-making will'. First, policy capability refers to the possession of 
economic resources by either the government or the private sectors to conduct economic 
activities with target states in the service of security concerns. Second, policy-making will 
refers to the will of the government and private sectors to pursue business-track diplomacy 
consistently as a long-term security purpose. Moreover, because the government and the 
private sector may have different interests and motivations for engaging in economic 
activities with target states, policy-making will require close cooperations between these two 
sectors. 
1.3.1.a Economic capability 
The first prerequisite of business-track diplomacy relates to the economic capability of a state 
and its private sector. Capability means the possession of economic capacity by actors 
sufficient to make a target state interact economically with them. The question therefore is 
whether a state has economic power to engage with target states through business activities. 
In order to engage with a target state, a state, both in its public and private sectors, should 
31 
possess essential economic assets that a target state is looking for through its own economic 
activities. The components of economic capacity can be production, finance, trade, energy, 
food and technology. 
Another important aspect of economic capability is related to a target state's 
vulnerability. Put differently, a target state has to see tangible benefits from economic 
interaction. Thus, a target state's economic difficulties and so the vulnerability can increase 
the economic capability of the actors in the other state to utilise business-track diplomacy. 
Vulnerability could result from the economic or security threats caused by international 
economic interdependence. Conversely, economic self-reliance or independence may increase 
economic difficulties and thus potential vulnerability to external factors. The case study of 
North Korea's economic difficulties presented in Chapter 2 clearly indicates this type of 
situation. North Korea's lack of adaptability to international trends of economic 
interdependence and liberalisation in the Cold War era actually contribute to its economic 
insecurity and thus ironically increase its vulnerability to external forces (Gills 1996). 
I.3.i.h Policy-making will 
Following on from the capability for business-track diplomacy, the second prerequisite of this 
model is policy-making will, which refers to the policy-makers' will for an actual 
mobilisation of the economic capability in the service of security objectives. However, the 
pursuit of economic-based forms of security policy, which are aimed at the long-term 
establishment of complex linkages and interdependence with a target state, is not easy 
compared with military security policy; the latter is relatively easy to mobilise and can 
quickly satisfy domestic and international political demands for action. Since the positive 
effects of business-track diplomacy may only become visible in the long term, it can be 
assumed that the pursuit of consistent business-track diplomacy would require a high degree 
of political will and energy by the actors. 
As pointed out earlier, the most important actor in this regard is the government. 
Political will for policy-making in a way that utilizes the business-track diplomacy is required 
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in order to enhance the activities of the public and private sectors doing business with target 
states in the service of security objectives. Even though non-state actors are increasingly 
important as economic actors, the government is still the largest political and economic actor 
with legal and political authority, and financial resources to promote this type of policy. Thus, 
the policy-making will of the government is a key factor in the actual instrumentalisation of 
this policy. Chapter 3 looks at the policy-making will of the South Korean governments (Roh 
Tae-woo, Kim Young-sam, and Kim Dae-jung governments) towards the utilisation of the 
business-track diplomacy and the its impact on South Korea's engagement with North Korea 
in the post-Cold War era. 
The other important actors can be business community, which is key possessor and 
facilitator of economic capacity. The will to engage in economic activities in other states by 
private sectors might be mainly dependent upon expected economic benefits. Thus, it can be 
imagined that the business environments of target states, and the short and long term profit 
expectations of the business community are important factors for enhancing business will. 
The example of the South Korean business community's active involvement with China and 
the former Soviet Union indicates that business interests regarded the two powerful states as 
potential markets and this was an important factor in the chaebols' (South Korean 
conglomerates) participation in the South Korean government's 'Nordpolitik' in service of 
security objectives. However, as Strange (1996) pointed out the intentions of the MNCs are 
not purely profit-related and may have other motivations, for instance, much longer-term 
considerations like corporate survival.7 Therefore, political decisions rather than just the 
profit-based strategy of business community will be investigated, and thus it is necessary to 
look at the decision-making of the MNCs. This question will be addressed in chapter 6 by 
documenting the Hyundai Group's decision to engage in several inter-Korean business 
projects including Mt. Kumgang tourism. 
7 Strange (1996: 186) quoted Peter Drucker's argument that "[t]he head of a large transnational 
corporation is a modem Prince, a strategist who must negotiate his way through a hostile world. . . 
Mo~t companies have seen an enlargement of their political functions with units devoted to public 
affalrs and embassies". 
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1.3.ii Policy-making will and foreign policy analysis (FPA) 
The previous discussions introduced the "business-track diplomacy", the theoretical model to 
be used to test South Korea's ability to use economic engagement towards North Korea to 
address post-Cold War security problems. Then this study intends to focus on whether there 
has been enough policy-making will of business-track diplomacy in South Korea in the 
1990s. 
As pointed out above, if a state is to perform business-track diplomacy, it needs to 
possess both economic capability and policy-making will. The first prerequisite of economic 
capability, which is concerned with the economic capacity possessed by a state both in 
government and private sector to initiate an economic engagement policy with a target state in 
the service of national security objectives, is an essential factor for the success of this type of 
security policy. 
This thesis, however, is concerned more with actual policy-making will towards 
business-track diplomacy. As discussed in the Introduction, the main aim of the study is not to 
examine whether South Korea possesses the necessary economic capability for effective 
business-track diplomacy towards North Korea, though this question will be addressed to a 
certain extent, but to reveal whether South Korean policy-makers have had the policy-making 
will to carry out business-track diplomacy toward North Korea as a long-term security policy. 
Thus, the importance of policy-making will in the utilisation of business-track 
diplomacy will be examined in detail. Because policy-making will itself is dependent upon 
the nature of the internal policy-making processes of states and the interaction between their 
principal international and domestic security actors, this thesis investigates the case of the 
South Korean foreign policy-making process with regards to the North Korean security 
problem in the 1990s. Hence, it is necessary to review the Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) 
literature to establish the appropriate theoretical tools to investigate South Korean policy-
making process with regards to post-Cold War North Korean security problems. 
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1.4 Theoretical approaches in FPA 
This section introduces possible analytical methods for explaining a state's policy decisions 
and thus the policy-making will of South Korea. In order to probe the "why" question 
underlying South Korea's security policy toward North Korea in the post-Cold War era, and 
especially the policy change towards active economic engagement with North Korea under 
Kim Dae-jung government, several possible external and internal variables should be 
examined as crucial factors. As its policy towards North Korea is assumed to be a foreign 
policy, it is necessary to review the foreign policy analysis (FPA) field. The main reason for 
the review is that without a comprehensive assessment of several analytical tools, there would 
be a danger that a singular approach in isolation would produce only a partial analysis of the 
event. 
In fact, there have long been concerns and debates with regard to the question of what 
constitutes the appropriate unit for explaining a country's foreign policy. Thus, various 
approaches in this field have been developed. For example, Rosenau (1966) distinguishes five 
different levels: the individual, the role, the regime, the domestic society and the international 
system. Also, Waltz (1959) distinguishes three levels: the individual, the state and the 
international system. This thesis looks at international and domestic approaches and then 
introduces the importance of beliefs held by key decision-makers in foreign policy making. 
1.4.1 International system approach 
For years IR theorists have argued for the relative importance of the external factor 
in determining a state's foreign policy. Some advocates ofreatism define the primary goal of 
foreign policy as survival in the international system. In this literature, the issues that have 
the most influence on foreign policy are security, military power, alliance politics among 
states, and the pursuit and balance of power (Morgenthau 1993; Waltz 1979). This "billiard-
ball" model, as Hill and Light (1985: 157) have put it, sees foreign policy as determined 
mostly by the interplay among states. Thus, this approach sees that the international 
environment mainly determines a state's policy because all states react similarly to the same 
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objective external situation. So, changes in a state's domestic regime, its bureaucratic 
structure, and decision-makers' personalities and opinions are assumed not to lead to 
significant changes in foreign policies. Wolfers (1962: 13), for instance, put it this way: 
The greater the external pressure, the greater the similarity of behaviour and 
therefore less the need to study the internal decision-making processes ... imagine a 
number of individuals, who find themselves inside a house on fire. It would be 
perfectly realistic to expect that these individuals, with rare exceptions, would feel 
compelled to run toward the exits ... Surely, therefore, for an explanation of the rush 
for the exits, there is no need to analyse the individual decisions that produced it. 
As Rosenau (1966: 47-8) suggests, the international environment is more important in 
determining the policy of small states than that of powerful states because of the greater 
impact of external pressure on small states. Thus, a small state like South Korea, compared 
with other countries, such as the US, Russia, China and Japan, has a security policy which 
might not have resulted from the internal decision-making process. Thus, the importance of 
the other variables decreases if variables from the international environment are extremely 
important. 
However, this is not always the case. The international situation is not always as 
extreme and clear case as in the "house-on-fire" example. For instance, the foreign policy 
issue could be 'preventing fire' rather than "reacting to the fire". If the former is the case, 
with a state selecting prevention measures, policy outcomes could depend upon the internal 
decision-making process. Thus, there is a possibility that domestic actors' preferences and 
beliefs would impact on which specific measure is chosen. It is rare that the behaviour options 
for a certain situation are always reduced to one. 
1.4.ii Domestic level approaches 
Since all states do not behave similarly in similar situations, the state may be the appropriate 
level of analysis. The variation in decision-making processes may be accounted for by 
variations in the social and economic structures and in the domestic actors of the state. This 
level of analysis as well as the individual level of analysis emerged in order to overcome the 
shortcomings of the realist approach. In this view, scholars pay more attention to the 
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influence of domestic factors by revealing and analysing the areas inside the black box 
neglected by realism (Light 1994: 95-6). This approach is based on the assumption that the 
state is not a unitary structure in foreign policy-making. Contrary to the realist assumption, 
scholars of this approach acknowledge that there exist many foreign policy-making processes, 
resulting in different policy choices. These vary according to the nature of the political system 
in a given country, according to the intensity of the situation, according to the policy issues, 
and according to the domestic actors that become involved. 
One of the domestic variables that affect the foreign policy process is the type of 
political system. Rosenau (1966) distinguished between "open" (democratic) and "closed" 
(authoritarian) systems. His work in foreign policy-making has been followed by others. 
Hermann and Hermann (1989), for instance, classified governments according to who can 
participate and how much they can participate in the foreign policy-making process.8 For 
instance, in some countries, such as the US, political participation is supposed to be extensive. 
In other countries, participation can be limited to an elite based on political parties, 
bureaucracies or other factors. In discussing the foreign policy process, Hermann and 
Margaret Hermann (1989), argue that in democracies, as compared to authoritarian systems, 
more decisions, on a wider variety of issues, will be affected by more domestic actors. This 
pluralistic range of domestic actors in a democratic country also means that the process of 
interaction between these actors is quite natural; at the same time, producing a policy outcome 
is likely to be more difficult and to lead to more conflict and gridlock than in authoritarian 
countries. Hence, in chapter 4, the impact of South Korea's democratisation, from the late 
1980s, on foreign policy-making process and its choice for business-track diplomacy towards 
North Korea will be examined. 
If states of the same type behave in the same way, then changes in other factors, such 
as a state's leadership, will not produce significant changes in foreign policy, and FPA is not 
8 The types of governments identified by them are: authoritarian (few can participate, and there are 
minimal rights to oppose); competitive elite (few can participate, but they have extensive rights to 
oppose and compete); democratic (many can participate, with extensive rights to oppose and compete)· 
and limited democratic (many can participate, but only with limited rights to oppose or compete) 
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required to investigate the beliefs and perceptions of individual decision-makers. However, 
there is no guarantee that states with the same type of political system behave the same way in 
similar situations. For instance, according to the nature of the issue area and the situation, 
even in the same political system, different actors may operate in different decision-making 
processes. Rourke (1991: 122-3) argues that while a mix of foreign and domestic policy 
issues such as foreign trade or the sale of weapons, are likely to be open to increased and 
effective participation by more domestic actors, 'pure' foreign policy issues, such as a 
government's participation in a civil war, are likely to be decided among political leaders. 
Another domestic approach is focused on interplay among specific domestic actors. 
As noted earlier, the domestic approaches see the state not as a unitary actor in FPA. 
Bureaucracies, the media, the political opposition, interest groups and other sub-national 
actors, all have an influence on the state, and they are potential domestic variables for foreign 
policy outcomes. Furthermore, the more democratic a state is, the more likely it is to have 
active domestic actors, and thus the more influence they may have in the foreign policy-
making process. Various approaches have been developed to show the impact of domestic 
actors on foreign policy-making. The bureaucratic politics approach, the iron-triangles 
approach, and the military-industrial complex approach can be included as domestic level 
approaches of FPA.9 
This thesis shows that some domestic actors, such as the political opposition and the 
public opinion, can influence the foreign policy making. Those actors might be important 
domestic factors in South Korea's policy-making towards North Korea. For instance, the 
political opposition has an impact on foreign policy in democratic political systems; those 
who are in power face rivals who would could replace them. Oppositions vary; there is a 
distinction between oppositions who merely want to change policy and those who want to 
gain control of the government. A second distinction is between those who are located inside 
(Hermann and Hermann 1989). 
9 For the bureaucracies' influence on a state's behaviour, see Allison's work on Cuban missile crisis 
(1971). For the impact ofc1ose relationship between the military and military industries corporations 
on defence policies, see (Rosen 1973). 
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and those who are located outside the government (Rourke 1991: 128-9). An example of 
opposition is organised political parties. In any form, opposition parties serve as sources of 
criticism and thus constraints to the government's policy-making. However, opposition and 
criticism can emerge from any part of a state, such as the media, interest groups and other 
domestic actors. These oppositions, whatever their reasons, could influence public opinion 
and in turn foreign policy-making. 
Another set of domestic actors which can influence foreign policy-making are the 
general public. To discuss the role of the public requires a look at the influence of public 
opinion on foreign policy. For instance, one study shows that the constant public protest over 
the war was a factor in ending the U.S. involvement in Vietnam (Small 1988). In fact, 
because many of those who make foreign policy are essentially elected politicians, they pay 
attention to public opinion. Thus, opinion polling and public protests are likely to increase the 
public's impact on the decision-makers' mind. For instance, although some may argue that 
elections are not normally won and lost over foreign policy, this can be very much an issue, 
and can be part of the general electoral equation. It seems that the South Korean Kim Y oung-
sam government's inconsistent North Korean policies clearly reflect the impact of the public 
opinion on his policy choices, and his concern over the impact of this issue on the general 
election, which will be discussed in chapter 3. 
However, the influence of domestic actors on foreign policy is complex and difficult 
to measure. Both the role of opposition and the public differ greatly across political systems, 
issues, and decision-makers. In fact, there is no system in which the opposition or the public 
consistently controls policies. Certainly there is no simple connection between domestic 
actors and foreign policy. For instance, because decision-makers or politicians have legal and 
instrumental advantages, such as information, the capacity to shape public opinion through 
the media, and influence over the other domestic actors, the role of domestic actors on foreign 
policy-making can vary according to other circumstances, including the style of the decision-
makers. 
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1.5 Defining the beliefs approach 
The previous sections reviewed some of the international and domestic variables used by 
foreign policy approaches developed in IR and FP A. As the above discussion shows, despite 
the advantages of these approaches, it is often impossible to explain crucial decisions and 
policies without reference to the traits of the high-level decision-makers involved in the 
foreign policy-making process. In fact, both international and domestic approaches sometimes 
cannot immediately provide reasons for why and when policy changes occur because they 
neglect the importance of the decision-makers. Thus, this section will take up the analysis of 
decision-makers as a crucial factor in foreign policy-making. 
Before moving to the impact of beliefs held by decision-makers on foreign policy 
outcomes, several other approaches should be distinguished in order to clarify the approach to 
beliefs taken in this thesis. One is the human nature approach that examines the fundamental 
human characteristics that affect foreign policy-making. The humankind approaches can be 
divided into biological and psychological categories. Biological researchers are concerned 
with the relation between the humans' physical and political nature. For classical Realist 
thinkers, such as Morgenthau (1993: 4), "politics, like society in general, is governed by 
objective laws that have their roots in human nature". Political realists also seem to share the 
assumption of ethnologists, which argue that animal, including human, behaviour is to at least 
some degree based on aggressive genetic characteristics.10 
The other approach is concerned with human's psychological factors. This approach 
can be used to explain human behaviour in world affairs as well as social life. Here the focus 
is on the common psychological traits of humans, not the psychological make-up of 
individuals, which will be discussed later. It mainly concerns aggression and violence as a 
reaction to felt discrepancies between preferred and actual states of affairs. A number of 
conflict resolution theorists suggested this as a cause of violent behaviour. Johan Galtung's 
10 For instance, although Lorenz (1967) believed that the aggressive behaviour of human tends not to 
be lethal and to have survival value, he also believed that aggression was innate to human as well as 
other species. 
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'structural violence,'11 Ted Gurr's 'relative deprivation' and John Burton's 'human need 
theory' all contributed to this type of approach (Sandole and Merwe 1993). 
The other type of decision-maker approaches focuses on possible psychological 
factors which have impacted on decision-makers' policy-choice and vary from analyst to 
analyst.12 It could be decision-makers' mental and physical health, personal experience, 
education, or lessons from history. Although these personal factors might help shape their 
beliefs or help consolidate their pre-existing beliefs, this study is not concerned with the 
physical and psychological factors that contribute to the decision-makers' impact on foreign 
policy, but with the role of beliefs held by high-level decision-makers on foreign policy-
making. 
Put differently, a country's foreign policy might be different even when the 
international and domestic environments are similar if beliefs held by decision-makers are 
different. It is the importance of decision-makers' beliefs that this thesis is arguing for, 
through an analysis of South Korean President Kim Dae-jung's beliefs relating to business-
track diplomacy towards North Korea in the service of security objectives and their impact on 
South Korea's policy-making. 
l.S.i Basic assumptions of the beliefs approach 
The previous discussion introduced human nature considerations that impact on foreign 
policy-making. The following analysis focuses on humans-as-individuals and emphasises the 
characteristics of political leaders. It makes the assumption that individuals make foreign 
policy decisions, and that different individuals can make different decisions even in the same 
external and internal environment because they differ in their beliefs. Advocates of this type 
IIFor instance, 'structural violence', which is defined as a structurally based discrepancy between 
actual and potential states of physical and mental well-being created through the system of differential 
and unequal access to the means for closing gap between the actual and the potential, could be the 
source of violence by those who have been suffering or are about to suffer from it (quoted in Sandole 
and Merwe 1993: 11-4). 
12 According to Riccards (1977: 226), decision-makers' health can be an important factor in decision-
making. He argues that the physical health of US President Franklin Roosevelt may have affected 
Soviet-American relations. By the time of the Yalta Conference in 1945, only two months before his 
41 
of approaches are primarily interested in the psychohistory of individual leaders (George 
1969; Holsti 1962, 1995; Smith 1988). Therefore, the question is not what these persons 
decided. Rather, the question is why they made certain foreign policy choices. 
In contrast to the international and domestic approaches discussed above, the beliefs 
approach acknowledges that understanding foreign policy decisions requires a focus on the 
individual or decision makers' beliefs towards the surrounding environments. Some argue for 
the necessity of this level of approach in FPA. For instance, it is suggested that "state's 
interest are not defined solely by the international system, much less by its structure alone, but 
they are also likely to reflect elements within the domestic political arena . , , One must 
indeed take these internal process into account, with special attention directed at decision 
makers and their definition of situation"{Holsti 1995: 47). Also, Rosenau (1990: 25) points 
out that "most approaches in FPA tend to underestimate or ignore the importance of the micro 
level, such as decision-makers or political leaders, and thus most theories have not gone 
micro enough. The micro-level in systemic approaches is usually identified with nation-states 
vis-a-vis the international environment and the macro-level factor", Even in the context of the 
international-domestic linkages approaches, some domestic factors, such as interest groups 
and the foreign policy-making community, have occasionally been treated as micro-level 
units, but these approaches do not go deeper than that. Thus, individual beliefs approaches 
assume that there is a need to go beyond the argument that both international and domestic 
elements are important. 
There are several assumptions made in this approach. The first is that, as described 
earlier, foreign policy is made and implemented by humans; it does not see states as 
monolithic, impersonal creatures that somehow behave on their own. The second assumption 
is that different decision-makers generate different foreign policy-decisions even in the same 
international and domestic environments, such as diplomatic relations, governmental 
structure, or processes of policy making. The third assumption is related to the first two. 
death, he was very seriously ill and unable to deal effectively with the complex diplomatic issues 
discussed. Two months later Roosevelt was dead. 
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Given that foreign policy is made by humans and that decision-makers can have an impact on 
foreign policy outcomes, this approach also assumes that how these decision-makers see the 
world and what they believe is an important object of study. 
With these basic assumptions of the beliefs approach to FPA in mind, this study now 
presents the analytical frameworks which will be used to examine the impact of the belief 
system held by President Kim Dae-jung on South Korea's policy-making with regard to post-
Cold War North Korean security problems in chapter 5. It begins by distinguishing three 
types of impact of beliefs on foreign policy outcomes: road maps, information screening, and 
institutionalisation. It then looks at the shortcomings of the beliefs approach, its 
methodological challenges, and the strategies used to cope with these concerns. These tasks 
will be accomplished by reviewing the literature on the beliefs approach. 
I.S.U Three types of impact of beliefs on foreign policy 
One of the core subjects of this study is the causal relation between beliefs and foreign policy 
output. The central question is whether the beliefs held by decision-makers have real impacts 
on foreign policy decisions, and if so, how they impact on foreign policy-making. Beliefs 
might be evident in any foreign policy-making analysis as a possible factor in a certain policy 
outcome. These can be present in the form of ideology, social norms, perceptions or historical 
lessons. However, this does not mean that some beliefs always explain choices by policy-
makers. 
The rational-model might suggest that choices for specific beliefs simply reflect the 
rationally selected interest in a given set of external and internal conditions. Beliefs can be 
just political propaganda to legitimise and popularise actors' interests. 13 In order to argue that 
the beliefs themselves do playa causal role in policy decision, it is necessary to elucidate the 
J3 There has been a strong tendency in the IR field to use the model of self-interested actors. This 
model assume that actors could correctly anticipate the results of their actions and maximise their 
interests, subject to constraints, and thus the actor's preferences and causal beliefs are naturally 
selected and given. In this rational model, policy analysis tends to focus on the international and 
domestic constraints faced by actors (Goldstein and Keohane 1993: 4-7). 
43 
'causal pathways' (Goldstein and Keohane 1993: 11-3) through which beliefs have the 
potential to influence foreign policy output. This thesis introduces three types of causal 
pathways for beliefs: their role as road maps, in information screening, and as decision-
making rules. 
l.S.ii.a Beliefs as road-maps 
Beliefs impact on foreign policy outcomes when they serve as "road maps" for decision-
makers. Goldstein and Keohane (1993), for instance, concerned with the role of ideas in 
foreign policy-making, define ideas as shared beliefs. This means that the ideas and beliefs 
are interchangeable concepts. Also, they distinguish three types of beliefs: world views, 
principled beliefs and causal beliefs, and describe the meaning and the impacts of each three 
beliefs on foreign policy. Out of these types of beliefs, the concept of 'causal beliefs' is the 
main point of this discussion. They define the' causal beliefs' as: 
[b ]eliefs about cause-effect relationships which derive authority from the shared 
consensus of recognised elites ... Such causal beliefs provide guides for individuals 
on how to achieve their objectives. Scientific knowledge may reveal how to slow 
down the green house effect in the earth's atmosphere ... Causal beliefs imply 
strategies for the attainment of goals, themselves valued because of shared principled 
beliefs (Goldstein and Keohane 1993: 10). 
The core feature of this belief approach is that even if actors' preferred outcomes or 
goals are clear and given, as rationalist analysts assume, causal beliefs are still important in 
foreign policy-making because there might be a case where actors do not know with certainty 
the consequences of their actions. Under conditions of uncertainty that might be caused by 
incomplete information, actors' expectations depend on causal beliefs. These beliefs help to 
select which of various means will be used to reach their objectives. Goldstein and Keohane 
(1993: 16) define the role of 'road maps' as: 
[w]hen we view politics as an arena in which actors face continual uncertainties about 
their interests and how to maximise them, the need for ideas to act as road maps 
becomes apparent. Ideas serve the purpose of guiding behaviour under conditions of 
uncertainty by stipulating causal patterns or by providing compelling ethical or moral 
motivations for action. They can stipulate what is right and wrong, provide new social 
visions, or merely suggest what economic policy will steer a nation toward increased 
wealth. 
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Namely, even though they recognise that 'road maps' could be mainly instrumental, 
relating to strategic aspects of beliefs, causal beliefs can be understood within the context of 
the principled belief and of broader world views. The concept of principled beliefs consists of 
normative ideas that specify standards for distinguishing right from wrong. Thus, the beliefs 
as road maps could encompass the moral consideration present within shared principled 
beliefs. 
In sum, the main premise of this thesis is that beliefs can be persuasive ideas by 
acting likes road maps in determining the means to use in uncertain situation in order to reach 
certain goals. In chapter 5, President Kim Dae-jung's "sunshine policy" towards North Korea 
will be discussed as Kim Dae-jung government's 'road map' to achieve South Korea's 
security objectives, such as decreasing inter-Korean tensions and achieving peaceful Korean 
reunification. 
l.S.ii.b Beliefs as information screens 
In the second pathway, beliefs held by decision-makers are used to screen information in 
certain situations. Images, belief systems, operation codes belong to this category. This 
approach builds on the tradition of 'behaviourism', which focused on observable and 
measurable components of behaviour rather than unobservable assumptions (Smith 1988: 14). 
The beliefs literature emerged as an attempt to be specific about the psychological component 
of individual behaviour, which could be an important factor in FPA, but which had been 
considered as far less important for the explanation of state behaviour than systemic or state 
determinants. With this common objective, several approaches were developed which are 
closely related to the notion of beliefs. 
This section introduces briefly three approaches: the images, belief systems, and 
operational codes. First, the concept of 'image' was proposed by Boulding (1956). The core 
argument is that each individual holds images of the world, and that these images greatly 
influence how the individual sees incoming informations or, as Boulding called them, 
'messages'. Accordingly, information which supports pre-existing images held by the 
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individuals can be easily accepted, whereas information which contradicts these images is not 
easily accepted.14 
The second approach is that of 'belief systems' introduced by Holsti in 1962. In fact, 
the concept of belief systems is closely related to the concept of 'image' developed by 
Boulding. However, the difference between Holsti's belief system approach and the image 
approach is that Holsti focused on empirical investigations, known as 'content analysis'. His 
work went beyond a conceptual discussion on the nature of beliefs. Rather, it was directed 
towards the empirical analysis of a leader's belief system and its impact on foreign policy. 
His case study was the beliefs of US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. He analysed 3,584 
statements made by Dulles between 1953 and 1959. Holsti concluded that Dulles has a fixed 
view of the Soviet Union, or a 'closed belief system', viewing it as 'inherent bad faith', which 
significantly affected the way in which Dulles interpreted Soviet behaviour (Holsti 1962). 
Third, the concept of the 'operational code', developed by George (1969) is similar to 
the concepts of image and belief systems that act as a screen thorough which information is 
filtered and interpreted. George sees the operational code as a way of explaining an actor's 
policy decision and thus a country's foreign policy. However, George's approach has 
methodological differences from the other two. He identified two sets of beliefs an actor has 
and which define the actor's operational code. First, 'instrumental beliefs' are those 
concerned with the best way for the actor to achieve his or her goals. Second, 'philosophical 
beliefs' are related to an actor's norms and world views. Accordingly, he lists a set of 
questions, the answers to which define an actor's operational code. 
There are, obviously, differences between the three approaches in terms of their 
methodologies. However, these approaches overlap in terms of their assumptions about the 
nature of the relationship between the beliefs held by individuals and the external behaviour 
of states; they also share a focus on the relationship between beliefs and information 
processes. Firstly, what all the beliefs approaches indicate is that the political leaders' images, 
14 In applying the image concept to international relations, Bronfenbrenner (1961), for example, argued 
for to existance ofa 'mirror image', in which both US and Soviet peoples saw the other as the 
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belief systems, operational codes influence the information process so as not to alter pre-
established beliefs. Decision-makers' beliefs can affect how they see and react to incoming 
information or an event, indicating that similar information processes are at work in all the 
approaches. Secondly, this beliefs literature has a common concern that a gap can exist 
between beliefs and the reality of the operational environment, which causes information 
distortion. Thus, leader's misperceptions or closed belief systems is recognised as a possible 
explanatory mechanism in their account of foreign policy decisions. 
All these approaches acknowledge that beliefs held by decision-makers influence 
policy outcome because they are used as 'information screens', and look at the impact of 
beliefs in the information process. Before a situation exists for the foreign policy decision-
maker, there must be information screening. IS First of all, there has to be an impetus from or a 
problem in the international environment. Then the process of information screening by 
which the decision-maker selects, organises, and finally interprets incoming information 
about the surrounding world must take place. Because information is a vast, ongoing wave of 
signals and facts, and is sometimes distorted, it is argued that individuals in high-level 
positions cannot process, handle, and understand all the available information. Decision-
makers then must select, organise, and interpret the information directed at them from the 
international environment. 
In this information screening process, some information is simply ignored; some is 
looked at quickly and then either thrown out or buried either intentionally or unintentionally; 
some is altered so as to not upset existing beliefs held by the decision-makers; some is simply 
accepted as the reality. Any kind of beliefs, as discussed above, act as a screen to filter 
information. Thus, the information screening process greatly depends upon the specific 
beliefs that already exist in the mind of the individual decision-makers. Put differently, a 
person's beliefs towards the world help determine what is selected and attended to, 
consequently making some things look more important and others less so. Thus, pre-existing 
a1gressor and used this as a justification for pursuing a confrontational policy in the Cold War period. 
I The word 'screening' is used interchangeably with 'a set of lenses' or 'filtering' (Holsti 1962). 
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beliefs ultimately affect how people make decisions through infonnation screening processes. 
These decisions may then be implemented in some fonn or other as foreign policy. 
This beliefs literature identifies various infonnation screening mechanisms or 
psychological factors that affect how decision-makers select and interpret the incoming 
infonnation on the basis of pre-existing beliefs. First, people try to achieve 'cognitive 
consistency': they want the beliefs they hold not to contradict each other. Individuals strive to 
ensure that their beliefs are consistent. When they are not balanced, the individual experiences 
dissonance and will then carry out certain measures to reduce the dissonance (Festinger 
1964).16 When new infonnation contradicts established images, people tend to simply ignore 
or reshape the new disturbing infonnation rather than change their images or beliefs. 
Second, 'historical learning' is another mechanism that helps to shape infonnation 
processing. Decision-makers often apply the lesson of world history to current situations. The 
"lesson of Munich" is an example of this, which has done much to affect the actions of 
Western leaders since World War II. The British, in an attempt at appeasement, allowed 
Hitler to annex part of Czechoslovakia. This became an obvious failure as Gennany attack the 
rest of Czechoslovakia, and finally most of Europe. Thus, the lesson drawn by western leaders 
was that you do not compromise with aggressors. For example, when US President Truman 
was faced with the North's invasion of South Korea, he sought to avoid the 'Munich 
syndrome' by deciding for war.17 Decision-makers often use historical analogies for events 
and people in order to simplify and organise memories and perceptions. However, this also 
leads to selective perception: noticing those details of a present event that look like a past one, 
while ignoring the important differences. 
16 Festinger's concept of cognitive dissonance (1964), which is about the discordant relationship 
between preferred and actual states of affairs or between our beliefs and values and the environment as 
it actually is, is also used to explain violence as a reaction to avoid or reduce further dissonance-
rrovoking situations. 
7 Truman said "in my generation this was not the first occasion when the strong attacked the weak. I 
recalled some earlier instances: Manchuria, Ethiopia, Austria. I remembered how each time that the 
democracies failed to act it had encouraged the aggressors to keep going ahead ... If this was allowed 
to go unchallenged it would mean a third world war, just as similar incidents had brought on a second 
world war" (quoted in May 1973: 32). 
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The third mechanism is 'wishful thinking', the influence of fears and desires on 
images. It is motivated by perceptions. In order not to clash with existing beliefs and hopes, 
decision-makers tend to select and interpret incoming information based on their hopes. In 
order to achieve desired objectives, decision-makers may be motivated to underestimate 
information which weights against their hopes. As discussed earlier, these approaches are all 
linked to the work on false perceptions, caused by rigid pre-existing beliefs which result in 
distorted interpretations. 
The above discussion indicates that misperceptions lead to poor foreign policy 
decisions. However, this thesis is not concerned with distinguishing between the closed and 
open beliefs of decision-makers; the former will be more likely to result in inaccurate 
perceptions of the operational environment. The main premise is that beliefs do matter in 
information processing. Put differently, once certain beliefs are selected, this pathway limits 
choice because it logically excludes other interpretations of reality and sustains its direction, 
as will be discussed in chapter 5. 
l.S.ii.c Beliefs as decision-making rules 
The third pathway is the impact of certain beliefs on the foreign policy-making structure. If 
decision-makers share certain beliefs, they are likely to involve certain foreign policy issues 
with regard to the beliefs. Especially, because South Korean case is referred to belief held by 
South Korean president Kim Dae-jung, this is more likely. According to Kohl's (1976) 
'Royal-Court Model' of the foreign policy-making process, foreign policy making can be 
highly centralised, and dominated by the President and! or their key advisors if he/she wishes 
to take charge. This model could be viable, but it depends on decision-makers' beliefs, 
interests, or operating style. In contrast to the bureaucratic model of foreign policy-making, 
elites recruited for the 'presidential court' are chosen because they share President's basic 
ideas and world view (Kohl 1976: 3). 
More extensive types of impact of beliefs on foreign policy-making are through 
institutionalisation; institutionalised beliefs have a lasting influence on politics through their 
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incorporation into the terms of the domestic political debate, that is, they became norms or 
institutions. The institutionalised norms can be defined as "standards of appropriate behaviour 
of actors with a given identity or stable collections of appropriate practice and rules for 
specific actors in certain situation" (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 891-2). Goldstein and 
Keohane (1993: 21-3) also argue that once beliefs have influenced the organisational set-up, 
their influence will persist in the organisation through the people working in the organisation. 
Although the initial interests which cause institutionalisation can fade away, if beliefs are 
institutionalised, the impact of beliefs may be prolonged. In other words, beliefs which 
became embedded in domestic politics and are regarded as the order or culture of appropriate 
action, have an impact on related external issues and thus foreign policy outcomes. Blum 
(1993), for instance, argues that despite numerous deficiencies in Soviet foreign policy during 
the Cold-war period, which could be traced to the basic assumptions and values of socialist 
society, the stability of these core beliefs placed limits on the kind of options available to 
policy-makers. Beliefs also affect domestic politics by influencing the coalition building 
process: coalitions that espouse platforms compatible with the requirements of dominant 
beliefs have powerful advantages over those who do not. 
As will be discussed in chapter 4 and 5, this study looks at the impact of beliefs not 
only on the governmental decision-making centred on President Kim Dae-jung but also on the 
implications of 'nonn dynamics' for South Korea's active engagement with North Korea in 
the South Korean domestic policy debates in the 1990s. 
I.S.iii Shortcomings and methodological concerns of the beliefs approach 
There are several concerns raised by the analysis of the beliefs literature, and by the approach 
taken in this thesis. These concerns will be examined in order to conduct a clear analysis of 
the relation between South Korean foreign policy and the beliefs approach. The first concern 
of this research is the actors' sincerity. Smith (1988: 28), for instance, "questions whether we 
can believe the reasons policy-makers give for their decision". The central worry is that they 
may be presenting a post-hoc justification for their decisions or they may be saying things to 
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popularise their choices. To overcome this methodological difficulty requires an objective 
interpretation of information with regards to the beliefs of decision-makers in order to 
examine whether they can truly justify their claims. Goldstein and Keohane (1993: 27) call 
for "the observer to engage in the interpretation of meaning through empathetic understanding 
and pattern of recognition, made possible by a shared language and shared tradition". Thus, 
this thesis looks at all the information related to President Kim Dae-jung's personal views and 
beliefs on North Korean security problems. An evaluation will be made concerning both the 
quantity and the quality of information to reveal whether there is a consistent pattern to his 
beliefs concerning North Korean security problem both before and after he became the South 
Korean President. 
However, this would not reveal whether there is a causal relation between beliefs and 
certain policy choices made by decision-makers. Put differently, although actors have beliefs 
that might be relevant to policy choices, these may not be the decisive reason for that choice. 
They may use beliefs as political propaganda to boost public support, hiding the real reasons 
for certain policy choices. Thus, there remains the problem of constructing a causal link 
between beliefs and policy choices. This work is not an easy task because it is difficult both to 
obtain material about decision-makers in countries where information is restricted, and to 
access worthy information which indicates the real intentions and perceptions of decision-
makers when new foreign policy issues arise. Because the impact of Kim Dae-jung's beliefs 
on South Korean policy choice is a current event, this thesis will face these difficulties. Thus, 
this thesis is dependent upon "causal inference, which requires the check of spurious 
correlation by asking about external and internal constraints that may affect the policy choice" 
(Goldstein and Keohane: 29). As pointed out earlier, if different actors with different beliefs 
would have selected the same policy direction, the claim that beliefs are important factors in 
policy choice would not be persuasive, although the beliefs held by decision-makers actually 
playa important role on a policy outcome. For instance, it is possible that although Keynesian 
ideology played an important role in the establishment of liberal institutions in the West after 
World War II, the notion of hegemony, in which the political and economic power of the 
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United States after World War II led to the spread of both capitalist ideas and liberal 
institutions in the West, could alone explain all these results. Thus, causal relations between 
capitalist ideas and liberal institutions would not be persuasive (Ikenberry 1993). 
This methodological problem also applies to the case of South Korean policy towards 
North Korea. As pointed out earlier, this thesis argues that there has been a policy change 
under the Kim Dae-jung government, and his beliefs are an important factor for policy 
change. However, this only satisfies the basic condition of the impact of beliefs on policy 
choice, by showing the different policy choices of different leaders. Also, if the thesis shows 
that President Kim Dae-jung has consistent beliefs regarding this policy area, it satisfies the 
secondary conditions. However, the surrounding internal and external environments when he 
became president were not the same as during the previous governments, meaning that these 
environmental changes, and not the beliefs held by Kim Dae-jung, could account for the 
policy change. Therefore, this thesis requires detailed investigation of internal and external 
environments both in the previous and the Kim Dae-jung governments. 
The second concern is with the way in which beliefs impact on foreign policy-
making. Many cognitive psychology approaches that discuss information screening have 
focused on the implication of the cognitive psychology of certain individuals for their 
interpretation of reality and for information processing in regard to a certain event. These 
arguments, such as the notions ofmisperception, closed belief system or, mirror-image, which 
result in poor foreign policy-making, are central to much of the work on conventional beliefs 
approaches in FPA. However, given the difficulty in measuring the extent of openness or 
closeness of a belief (Smith 1988: 28), this thesis will not seek to show whether Kim Dae-
jung's beliefs are closed or open. Moreover, since much information about the inter-Korean 
security issue is new and still the subject of debate, this thesis cannot conceptualise the open 
and closed dimension of these beliefs in the current dynamic environment in the Korean 
Peninsula. Therefore, this thesis does not seek to analyse the right or wrong dimension of his 
foreign policy change. Its only concern in terms of conventional cognitive psychological 
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approaches is that beliefs held by key decision-makers certainly influence the nature of the 
information screening process, and thus policy-making. 
1.6 Methodological framework on South Korean policy-making towards North Korea: 
International system approach towards a synthetic approach 
The main purpose of this section is to discuss how to apply the above foreign policy 
approaches to the analysis of the South Korean policy-making process in regard to its policy-
making will to adopt a business-track diplomacy in the 1990s, especially under the Kim Dae-
jung government. So far, we have reviewed three approaches to foreign policy analysis: the 
international systems approach, the domestic level approach, and the beliefs approach. As we 
have seen, each approach has its advantages and disadvantages in explaining state foreign 
policy-making and changes to these policies. 
The international system approach has provided the most persuasive explanation of 
South Korea's security policy towards North Korea in the Cold War period. In an approach 
that saw the state as rational actor, North Korea was the enemy, and it was felt that its threat 
should be deterred by military power; security policy was centred on a military alliance with 
US. Thus, there was little need to look at other domestic variables to explain South Korea's 
security behaviour in the Cold War era. Consequently, the South Korean FPA field has 
remained limited to international structural explanations. Ha Young-sun (1988: 3-4) explained 
the reasons for this trend as follows. First, because of South Korea's weak position compared 
to the surrounding big powers on the Korean Peninsula, such as the US, the Soviet Union, 
China and Japan, the room for autonomous foreign policy was greatly limited. Thus, the study 
of alternative models for South Korean foreign policy analysis has also been neglected. 
Second, the limited autonomy of South Korean foreign policy was deepened by two 
international factors: the Cold War, and the separation between South and North Korea. Faced 
with a stark international environment of military threats and tensions during the Cold War 
period, South Korea's foreign policy, especially in the security field, has been significantly 
dependent upon the policy direction of the strong military power of US. Most scholars agree 
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that this was because South Korea's security interests generally coincided with those of the 
US in the Cold War period. Thus, in terms of South Korea's FPA, domestic political factors 
have not been regarded as having a decisive impact on security policy outcomes. 
Third, the underdevelopment of the South Korean security policy field has been 
compounded by its military based, authoritarian, power structure. Because authoritarian 
regimes strongly limit access to and distribution of information on the security policy making 
process, this limits the efforts to investigate the inside of the policy-making process, which 
would provide important evidence for the domestic and individual levels of foreign policy 
analysis. 
Thus, this thesis assumes that even after the end of the Cold War, the importance of 
the policies of powerful states, such as the US and Japan, towards the Korean Peninsula 
continues because there is still undeniable political and military confrontation surrounding the 
Korean Peninsula. Thus, the international system approach will be used in chapter 4 to 
explore possible external variables that had an impact on North Korean policy under the Kim 
Dae-jung government. 
However, the changes in the external and internal environments with regard to South 
Korea in the 1990s present a great opportunity to develop domestic and beliefs approaches, 
and to increase the scope ofFPA research. First, the end of the Cold War era, South Korea's 
rapid economic growth and greater international recognition, might increase South Korea's 
ability to pursue more independent foreign policy. The collapse of the Cold War system 
meant that South Korea became free in some degree from international restrictions. Also, 
South Korea's growing status in the international economy and membership of international 
organisationsl8 greatly extended the sphere and range of South Korean FPA. These 
developments mean that South Korea's foreign policy options can be extended compared with 
those of the Cold War period. 
18 According to World Trade Organisation (WTO) data (1998), South Korea is ranked 12th in the world 
in total export volume, with US$136.6 billion, and ranked 11th in total import volume, with US$144.6 
billion. Also, South Korea joined the United Nations (UN), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC), Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and World Trade 
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Second, South Korea's democratisation from the late 19805 onward might contribute 
to the spread of democratic norms in the society and increase civilian demands to participate 
in foreign policy-making. That means an increase in domestic actors' participation in the 
policy-making process. The foreign policy-making structure in South Korea might become 
pluralistic with various groups exercising different degrees of influence at the domestic level 
according to the particular issue addressed. 
Third, along with the development of domestic democratisation, access to diplomatic 
documents and information has become relatively easier, which contributes to deeper research 
on South Korean FPA. For instance, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) 
enacted the law on the Preservation and Publicity of Diplomatic Documents and 
institutionalised the opening of past diplomatic documents to the public in January 1994. 
From January 1998, according to the law for the Information Opening to the Public of 
Government Institutions, the sphere of information has been extended. Moreover, most of 
South Korea's government departments, including the MOFAT, the Ministry of National 
Defence (MND), and the Ministry of Unification (MOU), have been publishing 'White 
Papers', which record their goals and activities for every year since 1990. Most importantly, 
increasing press freedom might contribute to detailed analysis of the policy-making process. 
Fourth, despite the increasing importance of various domestic actors in the foreign 
policy-making process, the role of the President may be re-examined. Henderson (1968) 
described a generation ago the salient features of Korean politics as the ''politics of the 
vortex", and Korean politics had been dominated by the party in power and its leader in 
particular. His observations still describe fairly accurately the last fifty years and even the 
present situation. This is because parties in Korea have no coherent policy platform, and no 
consistent of leadership beyond those in control at the moment. 
Lim Seong-ho (1998: 523) also points to the continued domination of the presidency 
in South Korean decision-making especially in domestic issues, arguing that the conventional 
feature of imperial presidency and of peripheral National Assembly in the policy-making 
Organisation (WTO) in 1990s. 
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process is growing in spite of South Korea's gradual democratisation in the constitutional and 
electoral dimensions. Scholars provide some of the factors that may influence this type of 
policy-making process in South Korea. Popular explanations point to socio-cultural reasons, 
such as the impact of single nationality, Confucianism, a military culture and a strong 
presidency in the Cold-War period (Kang Ryang 1994: 182). Whatever the reasons are, most 
scholars agree that South Korea has a top-down policy-making process centred on the 
president. Of course, this is not necessarily to say that other domestic actors are not important 
in South Korean policy-making. However, as pointed out earlier, if the president has political 
and policy-making will on a certain issue, there can be a very top-down policy-making 
process, centred on president. In this thesis, it is assumed that decisions about South Korea's 
foreign policy can be made at the pinnacle of the government hierarchy by the president and 
his staff, who are relatively free from organisational constraints. Thus, beliefs held by the 
president can be important in the policy-making process in South Korea. 
As pointed out in the Introduction, this study argues that a beliefs approach makes a 
contribution to the field of foreign policy analysis for South Korea, which, in its current state 
has been criticised by South Korean scholars themselves as no more than the description of 
modem diplomatic history or analyses of big powers' policy towards Korean Peninsula (Koo 
Y oung-rok 1995: 7). In fact, although there are numerous journals for specific Korean issues 
and questions, there is little South Korean foreign policy research that is based on general 
conceptions or theoretical frameworks. Lacking theoretical sophistication, the study of South 
Korean foreign policy has concentrated on descriptions of South Korean foreign policy during 
specific periods and issues or on analysis of surrounding big powers' policy towards South 
Korea or vice-versa. Conventional analysis of South Korean foreign policy focuses on 
description of South Korea's policy choice as determined by the international structure. 
However, innovative, this study should be based on objective policy analysis. Thus, 
this thesis has to look at the international and domestic levels as well. As pointed out earlier, 
this is, firstly, because each of these approaches in isolation produces only a partial analysis. 
Second, without comparing other possible variables for foreign policy outcome. the role of 
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beliefs alone cannot be shown to be the crucial factor, and would not be persuasive. Thereby, 
in order to prove the importance of the policy-makers' beliefs on South Korean foreign 
policy-making, a synthetic approach has to be employed. 
Conclusion 
The examination of the global security debate has revealed that in the post-Cold War era there 
exist increasing concerns about the utility of military power as the main instrument for 
preventing conflict and ensuring security. Faced with the rise of a range of intrastate conflicts 
and non-military-generated insecurity, policy-makers have considered economic engagement 
and comprehensive security policies to security. South Korean policy-makers also became 
increasingly aware of the need for comprehensive engagement approaches to deal with the 
post-Cold War North Korean security problems and with the future Korean unification. 
The existing literature on the relationships between economic interdependence and 
national security indicates that there are certain positive aspects to the role of economic 
interdependence in international affairs. Economic engagement enhances common economic 
and cultural interests, establishes multiple channels between states, and provides for the 
establishment of norms regarding the measured use of military force and a preference for 
nonviolent means to resolve disputes. As a state's long-term economic interdependence 
strategy to address a target state's security problems, this chapter has introduced the concept 
of 'business-track diplomacy' that will be used to examine the viability of economic 
engagement as a security strategy for a state in the post-Cold War period. The model suggests 
that, to use this type of policy, it is necessary for both public and private sectors to have both 
policy capability and policy-making will. In terms of policy capability, economic resources in 
both the private and the public sectors are needed to perform business-track diplomacy. 
Moreover, a target state's economic vulnerability is an important factor for increasing the 
potential usefulness of this strategy. The other requirement of business-track diplomacy is 
policy-making will, which is the main focus of this thesis. This is needed to mobilise 
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economic instruments to remove the sources of conflict among states by engaging 
economically and building interdependent links. 
This then brings the discussion to the case of inter-Korean security relations, and 
especially to the importance of South Korean policy-making will to adopt business-track 
diplomacy towards North Korea in order to resolve the post-Cold War North Korean security 
problems. This study hypothesised that there have been security policy changes in South 
Korea under the Kim Dae-jung government towards the consistent use of business-track 
diplomacy as means to address the North Korean security problem in the post-Cold War 
period. 
In order to explain this policy change towards business-track diplomacy, the study 
assumes that the beliefs held by Kim Dae-jung are the most crucial factor in this policy 
outcome, though international and domestic variables are still important. By adopting this 
assumption, this thesis attempts to escape from the restrictive international structure paradigm 
that dominates the study of South Korean foreign policy-making, and especially the study of 
the North Korea related security issue, and to show the importance of the role of beliefs held 
by decision-makers in the foreign policy-making process. 
However, in order to conduct an objective foreign policy-making analysis, a 
comprehensive examination of the state policy-making process is required. Thus, both 
international and domestic approaches will be employed, along with the beliefs approaches. 
Before moving on to examine South Korea's policy-making towards North Korea in the 
1990s, it is first necessary to demonstrate South Korea's need of business-track diplomacy 
towards North Korea. Thus, the next chapter will look at the changing nature of the post-Cold 
War overall insecurity of North Korea, which makes it suitable to be approached through an 
economic engagement policy. 
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Chapter 2. Conceptualising the North Korean security problems in 
the 1990s 
This chapter introduces the case of inter-Korean security relations in order to investigate the 
opportunities for South Korea to utilise business-track diplomacy in the post-Cold War 
period. The aim of this chapter is to prove the changes in the nature of the North Korean 
security problem, and thus the need for a shift from military power-dominated approaches to a 
comprehensive security strategy, which includes economic engagement, to alleviate the post-
Cold War North Korean security problems. 
The overview of the international politics surrounding the Korean Peninsula during 
the Cold War era acknowledges the crucial impact of great powers involvement in inter-
Korean conflicts, as well as the containment approach, which was applied in the form of a 
military balance of power, and through alliance politics. Moreover, the analysis of security 
situations on the Korean Peninsula, such as the North Korean nuclear case, demonstrates that, 
even after the end of the Cold War, the Korean Peninsula still possesses the potential for great 
power and inter-Korean conflict. Hence, all actors have continued to protect their interests 
through the use of military power and diplomatic manoeuvring. In other words, all sides have 
regarded North Korea's seemingly unchanged security threat in the post-Cold War era as one 
that should be dealt with through traditional containment strategy. 
However, while states have pursued a military and economic containment approach 
in response to North Korean security problems, the North Korean nuclear crisis and other 
military confrontations have revealed the growing limitations of the confrontational 
approaches as an effective means of addressing these problems. In fact, post-Cold War 
security problems concerning North Korea can not be conceived of as just traditional military 
threats. Rather, they should be conceived of as being generated by the total insecurity of the 
regime, due to its diplomatic isolation and economic failure. This requires a security policy 
based on the economic engagement approach. This chapter, consequently, argues that the 
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North Korean security problem is a suitable case for testing South Korea's attempt to use 
business-track diplomacy in pursuit of security objectives. 
2.1 Military security policy of the Korean Peninsula during the Cold War era 
2.1.1 Division of Korea 
The position of Korea after WWII was affected by the new global and regional situation. The 
defeat of Japan in WWIl changed Korea's status from Japanese colony to occupied territory, 
divided into US and USSR spheres of controls. At the 1945 Yalta Conference, U.S.-Soviet-
Chinese trusteeship over Korea was proposed, and a temporary division of the Korean 
Peninsula into South and North was established. Thus, Korea became divided into two zones 
of occupation, which became the sites of two antagonistic Korean regimes backed by the two 
great powers, the US and USSR. 
During 1945-1950, the two superpowers established favourable governments in 
Korea in the service of their strategic interests. For the U.S, the Korean Peninsula was one of 
the places it wanted to include in its capitalist global order, and specifically to help contain 
the Soviet Union's communist influence in the world. Its counterpart, the Soviet Union, was 
also eager to ensure a political environment favourable to its interests on the Korean 
Peninsula. The Soviets were pleased to find a population strongly influenced by the left in the 
northern part of Korea. As a result, and in contrast to the U.S. occupation, it encouraged the 
existing Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence (CPKI) branches, and this 
pro-communist organisation continued to function as the basic unit of government. 
Thus, the efforts at establishing one Korean government were not successful. The 
disagreement between the two superpowers on how to form a unified Korean government, as 
well as ideological differences and rivalries between the Korean political leaders, resulted in 
the two separate governments in Korean Peninsula. As a result, under US recognition, the 
Republic of Korea (thereafter South Korea) was inaugurated, and Rhee Syng-man became the 
first president of South Korea on the 15 th of August 1948. In the North, the Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea (thereafter North Korea) was inaugurated on the 9th of September 
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1948, and was promptly recognised by the Soviet Union. At last, Korea was officially divided 
into two, with each government claiming to be the only legitimate government on the Korean 
Peninsula. After the division, tensions between the North and South grew. There were several 
low intensity battles between South and North Korea between 1949 and the outbreak of the 
Korean War (Landsberg 1998: 87-9). 
On June 25, 1950, North Korea invaded South Korea in order to reunify the 
peninsula. The invasion was contested by a joint force of the US and the United Nations. The 
three-year long Korean War, which ended on July 27, 1953, was an enormous tragedy. More 
than 4 million people died; North Korea lost more than 20% of its pre-war population and 
South Korea had more than 1 million casualties. The Korean War was also a historical turning 
point not only in international relations but also in inter-Korean relations (Park Kun-young 
1999a: 31-2). Globally, it contributed to the United States shift from post-World War II 
disarmament policies towards containment of Soviet expansion. Regionally, Korea became 
the front line in the Cold War between the US and Soviet Union. Also, the ideological and 
political antagonism between the North and the South was intensified. The antipathy that 
developed between the two opposing regimes encouraged each of them to seek in every 
possible way to accomplish reunification on its own terms and at the expense of the other. 
2.1.ii The security environment of Korean Peninsula in the Cold War period 
The cessation of the Korean War, marked by the signing of an armistice in July 1953, did not 
produce a peace mechanism for the Korean Peninsula. Rather, the division of the two Koreas 
along with De-Militarised Zone (DMZ) meant that the Korean Peninsula became the focal 
point of not only the continuation of super-power competition between the US and USSR but 
also of intense inter-Korean competition for acquiring strategic superiority and legitimacy 
against each other. 
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2.1.ii.a International security structure 
The international security environment surrounding the Korean peninsula after the Korean 
War largely depended upon alliance politics between major powers and the two Koreas along 
with the Cold War structure in East Asia. The most important characteristic of the East Asian 
security environment during the Cold War era had been the balance of military power 
between the 'northern alliance', which was the strategic alliance between North Korea and the 
Soviets, and also North Korea and China, and the 'southern alliance' which was the alliance 
between the US and Japan, and also the US and South Korea. Such military alignments were 
basic means for both Koreas to ensure their national security against each other's threats. 
In the northern alliance, the Soviet Union was the core supporter of North Korea. 
After WWII, the northern part was occupied by the Soviet Union, and actually ruled by the 
Soviet Union's military government, which played a crucial role in shaping North Korea's 
political system. The Soviet Union signed an agreement with North Korea in 1955 that 
provided Pyongyang with financial, technological, and industrial assistance on mostly a free 
basis. The total amount of Soviet credits and grants, for North Korea's post-war 
reconstruction during the 1950s, was up to US$690 million. Also, to confront the emerging 
military threat from the southern alliance, the Soviets and North Korea committed to uphold 
the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance signed in July 1961. Despite 
strains in Soviet-North Korean relations, especially in 1960s and 1970s, the Soviet Union was 
a strong security guarantor of North Korea throughout the Cold War period (Kim Ilpyong 
1987).19 
The other ally of North Korea in the northern alliance was the People's Republic of 
China (thereafter China), established in 1949. China's participation in the Korean War caused 
19 Even in mid-1980s, an agreement was reached that the Soviet would supply MIG 23 fighters in 
retum for North Korea's permission for Soviet fighter planes to fly over North Korea's airspace and to 
use North Korean air bases. This build-up of the North Korean Air Force was an attempt to 
counterbalance the US dispatch of F16 fighter planes to South Korea. Also, joint naval exercises 
between two countries were conducted and the Soviet navy could use several North Korean ports. In 
the economic field, the two countries signed a number of economic and technological pacts (Kim 
Ilpyong 1987: 125). 
62 
the two countries' relationship to be called "lips to the teeth." After the Korean War, China 
provided both manpower and other aid for North Korea's post-war reconstruction. The two 
countries also signed a treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance in 1961, 
which is similar to the treaty between North Korea and the Soviets signed in 1961. 
However, the northern alignment was not always smooth and they experienced 
difficult periods of in their relationships. Until the late 1950s North Korea maintained close 
relationships with both the Soviet Union and China. However, as a result of the Sino-Soviet 
conflict, North Korea began to adopt a policy of equidistance. Especially, the U.S. 
engagement policy toward China as well as the Soviet Union in the 1970s opened the way for 
North Korea to adopt a more neutral policy toward its two big supporters. 
This stance became North Korea's negotiation tactic to secure economic and military 
aid from the Soviet Union and China by engaging in a dangerous game of trading one off 
against the other. Moreover, a series of disputes among North Korea, China and the Soviet 
Union20 brought about North Korea's rigid adoption of more chajusong (independence) in 
politics,juche (self-reliance) in economics, that later proved to be the main internal factor of 
its diplomatic and economic isolation in the post-Cold War era (Lee Seong-bong 1999). 
In order to balance the military power of the 'northern alliance', the triangular 
relationship between the United States, Japan and South Korea developed as a southern 
alignment from the 1950s. Following the Korean War of 1950-53, the United States signed 
the US-South Korea Mutual Defence Treaty with South Korea on the 151 of October 1953. 
During the Cold War era the U.S. government provided not only a security shield but also 
military and economic assistance to South Korea. The U.S. government has provided some 
20 For instance, during the Cultural Revolution in China in 1965-69 the Red Guards attacked the North 
Korean leader, Kim II-Sung, as the "Khrushchev of Korea" or a "fat revisionist." Meanwhile, in the 
relation with the Soviet Union, the Soviet suppression of Czechoslovakian resistance and the 
enunciation of Brezhnev doctrine under which the Soviet Union had the right to invade its brother 
countries in order to salvage their socialist systems created anxiety for the North Korean leadership. 
Moreover, the Sino-Soviet armed clash over Quingdo (Damansky in Russian) Island in the Ussuri river 
near North Korea in 1969 brought tension over border issues between China and the Soviet Union 
(Park Han 1998: 34-5) 
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nine to ten billion dollars in security assistance. South Korea has been one of most reliable 
allies in its policy of containing Soviet expansion in East Asia. 
United States has maintained combat troops and support units in South Korea on a 
continuous basis since 1950. Around sixty thousand U.S troops stayed until 1971 when the 
US Nixon administration withdrew some forces. Since then there have been usually about 
forty thousand U.S. military personnel in South Korea until the 1990s, although the numbers 
fluctuate. Also, South Korea has been the only place in the world where U.S. forces are kept 
at DEFCON 4 (Defence Readiness Condition Four), one level above normal. In recognition of 
the fact that the United States was responsible for the defence of South Korea, and to permit 
greater involvement of the South Korea in war planing, the Combined Forces Command 
(CFC) was formed in 1978. The CFC, which is the war-fighting headquarters, is the only 
combined U.S.-allied command outside of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). The 
CFC conducts a major annual war exercise that is known as Team Spirit. The purpose is to 
practice fighting a war with the North with possible use of nuclear weapons stationed in South 
Korea. In the mid-1970s it was generally believed that the United States kept over six 
hundred nuclear weapons in South Korea. Certainly, these weapons were always considered 
the ultimate deterrence to a North Korean attack (Goose 1987). 
Meanwhile South Korean-Japanese relations have been stormy and turbulent at best 
since Korea was liberated from Japanese colonial rule after WWII. However, the signing of 
the US-Japan security treaty brought Japan into the sphere of US containment policy. The 
renewal of the security treaty in 1960 between the two countries, which confirmed Japan's 
obligation to provide bases for the United States for security objectives in the East Asia, 
certainly contributed to the protection of South Korea from North Korea's military attack. In 
the 1960s the increased US burden of military costs in the Vietnam War forced the Japanese 
to take a more active role in the US containment policy in East Asia. Partly under US 
pressure, the normalisation treaty between South Korea and Japan was signed in 1965. Under 
the terms of this treaty the two nations reached agreement on economic cooperation in the 
form of Japanese government credits, commercial loans, and equity investment in Korea. The 
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Japanese government agreed to provide US$300 million in grants, US$200 million in soft 
loans and US$300 million in private commercial credits. In fact, Japan was under great 
pressure from the United States to share the security burden in East Asia, especially when the 
United States began to retreat from battle stations after the Vietnam War. 
However, the southern alignment was not always smooth in their relationships. For 
instance, there was a moment of difficulty between the United States and South Korea when 
the Carter administration announced in 1977 that U.S. troops would be withdrawn from South 
Korea (President Nixon began the withdrawals in the early 1970s). Moreover, the relationship 
between South Korea and Japan in the 1970s-80s also had its stormy moments. For examples, 
Kim Dae-jung, prominent opposition leader at that time, was kidnapped from a hotel in 
Tokyo by South Korean Intelligence agents in 1973. Also, there was an attempted 
assassination of President Park Chung-Hee, allegedly by a Korean resident of Japan, a 
member of the pro-North Korean association in Japan (Chochongryun). In the 1980s, there 
was the controversy over the correct description of Korean colonial history in Japanese school 
textbooks and disputes over fishing rights and the sovereignty of Tok-do Island (Takeshima in 
Japan). However, the South Korean and Japanese governments shared the same security 
interest - the deterrence of communist military threats - and these tensions were played down 
to a certain extent (Kim Dpyong 1987: 130-2). 
Throughout the Cold War period the United States played an important role in 
creating and maintaining the strategic alignment in the Far East region. The United States has 
been the security shield for Japan and South Korea, as well as their major trading partner. 
South Korea has depended heavily on the United States for security protection and on Japan 
for economic assistance and trade partnership. This strategic alliance developed in the context 
of the cold war and the Korean War, as these new allies sought to counter what they 
perceived to be the expanding influence of China and the Soviet Union, as well as the North 
Korean military threat to South Korea. 
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2.1.ii.b Inter-Korean competition during the Cold War 
After the Korean War and during the Cold War, the two Koreas had no significant intention to 
engage with each other until the late 1980s. Rather, the Korean Peninsula became the place of 
serious power competition for legitimacy and over the terms of the unification. In fact, during 
the Cold War, there was no substantial interaction between two Koreas, and thus no progress 
on Korean reunification, though there were some dialogues and proposals from each side.21 
The two Korean governments were not actively prepared to resolve unification issue at that 
time. Thus, the fundamental stance of the two Koreas has been based on a philosophy that 
could be characterised as negotiations according to what they want to pursue. The North has 
continued to seek immediate political integration measures, discounting the value of 
intermediate confidence building measures. On the other hand, South Korea preferred non-
political and military issues of discussion, and advocates a step by step approach. 
However, the stalemate reflected the fact that neither Korean government was 
seriously interested in improving their relationship and promoting a peaceful unification 
process between the two Koreas. For instance, South Korean President Rhee Syng-man's 
'March North by force' unification principle was an unrealistic and emotional reaction to the 
North after the Korean War. Also, the Park Chung-hee government's 'construction first, 
unification later' slogan was based on the idea that until and unless their national economic 
strength was comparatively stronger than the North, discussion on unification might be 
useless and even dangerous. In the North, the strategy of reunification by armed force was 
obvious in North Korea's military attempt to unify the peninsula in the Korean War. After its 
failure, North Korea switched to an emphasis on peaceful unification. Nevertheless, an 
21 A vivid example was that, beginning with the Nixon Doctrine, the two Koreas succeed to announce 
the Joint Statement of 4 July 1972 for pursuing peaceful unification. However, it was not the two 
Koreas' real intention. For instance, in 1972, At the beginning of direct dialogues between the two 
Koreas, the South Korean Premier Kim Jong-Pil said that the Joint Statement of 4 July was 'nothing 
more than a piece of paper'. Also, North Korea had other intentions. According to North Korea's 
Ambassador to East Germany, Lee Chang Su, who briefed East German leaders on North Korea's 
strategy in negotiation with the South at that time, "[t]he purpose of the negotiation with South Korea 
was to concentrate on forcing South Korean leaders into agreement, to free them from U.S. and 
Japanese influence and to withdraw the US military from the South (Oberdorfer 1998: 25-31). 
66 
underlying assumption was that this would materialise only after a revolution among the anti-
imperialist South Korean masses. 
The continuing difficulty of engaging dialogues between two Koreas was mainly 
caused by serious distrust against each other. North Korea viewed South Korea's intention to 
open up an inter-Korean dialogue as a cover up for consolidating the national division. 
Meanwhile, in the eyes of the South Koreans, North Korea never gave up its ambition of 
communi sing the South, while remaining fearful of the South's economic might and military 
build-up. North Korea was supposedly trying to use dialogue as a means to embody 'united 
front' tactics, taking advantage of the South (park Young-ho 1993: 462-3). 
Instead, the two Korean governments devoted all their energies to the competition to 
gain strategic superiority over the other. In the economic field, North Korea started its 
industrialisation program much earlier than the South did. Thus, with clear superiority in 
terms of economic well-being until the 1960s, North Korea began to send propagandistic 
materials by the end of 1950s to the South, claiming that it had created a people's paradise 
with highly developed welfare programs, with free education for all North Korean children 
(Hahn 1999: 11). For this reason, North Korea was perceived by South Koreans as having a 
definite edge over them, and so the South Korean government rejected most of the inter-
Korean dialogues and refused to make any proposal for Korean reunification. 
However, North Korea was beginning to lose the economic battle with South Korea 
from the 1970s. This resulted from the combined causes of South Korea's rapid economic 
development led by Park Chung-hee government from early 1960s and North Korea's several 
economic failures and constraints such as declining in availability of economic aid, its heavy 
military spending, and the adoption ofjuche (self-reliance)22 economy. By the late 1980s, it 
became evident that South Korea was the clear winner in the economic competition. South 
Korea's military elite seized power through coups, but used this power to develop its 
22 The idea ofjuche (self-reliance) propounded by Kim II-sung in early 1960s was based on the North's 
need to build up its own independent defence and economic capability because of the continuing Sino-
Soviet disputes during the Cold War era. However, the idea became used as a political doctrine to 
justify and consolidate Kim Il-sung's hold on political power in North Korean politics (Park Han 
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economy. South Korea's economic adjustment to the world economy in the 1960s to 1980s 
proved to be highly successful in restoring economic effectiveness and international 
competitiveness. In contrast, North Korea failed to implement internal reforms that were 
necessary for successful economic adjustment to new international conditions, instead 
sticking with an isolated economic policy based on juche ideology. North Korea's economic 
difficulties continued in the 1990s and became important contributing factors towards 
insecurity in Korean Peninsula. 
In the diplomatic field, North Korea was also successful in the early stages in gaining 
international support from third world countries, mainly due to its post-Korean war economic 
success, the juche (independent) foreign policy caused by the Sino-Soviet split, and the trend 
towards third world independence and anti-imperialism. However, by the beginning of the 
1980s, a different international trend emerged. For example, the Non-Aligned Movement 
(NAM) declared that the question of Korea would draw a non-partisan response from NAM. 
Also, North Korea suffered from South Korea's diplomatic gains from their economic 
engagement with the Third World countries. An international environment of decreasing 
Third World solidarity, and an increase in economic liberalisation and in interdependence in 
international economic activities, gave South Korea the opportunity to improve and even 
surpass North Korea's international standing. Thus, South Korea established diplomatic 
relations through economic cooperation with various regions, including most of the Eastern 
Europe socialist countries, and finally the Soviet Union in 1991 and China in 1992 (Gills 
1996). 
2.1.ii.c The impact of military security on the domestic politics of the two Koreas 
The intense inter-Korean military confrontation and competition during the Cold War 
impacted on the domestic political culture in both Korean societies. In the South, as a result of 
General Park Chung-Hee's coup in 1961, military officials and ex-military people either ran 
the country or had an enormous behind-the-scenes influence in the government and the 
1998). 
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private sector. Throughout the 1960s, the military became increasingly well financed and 
trained. On seizing power in 1961, General Park promptly created the Korean Central 
Intelligence Agency (KCIA),23 which built up a systematic of surveillance, and implemented 
stubborn and extreme anti-communism and anti-North Koreanism as a governing ideology. 
Park's regime concentrated on central planning and an export-led development 
strategy so as to build up the essential power of the nation. To do this, the military quickly 
and effectively co-opted civilian technical and bureaucratic expertise, and ruled unchecked by 
parliamentary and judicial power, largely limiting leaving politics uncomplainingly to their 
military regime. After a narrow victory against Kim Dae-jung in the presidential election of 
1971, President Park felt threatened, declared a state of emergency and imposed martial law 
on the 17th of October 1972. After the emergence of the Chun Doo-whan regime in 1980, 
military-led authoritarian rule continued. The National Security Planning (NSP) distributed 
guidance to the media. In the 1980s, purges of several hundred leading press personnel 
greatly reduced the spirit of press independence. Many other laws repressed political activity 
(Olsen 1999: 202-4). 
With the growing power of the military in the South, the policy on North Korea was 
also dominated by the military authorities, through tight control of information, civilian 
surveillance, and anti-communism education. The National Security Law forbade activity 
which in any way supported or appeared to favour anything connected with communism or 
North Korea. In fact, its provisions are subjected to broad, almost unchecked, interpretation. 
The Ministry of Unification maintains a Unification Study Institute which works with the 
Anti-Communist League, and which under the leadership of retired generals provides anti-
Communist training. Other programs, such as Hwarang (Knights of Silla, which was an elite 
military leadership of the 500-700 A.D. era) program led by the Ministry of Education, 
23 Since 151 of January 1981, it was renamed National Security Planning (NSP) under the Chun Doo-
whan government and renamed again as National Intelligence Service (NIS) after the Kim Dae-Jung 
government in 1998. 
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Anned Forces Spiritual Programs intended to instruct morality and patriotism in the school 
curriculum at all levels (Henderson 1987: 109-13). 
Thus, this anti-communism and anti-North Korea ideology was institutionalised 
under the military regimes, and became a cornerstone of 'conservatism' in South Korean 
politics even after the end of Cold War period. Given the popularity of the image of North 
Korea as unreliable partner or archenemy and the lack of direct experience with North 
Koreans, the South Korean governments' attempts at softer approaches, such as 
comprehensive engagement with North Korea, often became the target of criticism from the 
conservatives. In turn, the conservative criticisms often remind South Koreans of North Korea 
as an enemy. This force became a domestic restriction on the pursuit of economic engagement 
by the South Korean government. 
In trying to present the political evolution in North Korea, it is important to note that 
appearances could be misleading because North Korea is one of the least transparent states in 
the world. Nonetheless, some political trends seem credible. One of the trends was the 
necessity of a strong military establishment in the power succession process that began in the 
1970s, institutionalising the incremental assumption of power by Kim Jeong-iI, looking 
towards the eventual death of Kim 11- sung. A key part of the process, for present purposes, 
was the creation of political support systems for the 'Dear leader', that included military 
constituencies. 
North Korea seems to have institutionalised leadership succession by revitalising the 
support groups behind a highly centralised leadership group. In particular, the younger-
generation military constituencies owing their allegiance to the Kim Jeong-il were crucial 
because they helped to perpetuate North Korea's military state. It was evident after the death 
of Kim II-sung that the succession of Kim Jeong-II was successful because his most important 
political asset was the level of support he had gained among North Korea's military 
establishment. This means that strong military support is the necessary requirement for 
regime survival in the view of political elite. It is no surprise that both the elder and the junior 
Kim arrogated for themselves the title and the uniform of "supreme commander." 
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Importantly, the hierarchical relationships in the military have been a crucial element in the 
North, and became the cornerstone of the Kim Jeong-il regime. However, the North's strong 
military establishment became a restriction on its economic opening and reform in the 1990s 
(Olsen 1999: 205-6). 
In sum, the above historical overview after the division of Korea shows that national 
security issues for two Koreas have been characterised primarily in terms of military security. 
For South Korea, military threats from the North have been real and acute, ranging from the 
old memory of the Korean War to the numerous covert and overt military provocations by the 
North involving border clashes, guerrilla penetrations, espionage and psychological warfare. 
For North Korea, the military alliance between South Korea and the United States has been a 
real threat. Thus, ensuring national survival in a precarious security environment has 
remained the primary national goal of the two Koreas. In order to cope with insecurity, South 
Korea has attempted to maximise its military power, to mobilise its human and material 
resources, and to maintain an effective alliance with the United States, and indirect economic 
support from Japan. Meanwhile, North Korea signed a treaty with both the Soviet Union and 
China for its security. 
This balance of power between the two alignments proved to be effective in creating 
stability in this region, and no country wanted to break the status quo. Moreover, along with 
the Cold War bipolar system, the two Koreas confronted and competed with each other in the 
military, economic and diplomatic fields, and though there were some dialogues and contacts, 
these had no impact on improving inter-Korean relations. Also, the two Korean governments 
shaped a rnilitary-oriented political culture in their domestic societies during the Cold War 
era. This culture gave both Korean governments unlimited power to dictate policy toward the 
other Korea, and also shaped public opinion towards a tense and rigid perception of each 
other. 
In the overall hostile security environment, South Korea ended up clearly winning in 
all fields despite its inferiority to North Korea in the early days. North Korea's economic 
difficulties in fact generated another phase of insecurity in the Korean Peninsula towards the 
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end of the Cold War era. The following section will examine these international changes that 
impact on the nature of the North Korean security problems in the 1990s. 
2.2 Military tensions on the Korean Peninsula in the post-Cold War period 
Although the Cold War ended, the Korean peninsula in the 1990s remained a source of 
military tension, due to the danger of armed conflicts inherent in North Korea' military 
posture, including the proliferation of nuclear and ballistic missile technology. Thus, the 
Korean Peninsula could be, once again, the centre of the regional struggle among powerful 
nations and the two Koreas. In fact, North Korea's nuclear and missile programme in the 
1990s appeared as vivid examples of heightened insecurity in the Korean Peninsula. 
The build-ups, tensions, and crises on the Korean peninsula in this period took place 
despite the demise of Cold War period and the signs of the two Koreas moving towards 
reconciliation. From the early 1990s, the two Koreas initiated a series of inter-Korean 
dialogues, and signed on 13th of December 1991 the 'Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-
aggression, Exchanges and Cooperation'. Under this agreement both sides are committed to 
respect their respective political entity; to agree to the principle of non-interference; to 
renounce the option to attack each other; and to improve economic and social cooperation and 
exchanges (MOU 1992). 
2.2.1 Nuclear crisis 
However, the hope for a peaceful coexistence of the two Koreas was threatened by increasing 
concern over North Korean nuclear programs (Mazzar 1995}.24 The issue of North Korean 
nuclear development had surfaced as early as mid-1980s, when a U.S. intelligence satellite 
24 According to Michael Mazarr (1995: 4-8), the new emphasis on nonproliferation stems from the end 
of the Cold War. When the Soviet Union was brandishing 30,000 or more nuclear weapons at the 
United States, the threat of a handful of Pakistan, Indian, or even North Korean bombs did not seem a 
dominant security concern. It was a second-tier concern. Now the Soviet Union has disappeared, it is 
very possible that no other country possesses the combination of economic, political, and military 
strength to assume such a role. In such an environment, threats that once were secondary are now of 
primary importance. 
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gave U.S. analysts evidence of the construction ofa second reactor in the Youngbyon nuclear 
plant, which could produce a bomb's worth of plutonium. With concern about the North's 
nuclear ambitions, the US persuaded the Soviet Union to pressure the North into signing the 
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) on 12 December 1985.25 
Although the North signed the NPT, however, it delayed follow-ups such as the 
signing of the IAEA safeguards agreement, and the acceptance of regular IAEA inspections at 
its nuclear facilities. In the early 1990s, the Bush government began to try to persuade the 
North to comply with the IAEA inspection. It promised in September 1991 the withdrawal of 
all the US tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea, and one off bilateral high-level talks 
with North Korea. Also, the US and South Korean governments announced the cancellation 
of the 1992 US-South Korea Team Spirit military exercise, which was considered a serious 
military threat in North Korea. Moreover, after consulting with the United States, South 
Korea also followed the US policy of persuasion. For instance, on the 31 s1 of December 1991, 
the two Koreas concluded a Joint Declaration on the Denuclearisation of the Korean 
Peninsula, agreeing not to test, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy, or use nuclear 
weapons. As a result of the US-South Korean persuasion policy, on the 7th of January 1992, 
North Korea announced its intention to sign a safeguard agreement with the IAEA, and finally 
accepted IAEA inspections in May of the same year (Chung Ok-nim 1995: 12). 
After North Korea permitted IAEA inspections, the IAEA made 6 inspections at 
North Korea's nuclear facilities between May 1992 and February 1993. Following these 
inspections, IAEA suspected that North Korea had more chances for plutonium reprocessing 
than it had declared. With this disturbing evidence, the IAEA demanded special unscheduled 
inspections on two other suspected sites to resolve the question of North Korea's nuclear 
development. However, North Korea refused to accept special inspections on the 7'h of 
February 1993, and argued that the special inspection was unprecedented, and an 
infringement of sovereignty and national security (Chosunilbo, 8 February 1993). 
25 For details about the nuclear crisis case, see Mazzar (1995), Chung Ok-nim (1995) and Sigal (1998). 
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Meanwhile, dissatisfied with the progress of North Korea's compliance on nuclear 
inspections, both South Korea and the United States governments began to press North Korea 
to make satisfactory progress on the inspection. The two governments announced in October 
1992 the resumption of Team Spirit in March 1993, unless North Korea permitted the special 
inspection by the IAEA. The Ministry of National Defence (MND) of South Korea 
announced that they would use a B·IB plane, which is able to deploy nuclear weapons, in the 
1993 Team Spirit (Joongangi/bo, 26 January 1993). Moreover, the South Korean government 
revealed the existence of an alleged North Korean spy ring in the South. The National 
Security Planning (NSP), which is South Korea's main intelligence service, announced that 
there had been several dozen North Korean agents in the South, including prominent South 
Korean scholars and labour leaders, who had tried to establish anti-government political 
forces in South Korea in preparation for Korean unification in 1995 
North Korea reacted furiously, arguing that these acts were designed intentionally to 
disrupt the implementation of the North-South Korean accord, reached in 1991, and to disrupt 
the improvement of U.S. and North Korean relations. Predictably, during Team Spirit war 
game that month in 1993, North Korea, on the 12th of March 1993 announced that it would 
abandon the NPT to give ninety days' notice and declared 'semi-war' status on the Korean 
Peninsula (Kay 1993: A12). 
After North Korea decided to abandon the NPT in early 1993, the reaction of the 
newly elected both Bill Clinton (US) and Kim Young-sam (South Korea) governments were 
to seek a diplomatic solution on the nuclear crisis by using carrot-stick diplomacy. On the one 
hand, the United States and South Korea pressured North Korea with UN resolutions on the 
imposition of economic sanctions, unless North Korea would not comply with IAEA by the 
12th of June 1993. On the other hand, the United States and South Korea preferred that the 
crisis be resolved by diplomatic solutions. The US agreed to resume direct talks with North 
Korea on the 22nd of April 1993. 
Hence, on the 19th of July 1993, the second round of US-North Korea talks produced 
a joint statement in which the United States proposed that North Korea adapt light-water 
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reactors (L WR) to replace their current graphite-moderate reactors. It was the first time that 
the US was willing to put economic concessions on the negotiation table to resolve the crisis. 
In fact, the United States was interested in the fact that these L WRs are much less efficient at 
making plutonium for nuclear weapon. Pyongyang also seemed to be pleased, because not 
only were these LWRs helpful for solving the North's energy problems, but also this project 
could be used as a bridge to improve relationships with the US and possibly Japan, which 
were important factors for ensuring the North Korean regime's survival in the post-Cold War 
era. In fact, it was later proved to be a key solution in resolving the nuclear crisis. The U.S. 
negotiator Robert Gallucci, for instance, pointed out at the time that "this accord as a small 
but significant step" (quoted in Stevenson 1993: A2). 
However, the lack of multilateral ism in the resolution of the nuclear crisis actually 
contributed to an increase in tension on the Korean Peninsula. The IAEA's continued 
insistence260n special inspections, and a continuity of inspections safeguards, North Korea's 
desire to resolve the nuclear issue only through bilateral talks with the US while ignoring 
IAEA and South Korea, and South Korea's furious reaction to the North Korean tactics 
contributed to an increase of tension in the later part of North Korea's nuclear crisis. 
For instance, North Korea's negotiating tactic, "tongmibongnam" which was to 
engage in a dialogue only with the US, excluding other parties, including IAEA and South 
Korea, contributed to the continuing nuclear crisis. Consequently, South Korea's Kim Young-
sam government was displeased because its excessive dependence on the United States 
dealing with the North left it as a third party in the negotiation. Faced with harsh domestic 
criticism from South Korean conservatives, the Kim Young-sam government changed its 
stance from a conciliatory policy towards a much stronger policy, and demanded serious 
North-South talks in return for suspension of Team Spirit as well as the resumption of high-
level talks between the United State and North Korea. However, South Korea's demand were 
26 For instance, Sigal (1998: 70) pointed out that the nonproliferation experts became increasingly 
impatient and wanted to see North Korea punished for breaching the NPT and defying the IAEA. They 
were more worried about preserving the dignity of the IAEA's inspection procedures than about 
preventing future proliferation. 
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not realised and only resulted in a disparity between the US and South Korea, due to different 
priorities and procedures concerning nuclear issues (Chosunilbo, 28 November 1993). 
With delay on the progress of nuclear inspections, US and South Korean officials 
began to talk about sanctions more frequently, and stated that the loss of continuity of 
inspection safeguards would lead to a call for economic sanctions in the UN. However, North 
Korea had repeatedly stated that it would consider the imposition of sanctions upon itself to 
be an act of war, and would respond accordingly. At the same time, North Korea showed 
continuing interest in a dialogue with the US. For instance, North Korea showed willingness 
to seek a 'package deal' or. 'comprehensive approach' to resolve the nuclear crisis. On 11 th of 
January 1994, North Korean officials made a statement that they would accept the inspections 
that the IAEA demanded, if this were to be followed by a 'package deal' to the nuclear 
problem. North Korea seemed to be telling the US how to go about solving the nuclear issue 
(Chung Ok-nim 1995: 78-86). 
As will be discussed later, North Korea's strategy behind the 'package deal' was that 
using the nuclear card, it could achieve security guarantees and also economic benefits from 
the United States and possibly Japan. After the loss of former allies, Russia and China, and 
the demise of other socialist regimes, the rapid economic decline and the growing economic 
gap with South Korea, the improvement of relationships with the United States became North 
Korea's top priority in terms of political, military and economic survival (Mazzar 1995: 135-
6). After the talks between North Korea and the US, in January 1994, North Korea accepted 
an IAEA continuity of safeguard inspection in return for the cancellation of Team Spirit, and 
another round (The third round) of US-North Korea talks. 
As a result of the agreement on January 1994, IAEA inspectors returned to North 
Korea in March 1994 to conduct more routine inspections. During the inspections, however, 
inspectors argued that North Korea has progressed with its nuclear weapons work, and 
expanded the capacity of its reprocessing centre. The IAEA team demanded the gathering of 
samples of hot sell from the plutonium reprocessing facility. 
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North Korea however disrupted IAEA's activities. After that, the IAEA withdrew its 
inspectors. The US and South Korea began to move toward the resumption of Team Spirit in 
1994, and began to reconsider the imposition of economic sanctions. The economic sanctions 
against North Korea were to be developed in three stages. The first was to involve sending a 
warning sign to North Korea by stopping the flow of money, especially from the 
chochongryun (chosensoren in Japanese), pro-North Korea association of Korean residents in 
Japan, and through prohibition of their visits to North Korea. The second was the cessation of 
investment and remittances to North Korea; and the third and final stage was the interdiction 
of all shipping traffic to the North, including oil (Chosunilbo, 17 April 1994). 
On the 19th of March 1994, the nuclear crisis was intensified when Park Young-su, a 
North Korean delegation representative, threatened that "Seoul will tum into a sea of fire" in 
the case of war during the North-South talks (Glain 1994: A6). On the 30th of March 1994, the 
US Secretary of Defence, William Perry, warned that the United States would seek to enforce 
inspections to stop nuclear weapon development even at the risk of war. The continuing 
failure of the inspections also brought about an increase in US military readiness in South 
Korea, including deployment of Patriot and Stinger anti aircraft missiles. At the same time, 
North Korea and the United States, especially the State Department, still desired a way out of 
the crisis, without military conflict. This was evident in North Korea's acceptance of the 
IAEA's follow-up inspection, in return for the third round of the US and North Korea talks. 
However, nothing was finally decided. No solid proposals were made. Negotiations since the 
June of 1993 did not produced any substantial result. 
The most serious tension was occurred in May 1994, when North Korea disturbed 
IAEA's sampling, which would have revealed how much plutonium North Korea had 
acquired for making nuclear weapons in the past. North Korea had promised to allow the 
IAEA to observe de fueling and to check the rods afterwards, to ensure that there was no 
diversion of fuel for reprocessing. Toward the end of May, the dialogue between North Korea 
and the IAEA was broken off, and North Korea began to unload fuel, despite an IAEA appeal 
to North Korea to delay the process. IAEA Director General, Hans Blix, sent the UN Security 
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Council a letter saying that because of continued defueling by North Korea, the IAEA's 
opportunity to segregate and measure the fuel rods had been lost, therefore, the IAEA could 
not judge whether North Korea's nuclear material had been diverted in the past. 
The US and South Korea began to move towards specific plans for economic 
sanctions. Pyongyang responded with the announcement that the sanctions would be regarded 
as a declaration of war. Thus, the US, North and South Korea militarily prepared for a 
possible 'the second Korean War'. However, fear on both sides was apparent. The US and 
South Korea's fear was that unlike the Gulf War, an air-strike on North Korean Youngbyon 
nuclear facilities might lead to full-scale war against North Korea, with enormous human, 
political and economic costs. For North Korea, the US's wave strike with sophisticated 
weapons like in the Gulf War, would be a disaster. 
Despite these fears, the breaking out the second Korean War was very close at that 
time. In June 1994 the US leadership knew that they were on the brink of war with North 
Korea, and considered taking military options (Carter and Perry 1999: 128-33). According to 
a South Korean congressman, the US actually prepared to initiate an attack on North Korea at 
that time, but it was dissipated due to a North Korean official's direct call to the White House 
(Chosunilbo, 6 November 1998). 
However, the military tension came to an end on 15 June when the former US 
President Jimmy Carter, as a third party, visited North Korea and reached an agreement with 
Kim II-sung that North Korea would accept the IAEA's inspections, North-South presidential 
talks in the near future, and would stop its nuclear programme in return for a new dialogue 
with the US. Carter's 'second-track diplomacy' was brilliantly successful and ended a long 
and dangerous confrontation. Finally, the US and North Korea produced the • Agreed 
Framework' (AF) in Geneva on the 21 51 of October 1994. Under this agreement, North Korea 
confirmed that it would freeze its nuclear programme in return for US promises to establish 
an international organisation, KEDO (Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation), 
that would supply two 1,000 megawatt L WRs to North Korea, and provide free oil until 
L WRs were constructed. Moreover, the US guaranteed nuclear protection for North Korea 
78 
and promised to move towards full normalisation of economic and political relations with the 
North. In the meantime, North Korea promised to accept full international access to its 
existing nuclear facilities, and to be in full compliance with safeguards. North Korea also 
agreed to resume direct talks with South Korea. Hence, the US, South Korea, Japan, and later 
EU27 were established a KEDO and formed a consortium to construct two L WRs in 1995. In 
response to South Korea's demand, the main contractor for LWRs construction was South 
Korea's Korean Electric Power Company (KEPCO), in return for South Korea's promise to 
provide substantial amounts of money for the construction. 
2.2.ii Continued military tensions and instability on the Korean Peninsula 
But even if the nuclear issue has been declining as an urgent source of insecurity, there are 
still other factors that could bring North and South Korea and regional powers into military 
crises. In fact, the Korean Peninsula still remains one of the most heavily armed regions in the 
world, and both Koreas still perceive each other as capable of military initiatives and intent on 
unifying Korean Peninsula on its own terms. 
From the North Korean perspective, the US-South Korea military alliance is an 
enormous security threat given its superiority in massive and sophisticated weapons system, 
and North Korea's comparative lack of support from Russia and China. US-South Korea's 
military exercise such as Team spirit and the 5027 military war plan, are still in place. For 
instance, the objective of the 5027 war plan shifted in the 1990s from a defensive stance to an 
offensive one, designed to ultimately unify the Korean Peninsula by force in the case of a full-
scale war with North Korea (Yang Hung-mo 1999). 
For the United States, North Korea's development of nuclear and long-range missiles 
has been regarded as a serious threat to the US post-Cold war global strategy of 
'nonproliferation', intended to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
including nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. The United States is very concerned 
27 The EU formally became an executive board member of KEDO in September 1997 after the EU 
COmmission convinced the member states of the EU to use KEDO as a means to the Common Foreign 
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with North Korea's intention to develop WMD. It is not only a threat to the stability on 
Korean Peninsula and the East Asian region, but also to global security, through the threat of 
Pyongyang's transference of WMD to other countries, especially "rogue states", whom the 
US military is likely to fight in the future (Carter and Perry 1999: 133-5). In fact, it was 
reported that North Korea has already sold some of its Nodong-l missiles to Iran and 
Pakistan. As will be discussed in chapter 4, the US and Japan's concerns over North Korea's 
development of WMD grew when North Korea launched a long-range missile on 31 51 of 
August 1998. 
Also, from the South Korean perspective, North Korea seemed unwilling to give up 
its "united front strategy," which aimed at reunifying the Korean Peninsula by communi sing 
the South. The strategy consists of two parts: first, Pyongyang would instigate revolution in 
South Korea - "People's revolution for liberation inside the South"- and second, it would 
accomplish unification by force by weakening the US-South Korean alliance system, and 
causing the withdrawal of US troops from the South (Han Young-sup 1998: 331-2). Many 
South Korean policy-makers and North Korean specialists still believe that North Korea's 
post-Cold War behaviours, such as the development of WMD, continued reconnaissance 
missions in South Korea, efforts to exclude the South Korean government from dialogues and 
engaging only with the United States, are aimed not only at creating tensions and divisions in 
the South Korean society, but also in the relationship between the US and South Korea. 
Vivid examples exist of the continuing danger of military conflicts on the Korean 
Peninsula, even after resolving the nuclear crisis in 1994, such as when a North Korean 
submarine entered the East Coast of South Korea in September 1996. Although the submarine 
was probably on a routine reconnaissance mission, the Kim Young-sam government chose to 
regard it as a deliberate provocation and mobilised 60,000 troops to search for the North 
Korean crew. The operation ended with twenty-four North Korean soldiers dead and fourteen 
South Korean casualties. South Korean President Kim Young-sam demanded an apology 
from North Korea and suspended all its humanitarian aid and economic activities with North 
and Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU, (Drifte 2002). 
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Korea until its leaders apologised for this incident. It was reported that the South Korean 
government even considered military punishment immediately after the incident took place 
and prepared further armed strikes by selecting strategic targets in the North, However, it did 
not intend to engage in a full-scale war with the North, and the United States persuaded South 
Korea not to attack (Joongangilbo, 16 October 1996). 
Although the United States supported South Korea's demand for North Korea's 
apology, and agreed to engage in large-scale military exercises with South Korea in the same 
year, it was also worried that South Korea pursued a hard-line approach towards North Korea 
in order to appeal to domestic constituencies. In fact, tension between South and North Korea 
was high enough to trigger an inter-Korean military conflict until the 29th of December 1996, 
when North Korea expressed 'deep regret' to South Korea (Oberdorfer 1998: 391-3). Thus, 
the series of military tensions and crises surrounding the Korean Peninsula prove that, even 
after the passing of the nuclear crisis, the possibility of military conflict still exists in the 
Korean Peninsula, even in the post-Cold War period. 
2.3 The causes of military crises: North Korea's total insecurity in the 1990s 
As demonstrated above, even in the post-Cold War era, North Korea's military threat and the 
possibility of military conflict in the Korean Peninsula persist, and the use of military force 
remains the final means of resolving the security problems. However, this section will show 
that the post-Cold War North Korean security problems cannot be conceived of as being the 
same as during the Cold War era. There are clear departures from North Korea's military 
aggression during the Cold War, based on in its intention to communise the South by force. 
North Korea faces serious external and internal challenges, and thus has total insecurity in the 
1990s; its military drives are aimed at the fundamental goal of regime preservation. 
2.3.1 North Korea's loss of major allies 
There are two main factors that have contributed to North Korea's total insecurity in the post-
Cold War period. Firstly, North Korea's insecurity in the 1990s has in some way resulted 
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from the end of Cold War, and the eventual collapse of the bipolar structure in the Korean 
Peninsula. The end of the Cold War meant the dissolution of the confrontation between the 
US and the former Soviet Union. Moreover, the tension between the Soviet Union and China 
during the Cold War era diminished gradually. Beginning with President Gorvachev's 
promise to end the two countries' split, the Soviet Union and China agreed to reduce and limit 
military and weapons build-ups within their borders (Park Kun-young 1999a: 58-59). As a 
result of the end of the confrontation between the US and the Soviet Union, and of Soviet-
China rivalry, North Korea lost its security benefits and space for manoeuvre. As discussed 
earlier, North Korea benefited from the guarantee of military protection from the Soviet 
Union due to the US and Soviet military confrontation. Also North Korea was able to gain 
economic assistance by exploiting the rivalry between the Soviet Union and China. 
Furthermore, the two former allies, the Soviet Union and China, began to change 
their posture toward North Korea. During the Gorbachev years rapid changes in the Soviet 
Union occurred. This included the decline and collapse of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union (CPSU), drastic ideological revision, and the Soviet Union's own search for new 
economic interests.28 As a result, its conventional economic and military support for North 
Korea began to wane and it began to pursue new interests by expanding trade and economic 
collaboration, and by establishing diplomatic relations with South Korea on 30th of September 
1990. 
Russia, the successor state to the Soviet Union, because of its own difficulties, has 
been willing to offer North Korea little other than continued arms sales at prevailing world 
prices and some limited technological assistance. As a result, bilateral trade between the two 
countries has dropped sharply. Moreover, while Pyongyang did not wish to abrogate the 
28The collapse of communism under Soviet leadership brought complete confusion and great 
depression to the North Korean leadership in terms of its basic ideology and policy, and forced it to re-
examine both its domestic and foreign policy objectives and strategies. In fact, the collapse of the 
communist rule in the Soviet Union resulted in 'the most serious challenge to North Korean regime 
survival since its establishment in 1948' (Roy 1994: 370). 
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security treaty that was signed with Moscow in 1961, and was renewable automatically every 
five years unless one party objected, Russia finally announced that the treaty would not be 
renewed in 1995 (Chosunilbo, 29 September 1995). Thus, Russia's obligation to 
automatically come to North Korea's defence in case of attack, which was included in the 
security treaty, was practically abrogated. Furthermore, Russia, who had been an important 
player in the Korean Peninsula, began to disengage from Korean affairs due to difficulties 
with its military and economic capability, and substantially lost its influence. For instance, 
Russia was not included in the KEDO agreement, and was excluded from the 'four-party 
peace talks' held among the US, China, South Korea, and North Korea, as first proposed in 
April 1996. For North Korea, Russia was no longer a superpower, did not share a common 
ideology with North Korea, and it could not provide the same economic and security 
assistance as it had in the Cold War period. 
With the changes in the international environment from the late 1980s, Beijing also 
made substantial adjustments to its Korean policy. Despite its openly stated alignment with 
Pyongyang, China shifted its policy to a balance between North and South Korea. After the 
Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries established diplomatic relations with South 
Korea, from the late 1980s, China gained more freedom and confidence in expanding its 
relations with South Korea. In fact, China had strong incentives to develop relations with 
South Korea. Fundamentally, its good relationships with both Koreas put China in the best 
possible situation in East Asian affairs, by increasing its leverage in dealing with the Korean 
problem and East Asia as a whole (Zhao 1995: 197-8). 
The emphasis on economic development was one of China's primary reasons for 
normalising relations with South Korea. In fact, China had long since shifted its domestic 
priorities from political campaigning to economic modernisation. China's modernisation 
programmes cannot be realised without external support and exchanges from industrialised 
countries that can provide advanced technology, capital, markets, and managerial skills. South 
Korea was a nearby supplier of these resources, and having South Korea as a commercial 
partner, along with Japan and the West, would help to diversify China's sources. In fact, 
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China-South Korea economic relations expanded rapidly and they became important trade 
partners for each other in the 1990s. 
At the same time, China understood the importance of North Korea's survival. Unlike 
Russia, Communist China needs moral support from North Korea in order to uphold 
communism as a political force. Also, North Korea can be the buffer state to deter US 
influence throughout the Korean Peninsula. China's need for North Korea was evident in the 
nuclear crisis, when China reject the use of both economic sanctions and military power. The 
Chinese have continued to support North Korea politically and economically. China has 
provided economic aid to help North Korea in recent economic crises, preventing its collapse, 
and it became the number one trading partner, replacing Russia, from 1992 onwards. In sum, 
it appears to be in China's best interest to maintain a warm relationship simultaneously with 
North and South Korea. 
Even though China is still the most important supporter of North Korea, the 
relationship between the two countries is not the same as it was in the Cold War period. 
Following the normalisation of diplomatic relations between China and South Korea in 
August 1992, the Chinese requested that all Sino-North Korean trade be settled in hard 
currency, though China did reschedule North Korea's payment of the deficit. Hence, it seems 
that for China, North Korea had become a burden while South Korea had become an 
opportunity in the 1990s.29 
In sum, the collapse of communism in the former Soviet Union and the imbalance of 
power between the North and South alliance systems in East Asia after the Cold War period 
gave North Korea an enormous political and economic burden and created the danger of its 
collapse. Its insecurity became more apparent when South Korea began to exploit its growing 
economic power to work towards the normalisation of political and economic relations with 
the former socialist states of Europe, and eventually with Russia and China. 
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2.3.ii North Korea's economic insecurity 
Another and the most urgent source for North Korea's growing insecurity in the 
1990s can be found in its drastic economic decline. As seen in Table 2-1, North Korea has 
experienced a decline in GNP with a minus growth rate from at least 1990 to 1996. It is 
reported that the North Korean economy was showing no signs of recovery as late as 2001 
(Joongangilbo, 29 October 2001). In the face of severe economic hardship, the North Korean 
leadership had to open its door to international economic assistance, and has had to seek 
economic engagement with former enemy states, particularly the US and Japan, and even 
South Korea. 
Table 2-1. North Korea's GNP growth from 1981-1998 (%) 
1981 
-84 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 
EABC 4.3 2.4 3.0 3.0 2.4 -3.7 -5.2 -2.0 1.0 -2.0 -1.0 -2.0 1.0 3.0 
Bank 
of 4.3 2.4 3.0 3.0 2.4 -3.7 -5.1 -7.7 -4.2 -1.8 -4.6 -3.7 -6.8 
Korea 
Sources: based on Euro-Asian Business Consultancy (EABC) and Bank of Korea data. Quoted from 
Michell (1998: 139). 
2.3.ii.a Food sector 
The most visible sign of North Korea's economic crisis in the 1990s is the food sector. In 
1995, North Korea made an unprecedented appeal for food assistance to humanitarian 
agencies. North Korea's surprising appeal to the outside world was significant both in terms 
of its recognition of its own severe economic structural problems caused by self-reliance 
(juche) development and also for its willingness to open up to the outside world for possible 
foreign assistance. 
In fact, from early 1980s, North Korea seemed to have food shortage problems. For 
example, in the 1980s, Kim II-sung emphasised that communism would come true only when 
29 
It was reported that privately Chinese leaders are unhappy with North Korea's political succession 
process from father Kim II-sung to his son Kim Jeong-i!, its refusal to undertake serious economic 
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people are given enough food, and said "rice is communism"(quoted in Kim Woon-keun 
1999: 91). But this was not a serious problem then because North Korea was capable of 
importing food from the former Soviet Union and China. However, grain production and self-
sufficiency declined significantly in the 1990s, to below 60% of the self-sufficiency level in 
1995. As a result, many North Koreans, especially children and women, are reported to be at 
risk of malnutrition. In 1996 the UN World Food Programme estimated that almost 2.S 
million people were at risk of starvation in North Korea (World Food Programme 1997). 
North Korea's food shortage is caused by several factors. First, weakened foreign 
grain markets, especially in the former Soviet Union, have deteriorated the supply of 
resources. Moreover, the trade ban against North Korea, imposed by Western countries, has 
prohibited North Korea from importing necessary resources and technologies. Second, a 
limited supply of energy, raw materials and component parts restricted industrial activities. 
Because supplied fertilisers and agro-chemicals became insufficient, due to the severe drop in 
the operational rate of industries, agricultural productivity also decreased sharply. Thus, food 
security in North Korea remains closely linked to the overall performance of the economy, 
which determines its ability to generate resources for importing both agricultural inputs and 
raw materials for manufacturing. Third, the decrease in agricultural production in recent years 
is due, to some extent, to continued natural disasters such as floods, droughts and tidal waves. 
It is generally believed that the recent abnormal weather conditions have simply occurred by 
chance. However, the high frequency of floods can also be attributed to the level of 
deforestation in the mountains. Large parts of the forest have been felled for fuel-wood use 
due to the lack of oil and coal (Kim Woon-keun 1999: 89). 
Fourth, the current agricultural stagnation is clearly caused by the collective farming 
system, the so-called "Juche-oriented farming method." It is based on a sub-work system that 
consists of units of I 0 to 25 farmers. Each member receives an allocation of products based 
on his or her working standard, as measured by the level of production. However, this sub-
work system is challenged by many side effects such as people overrating work performance 
reform, and the extreme personality cults of Kim II-Sung and Kim Jeong-il (Oh Kongdan 1998: 139). 
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in order to receive larger allocations from the government, which leads to improperly 
assigning production goals. Lee Min-bok, a former researcher at the North Korean 
Agricultural Institute, argued that the main cause for the big difference in agricultural 
productivity between South and North Korea is not the land, weather, or technology, which 
are generally believed to be factors, but private cultivation in the South versus collective 
farming in the North Korea (Interview with Lee Min-bok, Seoul, December 2000). 
Table 2-2. North Korea's supply and demand of grain Unit: 1,000 tons 
Output Self-
Year Demand Shortage 
Total Rice Corn Others Sufficiency (%) 
1988 5,629 5,210 2,099 2,503 608 419 92.6% 
1989 5,762 5,482 2,159 2,681 642 280 95.1 
1990 5,757 4,812 1,932 2,380 500 945 83.6 
1991 5,762 4,427 1,641 2,210 666 1,335 76.8 
1992 5,894 4,198 1,343 2,256 599 1,696 71.2 
1993 6,065 3,884 1,317 1,963 604 2,181 64.0 
1994 6,156 4,025 1,402 2,024 599 2,131 65.4 
1995 6,224 3,451 1,211 1,851 389 2,773 55.4 
1996 6,061 3,690 1,340 1,976 374 2,371 60.9 
1997 6,188 3,489 1,503 1,599 387 2,699 56.4 
1998 6,270 3,886 1,461 1,947 478 2,384 62.0 
Note: the decline in demand in 1996 was due to estimate a lower of the population. 
Source: based on the Ministry of Unification of South Korea (MOU) data. Quoted from Kim Woon-
keun (1999: 95). 
Due to the severe food shortage, North Korea began to rely heavily on foreign 
assistance to feed its population. International NGOs and various states provided food 
assistance to North Korea which amounted to more than a million tons of grain each year 
from 1996 up to present. More importantly, North Korea became open to foreign influence in 
the 1990s. Especially the numerous humanitarian agencies, which became actively involved 
in food assistance in North Korea, contributed to an increase in the availability of information 
and improved access to North Korean institutions. Also, North Korea has had to engage with 
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countries such as the United States, Japan and South Korea, former enemy states in the Cold 
War era, for humanitarian aid and agricultural cooperation for technology and development. 
Therefore, North Korea's opening up to the outside world, which would have been 
unimaginable in the 1980s, resulted from its economic difficulties (Smith 1999). 
2.3.ii.h Energy sector 
One of the direct reasons for North Korea's recent economic crisis is energy insufficiency. 
North Korea's energy policy has been operated on the basis of a 'juche economy'. In other 
words, it exploited indigenous resources, notably coal to avoid dependency on foreign 
imports. As a result, in the 1990s, over 80 percent of North Korea's total energy supply came 
from domestically produced coal used in its thermal power plants. The second source of its 
indigenous energy supply was hydroelectric power, which consisted of over 7 percent of its 
energy supply. There is no domestic production of oil in North Korea despite oil resources 
having reportedly been located offshore in both the East and West seas, but due to financial 
and technical difficulties these resources have not been exploited (Sisa Journal, 12 November 
1999). 
To avoid dependency on foreign oil imports, only two of North Korean thermal plants 
are, reportedly, oil-fired. One is the 200 MW plant at 'Unggi', where many of the KEDO 
heavy fuel oil deliveries have been made. The other is believed to be quite small (l-Iong Soon-
jik 1998). Hence, North Korea's foreign energy dependency is quite low, at around 10-12 per 
cent of total energy supply, and its energy policy of self-reliance was quite successful until 
the early 1980s, due to the hydroelectric resources developed extensively during the Japanese 
colonial period, and to substantive and high-quality coal production. 
However, North Korean energy self-reliance began to drop in the 1990s. The first 
reason for this is that North Korea' coal production, its main source for energy, was 
significantly reduced in quantity and quality due to the lack of technology and foreign 
advanced equipment to help exploit new coal reserves. Secondly, North Korea's loss of 
access to foreign crude oil and refined products damaged greatly its industrial activities. In 
88 
particular, the poor maintenance of its transportation system and equipment caused 
bottlenecks in many industrial sectors. These problems were caused by scarce resources of 
foreign currency to pay for foreign imported oil and by the suspension of Russian oil supplies, 
which had been available in the Cold War era on a 'soft money' basis. Thirdly, its energy 
sector has a whole range of inefficiency problems; most of the thermal power stations are 
inefficient due to the lack of key spare parts; the electricity distribution system is poor and 
inefficient; responsibility and management within the energy industry are fragmented. It was 
reported that perhaps as high as 85% of North Korea's hydroelectric generating capacity was 
damaged by the severe floods of 1995 and 1996. But, North Korea seems not to have the 
capability (both in heavy equipment and fuel) to recover its facilities (Hippel and Hayes 1998: 
89). 
Table 2-3. North Korea's primary energy supplies (Thousand tons of oil equivalent) 
from 1989-1997 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Coal 32,069 30,217 28,103 26,266 24,383 22,551 20,985 19,546 18,959 
% of 82.1% 81.2% 80.7% 82.3% 82.5% 82.3% 81.9% 81.4% 81.3% total 
Hydro-
electric 2,492 2,492 2,731 2,058 2,056 2,021 1,978 1,936 1,878 
% of 6.4% 6.7% 7.8% 6.4% 7.0% 7.4% 7.7% 8.1% 8.1% total 
Cornbusti 
ble 
Renewabl 
e & waste 947 957 967 981 994 996 1,008 1,019 1,022 
% of 2.4% 2.6% 2.8% 3.1% 3.4% 3.6% 3.9% 4.2% 4.4% total 
Crude oil 2900 2908 2409 1908 1409 1118 1118 1129 1095 
% of 7.4% 7.8% 6.9% 6.0% 4.8% 4.1% 4.4% 4.7% 4.7% total 
Petroleum 
Products 654 599 612 705 729 731 519 372 369 
% of 1.7% 1.7% 1.8% 2.2% 2.3% 2.6% 2.1% 1.6% 1.5% total 
Total 39,062 37,173 34,822 31,918 29,571 27,417 25,608 24,002 23,323 
Source: based on International Energy Agency Statistics (1989-1997), and Hyundai Research Institute 
(HRI) data (www.hri.co.kr/nk/sc16.htm). 
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As a combined result of these energy problems, in 1997, the level of North Korea's 
total primary energy supplies was reduced to that of the early 1970s. The failure to meet the 
energy supply target of the Third Seven Year Plan (1987-1993) led to a reduction across the 
whole of North Korean industrial activities. Some observers indicated that North Korean 
factories probably operates at around 30% of total capacity, and they often experienced 
blackouts for extended periods of time (Hong Soon-jik 1998). 
With this severe energy problem, North Korea became vulnerable to outside help. For 
instance, the key to resolving the nuclear crisis was to provide the North with KEDO projects 
which offer both heavy oil until the first new reactor becomes operational and two light water 
reactors generating up to 2,000 MW, in exchange for North Korea's agreement to freeze its 
nuclear program. Pyongyang is clearly concerned that this massive project might threaten the 
political survival of the North Korean regime, due to the danger of ideological contamination 
from the outside world, and particularly from the South Koreans. However, the North Korean 
leadership perceived that limited openness to outside world is possible, and, more 
importantly, its dire energy situation forced it to accept the KEDO project. Moreover, North 
Korea even requested that the South Korean Kim Dae-jung government supply up to US$150 
million worth of electricity, at the inter-Korean ministerial talks in November 2000, and this 
remains a high priority agenda in the inter-Korean negotiations (Chosunilbo, 17 December 
2000). 
2.3.ii.c Trade sector 
North Korea's economic system is a centrally planned economy, characterised by extreme 
control of markets and closure to international economic exchange. This so-called luche 
economy is designed to avoid dependence on other countries. Historically, North Korea was 
able to trade with countries in the socialist bloc, especially the Soviet Union and China. Still, 
trade was never a major priority, and North Korea's reliance upon trade was comparatively 
low for a developing economy. North Korea was able to secure important resources such as 
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agricultural and industrial machinery and energy resources, through trade credits and long-
term trade agreements mainly with the Soviet Union and China. 
However, from the late 1980s North Koreas' trade environment deteriorated. The 
collapse of the Soviet and Eastern European communist regimes in the 1990s caused North 
Korea's rapid economic decline. From 1991, Eastern European countries eliminated the 
former account settlement system and changed to hard currency as the means of trade. The 
Soviet Union, later Russia, began to partially accept hard currency from January 1991, and 
then made it the sole method in 1992. Even China started to its form of trade from barter 
towards a hard currency basis in 1992. Table 2-4 shows that the total volume of imports has 
constantly exceeded that of exports, and that the trade volume has fallen dramatically since 
1991. This is mainly due to the dramatic decrease in trade with the USSR, as shown in Table 
2-5. North Korea-USSRIRussia trade was down from US$2,475 million in 1990 to US$365 
million in 1991, while the proportion of North Korean trade with the USSRIRussia declined 
from 52.3% in 1990 to 3.9% in 1997. 
Thus, North Korea has been looking for new methods of acquiring hard currency. 
Numerous reports revealed that to North Korean government was involved in international 
crime, such as smuggling and selling drugs and other goods for hard currency. The severe 
decline in trade with other countries forced an increase in illegal activities. North Korea also 
engaged in the sale of military goods to third world countries. The need for hard currency in 
the 1990s encouraged North Korea's export of missiles and maybe nuclear related 
technologies to countries such as Iran, Iraq, Cuba and Pakistan. It is not clear how much 
North Korea earned from arms exports because this does not appear in trade statistics. 
However, this has clearly helped North Korea to acquire hard currency. For instance, 
Joongangilbo, a South Korean daily newspaper, reported that North Korea's Korean Central 
News Agency (KCNA) argued that missile development and exports are a state's legitimate 
right, and that the US economic embargo against North Korea was the main reason for 
continuing with missile trade. In 1998, during missile negotiations between the two countries, 
North Korea promised that it would stop missile exports if the US provided alternative 
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sources of supply for up to US$500 million annually in hard currency (Joongangilbo, 19 June 
1998). 
Table 2-4. North Korea's trade volume between 1988-1999 (US$ millions) 
Year Exports Imports Total Balance 
1988 1.897 3,241 5,138 -1,344 
1990 1,972 2,761 4,733 -789 
1991 1,115 1,716 2,831 -601 
1992 1,183 1,650 2,833 -467 
1993 1,200 1,628 2,828 -428 
1994 1,015 1,278 2,293 -263 
1995 958 1,381 2,339 -423 
1996 908 1,320 2,228 -412 
1997 1,097 1,388 2,485 -291 
1998 651 1,013 1,664 -362 
1999 637 1,176 1,813 -539 
Source: Based on Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA) data, KOTRA (2000). 
Deepening economic decline and limited resource availability forced North Korea to 
look for new trade partners, and thus some tentative economic refonn measures. One early 
example was the creation of a Free Economic and Trade Zone in the area of Rajin-Sonbong 
near the Tumen River in 1991. Also, additional legal frameworks for foreign firms operating 
in North Korea were established. Nevertheless, investments have remained relatively small. 
The Chochongryun (Pro-North Korea association of Korean residents in Japan) accounted for 
nearly 90% of investment, and most of these are concentrated in light manufacturing and 
retailing. Obstacles, such as North Korea's central control over labour, its underdeveloped 
infrastructure, and continuing political tension with South Korea contributed to the lack of 
success of the free trade zone policy (Sisa Journal, 9 December 1999: 49-50). 
However, it is also true that North Korea's trade policy has undergone considerable 
changes in the 1990s, despite retaining the construction of an independent and self-reliant 
national economy as the main national goal. It was recognised that North Korea's old enemies 
can help its declining economy, and ensure the survival of the regime if economic opening to 
outside world is well managed. Thus, Pyongyang undertook negotiations with its primary 
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enemy, South Korea, that led to an agreement in 1991, which provided for comprehensive 
cooperation. Inter-Korean trade has since been continuously growing. 
Table 2-5. North Korea's trade volume with its main trade partners: 1990-1997 
(US$ millions) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Total Vol. 2,475 365 292 331 140 83 65 84 Russia! 
% of total 
USSR NK trade 52.3% 12.9 11 12.5 6.6 4.0 3.3 3.9 
Total Vol. 483 610 697 900 624 550 566 656 
China % of total 
NK trade 10.2% 22.4 26.2 34.1 29.6 26.8 28.6 30.1 
Total Vol. 476 508 480 472 493 595 518 489 
Japan % of total 
NK trade 10.6% 17.9 16.9 16.7 21.5 25.4 23.2 19.7 
South Total Vol. 13 111 173 186 194 287 252 308 
Korea % of total 0.3% 3.9 6.1 6.6 8.5 12.3 11.3 12.4 NK trade 
Note: NK means North Korea. 
Source: based on Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA) data, (KOTRA 2000, 2001a). 
As of 1997, China is North Korea's largest trade partner, followed by Japan and 
South Korea. As seen in Table 2-5, Russia received more than half of North Korea's total 
trade in 1990, but became a small trade partner, with 3.9% of total North Korean trade, by 
1997. Trade with South Korea has increased rapidly, although political and military 
reconciliation between the two Korean governments has not been achieved. Moreover, it was 
suggested that if North Korea would undergo successful reforms, such as a significant 
reduction of the military, and a release of productive factors for alternative uses, South Korea 
would become the number one trade partner, based on a 'natural' pattern of trade. South 
Korea, along with Japan, both former enemies, together would account for nearly two-thirds 
of North Korea's trade (Noland 1998: 201-2). 
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The above discussion demonstrates that North Korea faced serious internal and 
external insecurity in the 1990s. Externally, the end of the Cold War had serious negative 
impacts on North Korea's security. The international structural changes, such as the demise of 
USSR, the disengagement of Russia from Korean affairs, and Russia's and China's 
engagement with South Korea, damaged the North Korean regime in all aspects. Internally, 
North Korea's economic hardship and the growing economic gap with South Korea became 
the most immediate threat in terms of regime survival. Thereby, North Korea's total 
insecurity in the post-Cold War era is the main concern for instability in the Korean 
Peninsula, and the main cause of North Korea's military adventurism in the post-Cold War 
era, which will be discussed in the next section. 
2.3.iii North Korea's survival strategies 
With difficulties resulting both from external and internal changes, North Korea began to 
establish some external strategies in order to break out of diplomatic isolation, to secure 
economic benefits, to restore the balance of power vis-a-vis South Korea, to counter South 
Korean pressure, and ultimately to ensure its regime survival. These strategies, which will be 
discussed in this section, actually contributed to continuing military tensions in the Korean 
Peninsula. Of course, because of the closed nature of the North Korean political system, it is 
difficult for outsiders to observe and analyse its external behaviours with a high degree of 
accuracy. However, judging from the patterns that have emerged in North Korea's foreign 
relations in the 1990s, several strategies of engagement with the outside world can be 
detected. 
2.3.iii.a Pyongyang's 'southern' and tongmibongnam policy 
First, it appears that North Korea wants to establish links with those powers traditionally on 
the South's side in the Cold War era, namely the US and Japan. This strategy has been called 
North Korea's 'southern policy' (namginchungchek in Korean). North Korea's aim for its 
southern policy, in the early stages was engagement with Japan. North Korea's policy towards 
94 
Japan underwent a significant change in 1990 as Pyongyang decided to seek normalisation 
with Tokyo. The change was caused by several factors. First, the Soviet-South Korean 
summit between Gorbachev and Roh Tae-woo, held in San Francisco on the 4th of June 1990, 
must have impacted on the North Korean leaders. In fact, this dramatic meeting signalled the 
beginning of diplomatic relations between Seoul and Moscow. In order to compensate for this 
setback, Pyongyang decided to seek rapprochement with Tokyo. Second, North Korea's 
desperate need for foreign capital and technology to revitalise its stagnant economy was also 
a motive. Under the circumstances, tapping Japan's capital and technology was the best 
option available to Pyongyang. Third, Japan also was sending signals that it was willing to 
have talks with North Korea on several bilateral issues including the normalisation issue (Kim 
Hong-nack 1998: 117-8). 
On the 30th of March 1989, Prime Minister Takeshita Noboru expressed 'deep 
remorse and regret to Koreans for Japan's past actions in Korea and reiterated Japan's 
willingness to improve relations with North Korea' (Chosunilbo, 31 March 1989). After that, 
forty members of a delegation from the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Social 
Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ), headed by Kanemaru Shin of LDP and Tanabe Makoto of 
SDPJ, visited Pyongyang on the 24th of September 1990 (Hughes 1999: 82). In a series of 
talks held with the Japanese delegates, North Korean leaders stressed the importance of both 
early normalisation of diplomatic relations between the two countries and of Japan's apology 
and compensation for the suffering of Koreans during Japan's colonial rule (1910-45). 
After an agreement was reached through preliminary negotiations between 
Pyongyang and Tokyo, on the 28th of September 1990, North Korea and Japan embarked on a 
series of negotiations aimed at normalising diplomatic relations between the two countries. 
However, despite the initial optimism expressed by political leaders of both countries, the 
normalisation talks between Pyongyang and Tokyo were suspended, and have not had yet any 
substantial results. 
However, North Korea was continuously willing to seek closer ties with Japan partly 
in order to reverse the negative international situation created by South Korea's successful 
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nordpolitik, and also in order to secure economic compensation from Japan. For instance, in 
the summer of 1996, North Korea made an effort to resume the normalisation dialogues with 
Japan. In his interview with a delegation of Japanese newspaper correspondents, on the 20th of 
May, Kang Sok-ju, the then Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, stressed the desirability of 
handling the normalisation issue bilaterally without the influence of the US and South Korea. 
He also said that "[i]f Japan settled the apology and compensation issue with North Korea, 
Pyongyang-Tokyo relations could be normalised easily" (quoted in Kim Hong-nack 1998: 
130). In a sense, the new Japan policy was linked to Pyongyang's overall strategy for the 
survival of the Kim II-sung regime. 
The second and most important target of North Korea's 'southern policy' is engaging 
with the United States. As seen in the nuclear case presented above, it seemed that North 
Korea used nuclear development as a diplomatic tool to engage with the United States. In 
fact, a number of motives - none of which are exclusionary - could explain North Korea's use 
of the nuclear card in the 1990s. One possible motive is that the North Korean regime viewed 
the acquisition, or at least perceived acquisition by the outside world, of a nuclear arsenal as 
useful for security in the face of the U.S. nuclear threat and the superiority of conventional 
military power of the U.S.-South Korean alliance. This motive was deepened by doubts about 
the reliability of traditional military allies and sources of protection. In fact, the USSR had 
withdrawn its nuclear umbrella following the normalisation of relations with South Korea in 
1990 (Mack 1991: 88). Thus, North Korea's motive for the actual acquisition of nuclear 
bombs could be seen in terms of a need for a security guarantee against superior South 
Korean military power. 
However, North Korea's cooperative behaviour towards the US in the playing out of 
the nuclear crisis suggests that it was eager to forge a new relationship with the US. For 
instance, the contents of AF in 1994 clearly reflect Pyongyang's intentions. Under the 
agreement, North Korea offered to freeze, and ultimately dismantle, its nuclear programme, 
and to disclose its past nuclear activities. The United States in tum committed to provide two 
96 
light-water reactors, a quantity of heavy oil annually, negative security assurances, and to 
move towards full normalisation of political and economic relations. 
Thus, Pyongyang's acceptance of political and economic concessions from the US in 
return for its willingness to abandon to nuclear programme perhaps indicated that North 
Korea was using the nuclear card as engagement tool, to pursue closer ties with the United 
States. Considering Pyongyang's general cooperation on the nuclear accord, such as agreeing 
with the procedures for the implementation of KEDO,30 its general cooperation with the 
lAEA and with the US officials managing the spent fuel rods, and its willingness to negotiate 
on the first joint search for the remains of U.S. soldiers missing in action (MIA) from the 
Korean War, it is evident that, despite occasional provocative behaviour, it has sought to 
pursue a productive relationship with the US in the 1990s. 
This was also evident in North Korea's willingness to negotiate on missile issues with 
the US. The Berlin agreement between the US and North Korea, reached in September 1999, 
temporarily resolved the North Korean missile crisis that had been a source of tension since 
North Korea test-fired a 'Taepodong-l' missile (or satellite) in August 1998. The core of the 
U.S.-North Korea deal was North Korea's commitment to a moratorium on missile tests, and 
the U.S. promise to ease economic sanctions against the North. As a result of constant 
progress in the dialogue between the two countries, Cho Myong-rok, the number two man and 
deputy chairman of defence ministry of North Korea, visited the United States in October 
2000. He had a discussion about several issues related to nuclear weapons, missile 
development and the removal of North Korea from its list of terrorist supporting nations, with 
high-level US officials including President Clinton. Moreover, US secretary of state 
Madeleine Albright, the highest U.S. official to visit North Korea ever, met with Kim Jeong-il 
on the 23rd of October 2000 (Landsberg 2001: 20-1). 
30 Despite the prospect of South Korea playing a substantial role in the KEDO project, as Korean 
Electric Power Company (KEPCO), a South Korean public company, was going to supply Ulchin-3 
power reactors, a Korean-modified version of the Westinghouse nuclear reactor, North Korea agreed 
with the deal. A the same time, North Korea got its way in having the United States nominated as core 
programme coordinator, after three weeks of difficult talks in Kuala Lumpur in June 1995 (Chosuni/bo, 
13 June 1995). 
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After her visit to the North, it was learned that she requested that North Korea join the 
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) during her conversation with Kim Jeong-il. A 
diplomatic source in Seoul said that the two countries were preparing a comprehensive 
package deal which included Pyongyang's suspension of its missile exports and joining 
MTCR, in return for assistance in economic cooperation, international financing, and a 
Clinton-Kim Jeong-il summit meeting for the first time (Interview with a junior official of 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT), London, December 2000). It seems clear 
that North Korea has been seeking a safety guarantor for its regime survival by engaging with 
the US and using the nuclear and missile cards that were the United States' one of top foreign 
policy issues in the post-Cold War era. 
However, the North Korean regime is trying to overcome its total insecurity in the 
post-Cold War era by approaching the US through its own channels, rather than 
accommodating South Korea (tongmibongnam policy). North Korea's recent cooperation 
with the U.S. could be understood in the context of an ever-growing challenge from the South 
in the game of unification. While North Korea has considered both the US and South Korea 
as sources of threat, that of the US is less than the more pressing threat from South Korea. To 
deter South Korea's pressure, Pyongyang adopted tongmibongnam policy, which means that 
it has appeased the lesser threat presented by the US through negotiating cooperation, while 
disengaging from dialogues with the South Korean governments (Park Kyung-ae 1997) 
This strategy aimed not only to reduce South Korea's influence in the Korean 
peninsula, but also to sabotage the political solidarity of the US-South Korea's security 
alliance. For instance, this strategy was used during the nuclear negotiation process. The 
nuclear case provided an opportunity for North Korea to initiate its bilateral relationship with 
the US. Pyongyang obtained direct talks with Washington, and succeeded in achieving its 
goal of cutting Seoul out of the dialogue, driving a wedge between the US and South Korea. 
Hence, South Korean President Kim Young-sam accused the US of insufficient consultation 
and involvement of the South in the nuclear diplomacy, while the US officials often 
complained about the inconsistency of the South Korean policy, and stated that whenever 
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Washington got tough, Seoul became concerned and urged a softer approach; when the US 
talked of compromise, South Korean leaders demanded a firm stance against the North 
(Joongangilbo, 15 June 1993; Mazarr 1995: 139-42). Thus, the nuclear negotiation process 
provoked severe criticism from Seoul, and prompted hard-liners to launch severe political 
attacks on the government over its loss of diplomatic sovereignty on Korean affairs. 
However, one dimension of North Korean policy is often missed, as analysts tend to 
focus on the tactical aspect of Pyongyang seeking to drive a wedge between Washington and 
Seoul (Manning 1998: 146). North Korea's basic objective behind the tongmibongnam policy 
is its own survival rather than an attack on the political solidarity of the US and South Korea. 
In sum, North Korea is increasingly cooperative with the US because the North 
Korean regime perceived the US as a potential supporter of its survival. Even though the US 
is still North Korea's enemy, along with South Korea, the latter is perceived as the biggest 
source of threat. Hence, North Korean leaders appease the US, the lesser threat, in order to 
counter South Korea, the primary threat of its regime survival. In fact, with rapidly growing 
external and internal insecurity, such as diplomatic isolation, economic crises and even the 
death of Kim II-sung in August 1994, the fear of collapse and a fate similar to that of East 
Germany, was an enormous threat for the North Korean regime to manage, and thus it was 
reluctant to engage with South Korea. 
2.3.iii.b Pyongyang's military provocation and brinkmanship 
The above discussion indicated that the North Korean leadership began to find its military 
endeavours and using brinkmanship tactic, as useful means to preserve its regime. Thus, 
Pyongyang has purposely raised military tensions to sustain itself both externally and 
internally. With its deepened legitimacy crisis and economic difficulties, the regime seeks 
externally to pursue political and economic objectives through military aggression, such as 
nuclear and missile developments and internally to retain the allegiance of the general 
population and the military, the backbone of North Korean society. 
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Given these military endeavours and brinkmanship tactics, North Korea seems to be a 
'crazy' and 'irrational' state, but this is rather a risky calculation. North Korea's utilisation of 
military endeavours and brinkmanship is grounded in its increasing insecurity in the 1990s. 
Externally, using these tactics in negotiation aimed to obtain as many concessions as possible 
from the international community. In the nuclear negotiations with the United States, since 
North Korea is a weak state vis-a-vis the United States, its leadership realised that its options 
were severely limited. Instead of giving up the initiative to the US, Pyongyang has chosen to 
pursue the highly risky strategy of playing a 'chicken game' to achieve its policy objectives. 
North Korea managed to compensate for its weakness by playing a hard ball game of 
bargaining and negotiation with the United States. 
Instead of compromising with the strong, North Korea stood firm and defied world 
public opinion. The high-risk game of brinkmanship towards the United States was 
considered dangerous, but was worthwhile as it helped compensate for North Korea's 
weakness. The specific tactics that Pyongyang employed were crisis-causing, ambiguity, 
brinkmanship, bellicose rhetoric and propaganda, and these threats were backed by its still 
strong military power. As mentioned earlier, North Korea's desperate situation in terms of 
regime preservation in the 1990s forced it to its use the military and missile card with 
brinkmanship to maximise its advantages, and this was necessary for its survival. In fact, in 
the nuclear negotiations with the United States, Pyongyang realised that it had no alternative 
but to engage with the United States in direct bilateral negotiations. Whatever may have been 
the original motives, Pyongyang subsequently discovered that the nuclear card was a valuable 
instrument for its external policy because nuclear development was taken seriously by the 
United States (Kihl 1998). 
Internally, Pyongyang's concern with control over public discontent is also likely to 
have played a role in Pyongyang's military aggression. The current North Korean leader, Kim 
Jeong-il has faced unprecedented political and economic challenges in the 19905, especially 
after the death of his father, Kim II-sung. Under these circumstances, the North Korean 
regime might need to build a mythology around Kim Jeong-il that he has similar leadership to 
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his father, Kim II-sung, in order to keep public loyalty and also the support of the military, the 
back-bone of North Korean society.3! 
For example, a week after the North Korean missile test, on 31 August 1998, The 
Supreme People's Assembly approved Kim Jeong-il as the supreme military commander. He 
was then re-elected chairman of the National Defence Commission (NDC) on 9 September, 
the 50th anniversary of the founding of the communist government. Internal publicity and 
press releases from the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), North Korea's official media, 
celebrated the launch and paid tribute to Kim Jeong-it. It is often believed that the North's 
military aggression and provocation are sometimes related to domestic factors, such as the 
necessity to appease of its military authorities, and also to sustain the public propaganda 
around thejuche ideology and to demonstrate the superiority of the North Korean leadership. 
Moreover, it is commonly recognised among analysts in Seoul that the interplay 
between domestic political structures and the external environment means that "North Korea 
needs an enemy". In order to appease domestic and economic discontents in the 1990s, the 
regime focuses public attention on external relations (Interview with South Korean academic, 
August 1999). The North Korean people have been denied any access to information about 
the outside world; all television and radio sets must be registered and have fixed channels; 
representatives of foreign governments, journalists, or other invited visitors do not have 
freedom of movement. For all these reasons, it is much easier for Pyongyang to fabricate an 
external crisis for domestic political considerations. 
In creating an enemy and an external crisis, Pyongyang often uses bellicose rhetoric 
or gives information about disputes without presenting the positions of their negotiating 
counterparts, especially South Korea. In its policy toward South Korea, the regime has to 
maintain a high level of tension. Being able to point to South Korea as an implacable enemy 
has been an essential factor in the North Korean regime's control of its people. It tries to 
maintain an atmosphere of imminent danger of war breaking out by taking provocative 
3! Because of the importance of North Korean military in North Korean politics, Kim Jeong-il called 
for 'military first policy' (sungunchungchi in Korean) after he became the 'supreme military 
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actions against South Korea, in order to mobilise the people to rally around the regime. Thus, 
inter-Korean dialogues and negotiations often fail to have substantial results, because North 
Korea's goal in participating in them is often for domestic propaganda purposes rather than to 
sincerely engage in a negotiation process (Kim Choong-nam 2000: 249-51). 
2.3.iv North Korea's economic insecurity: vulnerability and opportunity 
It is apparent that North Korea's post-Cold War insecurity has forced it to adopt military 
brinkmanship as a means to engage with the US and Japan and to ultimately secure its own 
survival. Indeed, the most immediate threat to its leadership is the sagging economy. As 
previously argued, economic insecurity, such as the food and energy shortage and a lack of 
hard currency, could bring about North Korea's internal collapse and possibly its absorption 
by South Korea. The growing economic gap with South Korea and the event of German 
unification, with the absorption of socialist East Germany by the West, were all frightening 
developments for the North Korean leaders. 
Threats to the North Korean regime remain predominantly internal. Economic 
hardship creates social and political instabilities that are perceived as more immediate threats 
to the regime than the external military pressure. Thus, the North Korean leadership views 
incremental and limited economic opening, through rapprochement with former enemies, as 
less risky than continued economic closure and stagnation (Shuja 1996: 95). 
There is evidence that North Korea's negotiation with other countries in the 1990s 
was aimed at opening diplomatic and economic channels, and thus breaking out of the severe 
economic difficulties. In negotiations with Japan over normalisation, the 'compensation 
money' issue has been the issue most strongly argued by Pyongyang. This would secure as 
much as US$IO billion in the form of economic aid that is vitally important for economic 
reconstruction (Kim Hong-nack and Hammersmith 2000: 596). Also, the nuclear negotiations 
first appeared to be a matter originating from North Korea's military insecurity. As 
negotiations continued, however, the 'nuclear issue' became not only North Korea's means to 
commander' in 1998 in order to gain military support. 
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restore the balance of military power vis-a-vis South Korea and the US, but also a means to 
gain economic contacts and concessions from the outside world. The supply of L WR and 
crude oil, possibly ending the US economic embargo, and attracting investment from Western 
countries and from international financial institutions became calculated gains in return for 
the abandonment of its nuclear program. One proof of this was that North Korean officials 
often complained that, despite their freezing the nuclear program, the US was not keeping its 
promise of Article II of the AF that "within three months of the date of this document, both 
sides will reduce barriers to trade and investment and improve economic relations." Vice 
Premier and Foreign Minister Kim Young-nam reportedly said that the United States has 
cheated Pyongyang out of the most important benefits promised under the AF (quoted in 
Harrison 1997: 63). 
Moreover, North Korea seems willing to give up missile exports in return for 
economic concessions. It is noteworthy that the missile launch came immediately after North 
Korea's representatives at the New York negotiations had doubled the price for ceasing 
missile exports. Given that the AF in 1994 formed KEDO, North Korea hoped that missile 
development would also generate the same kind of economic benefits from other countries 
(Kim Tae-woo 1999: 489-90). In talks between Albright, US Secretary of State, and Kim 
Jeong-iI, in October 2000, North Korea hinted that the missile issue could be resolved if 
alternative resources were provided, such as food, energy, and hard currency. From these 
events, the important point is that even though North Korea remained interested in nuclear 
and missile development, it was willing to trade them for economic concessions and to open 
to some extent to the outside world for economic cooperation. 
Most importantly, despite North Korean propaganda and bellicose rhetoric, such as 
threats to 'turn Seoul into a sea of fire', employment of guerrilla forces, including several 
submarine intrusions towards South Korea, and the attempt to engage with the US and at the 
same time to exclude South Korea from the negotiation table, it did conduct private and 
multilateral-level economic exchanges with the South. Beginning in 1989, inter-Korean 
economic cooperation has been constantly expanding, both in size and quality. As argued 
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previously, South Korea is now the third largest country in terms of trade volume with North 
Korea, after China and Japan. The content of trade also diversified from indirect trade to joint 
ventures and independent ventures by the South, such as the Mt. Kumgang projects. Also, 
North Korea showed a willingness to resolve several obstacles blocking inter-Korean 
economic cooperation. For instance, North Korea was willing to talk about allowing 
companies to make direct remittances, ending double taxation, developing a single currency 
to be used for inter-Korean trade settlement, and establishing a committee to settle trade 
disputes, at the North-South ministerial talks on the 2th of November, 2000 (Joongangilbo, 
12 November 2000). Moreover, after the first Presidential summit between the two Koreas, 
on the 15th of June 2000, it was agreed that social infrastructure, including railroads, roads, 
and ports will be built across South and North Korea. This means that North Korea will 
accept a huge increase in human and material exchanges between the two Koreas in return for 
economic benefits (Lee Sang-man 2000: 43-5). 
Surely, North Korea is facing the dilemma that it has to adopt at least minimal 
economic reforms, since opening up to foreign economic influence, both capital and human, 
was needed for its survival. Various scenarios for North Korea's future, such as minimal 
opening and collapse, limited reform and muddling through, and Chinese-style reform have 
been suggested (Kim Choong-nam 2000). Whatever scenario will occur, it is safe to say that, 
in order to survive, North Korea has to launch at least limited reform and opening. In fact, it 
has showed some signs of this. With severe economic difficulties, North Korea has had to 
engage with capitalist countries, and thus to increase its economic vulnerability to outside 
influence. In turn, this is an opportunity for South Korea, which has not been able to engage 
with North Korea in political and military issues as shown earlier, to utilise business-track 
diplomacy to address the post-Cold War North Korean security problems. 
2.4 Post-Cold War South Korean security and North Korea 
The above examination indicates that the post-Cold War North Korean security problems are 
quite different from those of Cold War period. As chapter 1 showed, there have been changes 
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in the understanding of security in tenns of threats and the appropriate means to them, in the 
post-Cold War period. This section addresses the new dimensions of South Korean security in 
relation to North Korea in the 1990s. Therefore, the purpose of this section is to explicate 
South Korea's view of its security with regard to North Korea, in tenns of threats and means. 
2.4.1 North Korean threats 
2.4.i.a South Korea and military threat 
As argued earlier, North Korea's military threats and crises have continued in the post-Cold 
War period. North Korea's conventional military power is still significant to South Korea's 
security concern, though North Korea's continuing economic decline has led to a decrease in 
its military capabilities. However, North Korea still has some two-thirds of its more than one 
million-man anny deployed within 100km of the DMZ, and has significant advantages over 
South Korea in the quantitative military comparison, not to mention the long-range missiles, 
the chemical weapons and its ambiguous nuclear status (Olsen 1999: 194-201). While it is 
doubtful that Pyongyang could sustain a full-scale offensive for a long period of time in the 
case of another Korean War, it is still capable of causing enonnous physical damage to Seoul, 
the capital of South Korea. 
The conservative camp in the South argued that the conventional military threats 
from North Korea would not disappear until the demise of the totalitarian Kim's family 
regime. The nuclear and other missile developments in the 1990s initiated by North Korea 
have strengthened this position. They also believe that the North Korean regime will maintain 
the status quo policy as its future survival strategy. This scenarios is based on the assumption 
that the Pyongyang regime values most highly its own survival and that it fears that any 
substantial reforms would have the same consequences as the refonns in the fonner socialist 
nations in Eastern Europe. The ruling elite in North Korea may believe that its survival does 
not necessarily require a change of direction. Under this scenario, Pyongyang might tighten 
socio-political control by intensifying indoctrination, by continuing the secret programs for 
weapons of mass destruction, by maintaining tension in the Korean peninsula to sustain the 
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people's loyalty to the regime, and by adopting minimal economic reforms applicable only to 
segregated areas, such as the special economic and tourist zones. Thus the current economic 
hardship of North Korea would not lead to North Korea's openness to the outside world or to 
a diminished totalitarian political system (Kim Choong-nam 2000: 254-8). 
Therefore, the policy of the U.S.-South Korea-Japan alliance toward North Korea 
should be coordinated to increase its military capability vis-a-vis North Korean military 
threats, and to bring the North Korean regime down as soon as possible. By operating this 
continued containment approach; the so called "contained collapse scenario", and by 
hastening the pace of reunification on South Korean terms through continuing economic 
sanctions and other forms of pressure designed to debilitate North Korea gradually, the 
Korean security problem would be solved (Eberstadt 1997; Harrison 1997: 58). 
However, this approach is likely to increase the real risk of military conflict in the 
Korean Peninsula, and the vulnerability of Seoul to be attacked. Most observers of the Korean 
Peninsula seem to agree that North Korea is now not capable of achieving the reunification of 
the Korean Peninsula by force. Nevertheless, some observers believe that there is a possibility 
of full-scale Korean War. The logic is that deepening diplomatic and economic difficulties, 
and internal and social convulsions, could create domestic turmoil in North Korea, and then 
the leadership in North Korea might well risk attacking South Korea, especially Seoul 
(Manning 1997: 602). 
Thus, the 'contained collapse approach' of the United States and its allies could 
create a real risk of North Korean military attack on South Korea. Some observers agree with 
the prospect of North Korea's 'suicidal war', based on the conventional premise of North 
Korea's irrationality, given North Korea's past image as a supporter of military aggression 
and terrorist activities (Roy 1996: 22-4). Others also argue that Pyongyang's elites might 
believe that even with a poor prospect of winning the war in the Korean Peninsula, North 
Korea might still attack the South because this is more rational than accepting South Korea's 
absorption. In the scenario of an implosion, North Korea would not surrender quietly, as did 
most communist regimes in Europe, because the leadership in Pyongyang fears the fate of war 
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crime tribunals, and an uncertain future after reunification on South Korean terms. Thus, it is 
very likely that Pyongyang might launch a military action to be able to bargain for better 
unification prospects (Manning 1997: 605). 
From these assessments, North Korea's military threat towards South Korea in the 
1990s has quite different implications from that of the Cold War period. First, in the 1990s, 
North Korea's military threat does not derive mainly from North Korea's military superiority 
over South Korea which, for instance, led to the Korean War initiated by North Korea on the 
25th of June 1950. Rather, the danger of possible military conflicts or full-scale war in Korean 
Peninsula can be caused by North Korea's total insecurity, and its calculation that attacking 
the South is a means to overcome its domestic crisis and ultimately regime survival. 
Second, North Korea's military threat is no longer just a matter of South Korea's 
upgrading its military capability, preventing North Korea from unifying the Korean Peninsula 
by force and defeating the North in the event of war. Here, the implication is that there should 
be approaches that prevent any inter-Korean military conflict, as a second Korean War could 
destroy the whole Korean Peninsula. 
2.4.i.h South Korea and political and social threats 
As pointed out above, the possible collapse of the North Korean leadership might lead to an 
"explosion" scenario, in which North Korea launched an attack against South Korea to alter 
the end game. Whether the collapse of North Korea would bring about a military explosion or 
not, the prospect of sudden and rapid disintegration of the North would create political and 
social threats for South Korea. 
First of all, the rapid disintegration of the North means that South Korea may have a 
huge number of refugees from the North. In fact, the number of defections from North Korea 
has increased in the 1990s. Because of continued economic decline, food shortages, and 
especially with natural disasters that have occurred since 1995, there has been speculation 
about the likelihood of massive refugee flows from North Korea. Some argue that given the 
North Korean government's tight control over its population, in both ideological and military 
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terms, and the North Korean people's support for the leadership, the current defectors now 
seeking asylum in South Korea are not likely to become a substantial flood of refugees in the 
future. However, the following causes for North Korean defections to other countries in 1990s 
indicate a possible refugee crisis in the region. 
While ideology and family were the main reasons for defection until the early 1980s, 
economic and social conditions have become increasingly important causes in the 1990s. 
First, North Korea's food shortage could get worse, and thus its people's physical and mental 
health could decline further. An increasingly large number of North Koreans, particularly 
those residing in the border provinces of Jakang, Yangkang and Hamkyung, where the food 
shortage is reportedly the most serious, take the risk of crossing the border into China, despite 
the fact that the majority of North Koreans remain within one of the world's most tightly 
controlled countries. The difficult situation at home appears to be worse than the fear of being 
caught by border patrols. 
Second, information and commodities from other countries have flown into parts of 
North Korea. In the midst of poor economic and social conditions, more and more North 
Koreans have begun to access information about the economic, political and social conditions 
of other countries, such as South Korea, and China's relative economic well-being compared 
with the North. This has provided many North Koreans with further incentives to leave. 
Third, illegal economic activities are becoming a source of funding for the flight of 
many North Koreans. Under the communist structure, private economic activity is not only 
prohibited, but is portrayed as a political crime. With chronic food shortages and economic 
difficulties, the people of North Korea are engaging in such economic activities to earn cash, 
which in turn can lead to further crimes, such as bribery, theft and embezzlement. Those who 
defected to South Korea, including North Korean diplomats, students and officials, feared 
forcible repatriation in the North after engaging in 'illegal' economic activities (Lee Shin-
wha 1999: 182-6) 
Thereby, it seems that the increased number of North Korean refugees will be a heavy 
burden on countries such as South Korea, China, and Japan. According to one source, up to 
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300,000 North Koreans have fled into China since 1995. Most of the escapees hoped to 
accumulate food and return to North Korea to feed the rest of their families.32 In fact, from the 
mid 1990s, international concerns related to the possibility of sudden and unpredictable 
changes, either from explosion or implosion on the Korean Peninsula, have revolved around 
the likelihood of desperate North Koreans fleeing their country as refugees. According to a 
report by the Japanese Defence Ministry, if a war broke out in the Korean Peninsula, more 
than half a million South and North Koreans would become refugees, and 6.9 million would 
flee to Japan, China, and Russia until the situation would be stabilised (Chosunilbo, 12 May 
1998). 
In the case of South Korea, by the end of 1997, there were over 790 North Korean 
defectors. In the past, the South Korean government welcomed defectors from North Korea as 
heroes for the sake of domestic political propaganda. But with the increasing number of those 
fleeing from the North, the South has begun to accept North Korean defectors on a more 
selective basis. South Korea also started to make comprehensive contingency plans to prepare 
against possible mass inflows of refugees from the North. In December 1996, the South 
passed legislation to earmark funds for refugee settlements, and to build refugee camps to 
accommodate some 500 people each (U.S. Committee for Refugees 1997). 
Whether there will be a full-scale war in the Korean Peninsula, or a massive flow of 
refugees, due to domestic unrest in North Korea, the clear fact is that South Korea and the 
region, are generally not prepared for this and would have to face a heavy burden. For 
instance, of the 790 North Korean defectors into South Korea in 1997, many failed to fit into 
South Korean society, and are unemployed or working as manual labourers. If thousands 
more North Koreans were to come to the South, serious domestic disorder may occur, and this 
will be a crucial social constraint on achieving the reunification of Korea. 
In fact, in spite of the denial for the South Korean Embassy in Beij ing, the South 
Korean media reports that the South Korean government has set a quota of only 100 defectors 
32 The source is the Korean Buddhist Sharing Movement, a South Korean non-governmental 
organisation who currently helps hungry North Korean People. 
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from the North per year (Lee Shin-wha 1999: 193). Thus, the nature of the threat posed by 
North Korea in the 1990s shifted from a focus on its nuclear challenge and military 
aggressiveness to a focus on problems caused by North Korea's internal instability. Some 
observers pointed out that policy-makers in South Korea should pay attention to the broader 
social and cultural context within which North and South Korean relate because so many 
violent ethnic and international conflicts are fought on the basis of cultural factors. Therefore, 
without longer preparation for the economic, social and cultural integration of the two Koreas, 
which, at the moment, share little common way of life and thinking after 50 years of total 
separation, the North Korean refugee flow to South Korea may become a threat to South 
Korean society, and ultimately threaten the peace on the Korean Peninsula because of serious 
misperceptions and the prospects for a successful unification of the two Koreas (Grinker 
1999; Park Tong-whan 1999). 
Another socio-political threat is the problem of the cost of unification either in case of 
war or sudden collapse of North Korea. Although the reunification of the Korean Peninsula 
has been the main goal of the South Korean national security, South Korean policy-makers 
began to realise that pushing the North to the wall risked either war or the sudden collapse of 
the North Korean regime, both of which carried unacceptable costs. 
The manner of the collapse of East European socialism led some members of the 
governing elite to reassess their approach to Pyongyang. Instead of promoting the isolation 
and then collapse of the North Korean system as the way to unification on South Korean 
terms, they began to see the need to cushion that system from crisis. Particularly, the German 
case suggested that the costs of unification were likely to be enormous. Indeed, the effect of 
German reunification on that country's subsequent economic performance has markedly 
reduced enthusiasm in South Korea for Korean reunification. Also, it could be seen from 
Romania and elsewhere that the rapid demise of socialism could bring dislocation, discontent 
and disorder. 
Reunification costs have been variously estimated, depending on differing 
assumptions and scenarios, as covering a range between US$200 billion and US$3.2 trillion 
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(Wolf 1999: 177_81).33 This huge range is a reflection of ignorance about the relevant real 
economic conditions in North Korea, the circumstances and timing of reunification, and the 
differing economic goals that Korean reunification should seek. In any case, because the cost 
estimates of Korean reunification are so high, relevant states involved in Korean affairs have 
been reluctant to encourage rapid Korean unification. 
In addition, as argued earlier, political and social integration costs are not included in 
calculations of reunification costs. For instance, the West Germanisation of East Germany in 
1990 taught the South Koreans that a rapid integration between the two Koreas without 
Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) would generate enormous social costs for the unified 
Korean state. From the early 1970s the two German states had maintained numerous channels 
of communication, which included television reception, mail exchange, visits, and so on. 
Thus, East German residents had been exposed to the Western way of life for a long period of 
time before the formal merger took place. This contributed the fact that most East German 
people were ready and willing to become part of West Germany, though some East and West 
Germans would not be satisfied with the outcome of such integration until much later (Park 
Tong-whan 1999: 47-8). 
However, North Koreans are far from where East Germans were at the time of the 
unification. North Koreans, in fact, remain in essence removed from firsthand information 
about the South. The interactions that have taken place since 1989, when Seoul officially 
opened its door to Pyongyang with a policy of exchange and cooperation, have affected only 
a small number of North Koreans. Consequently, it is safe to assume that most North Koreans 
would be unprepared and unwilling to be integrated into the South. However, with the 
collapse of the Pyongyang regime, North Koreans will most likely come under the 
jurisdiction of the South Korean state. But there is no assurance that they will become part of 
the South Korean nation. Thus, the rapid disintegration of North Korea would indeed mean a 
monumental challenge to the building of a united community of people on the Korean 
33 For instance, South Korean government's budget for the year 1999 was up to US$83 billion 
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Peninsula. Without adequate preparation, the Koreans may even be left with the undesirable 
option of having to establish a separate regime in the North. 
2.4.ii Security strategy 
As argued earlier, concerns over North Korean threats to South Korea are changing; they are 
now mainly caused by North Korea's uncertain future. Thus, South Korean policy-makers 
have begun to reconsider the traditional containment policy approach to deal with the North 
Korean military threat, and to think about comprehensive policy measures to contribute to 
South Korean security concerns vis-a-vis North Korea. The military power and alliance 
politics alone was no longer seen as an effective means to prepare for or to resolve various 
North Korean threats to South Korean national security. 
Under the changing international environments discussed earlier, military power has 
only limited effectiveness in satisfying new South Korean security concerns regarding North 
Korea. First, even though the combined US and South Korean military power is much 
stronger than North Korea in terms of sophistication, they were unable to use it as a 'stick' at 
the negotiation table, because North Korea was still well prepared and had enough fire power 
to attack the US-South Korea alliance, and also it was eager to use its military power as part 
of a brinkmanship tactic. Thus, when military power was used as the pressure on North 
Korea, it only created deeper crisis, as seen in the nuclear negotiation, and failed to generate 
an agreement with North Korea. 
Second, as mentioned earlier, the actual use of military power is not feasible either. It 
was seen in the nuclear crisis that the United States was not willing to resolve the problem 
through military attack, like in the Gulf War, while the South Korean government was also 
concerned about possible full-scale military conflict between the two Koreas because it could 
bring enormous human and financial costs. Also, military conflict on the Korean Peninsula is 
not in the interest of other countries, such as China, Japan, and Russia either (Mazarr 1995: 
214). 
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Third, military pressure alone provides only the possibility of North Korea's future 
implosion or explosion aspects as mentioned earlier. If North Korea were pushed even further 
into diplomatic and economic isolation by the containment policy based on passive military 
deterrence of the US and South Korea, North Korea may collapse internally. This could bring 
political and social problems, such as refugee flows and thus domestic disorder. Moreover, 
with no prospect of survival for the North Korea regime, it could be regarded as rational for 
the North Korean leadership to launch a military attack against South Korea. 
Finally, the military-oriented confrontational approach does not contribute to South 
Korea's relational influence over North Korea in the long-term. As seen in the nuclear and 
missile negotiations, South Korea was left out as the third party, while North Korea engaged 
only with the US. In fact, the South Korean Kim Young-sam government had demanded 
several measures for inter-Korean relations, such as exchanges of special envoys, direct 
dialogues, and the fulfilment of military and political terms of reconciliation promised in the 
1991 inter-Korean agreement. However, there was no substantial progress in these matters 
(Gurtov 1996: 27). Rather, this only brought damage to the traditional US-South Korean 
alliance as discussed earlier. This result indicates that if North Korean problems were focused 
on a military agenda, this would be a US centred issue, and South Korea may not have say. 
Thereby, in dealing with these security issues, the concept of business-track 
diplomacy was introduced in chapter 1 to describe a possible, alternative, security strategy for 
South Korea. As revealed earlier, North Korea's economic vulnerability was due in the 1990s 
to the severe decrease of economic exchanges with former socialist countries, particularly the 
Soviet Union/Russia, and to its rigidjuche economy, which created structural problems in the 
changing economic environment. Moreover, although North Korea was not willing to talk 
with the South Korean government about political and military matters, as seen in 
Pyongyang's tongmibongnam policy, it continuously calls for business interactions with the 
South's private sectors and even for economic aid from the South Korean government. Thus, 
the economic sector is the most viable opportunity for South Korea to engage with North 
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Korea, and to increase its interdependence and relational power towards North Korea in the 
post-Cold War era. 
Given Pyongyang's unwillingness to engage with the Seoul government, the 
business-track diplomacy model can open up alternative forms of engagement with North 
Korea, through private sector business activities, that can contribute to breaking inter-Korean 
governmental deadlocks. They can be effective because their energetic but low profile 
operations help bring about breakthroughs, which governments often fail to achieve. They 
also have to face fewer inhibitions and constraints than governments in democratic societies 
do (Chung Ok-nim 1999b). 
Conclusion 
The main purpose of this chapter has been to document the changes in the nature of North 
Korean security problems in the post-Cold War era. The North Korean security problem in 
the Cold War era was dealt with through a policy of containment, enhanced by the balance of 
military power alliance system. Continuing military threats including nuclear and 
conventional provocation towards South Korea in the post-Cold War period would seem to 
support a continuing containment approach towards North Korea. 
However, the analysis of North Korea's military behaviour in the post-Cold War era 
has shown that it is a symptom of the North's total insecurity and its effort to survive. 
Especially, its economic difficulties in the 1990s provide the interested states with an 
opportunity to pursue economic engagement with North Korea. Because Pyongyang is willing 
to accept economic and diplomatic concessions in return for giving up nuclear and missile 
development, it might be possible that economic engagement would lead North Korea into a 
set of interdependent relations which might moderate its security behaviour. As discussed in 
chapter 1, even a heavily militarised Korean Peninsula can be perceived as very much a post-
Cold War security problem and one where economic activity can playa role. In line with the 
theory of economic security policy, as seen in chapter 1, it can be argued that the second type 
of economic security policy, aimed at a target state's favourable political response in the 
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event of conflict by imposing economic pressure was not successful in the case of North 
Korea. 
Rather, the prevention of North Korea's implosion or explosion due to economic 
hardship in the 1990s became the crucial security problem for the involved states, especially 
South Korea. Thus, the third and forth types of economic security policies can be suitable as 
the means to address these threats. Hence, having demonstrated both the opportunity and the 
need for South Korea's use of business-track diplomacy towards North Korea, the next 
chapter will examine whether the South Korean governments have actually utilised this type 
of strategy towards North Korea in the post-Cold War era. 
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Chapter 3. South Korean policy change: Consistent engagement 
with North Korea under the Kim Dae-jung government 
The previous chapter showed both the need and the opportunity for the utilisation of an 
economic engagement policy by South Korea to address the post-Cold War North Korean 
security problems. Hence, this chapter will investigate whether the South Korean 
governments have devoted political energy into utilising business-track diplomacy towards 
North Korea in the 1990s. 
The following investigation will be based on a comparison between the 
characteristics of the North Korea policies adopted by two previous governments, the Roh 
Tae-woo (1988-1992) and Kim Young-sam (1993-1997) governments, and that of the current 
Kim Dae-jung government (1998-current). It wiIl explore the different views towards and 
practice of business-track diplomacy towards North Korea, to address post-Cold War North 
Korean security problems. Thereby, it will argue that the Kim Dae-jung government shows a 
strong policy-making will towards engaging with North Korea. The analysis will then turn to 
the extent to which previous South Korean governments have faced policy-making 
restrictions on engagement, and the extent to which these restrictions have resulted in 
inconsistencies in the implementation of business-track diplomacy. 
3.1 Rob Tae-woo and Kim Young-sam governments' policies towards North Korea 
3.1.1 Recognition of the importance of the economic engagement approach 
South Korea's pursuit of economic engagement with North Korea is not a new policy as is 
often perceived about the "sunshine policy" of the Kim Dae-jung government. In fact, South 
Korean policy-makers have long been aware of the importance of economic, social and 
cultural engagements with the North, as the proper means to reduce North-South tensions in 
the short term, and pursue peaceful reunification efforts in the long term. In particular, the 
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changing international environment from the late 1980s made South Korean policy-makers 
rethink their North Korea and unification policies. Between 1988 and 1990, South Korea's 
increasing international recognition was accompanied by North Korea's setbacks, including 
the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games, and the demise of the Eastern European socialist countries. 
One important factor encouraging a change in South Korean attitudes toward the 
engagement policy with North Korea was the 1990 reunification of Germany. After the event, 
South Korean politicians, scholars, journalists and business leaders were eager to observe the 
German unification experiences through visiting Germany, inviting many Germans to South 
Korea, and conducting seminars on such topics as 'lessons from the German unification for 
Korea' (Rhee 1993: 360). Thereafter, South Korean policy-makers seemed to draw a 
conclusion that they should pursue multi-stage and gradual reunification, along with a 
contingency unification plan in case of rapid disintegration in the North. In this scenario, a 
gradual increase of inter-Korean economic and social exchanges is the ideal formula to 
address post-Cold War security problems because it will encourage North Korea's plans to 
open up and adopt economic reforms and thus it will reduce the economic cost of the eventual 
Korean unification (Mo 1994). Therefore, South Korea's pursuit of economic and social 
interdependence with North Korea has been a key unification policy for South Korean policy-
makers in the 1990s. 
South Korea's policy of inter-Korean economic exchanges and cooperation actually 
began as an initiative of the Roh Tae-woo government in 1988. At the time, South Korea was 
preparing for the Summer Olympics in Seoul. One of the concerns of South Korea and the 
international community was to deter North Korea's aggressive behaviour toward the South. 
Thus, South Korea and the United States decided to mitigate North Korean belligerency by 
suggesting friendly gestures including promising economic benefits toward the North. 
On 7th of July 1988, South Korean President Roh Tae-woo made a Special 
Presidential Declaration for National Self-Esteem, Unification, and Prosperity (7.7 
Declaration). In this, he proposed South-North Korean economic exchanges and cooperation. 
South Korea lifted economic sanctions against North Korea in October 1988, and enacted the 
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Guidelines for Intra-Korean Exchanges and Cooperation in June 1989. These measures aimed 
at encouraging contacts between the residents of the South and the North and economic 
transactions between the two Koreas. Later, in 1990, the South Korean government created a 
more comprehensive legal framework: the Intra-Korean Exchanges and Cooperation Act. 
This act provided South Korean firms with legal foundations regarding South-North 
economic exchanges, which became treated as domestic transactions rather than international 
trade. This act was followed by the enactment of The South-North Cooperation Fund Act in 
August 1990, in which the South Korean government committed to raise funds that could be 
used to provide financial assistance for inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation projects 
(Kim Kyu-ryoon 2000; Choi Gi-woo 1998). 
Furthermore, after engaging in a series of high-level governmental talks, the two 
Koreas finally produced the 'Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, Exchanges and 
Cooperation', in December 1991. The twenty-five articles of the 1991 agreement cover 
almost the entire range of issues: political relations between the two sides; agreement on non-
aggression; the promotion of confidence-building and arms control; economic cooperation 
and social-cultural exchanges. Especially, Article 15 stated that "in order to promote the 
integrated and balanced development of the national economy and the welfare of the entire 
people, the South and the North shall engage in economic exchanges and cooperation, 
including the joint development of resources, the trade of goods as inter-Korean commerce 
and joint venture". 
In addition, the two Koreas agreed on concrete measures for the implementation of 
the economic cooperation agreement in September 1992. For example, economic 
consultations in the Joint Commission for Economic Exchanges and Cooperation welcomed 
the negotiation of payment settlements for goods exchanges, avoidance of tariffs and double 
taxation, and the procedures for investment guarantees and arbitration disputes. Thus, most 
aspects of the economic transactions between the two Koreas were put on the table (MOU 
1996). However, the two Koreas halted high-level talks at the end of 1992, and subsequently 
South-North economic exchanges and cooperation were performed on a limited scale only, 
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through indirect trade, due to the emergence of the nuclear crisis and also South Korean 
domestic political considerations at that time, which will be discussed later. 
The Kim Young-sam government (1993-1997) also tried to expand inter-Korean 
exchanges and cooperation. After its inauguration in 1993, it signalled Seoul's intention to 
pursue an engagement policy towards North Korea. Seoul announced that it would show 
flexibility in dealing with Pyongyang in areas such as its nuclear program, economic 
exchanges, and other social and cultural exchanges. Even as the nuclear crisis developed from 
March 1993, the South continued to have indirect economic relations with North Korea, 
though there were virtually no new initiatives or improvements in the economic, and cultural 
and social exchanges between the two Koreas because of the nuclear crisis. 
After the nuclear crisis was resolved, in August 1994, President Kim Young-sam 
announced the Unification Formula for the Korean National Community that included the 
establishment of a South-North economic community (Kim Kyu-ryoon 2000: 81-3). In 
November 1994, it legalised the reopening of economic cooperation between South Korean 
firms and the North, believing that this would bring the two political systems economically 
closer, and therefore they would be less likely to fight against each other. It would also open 
the possibility of peaceful coexistence and ultimately unification between the two Koreas. 
Seoul also tried to secure a leading role in the KEDO project and accepted the financial 
burden, assuming more than 60% of the total estimated cost for the L WR project, which is 
believed to be between US$5 billion and US$5.5 billion (Kihl 1999a: 127). Furthermore, 
given concerns about the possible sudden collapse of the Pyongyang regime, and its 
humanitarian impact on the North Korean people, South Korea has provided food aid since 
mid-1995. In fact, due to the shift towards this engagement approach towards North Korea, 
after resolving the nuclear crisis, the inter-Korean trade volume jumped from US$19 million 
in 1994 to US$29 million in 1995, with a growth rate of 53% compared to 7.6% and 4.3% in 
1993 and 1994, respectively, during the nuclear crisis (MOU 2001a). Under the Kim Young-
sam presidency, inter-Korean trade, including governmental level economic aid, reached 
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more than US$300 million in 1997, placing South Korea as the third largest partner in North 
Korean trade relations. 
3.1.ii Limited engagement policy: Jeongkyungyeonkae principle 
However, while the economic and social engagement with North Korea has undoubtedly been 
considered an optimal policy by South Korean policy-makers in the post-Cold War period, 
there are obvious policy-making difficulties which hamper its execution. Put differently, 
North Korean opening-up and reform and South Korean economic engagement should be the 
ideal working formula but, regrettably, the confrontation-containment formula has quite often 
prevailed in inter-Korean relations. 
As stated in chapter 2, in response to North Korea's continuing military 
confrontational approaches and tongmibongnam policy towards South Korea, both the Roh 
Tae-woo and the Kim Young-sam governments adopted ajeongkyungyeonkae policy (linking 
economics with political affairs). As discussed in the theory chapter, both governments' 
policy towards North Korea was limited to either a 'carrot' or a 'stick' type of economic 
security policy, and was aimed at changing North Korea's behaviour in the event of conflict. 
Therefore, Seoul did not pursue a consistent and long-term oriented economic 
interdependence strategy to promote an environment of economic linkages and other social 
relations with North Korea, which is identified as the fourth type of economic security policy 
in chapter 1. 
The first reason for adopting the jeongkyungyeonkae policy was that the South 
Korean governments were concerned with North Korea's pursuit of an unchanging 'united 
front strategy' against the South. Some security planners in the South, especially in the 
Ministry of National Defence (MND), and NSP still firmly believe that the North's ultimate 
goal is to "liberate" the South and to implant a socialist revolution through violent means. 
They also still believe that despite remarkable improvements in the forces in the South, the 
South is still inferior to the North in its overall military capability even in the post-Cold War 
period (MND 1991; 1992; interview with a former senior official in NSP, Seoul, August 
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1999). To deal with these problems, South Korea regarded the effective management of its 
alliance with the US as the primary means of ensuing security, and initiated forced 
modernisation and improvement of the armed forces (MND 1991: 184). 
At the same time, these concerns impacted on the South's economic interaction with 
North Korea. First, the two previous South Korean governments continuously disallowed 
large-scale South Korean investment and technology transfer that had the potential to 
reconstruct the fragile North Korean economy. The main reason was that rapid and large-
scale economic assistance from South Korea and the chaebols (South Korean conglomerates) 
would only help North Korean military build-up. Thus, Seoul limited both public and private 
investment to a maximum ofUS$S million per project. It even disallowed the visit of chaebol 
chairmen to North Korea, despite the fact that South Korean chaebols' business activities with 
the North could be crucial for North Korea's economic transformation. 
For instance, as will be seen in chapter 6, Chung Ju-young, the lIyundai Group 
Chairman, was eager to conduct large-scale economic developments in the North, including 
Mt. Kumgang tourism. Over a series of negotiations he reached a basic business agreement 
with the North, but the Hyundai Group failed to implement any business projects with the 
North during the Roh Tae-woo and Kim Young-sam governments, because they disallowed 
the chaebol's investment in the North (Landsberg 1998: 226-7). As seen in Table 3-2, there 
were no large-scale economic projects with North Korea carried out by the South Korean 
business community, including the chaebol, until the advent of the Kim Dae-jung government 
in1998. 
Second, economic engagements during the Roh Tae-woo and Kim Young-sam 
governments were greatly influenced by overall inter-Korean political and military relations. 
In other words, Seoul's economic engagement policy towards North Korea was conditional 
upon North Korea's behaviour, and was not developed as an independent and long-term 
security policy. Thus, economic pressure along with military containment were often used as 
the 'sticks' against Pyongyang's confrontational behaviour. As seen in the nuclear crisis case, 
previous South Korean governments ordered a total ban on all inter-Korean economic 
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cooperation projects, excluding indirect and processing trade, during the nuclear crisis from 
late 1992 until the AF was reached in October 1994. 
Moreover, as the nuclear crisis became more serious, the US and the South Korean 
governments were willing to use multilateral economic sanctions against North Korea as one 
means to deter North Korea's military behaviour, and to encourage the North's compliance 
with nuclear inspections. Furthermore, the US and South Korea relied more on military 
pressure in order to coerce North Korea back into the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime. 
The military pressure took the form of a resumption of the Team Spirit Exercise, the US 
deployment of Patriot missiles, and the movement of a carrier battle group closer to the 
Korean Peninsula. To be sure, Seoul was undoubtedly opposed to a military solution to the 
nuclear issue, but the Kim Young-sam government accepted the US employing military 
pressure for the issue, because it did not want to look weak on policy towards the North 
Korea. 
However, these pressures only increased the prospect of armed conflict in the Korean 
Peninsula, and failed to make North Korea accept nuclear compliance. Moreover, after the 
resolution of the nuclear issue, continuing inter-Korean military confrontations made it 
difficult for Seoul to implement a consistent business-track diplomacy. The Kim Young-sam 
government, for instance, utilised the North Korean submarine infiltration in the South, in 
September 1996, as an excuse to threaten to end cooperation in the KEDO project, and to ban 
inter-Korean economic cooperation, including humanitarian food aid to starving North 
Koreans, claiming that the Pyongyang regime had overstated the extent of food shortages. 
Third, the two previous South Korean governments have pressured other countries 
not to engage with, or provide economic benefits to North Korea unless North Korea was 
willing to participate in South-North direct talks. As discussed in chapter 2, normalisation 
with the US and Japan could be crucial in terms of North Korea's chance to liberalise its 
economic relations with the West. The economic opening and reforms which may follow 
from this are actually desirable for South Korea. However, the idea of normalisation was not 
part of the previous South Korean governments' calculated interests. Concerned over the 
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'Koreanisation' of Korean problems, and with keeping its post-Cold War strategic advantages 
vis-a-vis North Korea,34 previous South Korean governments had not welcomed unilateral 
economic engagement by major powers such as the US and Japan with the North, without 
meaningful progress between South and North Korea. 
The Roh Tae-woo government claimed, through the '7.7 Declaration' in 1988, that 
Seoul was ready to cooperate with North Korea to improve its relations with the US and 
Japan. However, after North Korea and Japan announced a major diplomatic breakthrough, 
having enhanced diplomatic and economic cooperation, when Kanemaru, a prominent 
Japanese politician, visited the North in September 1990, the Roh Tae-woo government 
showed great concern. In other words, it wanted to maintain Seoul's superior position to 
Pyongyang, in order to push North Korea into direct negotiations with South Korea. Thus, the 
Roh Tae-woo government demanded that Japan should engage in prior consultations with 
South Korea regarding negotiations with North Korea, and not extend economic cooperation 
until after real improvement in inter-Korean relations (Quinones 2000: 149-50). 
This South Korean policy towards Japanese-North Korea relations was continued by 
the Kim Young-Sam government and became Japan's external constraint in its engagement 
towards North Korea. The Kim Young-sam government constantly opposed any improvement 
in Japan! North Korean relations or economic contacts, and cautioned Japan not to act 
unilaterally in regard to engagement with the North. 
For instance, the Kim Young-sam government demanded that Japan should not 
provide rice to Pyongyang until a deal on rice aid talks could be struck between Seoul and 
Pyongyang in the summer of 1995. Although Japan acceded to South Korea's request, 
President Kim expressed South Korea's displeasure at Japan's handling of the rice-aid issue, 
because Japan's offer of 500,000 tons of rice clearly overshadowed Seoul's offer of 150,000. 
Furthermore, South Korean policy-makers believed that North Korea's defiant acts towards 
34 The term 'Koreanisation of Korean problems' is borrowed from Ahn Byung-joon (1995). According 
to Shin Dong-ik (1997: 505), South Korea has adhered to the principle of direct dialogue between the 
two Koreas to resolve inter-Korean problems, because it believes that the Korean issue should be 
resolved by Korean themselves. He argues that many Koreans still feel that Korea was the victim of the 
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South Korea, despite South Korea's rice aid, were caused by Japanese massive rice aid and 
promises of help in the future. 
In an interview with the Japanese Nihon Keizai newspaper on 9 October 1995, 
President Kim Young-sam stated that "it is desirable for Japan to leave the North and South 
Korean issue to the Koreans ... Japan's attempts to improve relations with the North ahead of 
South Korea will not serve Japan's own interest" (quoted in Hankookilbo, 1 July 1995). After 
the 'rice aid incident', President Kim even cancelled a scheduled October meeting with the 
Japanese Prime Minister Murayama in New York. In an attempt to ease tensions between 
Tokyo and Seoul, Murayama assured South Korea that South Korea and Japan would consult 
closely. Japan was willing to try to conduct normalisation talks with Pyongyang without 
undermining exiting Tokyo-Seoul ties to link the pace of normalisation talks to the progress 
of the inter-Korean dialogue, and to refrain from providing any further economic assistance to 
Pyongyang prior to the establishment of diplomatic relations before Japan and North Korea 
(Kim Hong-nack 1998: 127-8). 
Moreover, the Kim Young-sam government was also concerned with the 
normalisation of relations between the US and North Korea. Although it had publicly stated 
its willingness to help the North avoid economic collapse and to improve Pyongyang's 
relations with the US, the opposite was true. Seoul reacted sharply to the US's willingness to 
negotiate with the North on the normalisation issue. It believed that a close US-North Korea 
relationship would later result in a peace treaty between them without bringing any 
meaningful progress between the two Koreas. In tum, Washington would be forced to 
withdraw its troops and to decrease military capacity dramatically in the South. 
Some conservative analysts in South Korea even argue that North Korea is pursuing a 
Vietnamese-style unification strategy. Huh Moon-do, former member of the Chun Doo-whan 
government, wrote in the South Korean magazine Monthly Chosun that "[a]fter the U.S. 
signed a peace treaty and withdrew its soldiers from Vietnam in 1973, it took only two years 
and three months until Vietnam was taken over by the Communists". His other concern was 
Yalta arrangements that produced the division of Korea by foreign powers in 1945. 
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that the normalisation of relations between the two states would likely unlock both the US and 
Japanese loans and investments. Thus, North Korea could survive without having to engage 
with South Korea (Monthly Chosun, September 1994). 
Furthermore, President Kim Young-sam even talked openly of his hopes for the 
imminent economic collapse of the North,3S in spite of the fact that his government's official 
unification policy was peaceful unification through gradual inter-Korean economic and social 
cooperation. In fact, the 'contained collapse' approach towards North Korea gained ground 
especially after the death of Kim II-sung in July 1994, based on Seoul's perception of North 
Korea's economic crisis and collapse in the near future. 
In sum, previous South Korean governments'concerns and calculations regarding the 
North Korean issue combined the diplomatic isolation approach and the official approach of 
engagement towards the North in the 1990s. Within this, the Kim Young-sam government 
was more inclined towards hard-line approach than Roh Tae-woo government. Thus, Seoul's 
inconsistent economic engagement policy, combined with economic and military pressure, 
discouraged its private sector's will to engage with North Korea, and vice versa. Moreover, its 
prevention policy towards Pyongyang's attempts to normalise its relationships with the U.S. 
and Japan constrained the atmosphere in which North Korea could engage with its formal 
enemies. Thus, Seoul's overall economic policy towards the North was often used as an 
instrument of 'coercive economic power' designed to force the North to relate to South Korea 
and ultimately to enable South Korea to absorb North Korea on its terms in the near future. 
However, it should be aware that the use of South Korea's economic security policy in this 
way was counterproductive, given that the North was known to be largely unresponsive to 
economic pressure. The North was, instead, likely to increase its aggressive military 
behaviour in the face of threats. More importantly, North Korea's collapse or chaos would 
create on enormous burden, especially on the South Korean people. 
3S New York Times (8 October 1994) reported that Kim Young-sam argued that the North Korean 
government was on the verge of an economic and political crisis that could sweep it from power, and 
that Washington should therefore stiffen, not ease its position in pressing Pyongyang to abandon its 
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3.t.iii Domestic politics: sources of inconsistent economic engagement policy 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the fundamental difficulty preventing deeper economic 
cooperation between the two Koreas during the previous South Korean governments was 
North Korea's provocative behaviour and unwillingness to engage with South Korea. It was 
not difficult to understand Pyongyang's sense of weakness and fear that the North could be 
absorbed by the much richer South. Thus, North Korea appeared terrified to open its door to 
the outside world, in particular to South Korea, who was seen as a Trojan Horse wanting 
reunification on their terms. In addition, the establishment of diplomatic relations between 
China and South Korea in 1992 increased North Korea's 'absorption phobia.' 
However, it was clear that Pyongyang wanted to engage with other former enemies, 
the US and Japan, especially in the economic field. Also, it was not opposed to selective 
economic engagement with the South Korean private sector. Thus, the limited economic and 
social cooperation in that period was not entirely due to the North Korean reticence. 
According to the Korea Economic Weekly, "[t]hroughout the crisis over North Korea's 
withdrawal from the NPT, Southern companies detected no change in their willingness to do 
business" (Breen 1993: 3). An equally important factor, which generated severe fluctuations 
in South Korea's North Korea policy, and limited deeper economic and social interactions 
between two Koreas, was South Korea's domestic political environment. 
For instance, the Roh Tae-woo government's economic engagement policy nearly 
stopped when the South Korean Presidential Election became heavily contested in Seoul in 
1992. The political authority of Roh Tae-woo, increasingly seen as a lame duck president, 
began to ebb, while the political power of Kim Young-sam grew after he was chosen as the 
ruling party's (Democratic Liberal Party: DLP) presidential candidate in May 1992. Several 
months before the presidential election, which was scheduled for December 16 that year, 
South Korea's hard-line policy, which had been visible since May, became conspicuous. As 
presented in chapter 2, examples of this were the resumption of Team Spirit Exercises and the 
suspected nuclear weapon program. He explained that compromise might just prolong the life of the 
North Korean Government. 
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arrest and announcement of the North Korean espionage ring by the National Security Planing 
(NSP), in October 1992. The then South Korean Prime Minister, Hyun Seung-chong, issued a 
letter to his counterpart in the North, requesting an apology for the espionage scheme. In 
response, North Korea officially disclosed its decision to boycott the South-North 
Coordinating Commission, thereby deepening the cool down of inter-Korean relations. South 
Korea in tum banned all inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation including economic, social 
and cultural activities. While North Korea had long had spies in the South and vice versa, the 
timing of the NSP's announcement raised questions about the DLP's political intention. 
According to Kim Hak-joon, who was the chief Blue House spokesman of the Roh 
Tae-woo government, before the espionage ring revelation, President Roh had authorised 
South Korean high level officials to visit North Korea in regard to joint economic 
development in the North, but the NSP, already under the control of Kim Young-sam, 
opposed the joint economic development mission, and exaggerated greatly the spy ring arrest 
incident. Also, the Roh Tae-woo government's economic engagement policy towards North 
Korea was totally stopped as 1992 Presidential election approached (Oberdorfer 1998: 274). It 
was interesting to see that both Kim Young-sam's election strategy and the South Korean 
government's North Korea policy were deliberately orchestrated to be hawkish and Seoul's 
tough stance toward the North continued until the election ended. 
It was reported that Kim Young-sam's overall election strategy was to distinguish his 
conservative hard-line policy towards North Korea from the rival candidate, Kim Dae Jung's 
relatively liberal and progressive stance, and thus appeal to the conservative public of the 
South. In fact, these tactics are not difficult to detect throughout the campaign period. For 
instance, Kim Young-sam stressed the anti-North Korean rhetoric in his campaign speech on 
the 9th of December 1992, near the DMZ area. He argued that 'for unification, a man of solid 
anti-communism ideology must be elected as the President' (Hankookilbo, 10 December 
1992). 
The trend of using the North Korean card to appeal to domestic political concerns 
was clearly demonstrated in the Kim Young-sam government. The timing of the policy shift 
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regarding North Korea suggests that domestic politics, such as election and public opinion, 
were the major determinants of the government's North Korea policy. As pointed out before, 
the starting point of its inconsistency in North Korea policy can be traced back to 1992 when 
Kim Young-sam, as the DLP's presidential candidate, employed an election strategy which 
included a hawkish stance towards North Korea. However, after he became the President of 
South Korea, his government proposed a series of engagement policies with North Korea. It 
repatriated the long-term North Korean political prisoner, Lee In-mo, to North Korea as 
requested and promised to pursue a South-North summit (Joongangilbo, 1 March 1993). 
However, Pyongyang's withdrawal from the NPT turned this engagement policy into 
a long deadlock between the two Koreas. The conservative media criticised Kim Young-
sam's early optimistic attitude towards Pyongyang, including his decision to repatriate Lee In-
mo, and negative views prevailed in South Korea's public opinion. The ruling party (DLP) 
was largely based on conservative support, especially an anti-North Korean posture, and 
North Korea's withdrawal was powerful enough to shift its policy towards a more hard-line 
approach. Three days after Pyongyang's withdrawal announcement from the NPT, the 
government confirmed a return to hard-line policies, suspending all levels of inter-Korean 
exchanges with North Korea to urge North Korea to abide by the IAEA request (Chosunilbo, 
15 March 1993). 
Moreover, the continuing bilateral negotiations between Washington and Pyongyang 
on the nuclear issue brought more criticism centred on Kim Young-sam's lack of diplomatic 
capability, labelling his North Korea policy as a total failure. South Korean Deputy Prime 
Minister Lee Hong-koo at that time confessed that Seoul's policy stance hardened during the 
nuclear crisis, and that this actually harmed on early resolution of the nuclear question. He 
pointed out that the South's tougher stance towards the North was not useful, but it was 
necessary. It was necessary in the context of South Korean domestic politics because a 
conciliatory stance towards the North would have created political tension and division in the 
South (Washington Post, 9 October 1994). 
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As soon as U.S.-North Korean nuclear negotiations were concluded, Seoul shifted its 
hard-line policy towards a more friendly approach. From late October 1994, the Kim Young-
sam government began to pursue massive investment programs in North Korea. The climax 
of this engagement policy towards North Korea was when 50,000 tons of rice were shipped to 
the North on 25th of June 1995, just two days before the local elections in the South. The 
ruling party seemed to expect that this historic food aid would give an image of a government 
successfully managing its relations with the North, and thus serve as an effective election 
strategy. 
However, the Kim Young-sam government's expectation for better relations with 
North Korea vanished after the flag incident,36 and the Pyongyang's capture of a South 
Korean freight vessel carrying rice from Seoul. The public anger against "being slapped for 
doing good" became serious enough to dramatically affect his popularity. Again, this incident 
took place several months before a crucial moment in the domestic political cycles, the 1996 
April National Assembly election, and the government reportedly decided not to consider any 
more food aid to Pyongyang before the elections. It also reportedly requested cooperation 
from Washington and Tokyo to abstain from providing further food aid to Pyongyang 
(Dongailbo, 25 January 1996). 
But after the 1996 National Assembly election, the Kim Young-sam government 
launched a series of engagement policies such as proposing four-party talks, the launch of 
KEDO construction, and the resumption of food aid. Indeed, the Kim Young-sam 
government's policy towards Pyongyang shifted several times during its term in office 
according to its domestic political interests; it was a naegtang on tang (erratic) approach. As a 
result, "inconsistency" has been the focal point of media and legislative criticism with regard 
to North Korea policy. Kim Yong-ho, a researcher at the Korea Institute for National 
Unification (KINU), pointed out that President Kim was too sensitive in reflecting public 
36 The 'Sea Apex' freight, which carried rice for North Korea, departed from South Korea on 25 June 
1995. When it entered the North Korean port of Chongchin, it was forced to hoist the North Korean 
flag, although the two Koreas had agreed that no flag would be hoisted when entering the port. 
Consequently, on June 29 1995, the South Korean government ordered all freighters on their way to 
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opinion, and did not hesitate to use the North Korean issue as a campaign tool at the time of 
elections, and so his engagement policy towards North Korea became inconsistent (Kim 
Yong-ho 1999). 
A second domestic source of Seoul's inconsistent business-track diplomacy towards 
North Korea was the lack of policy belief by the policy-makers with regard to economic 
engagement policy in the service of South Korean security objectives. It was clearly 
demonstrated about the Kim Young-sam government that the policy-makers, especially 
President Kim Young-sam, had no firm belief that a constant and active economic 
engagement with North Korea would serve South Korean security interests in the long run. 
As discussed in chapter 1, under the Korean presidential system, the President's 
power can be used as the backbone of consistent business-track diplomacy towards North 
Korea ifhe or she desires. Kim Young-sam, however, showed no political will to implement 
this kind of economic security policy continuously. It was suggested that the biggest reason 
for the Kim Young-sam government's inconsistent North Korea policy can be found in the 
President's lack of a Korean unification philosophy in terms of when and how unification 
should be accomplished, and what plan should be applied to reach this goal (Park Kun-young 
1999a: 171-4). 
Moreover, his lack of policy belief in business-track diplomacy resulted from 
ambivalent perceptions about North Korea. President Kim Young-sam seemed to have an 
obsession with achieving a historical breakthrough, the reunification of Korea on his own 
terms through the collapse of North Korea, though this was not a rational perspective (Kim 
Yong-ho 1999: 241). James Laney, the U.S. ambassador to South Korea during the Kim 
Young-sam government, also points out that "Kim Young-sam was a man divided in his own 
mind. His more rational side says the sudden collapse of North Korea would be a disaster, and 
he tells us all the things he is doing or is willing to do, to cooperate with North Korea. On the 
other hand, his emotional side wants North Korea to collapse on his terms, so he can be the 
first president of a unified Korea" (quoted in Oberdorfer 1998: 373). In fact, at times it 
North Korea which rice on board to retreat (Kim Yong-ho 233-5). 
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appeared that President Kim Young-sam's position was based on the expectation ofa 'speedy 
collapse and unification by the South of the North', especially after the death of Kim n-sung 
in 1994. In fact, one school of thought argued that a collapse of North Korea was not only 
inevitable, but also desirable. This school holds that to "engage" the North economically is 
only to prop up a rigid regime and to increase reunification cost (Eberstadt 1997). 
Because he was not serious about the need for an economic engagement policy to 
address the North Korean security problems as a long-term strategy, he was not willing to 
take personal political risks by pursuing this soft measure consistently. Rather, the lack of 
policy-making will for comprehensive engagement with North Korea made him react more 
sensitively to the conservative media and public opinion, and to change his stance toward 
North Korea frequently. In fact, President Kim Young-sam's lack of belief in the need for 
active engagement with North Korea for security purposes is in contrast with President Kim 
Dae-jung's strong beliefs about the effectiveness of consistent engagement with North Korea 
as viable long-term security policy, which will be discussed in chapter 5 in detail. Thereby, 
the difference in the decision-maker's beliefs actually influenced the policy-making will of 
the South Korean government, and in tum resulted in the difference in the degree to which the 
South's engage with the North. 
In sum, the two previous South Korean governments in the post-Cold War era (both 
the Roh Tae-woo and the Kim Young-sam governments) showed both the positive and the 
negative aspects of the economic engagement policy towards North Korea as a means for the 
resolution of the North Korean security problem. They understood the importance of the 
engagement policy in the long run and that it was the desirable approach towards North 
Korea. However, the external and internal environments of South Korea made it difficult to 
pursue the policy of greater and longer-term economic engagement with North Korea 
consistently. Externally, North Korea's nuclear development and continuing military 
provocation towards the South gave justification to conservative views in the South. 
Moreover, Pyongyang's tongmibongnam strategy caused Seoul to seek to limit the U.S. and 
Japan's engagement policy towards North Korea. Internally, the North Korean issue was still 
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a part of the South's domestic political game, especially at election time. Moreover, the two 
governments' engagement policy was not designed to produce long-term benefits by 
developing interdependent relationships with North Korea through economic and social 
activities but was trying to bring North Korea to the inter-Korean negotiation table. 
Hence, in the case of the two previous South Korean governments' engagement with 
North Korea, their economic security policies often resemble to the second and the third types 
of policy, the stick and the carrot approaches, as presented in chapter 1. Therefore, the fourth 
type of economic security policy, aimed at establishing inter-Korean economic and social 
linkages, and interdependence in the future, was missing. 
3.2 Active and consistent engagement with North Korea under the Kim-Dae-jung 
government 
The Kim Dae-jung government (inaugurated in February 1998) has shown a strong 
commitment to an active economic engagement policy towards North Korea as a core 
principle for dealing with the North Korean security problem. During its first three years from 
1998 to 2000, Kim Dae-jung government has shown a strong policy making will to constantly 
pursue this engagement policy, called the "sunshine policy", despite several domestic and 
international difficulties, which will discussed later. Moreover, Kim Dae-jung's engagement 
of North Korea is comprehensive and multi-layered, and it is aimed at deeper interdependence 
with North Korea in order to induce economic opening-up and reform. This analysis looks at 
three main areas as examples of increased engagement of North Korea; inter-Korean 
economic interactions, inter-Korean socio-cultural interactions, and the internationalisation of 
the engagement policy towards North Korea. 
3.2.i Economic cooperation 
Enhancing inter-Korean economic cooperation is the most apparent component of Kim Dae-
jung government's comprehensive engagement policy towards North Korea. For instance, 
despite Seoul's economic difficulties, caused by the financial crisis that occurred in late 1997, 
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it intended to carry out South Korea's obligations to maintain political and financial support 
for the KEDO project despite the enormous financial burden. It promised that South Korea 
would finance the bulk of costs associated with the construction of a light water reactor 
project, which, the Kim Dae-jung government thought, was an important stepping-stone for 
inducing North Korea's opening-up and economic reform. 
The new policy guideline for inter-Korean economic relations, according to the Kim 
Dae-jung government, is the separation of economic relations from political affairs 
(jeongkyungbunri), which is different from the former South Korean governments' policy of 
linking inter-Korean economic trade with political and military issues (jeongkyungyeonkae). 
The principle of jeongkyungbunri was intended to allow the autonomy of the South Korean 
private sector in regard to inter-Korean economic activity, even in the climate of continuing 
political and military tensions in the Korean Peninsula. It means that Seoul will loosen its 
control of economic activities with the North, and will respect the initiatives of the business 
community and NGOs to pursue voluntarily economic transactions with the North. 
In order to boost the private sector' economic engagement with the North, the Kim 
Dae-jung government has made efforts to institutionalise economic exchanges and 
cooperation with North Korea. Following a meeting of the National Security Council (NSC) 
in March 1998, Lim Dong-won, Senior Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Security (SSF AS) at 
that time, announced a two-stage approach to liberalising inter-Korean economic relations. 
The first stage is to give "full freedom" to South Korean businesses to visit, invest in, and 
move equipment to North Korea "under the current legal framework." The second stage is to 
revise laws that have "hampered South-North economic and business cooperation" (Korea 
Times, 27 March 1998). 
On 29th of April 1998, the South Korean government added to and revised the 
"Measures for the Revitalisation of Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation" which was first 
established in November 1994 after the end of the nuclear crisis. As seen in Table 3-1, the 
main provisions of the new version are to abolish completely the size restrictions on 
investment in North Korea by South Korean firms, and to allow all areas of business, except 
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strategic and heavy industries, as potential areas for investment. Also, lifting the previous 
limit of US$1 million for the transfer of capital goods means that machinery idle in the South, 
especially after the financial crisis, can be moved to North Korea relatively easily. Thus, the 
Commission-based Processing Trade (CPT), under which South Korean firms send unfinished 
or primary goods to North Korea which are then processed and imported back to South 
Korea, benefited from an expanded freedom, including the free transportation of machinery to 
North Korea. The Measure also included a legal basis for expanding visits to North Korea. 
Thus, business leaders, such as the chairmen of chaebols and the heads of economic 
associations that had not visited the North under both the Roh Tae-woo and the Kim Young-
sam governments, had an increased opportunity to conduct business projects with the North 
(Kim Kyu-ryoon 2000: 82-4; MOU 1998). 
Table 3-1. South Korea's 1998 measures for revitalisation of inter-Korean economic 
cooperation 
Items Previous 1998 Measure 
Level of economic cooperation Governmental control of Self-regulatory system under the 
Visit of North Korea by 
Businessmen 
economic cooperation 
Selective permission and the 
total ban on chairmen of 
chaebols 
The period of visit to North One year following approval 
Korea by businessmen and single visit only 
Contact: 20 days 
Period of handling permission Visit: 30 days 
for visit to North Korea 
Value of production equipment Less than US$1 million 
allowed to move 
Size of investment in North Maximum US$ 5 million 
Korea per project 
responsibility of business 
enterprises 
Permit upon preparation of 
invitation papers from North 
Korea 
Three years following approval 
and multiple visits 
Contact: 15 days 
Visit: 20 days 
No limit 
No limit 
Investment Items Light industry and service All sectors excluding national 
sectors defence and strategic industries 
Number of items with trade 205 
restriction 
178 and gradual expansion of 
items under overall approval 
Source: based on Ministry of Unification of South Korea. Quoted from MOU (1998). 
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Moreover, the government revised the laws regarding the South-North Cooperation 
Fund (SNCF) in October 1999, in order to provide small and medium companies which 
intended to do business with North Korea with loans. In fact, the fund had been used only in 
government level North Korean projects, such as food aid, and for the reunion of separated 
families (MOU 2001b). Furthermore, President Kim Dae-jung announced an initiative to 
build a South-North Economic Community in the New Year Message of 2000. He proposed 
that "the government-funded research institutes of the two sides start discussing the formation 
of the South-North economic community" (Korea Herald, 4 January 2000). He suggested that 
the South Korean government was ready to help North Korea to improve its poor 
infrastructure, including the energy, transportation and agricultural sectors, in a speech called 
the 'Berlin Declaration,' delivered at the Free University of Berlin, on the 9th of March 2000 
(Korea Herald, 10 March 2000). Seoul's proposal was intended to institutionalise the 
growing inter-Korean trade backed by political and legal bases agreed upon by the two 
Korean governments. The government felt that large-scale projects, such as the improvement 
of North Korea's infrastructures, which is an important precondition for increasing economic 
exchanges with North Korea, would not be developed without government-level legal and 
financial support. 
According to the South Korean Ministry of Unification (MOU 2000a), the objectives 
and processes of building the 'South-North economic community' are as follows: 
The 'South-North Economic Community' sets out to make the overall economy on 
the Korean Peninsula balanced, prosperous and welfare-oriented. The community 
rests on the assumption that the two Koreas share common economic interests, which 
in this process will be met by the increasing volume of South-North trade and 
cooperation projects, in which South and North Korea will augment the mutual 
dependence of the two Korean economies. To realise the common economic sphere 
and deeper interdependence, first, the two Koreas must develop a wide range of 
industries, spanning manufacturing, agriculture, fisheries, construction, tourism and 
finance. Second, they must be connected by land, sea, and air routes. Third, 
institutional and legal bases, such as a transparent payment system, the elimination of 
double taxation, and mechanisms for dispute settlement, are necessary in order to 
facilitate smooth economic exchanges. 
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In fact, the Kim Young-sam government announced in 1996 already that it would 
pursue the establishment of a Free Trade Area between North and South Korea until 2005 
(Joongangilbo, 30 December 1998). However, Pyongyang did not consider Kim Young-
sam's proposal a serious one at the time because of his inconsistent and coercive North Korea 
policy. But, North Korea might see Kim Dae-jung's proposal as sincere based on two years of 
consistent efforts towards engagement with North Korea. Meanwhile, the South Korean 
government felt less economic pressure two years after the financial crisis, which had started 
in late 1997, in terms of South Korean government's economic capacity to provide North 
Korea with financial help; there were hints from the North Korean leadership that they were 
ready to accept this proposal. 
Pyongyang in fact responded with the North Korean leader Kim Jeong-iI's decision to 
have an inter-Korean summit between 13-15 of June 2000, for the first time in fifty years. 
One of the undoubted factors that helped bring North Korea to the summit table was its need 
for economic rehabilitation. It seemed that the Pyongyang regime recognised that through 
expanded economic cooperation with South Korea it could attract Western countries and 
international organisations to invest in North Korea, and that the Kim Dae-jung government's 
intention of economic engagement of the North is serious. 
The inter-Korean summit provided the momentum for the expansion of inter-Korean 
economic cooperation, which ranged from private level to large-scale government projects, to 
socio-cultural venture projects at the NGO level. This summit also included further discussion 
about joint cooperation on social infrastructure projects in North Korea. The most significant 
aspect is South Korean government's involvement in inter-Korean economic exchanges. This 
is based on the idea that large infrastructure projects, and establishing legal and political bases 
for inter-Korean trade that contribute a rapid rise of interdependence between the two Koreas 
will need Seoul's political and financial help. 
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For instance, the summit produced the plans for reconnecting the Kyung-ui (Seoul-
Shinuiju) Railroad Line37 and other land and rail roads across the DMZ, and confirmed a 
project to build a huge industrial complex in Kaesung in the North. Also, Seoul was seriously 
studying a plan to supply electricity to North Korea, following an agreement made at the 
inter-Korean ministerial talks that ended on the 17th of December 2000. This expressed North 
Korea's special interest in South Korea's aid aimed at boosting the North's electricity 
capacity, since Kim Dae-jung announced the Berlin Declaration. The Kim Dae-jung 
government, on the other hand, wanted to increase the North's reliance on the South, and to 
deepen the interdependence between the two Koreas (Korea Herald, 28 March 2000). 
Furthermore, after the summit of the two Koreas opened the way, the four-point 
agreement on economic cooperation was reached at the next high-level official talks in 
Pyongyang, on the 11 th of November, 2000; it provided for investment guarantees, settlement 
of disputes, clearance of accounts and avoidance of double taxation. Particularly, the 
agreement on investment guarantees, the most significant issue that had previously tied down 
the negotiations, grants most favoured nation (MFN) status to South Korean firms doing 
business in the North. In fact, South Korea insisted that its firms be given domestic operation 
status in North Korea, which the North strongly refused. Also, the agreement on investment 
guarantees stipulated that North Korea may not confiscate South Korean capital, and that it 
will allow business owners to freely send profits to the South. Also, with the agreement on the 
clearance of accounts, South and North Korean firms will be able to make direct money 
transfers using banks in the peninsula, instead of having to use a bank in a third country, as 
was the case before (Korea Times, 15 November 2000). 
Thereby, during the first three years of the Kim Dae-jung government, from 1998 to 
2000, inter-Korean trade increased from US$222 million in 1998, to 333 million in 1999, and 
425 million in 2000, despite South Korea having a financial crisis and domestic economic 
37 This railroad is able to connect to Europe via Trans-Siberian Railway (TSR). The Korean Transport 
Institute (KOTI) of South Korea pointed out its economic benefits for the two Koreas: by using rail 
instead of current marine transport, transportation costs will be reduced one fifth of current cost, and 
the time would be cut to about a third. It is estimated that yearly transport costs can be cut by around 
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difficulties. In fact, any setback in inter-Korean trade volume during this time would not have 
been caused by the inter-Korean political and military issues, but by the direct impact of the 
Asian financial crisis. This was contrary to the developments under the Kim Young-sam 
government, during the 1993-94 nuclear crisis, and in 1996, when North Korea organised a 
submarine incursion into the South. 
Moreover, under the Kim Dae-jung government, the scale of inter-Korean business 
has greatly increased. During 1990-1997, under previous governments, seven inter-Korean 
business projects were approved, including the KEDO project. However, as shown in the 
shaded part of Table 3-2, eight joint business projects were approved in only three years, from 
1998 to 2000, under the Kim Dae-jung government. Also, the scale of approved business 
projects soared from US$16.27 (130.57 when including KEDO project) million under the 
previous governments, to US$411.1 million under the current government. 
The Kim Dae-jung government's business-track diplomacy differed from previous 
governments in its calm reaction to inter-Korean tensions caused by North Korean military 
provocation. As seen in the previous section, the Kim Young-sam government reacted very 
strongly to North Korea's military provocations, and often used them for domestic political 
purposes. The opposite was true in the Kim Dae-jung government. This was evident in the 
way in which the infiltration of spy submarines in 1998 and the naval clash between the two 
Korean navies in the West Coast of Korean Peninsula in June 1999 were handled. 
For instance, in June 1998, a North Korean midget submarine was caught on the East 
Sea shore of the South with nine bodies of suicide victims on board. Military investigators 
concluded that it was on a spying mission. While South Korean officials, including President 
Kim Dae-jung, were trying to downplay the seriousness of the submarine infiltration, 
domestic criticism was widespread. Apparently reflecting the views of conservative Koreans, 
the daily newspaper Chosunilbo said "the Kim Dae-jung's "sunshine policy" was put to a 
serious test. .. Even though he would try to maintain a policy of jeongkyungbunri in relations 
with North Korea, it might be very difficult for him to keep its engagement policy intact, 
US$25 million (quoted from Centre for Reunification Economics 2000: 33-4). 
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should North Korea continue to cling to its decept ive two-tiered policy toward s South Korea" 
(Chosuni/bo 23, June 1998). 
These domestic criticisms, especia lly from conserva ti ve media groups and the 
opposition party, have been voiced every time North Korea engaged in military provocations . 
In spi te of freq uent provocative incurs ions of armed North Korean spy ships into the South , 
unlike previous South Korean governments, Pres ident Kim Dae-jung stuck to the principle of 
jeongkyul1gbunri. Thus, it gave encouragement to the private sec tor not to stop bu iness 
activities w ith North Korean partners. 
Table 3-2: Approved business projects for inter-Korean economic cooperation 
Company Bus iness Spec ifics Amount (US$ M il. ) 
O 9 proj ects including jackets aewoo and ba s 5. 12 
_ .. ___ .. __ ........ _ ... __ ..... _ .. ____ ... ___ .. _ .. __ ._. __ . ____ . ______ S .. __ . _______ . ___________ . 
Green Cross co. Medicine 3.00 
~ .. ___ .. _.H .. _ ................ _., .. _ ..... _ ..__ ._ .. _ .._ .. __ .... _. ___ ... _ ... _ ..... ______ .H._._._. ___ . __ . _______ ._. __________ ._._ ,_ 
Date of Approva l 
5 October, 1992 
._!~_~~~'l.r.!S _.________.________ p_~~~!.<?p._~P.~i~_'Y.'!i~!:... ___________ ?.: ~q _._ .. _ 2 7 A pr i~, 1996 
_~~'Q.Q.... __ . ____ . ___________ Th~J_iK~.!. water reac tors . ro 'ect _ 114 '.~2 _____ 191uly 1996 
M 'h F d P . Collect and process marine 0 15 22 M 99 1 ung 00 rocessmg roducts . ay, I . 7 
--.-----. _______ ... __ ._. ____ . ___ .. ___ . ____ 2 _____ .. ------ - .... ---. 
Taeyoung Fisheries/LG 
International Farm and process sca llop 2.00 14 October, 1997 
--··- -·----·----·-------···----Pr-~d~ce -·p~inted~ateriaIs and ------.. --.--.. ------... ------- --.-. 
Aju Communication TV ads 0.2 t 4 November, 1997 
Dooray-"·villaie---·Farming-·ESt;bli~h a jointly operated 
_M~~.g~.!E.~~.!...!!..~so~.!!~~~ __ . far.!!!~ __ . __ . _____ _ 8.0 
I t ti· al C . Pursue joint research for the n ema on om . 
F d n· development of a new vanety 1.1 oun a on 
____ "._ .... _~_ .. _. ___ ._ .. ~_._._._. ____ .9.[~!!p.er _c0IE. __________ . ___ _ 
Hyundai Merchant 
MarinelHyundai 
Engineering 
Construction! 
Asan 
& 
Hyundai 
Engage in the Mt. Kumkang 
tour and development 100.33 
8 April 1998 
18 June, 1998 
6 August, 1998 
-·~:~;~~~ .... -·--·-·----Develop reaJ estate and n111 1'--~- 28 August, 1998 
._ .. ________ ._ .. ~-.---_.-... ~~.Eartme!!!.~~E.-_---- .______ _ ___ ... 
~-~~~~ . .!n~_1.:l~!!:Y~ ______ ._ .. _.frod.~£~.~~~!~~ __ "_" ____ . ____ ,o}98. __ . __ 2~.9ctober,12~~ __ " __ 
Hyundai ElectronicslKorea Joint communication business 0 13 11 N b 1998 T.E)ec.Q~Q~~i.I~l~c~m ____ lor 1!!. K~. to~ _______ . · . ove~~ __ _ 
... RY.~!1:8~~~_M~~<?!E<?.:..._ ..... _ .... _ .. _.~!!!Q:~~p~'!.~_~~_~~~_~"p'g!!lt __ . __ ~QQ.:9_Q..._ . ..2!..~~~.L~?99 ___ ~ 
,~ Sa~.!!!!gJ~1~£.t.!_~Ei~L_. ______ .19..i~~_~~~~10 m~ software Q.727 13 March 2000 _. __ _ 
Source : based on Ministry of Unification data (MOU 2000b). 
Note: the shading part indicates the projects approved by the Kim Dae-jung government 
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3.2.ii Socio-cultural exchanges 
President Kim Dae-jung's comprehensive engagement policy towards North Korea is 
designed to help North Korea's opening-up and reform through more contacts, dialogue, and 
cooperation between the two Koreas. Moreover, Seoul's engagement with the North is aimed 
at exploring common interests and creating a common Korean identity between North and 
South Koreans. As pointed out in chapter 1, business-track diplomacy is the exchange 
mechanism used as a bridge to make socio-cultural relationships between states and peoples. 
Thus, socio-cultural cooperation, including contacts, visits, humanitarian aid and socio-
cultural business project between the people of the two Koreas, is an important tool to achieve 
this South Korean goal. 
However, like inter-Korean economic cooperation, the socio-cultural field had been 
affected by the previous South Korean government's jeongkyungyeonkae policy. Previous 
South Korean governments monopolised inter-Korean interactions and channels, and used 
them as a political measure to boost regime popularity, and mitigate against North Korean 
military provocations. Moreover, the limits of socio-cultural cooperation were caused by 
Seoul's worries regarding North Korea's unchanging 'united front strategy', in which 
Pyongyang tried to create a united front with progressive political forces in the South to stage 
a revolutionary movement. 
However, the Kim Dae-jung government relaxed some of the procedures on various 
private sector activities towards North Korea. It simplified procedures for South Koreans to 
visit North Korea, relaxed the basis for approving socio-cultural exchanges and projects, and 
allowed Non-governmental organisations to give economic aid to North Korea through their 
own channels. These measures were designed to encourage both individual and civilian 
organisations to contact their North Korean counterparts, and thus establish diversified 
multiple channels between the two Koreas. At the same time, the political democratisation 
and social pluralism that have taken place over the last decade in South Korea have led to the 
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strengthening of c ivil society. The demand of the civil society to partic ipate in North Korean 
issues has been enough for Seou l to utili se civilian activities as bus iness-track dip lomacy.38 
Table 3-3. South Korean people visits to North Korea by year s 
Unit : number of cases (Number of People) 
Years Applied I Approved Rejected & % of Accomplished Rejec tion 
1989 1 (1 ) 1 (1) I ( I ) 
1990 7 (199) 6 ( 187) I (1 2) 12.3% 3 (183) 
199 1 12 (244) I II (243) 5.4% ' 10 (237) 
1992 17(303) 8 (257) 10 (47) 9.0% 8 (257) 
, 
1993 I 6 (21) 5 (19) I (2) 2.8% I 4 ( 18) 
1994 12 (78) 7 (54) 2. 1% I I (12) 
1995 64 (563) 58 (543) 9 (3 1) 4.4% 52 (536) 
1996 50 (249) 35 (170) 3 ( 19) 7.3% 28 ( 146) 
1997 156 (1 ,194) 149 (1,172) 3 (9) 2.2% 136 (1 ,01 5) 
1998 402 (3,980) 387 (3,716) 2 (12) 0.3% 340 (3,317) 
1999 886 (6,199) 862 (5,997) 2 (5) 0.2% 822 (5,599) 
2000 865 (8,070) 845 (7,737) [2 (8) 0.7% 804 (7,280) 
Mt. I '98 29 (14,228) 26 (12,812) - (9) 23 (10,554) I 
Kumkang ' 99 265 (163,623) 262 (163,178) I -(116) 258 (148,008) 
Tourists ' 00 396 (228,860) 396 (228,5 10) - (340) 396 (212,247) 
Total 690 (406,711) 684 (404,500) -(465) 677 (370,809) 
Source: based on Ministry of Unification data (MOU 200 1 a) . 
Note: the shading part is under Kim Dae-jung government 
Firstly, thanks to the Kim Dae-jung government' s promise of active engagement 
towards North Korea, applications to visit North Korea by South Koreans have sharply 
increased during this period. As shown in Table 3-3, under the two previous South Korean 
governments, total South Korean visitors to the North amounted to 2,405 for the nine years 
between 1989 and 1997, while the number rose to 3,3 17 in 1998,5,599 in 1999, and 7,280 in 
2000, and thus to a total of 12,596 during the three years. In addition, 370,809 South Korean 
38 According to a survey on the issue of inter-Korean cultural exchanges in 1990, many people pointed 
out the need of limiting political considerations, of increasing the role of the private sec tors rather than 
the government, and of a change in government policy towards opening up for North Korean culture. 
All of these were recognised as important requirements for enhancing intcr-Korea n soc ia-cultural 
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touri sts visited Mt. Kumgang in North Korea from 1998 to 2000. Moreover, despite the 
drastic increase of app lications for contacts with North Koreans after the current regime took 
office, the rejection ratio of the applications has greatly decreased. This is evidence of the 
Kim Dae-jung government's political support for inter-Korean personal exchanges. 
Table 3-4. Inter-Korean socio-cultural cooperation projects 
South 
organisations 
Korean Contents 
South To make unified Korean team to participate in Korean Table the World Table Tennis Game (24/04-06/05 , Tennis Assoc iation 
199D 
To make unified Korean team to participate in 
South Korean Olympic World Youth Football Game (27/05-04/06, 
Committee 
___1991) 
Unification and Cultural Inter-Korean joint research on North Korean 
Institute historical sites 
Sport Art 
Korean Photography 
Association 
Younbun Science and 
Technical _College 
Korean Welfare 
Foundation 
Korean Cultural 
Network Institute 
CAN Korea 
Producing TV Video for North Korean 
historical and cultural sites 
Inter-Korean photo exchanges and publishing 
Establishment of an science and technical 
college in Rajin and Sonbong area 
Establishment and management of pharmacy 
factory and hospital 
Establishing Inter-Korean Cultural data base 
International Music Festival for Pe ace in Seoul 
and Pong an on 1999 -----------==K::::o:::.r..::.ean~Urufication Music Festival in North 
SN21 Enterprise Korea 
Amount of 
Money 
(US$ mi l. ) 
0.7 
1.4 
0.06 
0.6 
0.16 
5 
2.4 
0.3 
0.6 
Approved 
Date 
21/03/91 
01/05/91 
10/12/97 
29/04/98 
29/04/98 
05/06/98 
05/06/98 
20/06/98 
16/04/99 
05/08/99 
Hyundai Asan Construction -;f indo-;; - g~asiu~-~ ;4.~--- -;0/09/99 -
____ P on ang'-__ --:-_,.-- ____ _ 
Kyemyon-g-P-r-o--:-duc-t,-io-n-·......;:.PJl.y:::.on;;<g~~y"'"an-·g sport art institution's performance-- - ~ 22/09/99 
in South Korea 0.5 
Uinbang 
Communication 
Neovision- . 
Mt. Kumgang international car rally for 
Unification 
Joint roduction of Television documentar 
I 
0.5 
NS21 Pyongyang sport art institution's performance in Seoul 5.5 
Korean -. -- Cultural 
North Korean culture and Art Business Network Institute 
Siszen 
Korean Culture 
Foundation 
Source: MOU (200Ia). 
Opening of site in tbe South of pro-North 
Korean site Chosun infobank 
Kurngangsan Art Institute's performance in the 
South 
Note: the shading part is under Kim Dae-jung government. 
cooperation (Institute of Cultural Development 1990). 
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0.5 
0.6 
0.1 
11 /11/99 
03/02/00 
23/05/00 
14/07/00 
01 /09100 
29/11/00 
Secondly, inter-Korean socio-cultural cooperation projects have greatly increased 
during the current government. Since permission for cooperation projects was first issued to 
allow the formation of a unified Korean team to co":pete in the 1991 World Table Tennis 
Games in Japan, a total of 18 organisations received cooperation-project approvals in the 
social and cultural area at by the end of 2000. As shown in Table 3-4, 15 out of 18 projects 
for inter-Korean socio-cultural cooperation have been approved during the first three years of 
the Kim Dae-jung government. Also, socio-cultural areas have been diversified from unified 
Korean teams in international sports competitions, to culture, art, media, education and 
cultural joint ventures such as the construction of an indoor sport centre, and of a North 
Korean cultural database. According to an official of the MOV, the increase in inter-Korean 
socio-cultural projects, and in the opportunity for both South and North Korean participants' 
to exploit common interests through these projects, should be credited to Seoul's liberation of 
the private sectors' role in engagement policy towards North Korea (Interview with a senior 
official ofMOU, Seoul, February 2001). 
Thirdly, Seoul gave the private sector greater leeway in dealing with the North in the 
provision of humanitarian aid. In contrast to the previous governments' insistence that all 
North Korean aid go through the Korean National Red Cross, controlled by the government, 
Seoul announced on the 18th of March 1998 that leaders of private organisations could visit 
the North for consultation on aid with North Korean counterparts. Also, it approved direct 
channels of aid outside the Korean National Red Cross in February 1999 in order to increase 
the capacity and efficiency of the private sector aid to the North (MOV 1999). 
Moreover, long-term humanitarian programs have been supported by government 
financial assistance through the South-North Korean Cooperation Fund (SNCF). The South 
Korean government simplified the process of aiding North Korea, shortened the preparatory 
stage of aid programs, and thus facilitated NGOs' contacts with North Korean counterparts. 
The result has been a rapid growth in the levels of activity of South Korean NGOs and in the 
number of contacts with North Korea. The number of organisations that can provide aid 
directly increased to 13 during the Kim Dae-jung government, from the Korean National Red 
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Cross as the only channel. Their independent aid programs contributed to an increase in the 
transparency of the distribution process, and to a specialisation of aid in each individual 
organisation in the North. These aid programs have developed over time from one-time relief 
assistance to continuous assistance by securing a base of operations in the North in various 
fields (MOU 2000c). For instance, World Vision, a South Korean NGO, operates six noodle 
factories in the North and provides food for 30,000 children every day. Oh Jae-sik, chairman 
of World Vision, said that "The North Korean assistance project should be aimed not only at 
emergency aid programs but also long-term development programs, and the Kim Dae-jung 
government understands its importance to his sunshine policy" (quoted in Joongangilbo, 8 
June 2001). 
3.2.iii Internationalisation of the engagement approach towards North Korea 
The other North Korea policy change under the Kim Dae-jung government with regard to 
enhancing economic engagement policy is encouraging international community to 
participate in engagement policy toward North Korea. This effort by the Kim Dae-jung 
government is based on the perception that the current international environment in the 
Korean Peninsula maintained the Cold War structure, despite the trend towards globalisation 
in the post-Cold War era. There still exists long-lasting hostility and mistrust, not only 
between the two Koreas, but also between the U.S. and North Korea, and Japan and North 
Korea. If these great powers were to engage with the North, this would increase the likelihood 
of North Korea's opening up and reforming. 
Thus, the maximisation of international collaboration is critical, not only because it 
can facilitate conflict management in the Korean Peninsula, but also because it can help North 
Korea to land softly. For the management of the Korean Peninsula, Seoul has stressed the 
continuation of the Four Party talks. It has also proposed the ''two plus four" (two Koreas plus 
the US, Japan, Russia, and China) formula, and the establishment of a Northeast Asian 
security cooperation regime in order to shape a new security environment conducive to 
tension reduction as well as peace and security building. 
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More importantly for North Korea's change towards economic opening and reform, 
the Kim Dae-jung government has been calling for two practical measures to be taken: North 
Korea's diplomatic normalisation with the US and Japan on the one hand, and the creation of 
global support favourable to North Korea's economic reform. For the latter objective, Seoul 
has actively supported North Korea's joining of the international financial and multilateral 
organisations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the Asia 
Development Bank (ADB), and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), to facilitate 
North Korean access to international capital. President Kim Dae-jung, for instance, has 
appealed to Asia-Pacific countries to economically engage North Korea and to help North 
Korea to join APEC and ADB through consultation with APEC members (Korea Herald, 31 
March 2000). Also, the Kim Dae-jung government has consistently sought the engagement of 
the other states towards North Korea. As a result, it helped, for instance, to widen the scope of 
EU countries' engagement with North Korea (Drifte 2002). Seoul's call for international 
support for engagement with North Korea was also aimed at encouraging the North to accept 
outside assistance to rebuild its difficult economy. 
Meanwhile, for the former objective, Seoul has been trying to persuade North Korea, 
the US, and Japan to normalise relations with each other. For instance, in the June summit of 
1998 with the US President Clinton, President Kim Dae-jung showed his intentions by urging 
him to adopt a more forthcoming policy towards North Korea, by easing the economic 
sanctions that the U.S. has maintained for nearly half a century. He even asked the U.S. and 
Japan to promote economic relations, and ultimately to normalise relations with North Korea. 
One US official of Department of State pointed out this "is almost like role reversal, we have 
become like previous South Korean administrations, where they did not want to have 
anything to do with the North. Now, the new South Korean government wants to change ... 
and we are stuck in the past" (quoted in Washington Post, 12 June 1998: A3). 
Moreover, Seoul has sought to focus Tokyo on intensifying its diplomatic relations 
with Pyongyang. For instance, in a meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo 
on19-21 March 1999, President Kim Dae-jung reconfirmed that he hoped Washington and 
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Tokyo would engage in direct exchange and cooperation with Pyongyang, instead of passing 
through Seoul (Korea Herald, 21 March 1999). President Kim Dae-jung has maintained this 
position throughout his presidency up until April 2002 when this dissertation was submitted. 
Also, President Kim Dae-jung reiterated his call on North Korea to make use of the United 
States so that it can become more stable and prosperous, stating that "Pyongyang has little 
reason not to take advantage of the United States at a time when Washington grants China its 
most favoured Nation status and assists in Beijing becoming a member of the World Trade 
Organisation" (quoted in Korea Times, 28 June 2000). 
However, an international mood for favourable to engagement with North Korea has 
not been established. As will be discussed in the next chapter, tensions between the US and 
North Korea have continued because of North Korea's military actions, such as the test-
launch of a long-range missile, 'Taepodong-l " continuing export of missile and technologies 
to 'rogue states', and the suspicion over an underground nuclear site at Kumchangri in North 
Korea. Moreover, the US has reacted to North Korean manoeuvres essentially on a case by 
case basis, which contribute to increased tensions in the Korean Peninsula, while 
conservatives in the US argued against the validity of its engagement or soft-landing policy 
toward North Korea.39 
With this kind of symptomatic US reaction, Seoul called for a more comprehensive 
and long-term oriented approach towards North Korea. For instance, Hong Soon-young, the 
South Korean Minister of MOFAT, argued in 1999 that "given North Korea's economic 
needs and growing isolation, the US now exerts the greatest influence on North Korea, and it 
should deal with it by rigor and caution, not overreaction or generalisation" (Hong Soon-
young 1999: 11). 
Furthermore, to enhance Seoul's continuing engagement policy and to prevent a US 
hard-line policy towards North Korea, President Kim Dae-jung has suggested the need for a 
39 The conservative Republican dominated US Congress is sceptical about the effectiveness of the 
engagement policy towards North Korea. Thus, the former Secretary of Defence. William Perry. has 
been named as 'North Korean Policy Coordinator' in October 1998 to review the North Korean issues 
and report to the Congress. 
146 
'package deal' solution as a means for dismantling the Cold War structure in the Korean 
Peninsula. Under the proposal, a grand compromise can be implemented between Washington 
and Pyongyang. The main point is that, to resolve North Korea's nuclear and missile issues, 
the US and Japan should lift economic sanctions, speed up the development of economic 
relations rather than taking symbolic steps, and also finally normalise relations with 
Pyongyang. Also, these measures are to be taken as a package deal40 (Korea Times, 7 May 
1999). 
Therefore, along with the Kim Dae-jung government's strong intention towards 
active engagement measures with North Korea, it also wanted to use the framework of 
trilateral cooperation and among the US, Japan and South Korea regarding North Korea 
policy in a different way. While these three countries have been consolidating their 
continuing military cooperation against possible threats, including North Korean nuclear and 
missile development, the Kim Dae-jung government has devoted its political energy into 
consolidating international support for a comprehensive engagement policy towards North 
Korea. This is quite different from previous South Korean governments that sought a 
framework for checking and balancing the U.S. and Japan's relationships with North Korea in 
the context of the inter-Korean relationship. The major points of comparison between the 
engagement policies of previous South Korean governments and Kim Dae-jung government 
are summarised in the following table. 
40 These views were expressed in an interview with Cable News Network (CNN) on 5 May 1999. 
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Table 3-5. Comparison of engagement policies of previous South Korean governments 
and Kim Dae-jung government 
Roh Tae-woo and Kim Young-sam 
Kim Dae-jung government (1998-current) 
governments (1988-1997) 
-Jeongkyungyeonkae policy 
Korean economic social, 
activities with inter-Korean 
military affairs). 
(links inter- -Jeongkyungbunri policy (Separation 
and cultural economic, social and cultural activities from 
political and the inter-Korean politics). 
-Use of military and economic pressure to -Relatively calm reaction to post-Cold War 
deter post-Cold War North Korean military North Korean military provocation and no 
provocation. use of economic pressure. 
-Object to the North's normalised 
relationships with U.S. and Japan, and seek to 
prevent international economic engagement 
toward North Korea. 
-Encourages the U.S. and Japan to normalise 
the relationships with North Korea, and 
supports North Korea to join in international 
financial organisations. 
-Ban on the large-scale inter-Korean -No restriction on the scale of inter-Korean 
economic projects and on chaebol leaders' economic projects and encourages chaebols 
visits to the North. to initiate inter-Korean economic 
cooperation. 
-Government's control over socio-cultural -Diversifying and enlarging private channels 
and humanitarian aid and activities with North Korea. 
Conclusion 
The above analysis has shown different North Korean policy emphases since late 1980s, 
though all the South Korean governments recognise the need of engagement of the North in 
the post-Cold War era. On the one hand, previous South Korean governments adhered to the 
principle of political and economic linkages (Jeongkyungyeonkae), and thus limited not only 
South Korea's inter-Korean activities, including economic, social, and cultural cooperation, 
but also hampered international efforts to engage with the North. Moreover, they did not 
support the normalisation of relations between North Korea and the US and Japan because 
Seoul feared it would lose its strategic superiority and the chance to bring Pyongyang into a 
direct dialogue. 
On the other hand, the current Kim Dae-jung government has helped to boost the 
South's various private actors' activities with North Korea by adopting the Jeongkyungbunri 
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principle. Moreover, internationally, the current government understands that the critical 
element to peace in the Korean Peninsula is to dissolve the continuing Cold War structure in 
this region by improving the relationships between the North and the outside world, 
especially the US and Japan. Therefore, this chapter has proved that there has been a change 
towards active and consistent engagement policy under the Kim Dae-jung government. 
Most significantly, the Kim Dae-jung government has gone beyond the recognition of 
the need for Seoul's engagement measures towards North Korea and has actually shown a 
strong policy-making will to implement business-track diplomacy towards North Korea. 
Hence, having demonstrated the existence of the condition for the implementation of 
business-track diplomacy as given in chapter 1 - namely, the policy-makers' will for the 
actual mobilisation of the economic capability in the service of security objectives - the next 
two chapters will investigate the various variables that might have influenced the 
manifestation of a strong policy-making will and thus the North Korea policy changes under 
the Kim Dae-jung government. 
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Chapter 4. The impact of international and domestic factors on 
Kim-Dae-jung government's policy shift 
The previous chapter demonstrated that the current Kim Dae-jung government has shown 
strong policy-making will to implement an active and consistent engagement policy towards 
North Korea when compared with previous South Korean governments. Thereby, this chapter 
and the next will investigate the 'why' question of the Kim Dae-jung government's policy 
shift towards active engagement with North Korea. As the theory ofFPA outlined in chapter 
1 indicates, there should be a comprehensive examination of exactly 'why' foreign policy 
changes towards North Korea have occurred under the Kim Dae-jung government. While 
chapter 5 will examine the impact of beliefs held by President Kim Dae-jung upon South 
Korea's policy-making towards North Korea, this chapter considers both international and 
domestic variables as possible policy inputs that could have influenced this policy shift under 
the Kim Dae-jung government. 
First, the international structure, which has traditionally been an important factor in 
the formulation of Seoul's foreign policy, in regard to the North Korean security threat, and 
especially so in the Cold War era, will be discussed. Hence, this thesis looks at the 
interactions and behaviours that occurred between states such as two Koreas, the US and 
Japan. Second, this thesis will look at South Korea's macro domestic factors, such as the 
development of democratisation and the advent of the financial crisis in South Korea, and also 
micro domestic factors such as various domestic actors that might influence Kim Dae-jung 
government's policy-making will towards the utilisation of an active engagement policy with 
North Korea. 
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4.1 External factors 
If the international environment is to be an important input in South Korea's active 
engagement policy under the Kim Dae-jung government, then this policy is related to two 
main external environmental changes in the late 1990s. As discussed in chapter 3, one 
limitation on Seoul's greater engagement with North Korea was caused by North Korea's 
tongmibongnam policy and military aggressiveness towards South Korea, though Seoul often 
used these for domestic political purposes. Thus, North Korea's more moderate policies 
towards South Korea, such as increasing economic opening up and decreasing military 
provocations, should be seen as positive conditions for Seoul's active and consistent 
engagement policy towards North Korea. 
The other important change is that in order for Seoul to pursue a consistent economic 
engagement policy toward North Korea, international efforts to engage with North Korea 
should be enhanced. Put differently, as Pyongyang's 'southern policy' indicates, it has been 
willing to engage with the US and Japan both economically and politically as a survival 
strategy. Thus, if the US and Japan, which have been the main enemies to the North, and are 
economically powerful states, show strong political will towards engagement with North 
Korea, this would be an important source of momentum for Seoul's use of business-track 
diplomacy. 
4.1.1 North Korean factor 
4.l.i.a Continuation of tongmibongnam policy and military aggressiveness 
During previous South Korean governments, North Korea had shown its military 
aggressiveness and utilised the tactic of avoiding the South Korean authorities in political and 
military dialogues. This hampered Seoul's deeper engagement policy toward North Korea at 
that time. Unfortunately, this North Korean behaviour continued both before and after the 
advent of the Kim Dae-jung government in February 1998. 
In contrast to their positive attitude towards the US, the Kim Jeong-il regime was 
reluctant to talk with the South Korean government, until the two Koreas agreed to have a 
151 
summit in June 2000. There had been at that point no single inter-Korean governmental direct 
talks since 1994. The only governmental-level contact between the two Koreas was in the 
four-party talks, jointly proposed by South Korea and the US in April 1996. Although the 
talks created a dilemma for Pyongyang, considering North Korea's strategy of negotiating 
with the US while isolating South Korea, Pyongyang had to accept the four-party talks in 
order to keep its relations with Washington cooperative. With the acceptance, however, 
Pyongyang could not avoid a formal dialogue with the South Korean government. In 1997, 
North Korea at last participated in the December conference for the four-party talks. 
However, this did not mean that the North had retreated from its tongmibongnam strategy. 
The Kim Jeong-it regime insisted on to the inclusion of the issue of the withdrawal of the US 
forces from South Korea and of the US-North Korea peace treaty on the agenda for the talks. 
Pyongyang made it clear that it would pursue issues in its bilateral negotiations with the US, 
even within the framework of the four-party talks. 
Moreover, less than one year before Kim Dae-jung became South Korean president, 
the defection of Hwang Jang-yop, the architect of juche ideology and former private tutor of 
Kim Jeong-iI, to South Korea, in February 1997, enormously increased inter-Korean tension. 
It must have embarrassed the North Korean leadership. In fact, Pyongyang issued a warning 
of terrorism, not only against Seoul but also Beijing, to which Hwang had fled. 
After the election of Kim Dae-jung as President of South Korea at the end of 1997, 
North Korea refrained from slandering the new government and took a "wait and see" posture 
(Nodong Shinmun, 1 January 1998). Probably encouraged by Kim Dae-jung's premise of 
dovish-looking North Korea policy, Pyongyang participated in the vice-ministerial conference 
for possible fertiliser aid from Seoul in Beijing in April 1998. These inter-Korean direct talks 
were significant because they took place almost three years and nine months after the 
previous contact for the first inter-Korean summit meeting scheduled in August 1994. 
However, the Beijing talks ended in failure due to the position of the South, which insisted on 
the construction of a meeting place for separated family members as a condition for its 
fertiliser aid. North Korea insisted on the unconditional provision of fertiliser aid. 
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North Korea changed its attitude soon after the failure of fertiliser talks with the 
South. Pyongyang was disappointed with Seoul's position on the principle of reciprocity, 
despite Seoul's promise of a flexible engagement policy towards North Korea. After the talks, 
Pyongyang again intensified its criticism of the Kim Dae-jung government, claiming that 
"there is nothing to expect anymore" from the new government (Nodong Shinmun, 30 April 
1998).41 Thus, despite Seoul's promise ofa more conciliatory policy towards North Korea in 
the first year of the Kim Dae-jung government in 1998, Pyongyang was suspicious about the 
real intentions of Kim Dae-jung's engagement policy and thus showed no interest in resuming 
a North-South governmental-level dialogue (Brown 1999: 132). 
Along with Pyongyang's continuing 'excluding Seoul' tactic towards the Kim Dae-
jung government, North Korea's military provocations continued. For instance, on 22 June 
1998, a midget spy submarine was accidentally caught in the net of a South Korean fishing 
boat; nine corpses found inside - apparently victims of execution and suicide - were returned 
through Panmunjom. Shortly thereafter, the body of a North Korean commando clad in diving 
gear washed ashore not far from the spot of the previous submarine intrusions. Despite 
Seoul's warnings, there were two more North Korean infiltration attempts by sea in the same 
year. In November 1998, a speedboat evaded pursuit along the western shore, while the 
December incident ended with the sinking of a spy boat off the southern coast. Moreover, in 
1999, the North provoked an armed naval altercation with South Korea. Several North Korean 
patrol boats transgressed South Korean territorial waters, prompting the South Korean Navy 
to ram the trespassers and to exchange gunfires, which reportedly left 20-30 North Koreans 
dead. Shortly after the armed naval altercation, North Korea also detained a South Korean Mt. 
Kumgang tourist on alleged spy charges (Cha 1999: 856-7). 
Also, international security concerns over North Korea's missile development 
programme continued, furthering military tensions on the Korean Peninsula in late 1998 and 
1999. The tension was triggered by a report from the New York Times (on the 17th of August 
41 The North Korean Nodong Shinmun (6 July 1998) commented that "President Kim Dae-jung is 
following the misguided footsteps of the former President Kim Young-sam". 
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1998), claiming that North Korea might be constructing a huge nuclear reactor in a mountain 
area in Kumchangri, some 40 km Northwest of North Korea's main nuclear site at Yongbyon, 
with some 15,000 workers digging at the site. Despite denials from North Korea, this report 
caused tensions between the US and North Korea. On top of that, on 31 August 1998, North 
Korea surprised the outside world by firing a multi-stage, long-range rocket or missile over 
northern Japan. Pyongyang claimed it was a satellite for peaceful purposes. Regardless of 
whether the test was for peaceful or military purposes, the general agreement was that the 
missile was a Taepodong-l with a range of 1,000-1,500 kilometres, which covers most of 
Japan. The Japanese government responded to the launch by temporarily stopping assistance 
for the KEDO project, though it later decided not to (Quinones 2000: 169-70). 
The US and Japan began to suspect that North Korea had developed nuclear weapons 
despite the AF reached in 1994, and that it already possessed or was developing long-range 
missiles to arm with a nuclear, biological and chemical warhead. Hence, along with pressure 
from the US Congress and media, especially the conservative circle, President Clinton named 
Dr. William Perry, former Secretary of Defence, as the 'U.S.-North Korea Policy 
Coordinator' in 1999, to participate in a full review of U.S. policy and objectives toward 
North Korea. Moreover, on September 21 1998, the US and Japan agreed to begin joint 
research on the TMD system in 1999 which irritated North Korea and also China (Dongailbo, 
22 September 1998). 
According to critics of Kim Dae-jung's sunshine policy, Pyongyang's military threats 
have increased rather than diminished during his government. Whatever the reasons behind 
North Korea's continuing military aggressions, its military behaviour showed few signs of 
abetting during the Kim Dae-jung government (up until April 2002 when this dissertation was 
submitted). The continuation of North Korea's military-first policy and threats has led many 
in Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo to question the wisdom of engagement policies that seek to 
persuade rather than coerce the North into cooperation. In particular, whenever North Korea 
has shown military aggression and thus created tensions in the Korean Peninsula, in Seoul, 
Kim Dae-jung's 'sunshine policy' has come under harsh criticism from conservative circles 
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for encouraging rather than discouraging Pyongyang's intransigence. Hence, Kim Dae-jung's 
economic engagement, including Mt. Kumgang tourism, became in danger of being stopped. 
4.l.i.b Signs of North Korea's stability and economic reform 
However, there are some positive signs from the North. First, the predictions of the imminent 
collapse of the North Korean system, especially after Kim Il-sung's death in 1994, proved to 
be wrong. Almost three years after the death of Kim II-sung in 1994, the delayed elevation of 
Kim Jeong-iI, Kim TI-sung's first son, to top positions was realised just before Kim Dae-jung 
took office. Kim Jeong-il took the title of General Secretary of the Korean Workers Party in 
October 1997, and the position of Chairman of the National Defence Committee at the first 
meeting of the lOth Supreme People's Assembly held on 5 September 1998, which signified 
the consolidation of his power in North Korea. Hence, the sudden unification approach based 
on the 'near collapse scenario' of the Kim Young-sam government appeared to be irrelevant. 
Instead, it would be more realistic for the Kim Dae-jung government to assume that North 
Korea will not collapse in the near future. 
Second, North Korea has shown signs of economic opening up and reform, especially 
from late 1997 (Chung Ok-nim 1999a: 29-30). From mid-1990s, North Korea revised the 
constitution, adopting elements of a market economy, such as price competition, incentives 
for foreign investment, farmers' markets,42 and sending North Korean officials overseas for 
market economy education. For example, according to an official of MOU, 15 North Korean 
economic officials were the first to receive training abroad, going in Shanghai in 1997. Then, 
91 officials were sent overseas for study. At the end of 1999, a total of 109 trainees were sent 
to locations overseas, including the United States and Australia, under the United Nation 
Development Programme (UNDP), to participate in programs aimed at teaching methods of 
42 Farmers' markets were used as a stop-gap method to provide consumers with daily necessities since 
the rnid-1990s. The North Korean people purchase around 60% of their grain and 70% of daily 
necessities through farmers' markets. About 300-350 farmers' markets are located throughout the 
country, and items are traded on a free-market basis. Furthermore, North Korean authorities have not 
only allowed existing farmers' markets to expand, but also have allowed new ones to be established 
(Chung chung-gil and Jeon Chang-gon 2000). 
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attracting foreign investment (interview with junior MOU official, Seoul, February 2001). 
Moreover, although it continuously refuses inter-Korean governmental-level talks, the North 
Korean authorities began to take advantage of Kim Dae-jung's jeongkyungbunri policy by 
welcoming South Korean companies' investment and civilian humanitarian aid. Pyongyang, 
for instance, opened the Mt. Kumgang tourism in the North to South Koreans for the first 
time. 
However, some analysts present negative views of North Korea's tentative reform 
efforts. For instance, Eberstadt (1998) argues that North Korea is not committed to 
developing a business-like pattern of economic engagement with South Korea, and also that 
Pyongyang's political and economic systems are not capable of handling economic reform. 
North Korea appears at best to be guided by an "aid-maximising economic strategy" 
(Eberstadt 1998: 131). Oh and Hassig (1999) reached the same conclusion. They suggested 
that the reforms undertaken by North Korea so far are "half-hearted and peripheral" and 
believe that North Korea will continue to adopt a muddling through approach rather than 
tentative economic reform (Oh and Hassig 1999: 289). 
In sum, Kim Jeong-il seemed to consolidate his power, thus giving the impression of 
little probability of imminent collapse, which is a positive sign for the operation of a long-
term engagement policy by the Kim Dae-jung government. Moreover, North Korea has 
shown signs of economic opening and reform. However, North Korea's international 
economic engagement in the late 1990s is not a new factor for the Kim Dae-jung government 
because Pyongyang's economic engagement with the South Korean private sector already 
occurred during the previous Kim Young-sam government. Moreover, economic reform 
measures are very slow and limited compared with other socialist countries such as China and 
Vietnam, which are eager to transform their economies towards a capitalistic model. Rather, 
North Korea's continuing military aggression and threats towards both the international arena 
and South Korea presented enormous difficulties for the implementation of President Kim 
Dae-jung's active and consistent sunshine policy. 
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4.l.ii US factor 
The United States has been the most important external actor for the formulation of South 
Korea's security policy. As pointed out in chapter 2, Seoul's security policy towards North 
Korea has been paralleled by the US containment policy in the Cold War era. Thus, the US-
South Korea military alliance has been the core policy means for South Korea with regard to 
North Korea's threat. Furthermore, as shown in North Korea's 'southern' and 
tongmibongnam policy, the US became the most important target for North Korea's 
diplomatic objectives, and became the crucial variable in influencing North Korea's 
behaviour and thus inter-Korean relations in the post-Cold War period. lIence, the US policy 
towards North Korea is still an important factor for the South Korea's policy with regards to 
the North Korean security problems. 
4.1.ii.a Soft-landing policy 
As seen during the nuclear crisis, the US and South Korea confronted the limitations of 
military power and economic sanctions for addressing the post-Cold War North Korean 
security problems. They recognised the effectiveness of economic 'carrots' as an alternative 
means to manage the North Korean nuclear threats and to achieve stability on the Korean 
Peninsula. Hence, it was the US along with South Korea and Japan that offered KEDO energy 
assistance to help resolve the nuclear crisis. In fact, the events of the nuclear crisis and its 
aftermath have taught US policy-makers that the strategy of offering an economic 'carrot' is 
likely to be a far more effective and less costly means to manage post-Cold War North 
Korean security threats. 
The realisation by US policy-makers that economic engagement is the most effective 
tool in moderating North Korean military aggressiveness has been consolidated since the real 
state of the North's economic decline has become known, especially after North Korea's 
request for emergency food aid to the outside world for the first time in 1995. Thus, the 
internal collapse of the North Korean regime has begun to take precedence over its external 
military threats. Fear of the sudden collapse of North Korea has begun to convince US policy-
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makers that rather than just attempting to treat the symptoms of North Korean security 
problems with a range of short-term economic concessions, a long-tenn economic 
engagement strategy is necessary to tackle North Korea's economic insecurity. It was the 
United States' hope that various forms of economic exchange will bring North Korea into the 
international community and make it a more normal state. 
For instance, Warren Christopher, US Secretary of State, stated in 1995 that "Our 
goal in crafting the Agreed Framework was to stop North Korea's existing nuclear 
programme ... [However] The AF not only stops North Korea's nuclear programme in its 
tracks. It provided the basis for reducing tensions in the region by opening the way for the 
establishment of more nonnal political and economic relationships between the United States 
and North Korea, and prospectively between North and South Korea".43 Hence, the US, 
especially the Department of State, regarded the KEDO project as the initial stage in opening 
North Korea up and to incorporate it into the East Asian region and the larger international 
community. 
4.1.ii.b Difficulties in execution of the engagement policy towards North Korea 
Although the Clinton administration has publicly supported the 'soft-landing' policy towards 
North Korea, there are several factors that hamper the execution of this approach. First of all, 
execution has been impeded by US domestic opposition. The core supporter of 'soft-landing' 
has been the Department of State, but it has encountered opposition from elements in the US 
military and Congress. A 'hawkish' attitude has emerged from the military and intelligence 
community along with the Republican dominated Congress from 1994. They have viewed the 
AF as a kind of appeasement of North Korean military behaviour. Also, they are concerned 
that political ties with South Korea and Japan were damaged by North Korea's 
tongmibongnam strategy in the nuclear crisis, and also the AF's negative effect on the 
43 Statement of Secretary of State Warren Christopher in the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in 
1995. 
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legitimacy of the US troops presence in the South due to the closer cooperation between the 
US and North Korea.44 
The hawkish side of the Republican Party in Congress opposed the KEDO project on 
the grounds that it offered too many concessions with no effective measures against North 
Korea's future military aggression beyond a vague commitment to engage with North Korea. 
Moreover, after the suspect underground construction at Kumchangri was reported and after 
North Korea's test-fire of a multi-stage missile over Japan in August 1998, the US Congress 
reacted very strongly against North Korea's military threats. The Republican majority in the 
Congress attached various conditions to the bills related to North Korea, sponsored anti-North 
Korea bills, opened hearings on North Korean issues, and began to work on budgets that 
would prevent the Clinton administration from pursuing an engagement policy toward North 
Korea.45 
For instance, the US Senate-House Conference Committee passed a compromise bill 
(the Fiscal Year 1999 Omnibus Appropriations Act on KEDO) on 19 October 1998, with the 
original 35 million dollars re-instated, but with multiple strict conditions. First, the 35 million 
dollars was not to be made available until 1 March 1999. Second, of the funds made available 
for KEDO, up to 15 million dollars would be made available prior to 1 June 1999 only when 
the US President certified and so reported to Congress that North Korea's full compliance and 
cooperation had been made with respect to the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearisation of 
44 It was reported that in 1997 the US Secretary of Defence William Cohen announced that the US 
would keep troops in the South regardless of the outcome of the South-North reunification dialogue, 
see Monthly Chosun (March 1998). 
4S The US Representative Benjamin Gilman introduced "The North Korea Threat Reduction Act of 
1999" on 18 May 1999. This act authorised appropriations of as much as SS million dollars for the 
fiscal year 2000 for assistance to KEDO as the Clinton Administration requested. This bill specified 
conditions for the release of funds by attaching as many as eight conditions, which are far more 
difficult to meet compared to the conditions attached to the bill for the Fiscal Year 1999 introduced on 
19 October 1998. This bill was the most anti-North Korea bill ever introduced in the U.S. Congress 
since the AF in 1994 (Baik Hak-soon: 80-3). Also, on 3 November 1999, Benjamin Gilman released an 
alternative Republican version of the Perry report, called 'North Korean Advisory Group' report. Its 
findings reinforced the Perry report, but put greater emphasis on the deterrence of military threats from 
North Korea. In the name of the American people's right to know, the report emphasised that North 
Korea posed a greater threat to U.S. national security, despite the 1994 AF between the US and North 
Korea. It revealed that despite the U.S. aid of some $64S million to North Korea over the past five 
years, it still developed nuclear weapons and had the capability to strike the United States with 
chemical and biological missiles (U.S. Department of State 1999). 
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the Korean Peninsula, North-South dialogue, the safe storage of spent fuel from the graphite-
moderated nuclear reactors, no significant diversion of U.S. assistance to North Korea's 
military build-up, and U.S full engagement in efforts to impede North Korea's development 
and export of ballistic missiles. Third, of the funds made available for KEDO, up to 20 
million dollars may be made available after 1 June 1999 only when the President certified, 
and so reported to Congress the following: the initiation of meaningful discussions with North 
Korea on the implementation of the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearisation of the Korean 
Peninsula; the agreement with North Korea on the means for satisfying the US concerns 
regarding suspected underground construction at Kumchangri; and significant progress in 
negotiations with North Korea on reducing and eliminating the North Korean ballistic missile 
threat. Hence, since late 1998, the Congress made it increasingly difficult for the US 
government to deliver free oil supplies on time to the North as promised in AF. 
The Senate-House Conference Committee also mandated "a full and complete 
review of United States policy towards North Korea by a very senior presidential envoy in the 
name of 'North Korea Policy Coordinator' to help restore confidence in the Clinton 
Administration's North Korea policy (House of Representatives of the United States 1998). 
As a result, President Clinton named former Secretary of Defence William Perry to the 
position of 'North Korea Policy Coordinator' on 12 November 1998. After a year, the Perry 
Report was submitted to the White House and the U.S. Congress in mid September and 
released in unclassified form to the public on 12 October 1999. 
However, the content of the year-long review process, documented in the "Perry 
Report" was also not necessarily supportive of the US's deeper engagement policy towards 
North Korea despite the Kim Dae-jung government's efforts to lobby William Perry to reflect 
this engagement stance in it.46 The U.S. Department of State has made the complete text of 
the unclassified version of the Perry report available to the public. The document is entitled 
"Review of United States Policy toward North Korea: Findings and Recommendations, on 12 
46 Lim Dong-won, Senior Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Security (SSFAS) of South Korea, has met 
William Perry more than six times from January to September 1999, at a time when Perry was 
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October 1999". The core of the Perry report is called "A Comprehensive and Integrated 
Approach", and is focused on U.S. concern over the North Korea's nuclear weapons and 
missile related activities. The U.S., under this plan, would seek complete and verifiable 
assurance that North Korea does not possess a nuclear weapons program and has stopped the 
testing, production, deployment, and export sales of missiles exceeding the parameters of the 
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). At the U.S. Senate hearing on 12 October, 
1999, Perry said that "[I]f we simply ignored them, if we simply tried to seal them off, they 
could still proceed with a missile and nuclear weapons program that could develop on a short 
time scale" (quoted in Kihl 1999c: 13). The report also mentioned that only if North Korea 
cooperated with the US to end its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile-related activities, 
would the U.S. establish diplomatic relations with North Korea and join in the Kim Dae-jung 
government's policy of engagement and peaceful coexistence. 
Even though the 'Perry Report' points out that the U.S. and its allies seek peaceful 
coexistence with North Korea rather than seek to undermine it, the U.S. position is that it 
would not hurry to implement greater engagement measures toward North Korea. Rather, it 
would continue to focus on North Korea's military issues. The Perry review team, for 
instance, rejected some of the greater engagement measures towards North Korea. It rejected 
'reforming North Korea' policy because this would require a long time to realise and the 
North would at the same time proceed with nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. Also, it 
rejected the option of providing economic concessions to North Korea in return for North 
Korea's abandonment of missile exports because it would only encourage North Korea to 
further blackmail (Perry 1999). 
To be sure, Mr. Perry's proposal indicated that the Clinton administration was willing 
to negotiate and cooperate with North Korea as a normal state. This is clearly in contrast with 
the fact that the U.S. was not convinced that the North Korean regime would survive, and this 
became the foundation of the 'North Korean Collapse' theory often cited in the mid-1990s. 
However, considering the fact that the US's status as a political, military and economic power 
reviewing the US North Korean policy (Monthly Joongang, May 2000). 
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and North Korea's strong desire to cooperate with the US, the Perry recommendation does not 
show enough political will of the U.S. in policy-making towards economic engagement with 
the North. 'Perry Report' was even called nothing more than a variation of 'coercive 
diplomacy' (Kihl 1999c: 26). 
Second, the difficulty in implementing an active engagement policy by the US with 
the North is not just due to hawkish domestic opposition and a lack of bipartisan support. 
Rather, the Clinton administration did not shown the necessary policy-making will for active 
engagement with the North. It is believed that US high-level decision-makers did not want to 
take political risks on the issue of engagement with the North and thus were relatively 
immobile over greater engagement with North Korea (Interview with a junior official in 
MOFAT, Seoul, February 2001). 
The AF, for instance, did more than freeze North Korea's nuclear program. It 
contained a promise that the United States would phase out economic sanctions and work 
toward the normalisation of relations with North Korea. In fact, positive developments 
followed the agreement. The US offered food aid to North Korea and partially lifted the 
economic sanctions on Pyongyang in return for North Korea's promise to stop missile testing, 
as reached in the Berlin agreement between the US and North Korea on 12 September 1999 
(Song Moon-hong 1999). 
However, the Clinton administration continued to maintain effective economic 
sanctions towards North Korea. The core element of U.S. sanctions to North Korea comprised 
prohibiting trade, investment, and assistance, as stipulated in the complicated way in the 
Trading With the Enemy Act (TWEA), various acts on international terrorism, and regulation 
against the Communist countries. Moreover, the Clinton administration did not support North 
Korea's entry to international financial organisations such as the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB), the IMF, and ffiRD. 
Therefore, even if North Korea is removed by the State Department from the list of 
terrorist restrictions and sanctions, which is believed to be the most probable concession by 
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the US in near future,47 the US's economic sanctions can be effectively continued against the 
North through other related regulations. Kim Jang-han (2000), a North Korean specialist of 
KOTRA, is sceptical about the US's lift of economic sanctions against North Korea and 
points out that in order to reinvigorate the trade between the U.S. and North Korea, securing 
the status of Normal Trading Relations (NTR) from the U.s. is the most important 
prerequisite, because there is a great deal of discrimination in terms of tariff levels imposed 
on non-NTR countries compared to those with the NTR status. However, he predicted that it 
would take a considerable time for the North to secure this, as seen in the cases of China and 
Vietnam, both of whom had to wait for years before being recognised as NTR even after the 
normalisation of diplomatic relations with the US. 
Moreover, the Clinton administration would not take advantage of the opportunity for 
normalising relations with the North. Especially after the historical South-North Korean 
summit in June 2000, the Clinton administration had a chance to push U.S.-North Korean 
relations forward. As pointed out in chapter 2, Cho Myong-rok, the number two man in the 
North, visited the US; then the US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright visited Pyongyang 
for a meeting that was designed to pave the way for a visit by President Clinton. The meeting 
was cordial and Kim Jeong-il gave a number of signals including Pyongyang's promise of not 
to produce, test, deploy or sell missiles with a range of over 300 miles and missile 
components. That is, he was willing and able to resolve the U.S. security concerns in the 
context of a broader agreement to improve relations between the two countries (Far Eastern 
Economic Review, 21 October 2000: 21). However, domestic political considerations led 
President Clinton to decide not to travel to North Korea.48 A critical opportunity to advance 
the reconciliation process was lost. 
47 In fact, the US kept North Korea on the "terrorism list" even though the State Department 
acknowledged that the North had not committed an act of terrorism since 1987 (Landsberg 2001: 20). 
48 Landsberg (2001) suggested that when the two countries began to move towards normalising 
relationships in late 2000, the media criticisms, orchestrated by those opposed to this improvement, 
succeeded in painting the Clinton administration as naive and thus likely to be cheated by the North. 
Under the domestic pressure, President Clinton was not willing to take the political risk and gave up 
the visit. 
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Third, the U.S. business community, which is an important actor in performing 
business-track diplomacy, has shown very little business interest toward North Korea. In 
other words, it is difficult to envision North Korea becoming competitive any time soon as a 
magnet for U.S. trade and investment. It seems that the U.S. corporations know that they 
cannot expect to be able to explore the North as one of their markets for the time being, as 
high economic growth would be necessary for a considerable period of time before North 
Korea had a reasonable purchasing power. In fact, US companies interested in investment in 
North Korea have decreased because of the level of internal change, with the North Korean 
regime not serious about economic reform, and state control of the foreign corporations 
extensive. There are many other places around the world which are far more attractive to 
American business representatives and investors than North Korea. It was suggested that "for 
the business community in the U.S., North Korea is almost bottom in terms of business 
interest because there are too much risks" (Olsen 2000: 112). 
As a result of lack of policy-making will for comprehensive engagement towards 
North Korea by US domestic actors, few commercial transactions are being made between the 
two countries. There has been no tangible progress in economic exchanges, which are 
virtually nil as seen in Table 4-1. There is virtually no export of North Korean products to the 
U.S. The U.S. exports to the North consist chiefly of economic and humanitarian aid. In fact, 
there was not a single case of imports by the U.S. from the North since the import of footwear 
worth US$8,OOO in 1992 until the U.S. imported 3 units of transformers worth US$ 29,000 in 
1999. 
Table 4-1. U.S.-North Korea trade 
Unit: Thousands ofUS$ 
1992 1995 1997 1998 1999 
Total Amount of Trade 475 5,006 2,409 4,454 11,289 
U.S. Export to the North 467 5,006 2,409 4,454 11,260 
U.S. Import from the North 8 0 0 0 29 
Data based on U.S. Department of Commerce. Quoted from Kim Jang-han (2000). 
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As discussed above, the United States shared the logic of an engagement policy 
towards North Korea. However, North Korea's continuing military threats forced the U.S. 
Congress to limit engagement with the North. Thus, it is difficult to get bipartisan support for 
an engagement policy towards North Korea. It is also true that the Clinton administration 
itself lacked the political will to take risks, to implement more active engagement measures, 
and to normalise relations with the North. Moreover, the powerful U.S. business community 
also saw no special business interests in investing in the North for the time being, unless 
North Korea introduced at least some tentative economic reform measures. 
4.1.iii Japan factor 
4.1.iii.a Support for the soft-landing policy 
Japan is undoubtedly an important country that could help North Korea's economic 
reconstruction, and thus its economic reform and opening up to the outside world. After South 
Korea experienced a financial crisis, Japanese economic power became an even more crucial 
element to help South Korea's economic engagement of the North. In fact, Japan itself has 
recognised its potential economic contribution to decreasing North Korea's military 
aggression. As discussed in chapter 2, in the post-Cold War era there has been growing 
feeling among Japanese leaders that Japan should explore the possibility of improving 
relations with North Korea. Also, they have gradually come to realise the limitation of the 
traditional military and economic containment approaches in dealing with the post-Cold War 
North Korean security problems, and that Japan's mobilisation of economic power can offer a 
chance to resolve the problems. 
At the height of the nuclear crisis, for instance, Japanese policy-makers did not see 
coercive economic policy as an effective tool for stopping North Korea's nuclear 
development. The plan to impose UN sanctions against North Korea, led by the United States, 
needed the active participation of the Japanese government in order to be an effective 
pressure on North Korea. It caned for Japan to halt all remittances by Chochongryun (Pro-
North Korea association of Korean residents in Japan) to North Korea. However, Japanese 
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policy-makers were aware not only that this measure would not be successful in preventing 
Japanese, and especially Pro-North Koreans, from sending money to North Korea, but also 
that this would have a negative impact on both international and domestic affairs, damaging 
the relationship between Japan and the pro-North Korean society in Japan, and between Japan 
and China (Chosunilbo, 22 March 1994; Lind 1997: 397-9). 
Hence, with the signing of the U.S.-North Korean Agreed Framework in October 
1994, the Japanese government, under Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi, welcomed the AF 
in Geneva and indicated its willingness to share the cost of building light-water reactors for 
North Korea. In fact, the Japanese policy-makers recognise the importance of policy 
coordination with the United States and South Korea and assumed a significant role in the 
management of the KEDO project. Thus, it expressed full support for the principle of 
engagement with North Korea and thus the 'soft-landing' policy. The Japanese support of 
engagement policy has been shown in the various food aids and humanitarian reliefs to 
Pyongyang through either directly or United Nations (Kim Hong-nack and Hammersmith 
2000: 597-601). 
At the same time, it is in North Korea's vital interest to establish diplomatic ties with 
Japan to compensate for diplomatic setbacks caused by South Korea's diplomatic relations 
with USSR and China in the early 1990s. Also, North Korea was sorely in need of Japan's 
financial assistance to cope with its economic crisis. Therefore, North Korean leaders tried to 
resume normalisation talks with Japan in the 1990s, in spite of various political and military 
tensions in the Korean Peninsula. Thus, Japanese policy-makers recognise Japan's potential 
economic capability and the need for an engagement policy towards North Korean in order to 
decrease North Korea's military behaviours and to reduce tension in the Korean Peninsula. 
4.1.iii.b Japan's immobilism and US-Japan security arrangement 
However, the normalisation talks between the two countries were stalled and no substantial 
economic cooperation was realised between them, in spite of several visits to Pyongyang by 
several prominent members of Japan's national legislature, the Diet, and numerous rounds of 
166 
working level discussions. There are several factors that contributed to the impasse of the 
normalisation between the two countries, which is one of the most important political 
prerequisites for Japan's economic based security policy towards North Korea. First, South 
Korea's external pressure made it difficult for Japan to initiate any diplomatic moves towards 
Pyongyang. As discussed in chapter 3, both the Roh Tae-woo and the Kim Young-sam 
governments were greatly suspicious of Japanese motives for the normalisation efforts 
towards North Korea, as it was based on the status quo policy of a divided Korean Peninsula, 
and on erasing Seoul's diplomatic and economic edges in the post-Cold War era. Hence, they 
were opposed to Japan's unilateral normalisation moves and large-scale economic 
cooperation with North Korea ahead of real progress between South and North Korea. 
The principal concern of Japanese policy-makers in pursuing engagement with North 
Korea was that it should not damage relations with South Korea, in the same way as during 
the Cold War era. The Japanese government continued to prioritise around relations with 
South Korea and was prepared only to improve relations with North Korea in such a way that 
ensured Seoul's diplomatic interests would not be damaged. For instance, after vigorous inter-
party negotiations and talks, from 1989, North Korea's Korean Workers Party (KWP), the 
Japanese Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), and the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ) 
produced the Three-Party Joint Declaration in September 1990. It promised to urge the 
governments of both countries to move towards the normalisation of relations; and stated that 
Japan should not only apologise for colonial rule but also provide appropriate compensation 
for the period since World War II. 
However, given the concern over North Korea's nuclear programme from late 1990s, 
the Japanese government agreed with Roh Tae-woo government's demand not to rush into 
normalisation and compensation but to urge North Korea to accept IAEA inspections and to 
apply economic pressure (Quinones 2000: 149-50). Thus, since previous South Korean 
governments were not supportive of Japan's active engagement with the North, Japan was 
forced to remain reactive in regard to the normalisation issue and to keep a watchful eye on 
the progress of inter-Korean relations. 
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A second source of restraint is the lack of Japanese policy-making will for pursuing 
an active engagement policy towards North Korea. It became apparent that Japan's policy-
makers and business community did not have the political energy for a greater engagement 
policy toward North Korea, even when the South Korean government dropped the objections 
to Japan's move towards normalising relations with the North. In fact, the new Kim Dae-jung 
government has been consistently encouraging the two countries' normalisation and 
improvement of economic exchanges. 
Rather, with growing concerns over North Korea's missile and nuclear development, 
especially from the late 1990s, Japanese policy-makers seemed more reluctant to initiate 
engagement with Pyongyang to address North Korean security problems, despite 
understanding its importance. Hughes (1999) highlights in his book "Japan's Economic 
Power and Security" the immobilisation of Japanese policy-making in the area of economic 
engagement towards North Korea. He argues that there are no individual politicians and 
parties willing to take risks and expand political energy enough to mobilise Japan's economic 
power for security concerns regarding North Korea (Hughes 1999: 187). 
Furthermore, under North Korea's present economic circumstances, it is difficult to 
expect that Japan's leading corporations will consider advancing into North Korea and 
spending their own money. Since they have experienced a hard time due to the North's 
default in the repayment of its debts incurred for the purchase of plant facilities back in the 
1970s, the Japanese business community has the image of North Korea as an unreliable 
business partner. Thus they would not be willing to run another risk by investing in the North. 
Also, Japanese businesses can see no good reason for investing in new projects in the North 
and assuming all the risk, as their South Korean counterparts do. Put differently, North Korea 
is apparently not a favourable location to attract Japanese businesses, compared to countries 
in other parts of the world. Their reluctance to invest in the North can be accounted for by the 
various problems of conducting business in the North. These constraints include the regime's 
political regulations and thus lack of management freedom, as discussed before; unreliability 
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of energy supplies; unexpected high labour costs and no substantial long-term economic 
incentives (Hughes 1999: 180-3). 
Also, the role of Chochongryun (pro-North Korea association of Korean residents in 
Japan) is not very great in terms of economic engagement toward North Korea, though it has 
made a considerable contribution to North Korea's economy through joint ventures and 
remittances. It seems that native Japanese companies understand that the kind of influence 
that Chochongryun has on North Koreans is just something they can more than secure 
through their cooperation with South Korean counterparts and thus they see no great merit in 
trying to advance into the North in cooperation with Chochongryun. Furthermore, it is 
expected that the role of the companies belonging to it will shrink further if Japanese 
companies start to make investment after the normalisation between Japan and North Korea. 
Thus, it is likely that Japanese businesses interested in investment in North Korea will choose 
to take part in either the projects linked with the Japanese government's compensation money 
for the past, after the normalisation between Japan and North Korea, or in joint ventures with 
South Korean businesses that have already established a foothold in North Korea (Sisa 
Journal, 9 December 1999: 48-9). 
On the contrary, Japanese policy-making efforts have been devoted to enhancing 
Japan's military role rather than to economic engagement in its security strategy in the post-
Cold War period, through the redefinition of the U.S.-Japan alliance and other measures. 
Under the set of revised' guidelines' for the US and Japan joint military alliance, announced 
in September 1997, the armed forces of the two nations would cooperate in dealing with 
emergency situations 'in areas surrounding Japan', with undefined boundaries, rather than 
strictly within the Japanese territory as under the old agreement. The Japanese Self-Defence 
Forces (SDF) would undertake, for instance, search-and-rescue operations in waters around 
Japan and assist U.S. forces in areas outside Japan (Chosunilbo, 2S September 1997). 
Immediately after the August rocket or missile launch by North Korea in 1998, the 
Japanese government repeatedly warned North Korea of the potential consequences if it 
repeated this action without giving Japan prior notification. In fact, the missile in question 
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was believed to be a Taepodong-l which was capable of reaching easily the whole of Japan. 
This premise also heightened the Japanese security concern about North Korea's military 
threat. Japan's strongest fear was of North Korea's possible chemical missile attack and the 
domestic disorder that it might produce, though there is general doubt that North Korea's 
missile technology is good enough to launch a genuine nuclear strike force (Hughes 1999: 
91). 
Feeling vulnerable due to its lack of offensive capacities to counter North Korea's 
possible attacks, Japan has resorted to self-help measures. For example, in November 1998, 
Japan decided to acquire spy satellites for the first time. In addition, in March 1999, a JDA 
Director General, Hosei Norota, told a Diet defence panel that Japan had the right to make 
preemptive military strikes if it felt a missile attack on Japan was imminent. Although Japan 
at present does not have the capability to carry out such a threat, the statement was clearly 
made as a warning against North Korea's military threats. Japan has also agreed to deepen its 
cooperation with the US on the joint development of intelligence satellite technology and the 
Theatre Missile Defence system (TMD), which China and North Korea oppose and even 
South Korea is reluctant to participate in (Quinones 2000: 168-172). 
Japan's interest in an enhanced military role has been prompted by North Korean 
nuclear and missile threats from early 1990s. However, the basic reason for Japan's pursuit of 
the military alliance with US is to counteract the uncertainties of the post-Cold War era. In 
Japanese eyes one of the uncertainties of the post-Cold War era is the future of the Chinese 
regime, and Japan chooses to maintain closer tie with the US in order to avoid its 
'abandonment' by US as the essential strategic partner in East Asia, though Japan may run the 
risk of confrontation with China at the same time. The US/Japanese TMD project, for 
example, can be seen by China as an attempt to counter its growing power through bolstering 
the ability of the US-Japan military alliance across Asia-Pacific region in the post-Cold War 
era. Thereby, Japan could face difficulties in maintaining harmonious relationships with 
China. Although there is scepticism about the feasibility and thus the true military benefit of 
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the project, Japanese policy-makers view it as an important measure of the political solidarity 
of the US-Japan alliance (Drifte 2000). 
4.2 Domestic factors 
4.2.i Democratisation 
As pointed out in chapter 1, a state's foreign policy-making could be influenced by its 
domestic political system. In South Korea, continuing transfonnation towards democratisation 
from late 1980s may have influenced South Korea's foreign policy-making process. Thus, 
this section looks at whether South Korea's democratisation has influenced the Kim Dae-jung 
government's North Korea policy. 
Firstly, South Korea's democratisation has certainly influenced the retreat from anti-
North Koreanism as the national security ideology during the Cold War era. As pointed out in 
chapter 2, South Korea has been depicted as one of the most rigid anti-communist states in the 
Cold War era. Having undergone the experience of the Korean War in 1950s, and the 
subsequent heightened hostility, distrust, and confrontation between the two Koreas, North 
Korea provided most South Korean people with the image of an arch-rival and enemy. Thus, 
South Korea has preoccupied itself with national security, especially military security and the 
anti-North Koreanism ideology as core principles of its North Korea policy direction. 
The primacy of anti-North Koreanism and military power were used by the military 
authoritarian regime to tightly control people through a peculiar fonn of national ideology 
from the 1960s to the late 1980s. President Park Chung-hee (1961-1979) adopted the 
principle 'victory over communism', which was apparently targeted at North Korea, and 
emphasised the supremacy of the state over individuals in the name of 'national security and 
stability'. This trend continued under the Chun Doo-whan regime from 1980 to 1987. Thus, 
South Korea's democratic and progressive movements, such as labour and unification 
activities, were cracked down in the name of social stability and national security, to deter 
North Korean threat (Moon and Paik 1998: 264-7). 
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However, the rapid growth of the South Korean economy and its growing 
interdependence with the outside world during the Cold war era produced a rapid widening of 
access to the communication media, which fostered a rise in the resources, skill, and cognitive 
sophistication of the general public and enhanced their political competence. This, in tum, 
created growing societal recognition and pressure for democratisation. There was also the 
growth of a group of middle-class citizens, who were becoming increasingly resistant to 
South Korea's top-down military rule and repression, and responsive to the effects of 
democracy elsewhere in the world. Some of these middle class individuals sided with student 
demands for democracy in late 1980s (Lee Aie-rie 1998: 223-6). 
South Korean people's opposition to military-led dictatorship included its excessive 
use of anti-North Koreanism as a governing ideology. Particularly the youth of South Korea 
began to consider the old concepts of national security ideology as instruments for building a 
hegemonic bloc for domination by the military led government in South Korea. In fact, in the 
past three decades, Korean political leaders have utilised the national security ideology as a 
tool for indoctrinating the masses, controlling civil society, consolidating legitimacy, and thus 
maintaining political power. Democratic activists along with the majority of the public 
strongly called for a choice for individual rights over nationalism (the supremacy of the state), 
equality over economic growth, welfare over defence, and also ideological diversification 
over rigid anti-communism and North Koreanism. Given the progress towards 
democratisation in 1990s, a substantial number of democratic movement activists, even ex-
pro-North Korean student activists, were able to come to the political arena as congressmen, 
government officials and members of interest groups. Therefore, the impact of the rigid anti-
North Koreanism ideology on South Korean politics was diminished, though this anti-North 
Korean mind-set is still the backbone of South Korean 'conservatism' in the 1990s. 
One direct impact of the move towards South Korea's ideological diversification 
beyond anti-North Koreanism on North Korea policy was the election of Kim Dae-jung as 
President in 1997. Although the presidential victory of the opposition leader Kim Dae-jung 
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could be accounted for by several other factors,49 one important implication was that many 
South Korean people felt that Kim Dae-jung, the most progressive and liberal politician in 
regard to societal and North Korean issues among prominent South Korean political leaders, 
was no longer ideologically dangerous (Kim Do-jong 2000: 46). In fact, Kim Dae-jung had 
been continuously accused of being a 'Red' and was damaged severely by this ideological 
attack, being defeated in the three previous presidential elections (1972, 1987, and 1992). 
Thus, he decided to make a coalition with the United Liberal Democrat (ULD), the most 
conservative party of South Korea, in the 1997 presidential election, to dilute his long-time 
pro-North Korean image. 
A second impact of democratisation on the South Korean policy-making process is 
that its policy-making structure is increasingly pluralistic, with various groups exercising 
different degrees of influence according to the particular issue addressed, even on North 
Korea policy. An important feature of authoritarian regimes is that the state enjoys a high 
degree of autonomy from the public. However, the impact of democratisation on the state 
autonomy over foreign policy-making becomes more complex by reducing its policy-making 
power and increasing the difficulties of implementing certain policies. 
Whereas the dominant elite groups in the previous authoritarian regimes, such as the 
military and the bureaucracy, may lose their political power to formulate policy towards 
North Korea, a large number of social groups are expected to emerge as new pressure groups, 
such as opposition parties, mass media, interest groups and so on. Thus, the government will 
find it increasingly difficult to exercise absolute control over North Korea policy, and has to 
accommodate the demands coming from the private sector. At the same time, it can utilise 
these non-governmental actors as effective policy means to achieve security objectives 
regarding North Korean threats. 
49 The opposition leader Kim Dae-jung's 1997 presidential victory was generally accounted for by the 
financial crisis that had broken out under the ruling party, the split of presidential candidates within the 
ruling party into Lee Hoi-Chang and Lee In-je, and the political coalition of opposition leaders, Kim 
Dae-jung and Kim Jong-pil. 
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As discussed in chapter 3, the pluralistic nature of North Korea policy in the South 
was well demonstrated by the fact that the media and the public opinion played a key role in 
shaping the Kim Young-sam government's North Korea policy. Thus, it can be assumed that 
a pluralistic range of domestic actors could possibly influence the Kim Dae-jung 
government's consistent engagement policy. The later sections will examine these domestic 
actors. 
4.2.ii Financial crisis 
The South Korean financial crisis in late 1997 provided both favourable and unfavourable 
environments for Kim Dae-jung government's engagement policy towards North Korea. On 
the one hand, the financial crisis helped to legitimate Seoul's engagement with the North. In 
the past, South Korea's overconfidence was met with fear and hostility in North Korea. But, 
the South's economic slowdown dissipated the groundless claim that the South could absorb 
the North in the case of the latter's collapse. Thus, economic difficulties forced the South to 
relax the unification policy based on the hope of North's sudden collapse and its own 
exaggerated notion of superiority, and, instead, to adopt the approach of seeking co-existence 
through mutual cooperation between the two Koreas. 
On the other hand, it decreased South Korea's economic capability to utilise business-
track diplomacy under the Kim Dae-jung government. As pointed out in the theory of 
business-track diplomacy in chapter 1, economic capability is one important requirement in 
order to pursue economic-based engagement with a target state. However, the impact of the 
financial crisis made it difficult for Seoul to enhance the business-track diplomacy towards 
North Korea. This crisis significantly curbed the financial ability of the South Korean public 
sector to promote economic exchanges with North Korea. Governmental level economic aid, 
such as food supplies, agricultural fertiliser and other financial aid towards North Korea, 
decreased compared to the 1993-1997 period, though civilian aid increased (MOU 2000b). 
A vivid example of this was found in the failure of Beijing talks in 1998 between the 
two Koreas. Although the Kim Dae-jung government was ready to initiate active engagement 
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with North Korea by providing fertiliser, it insisted on a separate family reunion event as a 
pre-condition for its fertiliser aid towards the North. Although Beijing talks were held only 
two months after the inauguration of President Kim Dae-jung, the South Korean government 
was not in a position to provide the North with unconditional economic aid. Moreover, other 
North Korean infrastructure projects, such as the development of its transportation and 
energy, which required huge amounts of money from the South Korean government, could 
not be carried out partly because of Seoul's financial difficulties. For example, North Korea, 
which is undergoing severe electricity shortages, as discussed in chapter 2, asked for South 
Korea's help, especially after the presidential summit in June 2000. Connecting the South-
North electricity lines would help to overcome the North Korean electricity problem that had 
been one of the main constraints for deeper inter-Korean economic cooperation. However, 
they could not reach an agreement at this point, partly because the Kim Dae-jung government 
had difficulty in using public money for it, though it wanted to (Yang Moon-soo 2001). 
In fact, the main obstacle to government level economic engagement with North 
Korea was not the lack of financial power caused by the financial crisis. Rather it was the fact 
that the financial crisis legitimised South Korean domestic criticisms of Kim Dae-jung 
government's unconditional economic assistance towards North Korea in the midst of South's 
economic difficulties. Hence, Seoul has been very cautious about government level economic 
aid towards North Korea. 
Furthermore, IMF sponsored loans, with conditions such as high interest rates and a 
deflationary fiscal policy, led to an unprecedented high rate of bankruptcy of chaebols, not to 
mentioned small and medium sized enterprises. Private corporations, especially chaebols, 
were no longer capable of engaging risky business activities with the North. In fact, the South 
Korean government's 'structure-reshaping' policy, backed by IMF, as the response to the 
financial crisis, brought enormous pressure for them to be extremely parsimonious in terms of 
financial management in order to survive. Hence, the new domestic business environment 
caused by the financial crisis and the adoption of the so-called 'neo-liberal' economic 
mechanisms changed the South Korea's business community towards being more profit and 
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economic-oriented rather than expansion and politically oriented. This meant that the South 
Korea business community became restricted in regard to politically and long-term motivated 
North Korean investments, and looked for profitability in their North Korean business 
projects. Thereby, the financial crisis also contributed to downgrade private sector's economic 
capability to implement business-track diplomacy towards North Korea. 
4.2.iii Ruling party and 'shared government' 
The North Korea policy of the ruling party, National Conference for the New Politics 
(NCNP) , which changed its name to the Millennium Democratic Party (MOP) a few days 
before the general election in April 2000, has generally reflected progressive opinion and 
supported President Kim Dae-jung's 'sunshine policy'. Pro-North Korean and unification 
attitudes certainly exist among a limited number of NCNP members. As part of the wider 
process of political democratisation, some student and labour movement activists, with liberal 
ideas towards North Korea, were elected as congressman of the NCNP. Thus, MDP's North 
Korea policy is supportive of the Kim Dae-jung government's engagement policy. 
However, a more important aspect is North Korea policy coordination between MOP 
and the conservative United Liberal Democrat (ULD) under the 'shared government'. In fact, 
in order to win the 1997 presidential election, NCNP recruited more centralists and even 
retired conservative army generals in order to attract more centre voters. Moreover, it made a 
political coalition with the ULD, which possesses many members with a hawkish position 
towards North Korea. In fact, Kim Dae-jung owes his victory in part to the unlikely coalition 
he formed two months before the election with the conservative chairman of the ULD, Kim 
Jong-pil. The support from Kim Jong-pil's stronghold in the Chungchong provincial region 
may have made the difference between victory and defeat in the presidential election. Before 
the presidential election, both Kims agreed to make a political alliance based on the promise 
of 'shared government' if they win the election. 
After the victory, both Kims participated in the government by assuming the roles of 
president and Prime minister. However, the two parties do not share much in terms of 
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political ideology about various issues, especially North Korean policy. The coalition was 
basically uncomfortable because of the differences in each party's political ideology and the 
party members' political background. The NCNP led by president Kim Dae-jung is basically 
a progressive party consisting of former opposition party members who worked for the 
democratisation and unification movement of Korea. The ULD, led by the prime minister 
Kim Jong-pil, however, is a conservative party which is constituted by former generals and 
ruling party members. Thus, the Kim Dae-jung government has internal political weaknesses 
that affect the implementation of the North Korea policy. Thus the Kim Dae-jung government 
was expected to be eventually forced into a conservative approach in terms of policy 
formulation, similar to the Kim Young-sam government. 
However, this unbalanced political coalition between NCNP and ULD actually 
played a positive role in containing opposition forces to the engagement policy towards North 
Korea during the first three years of Kim Dae-jung government. In fact, in the policy-making 
process of the 'shared government', Prime Minister Kim Jong-pil has not shown opposition 
towards Seoul's sunshine policy. It is generally believed that the conservative image of Kim 
Jong-pil and ULD has provided the public with a psychological assurance, that ULD would 
restrict the Kim Dae-jung government from implementing too soft a policy towards North 
Korea (Kim Do-jong 2000: 52-3). 
However, Kim Jong-pil and ULD did not make the conservative case in the North 
Korean policy-making process and rather defended the policy in return for increasing its 
political power in the shared government, such as the ULD's increased share of cabinet 
members. A congressman ofULD confirmed this when he said that "we are more comfortable 
with opposition Grand National Party (GNP) in some respects, and, most importantly, this 
applies to the North Korean issues. However, we are not going to raise a conservative voice in 
that issue because of political considerations" (Interview with a congressman of the ULD, 
Seoul, September 1999). 
For instance, when the 1999 naval clash between North and South Korea on the West 
coast of the Korean peninsula brought severe criticism over the sunshine policy from the 
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opposition party and the mainstream media groups, Kim Jong-pil defended the President 
Kim's policy towards North Korea. He said that that "I am a conservative on the North 
Korean issue as people know and it is no compromise. Because 1 am prime minister of this 
government, the people do not need to worry about the direction of this government's North 
Korean policy"(quoted in Chosunilbo, 22 June 1999). Whenever there were criticisms over 
the engagement policy implementation, caused by North Korea's incursions and other nuclear 
and missile threats, prime minister Kim Jong-pil indirectly supported the engagement policy 
by showing his confidence in the government, thus limiting conservative anger. This political 
support for the sunshine policy by Kim Jong-pil and the ULD was helpful for Kim Dae-jung's 
consistent sunshine policy. Lee Hei-chang, leader of the opposition party (GNP), argued that 
without the ULD's help on the sunshine policy it would have been impossible for the Kim 
Dae-jung government to continue with its North Korean policy for three years (Monthly 
Chosun, May 2001). 
However, the above discussion does not mean that the Kim Dae-jung government has 
a strong domestic political backing for engagement policy-making. This government actually 
maintains the weakest political base in South Korean since a direct presidential election was 
first organised in 1987. Compared to the GNP. which has a political base in the Kyungsang 
region. where more than 28 percent of total population live. and which held 165 seats in the 
National Assembly, Kim Dae-jung's MDP is a minority party with only 78 seats. Even with 
the 43 held by Kim Jong-pil's ULD, the coalition government controls only 121 seats. Thus, 
GNP remains the largest party in the South Korean National Assembly. In fact, a political 
break in the coalition between MDP and ULD in summer 2001 led to the step-down of Lim 
Dong-won, the architect of sunshine policy and President Kim Dae-jung's top-aide for North 
Korea policy, and thus harmed the government's consistent engagement with North Korea. 
4.2.iv Opposition party 
The policy of the majority opposition party. Grand National Party (GNP: Hannaradang in 
Korean), towards North Korea has generally reflected the conservative opinion contained 
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within the party. An anti-communist and anti-North Korea attitude certainly exists among 
members of the 'conservative meeting' (Bosuduluimoim), consisting of retired generals and 
former government officials, though there are certain moderate voices inside the GNP. 
In fact, the GNP does not publicly oppose the general theme of engagement policy 
toward North Korea. As discussed before, the pursuit of gradual confidence building 
measures through economic, social and cultural interactions between the two Koreas has been 
Seoul's key North Korea policy direction along with military deterrence in the post-Cold War 
era. However, it has criticised the Kim Dae-jung government's engagement policy for its one-
way and unconditional appeasement approach, which was based on wishful thinking, since it 
assumed that South Korea's consistent aid will decrease Pyongyang's military aggression and 
bring it into inter-Korean direct talks. Hence, GNP argues that selective engagement should 
proceed based on the strict give and take reciprocity rule (Hannaradang 2000: 1). Put 
differently, Seoul's engagement should be dependent upon North Korea's behaviours, which 
resembles previous South Korean governments' policies as presented in chapter 3. 
Moreover, a significant difference between the two parties lies in the priority given to 
the North Korea policy. The GNP sees the deterrence of North Korea's military threats 
through the maximisation of Seoul's military capability as the top priority of North Korea 
policy, while the Kim Dae-jung government considers consistent engagement policy as an 
important long-term security policy with regards to post-Cold War North Korean security 
problems. This policy difference is based on their different perceptions and interpretations on 
North Korea's intentions and subsequent changes. GNP' views about North Korea are 
sceptical. It sees no prospect of North Korea's self-reforms in the near future or of its giving 
up of the military solution. Therefore, engagement with North Korea should be conditional on 
North Korea's good behaviour, such as self-reform and ending military provocations. 
Otherwise, the sunshine policy only consolidates the authoritarian regime of Kim 
Jeong-il without improving the standard of living of the North Korean people (Hannaradang 
2000: 5). GNP argued that North Korea's conciliatory gestures for growing inter-Korean 
exchanges are merely a tactical shift that does not change the North's fundamental strategies 
179 
aimed at undermining the South Korean system and unification on North Korean terms. For 
instance, the Mt. Kumgang tourism project initiated by the Hyundai group, discussed in 
chapter 6, was viewed by the Kim Dae-jung government and the ruling party as a sign of 
North Korea's reform and also as a significant bridge for cooperation and interdependence 
between the two Koreas. The GNP however viewed this in sceptical terms, as perhaps a 
dangerous project, due to the North Korea's possible utilisation of the tourism profits for its 
military build-up (Hannaradang 2000: 3). 
These differences often brought about politicaIly motivated debates and domestic 
ideological conflicts in the South whenever there was a tension in the Korean Peninsula. For 
instance, after a series of North Korean provocations, including the naval clash between the 
two Koreas, the detainment of a Mt. Kumgang tourist, the breaking off of high-level talks 
between the two Koreas in June 1999, some GNP congressmen reiterated their call for the 
suspension of all aid and exchanges to the North, attacked the government's persistence with 
the engagement policy despite North Korea's unchanged behaviours, and demanded the 
resignation of Lim Dong-won, Unification Minister at that time. 
In fact, in addition to ideological differences over engagement with the North, 
domestic political games between the ruling and opposition party brought heated GNP 
opposition to the sunshine policy. In other words, the GNP has to raise a more hawkish voice 
against the current government's sunshine policy in order to satisfy its traditional 
conservative base in the South. Most GNP members understand that it should raise the tone of 
the debate in order to boost its appeal to conservative voters, who are its main political base, 
and thus it should oppose the government's somewhat liberal policy towards North Korea. 
One member of the GNP said "I understand that the consistent engagement policy is the best 
option for North Korea policy, at the same time, opposition against this policy is also 
necessary from the domestic political perspective" (Interview with a congressman of the 
GNP, Seoul, September 1999). Thus, the scope and nature of Seoul's comprehensive 
engagement policy towards North Korea is a highly contentious and emotional issue for 
ideological and political reasons. 
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Thereby, the GNP seemed determined to not allow the Kim Dae-jung government to 
get excessive political leverage on North Korea policy. This trend will continue towards the 
2002 presidential elections. For instance, in their first meeting after the April national 
elections in 2000, President Kim Dae-jung and GNP leader Lee Hoi-chang agreed that any aid 
program or inter-Korean cooperative projects that would entail a financial burden on South 
Korean taxpayers must be approved by the National Assembly. For instance, the GNP 
introduced legislation requiring congress approval for any aid offer to North Korea involving 
a cash payment in excess of US$SOO,OOO, any project that would involve the transfer of 
advanced technology to the North, or any program requiring that government controlled 
banks and government-owned corporations guarantee large-scale loans to North Korea 
(Munwhailbo, 28 June 2000). 
4.2.v Media 
The democratic transition in the South has created new actors in national security policy-
making and thus North Korea policy. The mass media became a very influential actor in 
shaping the nature of North Korea policy (Moon and Paik 1998: 269). In fact, the North 
Korea issue is one area where media publicity can be generated far more easily than in the 
case of purely domestic political issues. Due to the difficulty in accessing information on 
North Korea, the mass media play a great role in shaping public opinion and thus policy 
decisions. 
The prominent mass media groups in South Korea such as the "big three newspapers" 
(Chosunilbo, Dongailbo, and Joongangi/bo) are inclined towards the conservative camp. 
They frequently raise concerns over North Korea's continuing post-Cold War military threats, 
the damage of US-South Korea alliance, due to North Korea's tongmibongnam policy, and 
the North Korean regime's future opening up and reform. Thus, they have called for the Kim 
Dae-jung government to keep to a strict reciprocity rule in inter-Korean relations through 
numerous editorial sections. As discussed in chapter 3, they have greatly influenced the Kim 
181 
Young-sam government's policy toward North Korea through promoting conservative voices, 
significantly enough to change public perception and thus policy choice by the government. 
Their conservative coverage of these issues continued during the Kim Dae-jung 
government, especially until after the inter-Korean summit in June 2000. Thus, growing inter-
Korean tension, caused mainly by North Korea's military aggressiveness, became the 
conservative media groups' main source of attack on President Kim's sunshine policy. For 
instance, the Chosunilbo, Seoul's largest national daily and the most conservative newspaper, 
was pessimistic over the liberalisation of inter-Korean trade, and also the Mt. Kumgang 
tourism because it believed that North Korea was still an unreliable partner. At this juncture, 
the conservative media pointed out that "[u]nless North Korea turned out to be a truly reliable 
partner, the South needs to consider taking on tougher stances" (Chosunilho and Dongailbo, 
16 June 1999). 
Meanwhile liberal media groups which support the comprehensive engagement 
policy have been growing but have a limited voice. Hankyurae Shinmun, for instance, has 
been a newspaper supportive towards the Kim Dae-jung government's sunshine policy. The 
newspaper not only argues for the necessity of comprehensive engagement with North Korea 
but also criticises other conservative newspapers for their hard-line posture towards North 
Korea. For instance, after the West coast naval clash in 1999 between the two Koreas, its 
editorial section pointed out that the government should proceed with the sunshine policy in 
order to calm down both sides, and it should not listen to exceedingly conservative opinion 
(Hankyurae Shinmun, 16 June 1999). 
These different opinions became extended to ideological debates between liberal and 
conservative newspapers. The sunshine policy therefore has become a symbolic issue for this 
conflict.SO In keeping with the process of democratisation, the ideological spectrum in the 
media became diversified. Liberal newspapers and media groups are growing, but there are 
so This Ideological conflict between liberals and conservatives in South Korea in the Post-Cold War era 
is also known as 'South-South Conflict' (Namnamgaldung in Korean). 
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still powerful conservative voices and media groups that could influence the current 
government's policy towards North Korea. 
4.2.vi Business community 
As the previous chapters have demonstrated, private sector economic exchanges with the 
North is an important means for South Korea's business-track diplomacy. Historically, the 
South Korean business community has performed a crucial role in preparing the ground for 
the South Korean government's engagement efforts with China. It pioneered improvements in 
Sino-South Korean relations. South Korean businessmen's private diplomacy was an 
important dialogue channel for the two countries' move towards the normalisation of bilateral 
relations. Also, South Korean chaebols' promise of massive investment in China played a 
crucial role in Seoul's effort to normalise relations with China during the Roh Tae-woo 
government. This example of the South Korean business community's involvement 
demonstrates that it has a potentially important role in promoting inter-Korean engagement 
(Moon Jae-chul 1993: 74-6). 
In fact, the South Korean business community certainly has a potential business 
interest in economically engaging with North Korea. After inter-Korean economic exchanges 
were realised in 1989, South Korean firms, especially the chaebols, were eager to be involved 
in inter-Korean economic exchanges based on their calculated interests. First, South Korean 
companies expected that North Korea's abundant cheap labour and South Korea's idle 
machinery, especially after the huge bankruptcies caused by the financial crisis in 1997, could 
be combined to reduce production costs. In fact, the volume of inter-Korean CPT based on 
labour intensive and light industry is increasing every year. Also, half of those South Korean 
small and medium size companies are making a profit, which is very high compared with 
two-thirds of South Korean companies currently losing money from North Korean economic 
cooperation (KOTRA 2001b). 
Second, the business community was prepared for the long-term business prospects 
of a future inter-Korean economic community. They predicted that the North Korean 
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economy would be part of the Korean market and become integrated into the Northeast Asian 
economic sphere regardless of the realisation of ultimate Korean unification (Hong Soon-jik 
2000: 14). Based on this premise, they are exploring business opportunities, making personal 
connections and thus establishing business networks and understanding the culture of doing 
business with North Korea. 
Third, the chaebols in particular are keen to explore their interests as massive 
investment in inter-Korean economic projects could improve companies' image for South 
Korean consumers. It has been an important marketing strategy of some chaebols to boost 
popularity among South Koreans by presenting the image of 'national corporations' rather 
than only profit-seeking companies. Thus, many big businesses have promised massive 
investment especially before the 1997 financial crisis even though they expected financial 
losses. 
Fourth, North Korean born South Korean business leaders are more interested in 
investing in their hometowns in the North than other businessmen in the South are. As will be 
discussed in chapter 6, Chairman Chung Ju-young of Hyundai Group, who was born near the 
Mt. Kumgang area, was eager to help the weakened North Korean economy. 
However, there are down sides for the South Korean business community in doing 
business with North Korea. Despite early hopes, several factors have hampered its deeper 
engagement with North Korea and thus influenced the Kim Dae-jung government's use of 
business-track diplomacy. Firstly, there are various problems with conducting business in the 
North. These problems include the existence of a bureaucracy which disregards market 
economy principles; the unreliability of energy supplies and poor transportation; the lack of 
skilled labour l ; and also the uncertainty over investment safety caused by the inter-Korean 
economic agreements. Secondly, the 1997 financial crisis has directly impacted on the 
business community's stance towards North Korea, as discussed earlier. In fact, South Korean 
51 For instance, some South Korean chebols doing business with North Korea confessed that the level 
of labour skills in North Korea is not much higher in comparison with that of Southeast Asian workers, 
but the wages are unexpectedly higher. This is because labour costs are decided by the North Korean 
authorities rather than the market economy (Interviews with Hyundai Asan's officials, Seoul, 
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companies, including chaebols, could no longer neglect the lack of short-term profits vis-a-vis 
long-term commercial and social incentives in the North. Thus, big businesses are now very 
cautious about long-term, large investments in North Korea. Also, the South Korean 
companies increasingly demand that both the South and the North Korean governments 
remove several obstacles to inter-Korean economic cooperation, by improving North Korea's 
infrastructure and investment system, and by providing financial support for these 
companies. S2 
Conclusion 
This chapter has looked at both international and domestic variables in Seoul's North Korea 
policy-making process that might explain Kim Dae-jung government's strong policy-making 
will towards active and consistent engagement with North Korea. First of all, the international 
environment regarding the engagement approach towards North Korea was not necessarily 
helpful for South Korea's consistent engagement with the North. 
Surely, it appears that the Kim Jeong-il regime has consolidated political power in the 
North, thus decreasing the probability of sudden collapse of the North Korean system, while 
Pyongyang has shown positive signs of economic opening and reforms. Moreover, the US 
and Japan, who are important targets for North Korea's policy of engagement with the outside 
world, recognise the need for engagement measures to induce North Korea to participate in 
the international community, and to transform it into a more normal state. 
However, the international constraints for Seoul's engagement with North Korea are 
more decisive. Pyongyang has continuously used military aggression and provocations to 
ensure its survival, and its economic reforms are very cautious and limited. Thus, the US and 
September 1999). 
S2 Several factors could be blamed for discouraging South Korean companies' direct and large 
investments. A survey done in December 1997 by the Korea International Trade Association (KIT A) 
among 50 fIrms with inter-Korean trade experience summarises the difficulties of investing in the 
North. Thirty-seven respondents listed their North Korean partners' ignorance of market economics as 
the prime obstacle to inter-Korean cooperation, followed by poor social overhead capital, risk 
associated with political change, and institutional deficiencies in North Korea's investment system 
(quoted from Cho Myung-chul and Zang Hyoungsoo 1999: 37). 
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Japan were not eager to engage with the North despite the recognition of the need for a soft-
landing approach in dealing with the post-Cold War North Korean security problems. 
Moreover, these two countries' domestic opposition has limited their political will to 
implement active engagement measures with the North. Rather, the uncertainties of the post-
Cold War security framework in East Asia, along with continuing nuclear and missile 
tensions between surrounding countries in the Korean Peninsula, led to a strengthened US-
Japan military alliance as a means to deter possible military threats from North Korea and 
especially China's rising power in East Asia. These international constraints were not helpful 
for Seoul in initiating an active engagement toward North Korea. 
Regarding domestic variables, the democratisation of South Korea during the 1990s 
played a positive role in South Korea's engagement policy toward the North by making 
possible the election of the progressive Kim Dae-jung government. Also, the advent of the 
financial crisis, from late 1997, made the South relax the absorption policy towards North 
Korea and seek co-existence with the North. These were favourable domestic factors for Kim 
Dae-jung government's utilisation of business-track diplomacy towards North Korea. 
At the same time, democratisation produced new emerging actors that could influence 
Seoul's North Korea policy-making process. However, domestic actors were generally not 
favourable to President Kim Dae-jung's engagement with North Korea. The conservative 
media and the opposition party have been critical of Kim Dae-jung's sunshine policy, and 
demanded a hard-line approach toward North Korea. Moreover, the weak political base of the 
ruling party and the financial crisis in 1997 decreased Seoul's economic capability, in both 
the public and the private sectors, for implementing business-track diplomacy. Therefore, 
compared with previous South Korean governments, it is difficult to say that the overall 
international and domestic environments in which the President Kim Dae-jung government 
operated facilitated an active and consistent engagement with North Korea or were cordial to 
the government. 
This means that the international and the domestic environments during the Kim 
Dae-jung government were not crucial causes for the Kim Dae-jung government's strong 
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policy-making will towards active engagement with North Korea. Thereby, it is necessary to 
investigate the factors that overcame the above external and internal constraints on 
implementing an active and consistent engagement policy towards North Korea. As discussed 
in chapter 1, decision-makers' beliefs, here, the South Korean President Kim Dae-jung's 
beliefs about the effectiveness of his 'sunshine' policy in addressing the North Korean 
security problems in the post-Cold War era, will be examined as the crucial reason for Kim 
Dae-jung government's strong policy-making will of business-track diplomacy towards North 
Korea as the South Korea's long-term security policy. 
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Chapter 5. Impact of President Kim Dae-jung's beliefs on North 
Korea Policy 
This thesis made the argument in chapter 1 that the actors' policy-making will to adopt 
business-track diplomacy can be influenced by factors such as the international and domestic 
environments and also the beliefs held by decision-makers. Chapter 4 demonstrated that the 
international and domestic environments were not necessarily favourable for the Kim Dae-
jung government to implement an active and consistent engagement policy towards North 
Korea. Rather there were both external and internal constraints that could limit Kim Dae-jung 
government's engagement approaches with the North. 
Hence, this chapter wiIl examine South Korea's government change (from the Kim 
Young-sam government to the Kim Dae-jung government) as a possibly crucial factor in the 
North Korea policy changes under the Kim Dae-jung government. Put differently, the beliefs 
regarding unification and the North Korean issue held by President Kim Dae-jung can be the 
crucial factor for Kim Dae-jung government's consistent economic engagement with North 
Korea. This chapter will look at the contents of the beliefs held by President Kim Dae-jung, 
and show a causal relationship between these beliefs and the South Korean policy outcome 
regarding the post-Cold War North Korea security problem. As discussed in chapter I, this 
chapter demonstrates how through three causal pathways - road maps, information screens, 
and institutionalisation - President Kim Dae-jung's beliefs actually influence South Korea's 
policy-making towards North Korea. 
5.1 Origin of Kim Dae-jung's "sunshine policy" 
The current South Korean government's active engagement with North Korea is often 
depicted as a 'sunshine policy'. Paraphrasing a well-known Aesop's fable on wind and 
sunshine, it is argued that sunshine is more effective than strong wind in inducing North 
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Korea to come out of isolation and end confrontation. This idea of a sunshine policy towards 
North Korea became official after President Kim Dae-jung took office in 1998. As will be 
discussed later, because Kim Dae-jung has been an active supporter of gradual and peaceful 
unification between the two Koreas, and has proposed plans for a peaceful unification process 
for almost 30 years, his beliefs and interests regarding unification and North Korean issues 
could have an important impact on the current South Korean government's policy direction 
towards North Korea. 
5.1.1 Kim Dae-jung's "three-stage unification plan" in the Cold War era 
The evolution of Kim Dae-jung's "three-stage unification plan" of Korea could be divided in 
three phases. The first phase was in the 1970s. Put differently, Kim Dae-jung's beliefs and 
interests in South Korea's unification and North Korean policy can be traced back as early as 
1971. When Kim Dae-jung was a presidential opposition candidate against the incumbent 
president Park Chung-hee, he announced two Korean unification proposals for the first time -
the "four power guarantee of peace in Korea"s3 and the "gradual and peaceful unification of 
Korea through inter - Korean peaceful exchanges and cooperation". These proposals were 
made during the 1971 South Korean presidential campaign as election pledges against a 
background of intense political-military confrontation between the two Koreas. After his 
defeat in the presidential elections in South Korea, his early unification ideas were deepened 
and followed by the presentation of the "Three-Stage Unification Formula" in 1972 (Kim 
Dae-jung 1995: 300-4).S4 
His early "Three-Stage Unification Formula" was based on the concept of "peaceful 
coexistence" as the first stage, "peaceful exchanges" as the second stage and "peaceful 
unification" as the third stage. In order to facilitate the first stage of peaceful coexistence, he 
53 That means the US, Japan, the Soviet Union, China (the four powers) would ensure peace and 
prevent war on Korean Peninsula by reciprocal concessions in which the US and Japan would 
recognise the legitimacy of North Korea as a state, while the Soviet Union and China would recognise 
South Korea. 
S4 He announced his unification plan for the first time in press conference at the Foreign Press Club in 
Seoul, 13 July 1972. 
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proposed the simultaneous entry of the two Koreas into the United Nations, and the cross 
recognition of the two Koreas by the four powers, the US, the USSR, China, and Japan, as the 
instruments to guarantee 'peaceful coexistence' between the two Koreas. It was for the first 
time that a prominent South Korean political leader called for the international recognition of 
North Korea as a legal entity in the Korean Peninsula. In fact, after the division of Korea, 
South Korea's official position had been that North Korea was part of its territory. As the 
second stage of peaceful exchange, he stressed the need for the expansion of relationships in 
all social areas, including the exchange of reporters as well as exchanges in the economic, 
sports and cultural spheres. 
His early unification idea was based on emerging international changes in the Far 
East. In fact, in 1969, soon after his election to the U.S. Presidency, Richard Nixon 
announced in Guam what came to be known as the 'Nixon Doctrine', in which he declared 
the relaxation of the Cold War structure. According to the Nixon Doctrine, the US 
government would gradually withdraw its ground troops from East Asia, and actually it did 
withdraw one U.S. army division (20,000 ground troops) from South Korea. Also, President 
Nixon began to engage with China and the Soviet Union in the early 1970s. Viewing these 
international changes in East Asia as an opportunity for peaceful coexistence between the two 
Koreas and criticising the Park Chung-hee government's North Korea policy as 'military 
oriented' and 'closed', Kim Dae-jung offered his unification plan for peaceful coexistence 
between the two Koreas through the relaxation of tension and the prevention of war on the 
Korean Peninsula. 
However, considering the tense Cold War confrontations between the two Koreas and 
also the Park Chung-hee regime's 'construction first and unification later policy' towards 
North Korea, Kim Dae-jung's unification ideas were never allowed a proper hearing and 
evaluation in South Korea under the military dictatorship. For example, Kim Dae-jung's two 
proposals for the simultaneous entry of the two Koreas into the United Nations and the cross 
recognition of the two Koreas by the four powers were criticised as 'anti-nationalistic' and 
'pro-communistic' by the Park Chung-hee government. 
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Furthermore, President Park Chung-hee suspended the constitution, declared a 
national emergency, and dissolved the National Assembly in October 1972 in order to 
guarantee his life-long presidency. Kim Dae-jung condemned these acts as anti-democratic 
and an anti-unification conspiracy. As a result, Kim Dae-jung, who was regarded as a strong 
rival opponent of the Park regime after President Park's narrow victory in the 1971 
presidential elections, was subjected to continuing political repression - an assassination 
attempt, torture, imprisonment, political exile, and house arrest (Hahn Bae-ho 1999: 5). 
The second phase in the development of Kim Dae-jung's unification plan began with 
its assumption of a systemic institutional approach to facilitate the national unification 
process in mid-1980s. In other words, although his formula was still based on the three basic 
principles of peaceful coexistence, exchange, and gradual unification as the implementation 
guidelines, it began to take into account the importance of the establishment of political 
institutions between the two Koreas to facilitate the unification process (see Table 5-1). 
Hence, he proposed the concept of a "symbolic or loose federal structure" as the first stage of 
his three-stage unification plan.55 In the first stage, a "symbolic federal structure" would be 
established, composed of the representatives of the two Koreas. Each, however, would 
maintain their respective independent governments along with their opposing ideologies and 
systems, to which the two Korean governments would exercise their political power to 
discuss and implement matters of peaceful coexistence and exchanges between two sides. It 
was meant to be the primary political mechanism to boost and consolidate peaceful 
coexistence and exchanges between the two Koreas. Thus, in the second stage of his 
unification plan, the fmal transition could be to a 'federal structure' as political power was 
gradually transferred to the central government from the two independent governments of the 
divided Koreas. 
However, his proposal was attacked again by the South Korean Chun Doo-whan 
military regime because it was similar to the North Korea's unification proposal of the 
55 Kim Dae-jung announced publicly for the fIrst time the concept of the federation of Korea on the 
15th of August 1987, which is Korea's Independence Day from Japan's colonisation. 
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"Koryo Confederal Democratic Republic" (Koryo Yeonbangje), which called for a direct 
transition to a federal structure from the then division and confrontation between the two 
Koreas. As a matter of fact, North Korea has persistently adhered to this model since Kim 11-
sung proposed the federal mode of Korean unification on the 10th of October 1980. However, 
the North Korean proposal of 'Koryo confederation' is much closer to the concept of 
'federation', similar to the US government system. It is based on the notion of one nation, one 
unified state, two local governments, and two systems; diplomatic sovereignty and rights over 
military command and control are assumed to belong to one central government 56 
Despite clear differences between the Kim Dae-jung's unification plan and that of 
North Korea, Kim Dae-jung's unification proposal was distorted by the ruling military 
government so that it would seem identical to North Korea's. This was a continuation of the 
South Korean military governments' campaign to paint him "red", and he was a victim of 
groundless accusations and persecution. For this reason, Kim Dae-jung made efforts to 
highlight the clear differences between his unification formula and the North Korean 
proposal. Thus, he formulated the principles of the "Three Nos": no-violence, no-
Communism, and no-anti-Americanism. For example, regarding the principle of "non-
communism", Kim Dae-jung argued that this principle has to be the basis of Korea's 
unification. In other words, the unification through the communisation of Korea ought to be 
rejected, and the principle of democracy should be the ultimate goal for Korea. However, 
efforts should be made to provide opportunities for North Korea so that it can voluntarily 
accept the principle of democracy. To enable such a process of evolution, there has to be 
peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas, as well as dialogues and exchanges (Kim Dae-
jung 1997a: 312). 
As discussed in chapter 2, the South Korean military regimes' anti-communism and 
anti-North Koreanism underpinned their absolute power and influence. The most effective 
means to discredit their opponents was to fabricate the charge that they, and this included 
56 North Korea used the term 'confederation' as the meaning of 'yeonbang' in Korean, which, however, 
is translated as 'federation' in South Korea. 
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Kim Dae-jung, were pro-Communist. Thus, Kim Dae-jung's unification idea was unable to 
receive proper evaluation under the Cold War era. Thereby, no details or even the basic 
outlines of Kim Dae-jung's unification proposals were made known to the public. However, it 
is important to establish that during this period his three-stage unification plan was based on 
peaceful coexistence, exchanges with North Korea and gradual approach towards Korean 
unification. These ideas became the 'principled beliefs' of his unification approach and the 
sunshine policy in dealing with North Korea's security problems in the 1990s. 
S.l.ii Recognition of the three-stage unification plan in the 1990s 
However, from the late 1980s, Kim Dae-jung's three-stage unification fonnula was finally 
recognised as the blueprint for South Korea's official unification plan. In fact, due to a series 
of international and inter-Korean environmental changes, as pointed out in chapter 2, the Roh 
Tae-woo government announced South Korean government's first unification fonnula on the 
11th of September 1989, which is called the "Korean National Community" unification plan.57 
This unification plan continued to be South Korea's official fonnula under the Kim Young-
sam government. 
As seen in Table 5-1, the South Korean governments' unification fonnulae of the 
Korean National Community (both Roh Tae-woo and Kim Young-sam's) is almost identical 
to the Kim Dae-jung three-stage unification plan in tenns of the core principles of peaceful 
coexistence, exchanges, and gradual unification. The only difference is that the Kim Dae-jung 
plan sets up a confederation as a facilitating mechanism for peaceful coexistence and 
exchanges in the first stage, with a federation as the middle stage. In fact, the post-Cold War 
South Korean official unification plan under both the Roh Tae-woo and the Kim Young-sam 
governments recognised Kim Dae-jung's basic ideas about a gradual approach towards 
Korean unification, and the necessity of inter-Korean peaceful coexistence, exchanges and 
cooperation as the required processes and also the means to achieve institutional political 
57 It was presented in the South Korean National Assembly speech delivered by President Roh Tae-
woo. 
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integration between the two Koreas. For instance, Lee Hong-ku, Unification Minister under 
the Roh Tae-woo government, publicly admitted that the "Korean National Community" 
unification plan referred in many parts to Kim Dae-jung's unification plan (Kim Dae-jung 
1995: 325).58 
As the then opposition leader, Kim Dae-jung stated that "[s]ince 1971, when I began 
the national debate in the midst of a presidential election, by proposing peaceful exchanges 
between the two Koreas, trade ties with the Communist bloc, a Four-Power guarantee of 
peace in Korea, simultaneous membership in the UN, the cross recognition, and the "Three-
Stage Plan for Reunification", I have been relentlessly victimised by continuing government 
persecution. Nearly two decades afterward, my proposals finally received a belated, yet 
reluctant, recognition from the Roh Tae-woo government"(quoted in Kim Dae-jung 1994a: 
On entering the post-Cold War era, Kim Dae-jung announced the plan for the 
"Confederation of the Two Korean Republics" in April 1991 as the last refinement of his 
understanding of the first stage of his three-stage Unification Fonnula. What is significant 
here is that the previous expression of a "loose or symbolic Federal stage" was changed to the 
"Stage of Confederation". This was partly because he hoped that the change of a tenn (from 
federation to confederation) would help to avoid a repeat of the 1980s ideological dispute. 
More importantly, he recognised that the first stage of unification should be well-defined, as 
peaceful exchanges and cooperations between the two Koreas would increase in the post-Cold 
War era. Also, he proposed several organs under the confederation that would carry out the 
measures to facilitate peaceful coexistence and exchanges, such as the "South-North 
Summit", the "Council of South-North Confederation" which consisted of two sides' 
representatives, and the "South-North Ministerial Council as the executive body". Kim Dae-
jung (1997a: 16) points out the significance of the confederation and argues that: 
58 Lee Hong-ku stated this in Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee of the South Korean National 
Assembly on the 24th of February 1989. 
59 He delivered a speech before a Christian audience in Seoul on the 23n1 of August 1994. 
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While the two Korean governments still maintain their status quo of opposing 
ideologies and conflicting political and economic systems, the confederation will 
mean an institutionalised mechanism that undertakes the tasks of peacefully 
managing the division as well as the efficacious overseeing of the integration process 
by the establishment of joint organisations for closer cooperation. . . Unlike the 
unification plan of the present South Korean government, which insists on the prior 
process of deepening reconciliation and cooperation as the essential precondition to 
an inter-Korean confederation, the confederation in our scheme is viewed as an 
essential machinery for inducing the new environment which facilitates the 
reconciliation and cooperation ... [Therefore] we could soon begin the deliberate and 
calibrated process by beginning the confederal stage as an institutionalised attempt at 
inter-Korean harmony and cooperation. 
Thus, from the mid-1980s to the early 1990s his unification formula has concentrated on the 
significance of establishing of institutional mechanisms in the first stage, either in the form of 
a loose federation or of a confederation, to boost the inter-Korean cooperations and thus the 
integration process. Kim Dae-jung believed that the first confederal stage could be established 
between the two Koreas without much difficulty, because his concept of a loose federation or 
confederation of the two Koreas guarantees each state's sovereignty; it is based on one 
confederation, two states, and two independent governments. Therefore, even if the two 
Koreas were faced with difficulties after the confederation was established, there would still 
be no special threat or burden for either side. 
S.l.iii Sunshine policy as a "causal belier 
The above discussions indicated that Kim Dae-jung developed his principle of gradual and 
peaceful unification between the two Koreas during the Cold War era, and this became his 
principled beliefs in dealing with North Korea and the unification issues when he became 
South Korean President. This section will show that in the third phase of the Kim Dae-jung's 
unification approach, in the post-Cold War era, Kim Dae-jung began to call his North Korea 
policy the "sunshine policy" and established his views on post-Cold War North Korean 
security problems and the direction of unification. The contents of the sunshine policy 
became his 'causal belief and the 'causal belief of the current Kim Dae-jung government in 
its policy towards Korean unification and North Korea. This section will also show how Kim 
Dae-jung's causal belief was established and what its content is. 
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S.l.iii.a Establishing the framework for the sunshine policy 
The third phase of Kim Dae-jung's unification approach came after his third defeat in the 
presidential elections of 1992. Then, Kim Dae-jung concentrated his energy more on the 
unification and the North Korean issues. He publicly announced his retirement from Korean 
politics6O and established the Kim Dae-jung Peace Foundation (KPF) in December 1993. This 
think tank functioned as the supporting body for his activities regarding the unification and 
the North Korean issues. KPF carried on its research activities for Kim Dae-jung's "Three-
Stage Unification" proposal as its pivotal post-Cold War project. Also, with the changing 
nature of the North Korean security problems in the post-Cold War era, Kim Dae-jung and 
the KPF began to define the views on North Korean situation, and specific strategies and 
programs for the current sunshine policy. 
During this period, he specifically consolidated his views on North Korea policy. 
First, Kim Dae-jung recognised that because of the serious development of heterogeneous 
elements between the two Koreas during the last fifty years of division, there must exist at 
least minimal political confidence and pre-stage confidence building efforts between the two, 
before a South-North Confederation can be considered. In fact, this view is quite different 
from his early prediction that the confederation stage could be established without much 
difficulty between the two sides. 
As Kim Dae-jung points out, the need of a stage of confidence building before 
entering into a confederation of the two Koreas is due to the external constraints, such as the 
emergence of North Korea's nuclear problem, and the continuing confrontational Cold War 
structure on the Korean Peninsula (Kim Dae-jung 1997a: 18-9). Therefore, the current 
sunshine policy of the Kim Dae-jung government is based on the recognition of a necessary 
pre-stage of peaceful reconciliation and cooperation between the two Koreas, and is aimed at 
an increase in confidence building activities between the two Koreas and a break up of the 
Cold War structure on the Korean peninsula through comprehensive engagement policies 
60 He announced his retirement from politics after the presidential election result was made public on 
19 December 1992, and returned to politics by announcing his comeback on 13 July 1995. 
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with North Korea in order to facilitate the process of entering the first stage (confederation) of 
his 'three-stage unification plan'. 
Second, he began to argue that North Korea's economic opening up and reform, and 
thus acceptance of a market economy would be the precondition for further institutional 
political integration between the two Koreas. He repeatedly argued that a future unified Korea 
should be based on a market economy and liberal democracy.61 lie stated that "entering the 
stage of inter-Korean federation would be possible only when North Korea accept multiple 
political parties, democratic elections, the principle of market economy ... unless the North 
recognised the principle of democratic competition and market economy, the Korean 
federation would be impossible" (quoted in Monthly Chosun, October 1993). This is based on 
his view of North Korea's inevitable economic opening-up and reform in the post-Cold War 
era and on his belief that a state's adoption of market economy is the first step towards a 
democratic society. Kim Dae-jung (1997a: 121), for example, argues that: 
With deepening economic exchange and cooperation [with North Korea], we can 
expect changes in the North Korean economy. To begin with, the North Korean 
economy will overcome to a considerable degree its capital shortage and 
technological backwardness through its policy of open doors to the outside and will 
show greater vitality in its economic relations with the outside world. As the planned 
economic system gradually turns towards a market economy, the North Korean 
economy is expected to experience rapid growth, and the economic disparity with 
South Korea will begin to narrow. When and if such a development occurs, along 
with improved living standards for its citizens and the inevitable change as well in 
their world view and perception of the outside world, we would project that there 
would be inevitable demands for changes even in their political system. As these 
trends take root, it would be unavoidable for the North Koreans to tolerate or even 
accept the multi-party system and the principle of free elections. But most of all, 
through the process of economic exchanges and cooperation, the two Koreas will 
expand the scope of mutual understanding, and realise the natural bond of close 
interdependence. The maturing of these developments, not easy but steady and 
unstoppable, will have paved the foundation for the transition to the Second Stage 
(federation stage) of the unification process". 
Thus, Kim Dae-jung sees North Korea's economic difficulties in the post-Cold War period as 
an opportunity for transforming North Korea into a market economy, and ultimately a 
democratic society. Thus, the current sunshine policy is aimed at inducing North Korea's 
61 This view can be found in many of his speeches and interviews, from 1993 to 1995, when he 
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economic opening up, reform and systemic changes through active and consistent economic 
engagement with North Korea in order to facilitate the integration process between the two 
Koreas. 
Third, the Kim Dae-jung government's views on North Korea and the operating 
strategies of the current sunshine policy, which are the main policy changes compared to 
previous South Korean governments, were already formulated during this period. These 
perceptions of North Korea and corresponding strategies could be found in his books and 
numerous speeches written before he became the president of South Korea in 1998. As will 
be discussed in the next section, his operating strategies - the separation of economics from 
politics (Jeongkyungbunri), the package deal solution, and the face-saving strategy· were 
already proposed in this period. The nuclear crisis in the 1990s, in particular, seemed to give 
Kim Dae-jung the opportunity to establish the framework for his current sunshine policy 
towards North Korea. 
S.l.iii.b Use of the term "sunshine policy" and the logic or historical analogy 
During this period, Kim Dae-jung began to use the term 'sunshine' as his trademark North 
Korean policy, and it became his causal belief; he saw it as the right strategy to deal with the 
North Korean issues in the post-Cold War era. lie used it as an analogy in order to persuade 
the public and other states to pursue a comprehensive engagement policy in dealing with 
North Korea. Kim, for example, argued in a speech at the Heritage Foundation in Washington 
D.C. 1994, that the US must be patient and stick to the 'sunshine policy' which was the only 
effective way to deal with isolated countries like North Korea (Kim Dae-jung 1994b). The 
term 'sunshine policy' was also used as a catch-aU phrase to get attention during his 1997 
presidential campaigns. 
During this period, he began to use historical events to justify the need for a sunshine 
policy towards North Korea. On the 10th of October 1993, Kim Dae-jung discussed the North 
Korean issues with Professor Robert Scalapino. He argued that various exchanges with 
withdrew from politics. 
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communist North Korea would lead North Korea to be less military oriented and transform it 
into a normal state. He stated that: 
After World War II, we dealt with communist countries in two ways: one with a kind 
of 'sunshine policy'. We dealt with the Soviet Union and East European countries 
through diplomatic relations, economic cooperation, cultural exchanges, tourism, and 
everything. So we succeeded in making these countries become non-communist 
countries after communism collapsed in those countries. But with others we had a 
kind of a 'strong stormy' policy. We failed in Vietnam and were defeated. We still 
have not succeeded in making Cuba and North Korea changed (Kim Dae-jung 1994a: 
48-9). 
Moreover, regarding the German unification, he pointed out that the West German 
policies towards East Germany were more important than external factors, such as 
Gorbachev's Perestroika and the international cooperation of Western and Eastern European 
countries. According to him, the internal factor was the West Germany's consistent efforts to 
engage Eastern Germany, through economic, social, and cultural exchanges. German 
Unification was realised because of the consistence of Willy Brandt's "Ost Politik', which 
helped to bring change, not the confrontational policies of the West German governments in 
the 1950s (Kim Dae-jung 1993: 11-3). 
Given this strong conviction about the effectiveness of 'sunshine' towards North 
Korea, after his election, it became the official North Korea policy of his government. 
Addressing the London University School of Oriental and African Studies on 4 April 1998, 
President Kim stated that: 
It is now time for big changes in inter-Korean relations. This is because a new 
administration has been inaugurated in the South which is pursuing peace and 
cooperation with a flexible and sincere attitude, while maintaining a firm security 
posture ... I have been steadfast in advocating what I call a sunshine policy ... which 
seeks to lead North Korea down a path toward peace, reform and openness through 
reconciliation, interaction and cooperation with the South. As President, I will carry 
out such ideas step by step" (Office of the President 1999). 
After Kim Dae-jung became President, he continued to use historical examples to 
persuade the US government to pursue an active engagement policy towards North Korea. In 
an interview with Washington Post, on 11 th of June 1998, President Kim pointed out 
examples of policies toward communist countries, such as US President Richard Nixon's visit 
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to China, the U.S. policy of detente with the Soviet Union in the 1970s, and the post Cold 
War U.S. engagement with Vietnam. He argued that the United States lost the war but now 
through diplomacy and economic development the US have made Vietnam almost a pro-
American country (Washington Post, 12 June 1998). 
Of course, there are different explanations as to why communist countries have 
. 
collapsed and changed. For instance, some people believed that the collapse of the Soviet 
Union was caused by it domestic economic failure. Moreover, military confrontation in the 
Third World countries and the arms build-up in the pace against the United States, especially 
during the Reagan administration, actually facilitated its collapse. Therefore. the 
confrontational policy of the U.S. rather than the engagement policy brought about by 
Gorbachev's perestroika and glasnost, may have caused the collapse of the Soviet Union, and 
the whole of European communist bloc. 
On the one hand, Falin, a Soviet diplomat. and Willy Brandt, the former West 
German Chancellor, saw Ostpolitik as a crucial factor for the Soviet change in thinking. On 
the other hand, former West German chancellors Helmut Schmidt and Helmut Kohl believed 
that the crucial factor in forcing a reform of the Soviet was US's continuing military pressure 
(Craig, 1994: 162-7). Whichever argument is right, Kim Dae-jung became convinced that the 
changing international environments and North Korea's economic difficulties in the post-
Cold War were certainly an opportunity for an active and consistent sunshine policy, rather 
than a containment policy, to facilitate North Korea's transition to a market economy, and 
thus to a democratic state, and the realisation of his three-stage unification process. 
In sum, the current South Korean sunshine policy is based on the core principles of 
peaceful coexistence, exchanges, and a gradual unification process, as explained in the grand 
plan of Kim Dae-jung's three-stage unification formula that has evolved over almost thirty 
years. His ideas, though ignored in the Cold War era, were gradually incorporated into South 
Korea's official North Korea policy in the post-Cold War period. Based on his three-stage 
unification plan, he proposed the 'sunshine approach' as a set of strategies to deal with post-
Cold War North Korean security problems and also to facilitate his three-stage unification 
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plan. Put differently, the sunshine policy is the instrument for achieving Kim Dae-jung's goal 
of systemic economic changes towards a market economy in North Korea and deep political 
integration. He believes that as sunshine policy measures take effect, sooner or later, North 
Korea will change itself from within. Thereby, as argued in the discussion about the causal 
pathways through which beliefs influence foreign policy outcomes in chapter 1, the sunshine 
approach became Kim Dae-jung government's causal belief or road map for addressing the 
post-Cold War North Korean security problems and for achieving President Kim's long-term 
goal of a three-stage peaceful unification of Korea. 
The history of unification proposals by the South Korean governments and Kim Dae-
jung is summarised in Table 5-1. 
Table 5-1: South Korean unification proposals 
South Korean governments Kim Dae-jung 
1950s March to North by force; 
Unification through Victory over 
Communism under the Rhee Sung-
man government 
1960s Construction First and Unification 
later, Total security policy, no detailed 
unification plan under the Park 
Chung-hee government 
1970s Anti-communism policy and The three stage unification plan 
continuing Construction First and First stage: peaceful coexistence; 
unification later policy, no detailed simultaneous entry of two Koreas into 
unification plan under the Park United Nations; and four power guarantee 
Chung-hee government. for Korean Peace. 
Second stage: peaceful exchange; inter-
Korean exchange and cooperation in all 
areas 
Third stage: peaceful unification: 
opposition to unification through military 
means. 
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1980s 
Late 
1980s-
1997 
Anti-communism policy, National 
reconciliation plan: recognition of 
each system, inter-Korean exchange 
and cooperation, military tension 
reduction. 
But no detailed unification plan under 
the Chun Doo-whan government. 
The three-stage unification formula 
for "Korean National Community" by 
Roh-Tae woo and Kim Young-sam 
governments 
First stage: the stage of reconciliation 
and cooperation; recognition of two 
political entities; expansion of 
exchanges and cooperation; political 
confidence (1 Nation, 2 States, 2 
Systems,2 Independent governments) 
The three-stage unification formula 
First stage: phase of peaceful coexistence 
and exchanges under the 'loose federal 
structure' (one loose federation, one 
nation, and the two independent Korean 
governments continue to being charge of 
their foreign relations, internal and 
military affairs) 
Second stage: the phase of federation: the 
federal government in change of foreign 
relations, defence, and major internal 
affairs while two Koreas retain their own 
regional governments. 
Third stage: The complete unification 
1991: The three-stage unification formula 
First stage: the stage of inter Korean 
confederation; peaceful coexistence and 
expansion of peaceful exchanges and 
cooperation (I Confederation, 1 Nation, 2 
States,2 independent governments). 
Second stage; the stage of federation (1 
Nation, 1 State, and 2 Autonomous 
regional governments) 
Second stage: the stage of South- Third stage: complete unification. 
North confederation, build-up of From the 1993: 
conditions for political integration by -The establishment of Kim Dae-jung 
establishing and developing a Peace Foundation (KFP)-for research on 
economic and social community (1 specific programs and guidelines for the 
confederation, 1 Nation, 2 States and implementation of 'sunshine policy.' 
2 Independent governments) 
-Recognition of the need of pre-stage of 
Third stage: unified Korea minimal confidence-building between two 
Koreas for entering confederation stage, 
which is first stage of Kim Dae-jung's 
unification~lan. 
Source: data is based on Chung Ku-sup (1998) and Kim Dae-jung (1997a). 
5.2 Kim Dae-jung government's sunshine policy 
5.2.i Views on North Korea and the international security environment 
Seoul's North Korea policy is based on its view of the North. As pointed out in chapter 1 in 
the discussion on the impact of beliefs on the information screening process, President Kim 
Dae-jung's belief in sunshine approach impacted on the current South Korean government's 
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basic perceptions regarding North Korean issues and were established long before he became 
president in 1998. 
The Kim Dae-jung government's three basic perceptions on North Korea's intention 
and behaviours are as follows. First, the North Korean system is already a failed system; 
however, there are slim chances for North Korea to collapse any time soon. Second, economic 
reform and openness of North Korea are inevitable and the change has already begun. Third, 
in spite of these positive developments, the North's military-first policy and military threats 
will continue (Lim Dong-won 1999). 
Regarding the first assumption, no South Korean government doubts that North 
Korea's economic system has failed, and its impact on North Korea is enormously painful. 
However, the prospect of North Korea's collapse in the near future divided scholarly opinion, 
as well as North Korean policy-makers, during the 1990s. Some U.S. and South Korean 
specialists on North Korean affairs anticipate North Korea's short-term collapse because of its 
economic failure (Sisa Journal, 13 January 2000). As pointed out in chapter 3, based on this 
assumption, the Kim Young-sam government tried to contain and isolate North Korea, 
especially after the death of Kim-n-sung in 1994 and following North Korea's food crisis in 
1995. 
However, the current Kim Dae-jung government saw North Korea differently and 
argued that there is actually no chance that North Korea might crumble in a short period of 
time. A key advisor of the Kim Dae-jung government's North Korean policy, Lim Dong-won, 
argues that North Korea would not collapse due to its economic difficulties, and that the 
Western collapse theory may not apply because its system is different from any other 
communist countries, such as the former Eastern European socialist states. North Korea is 
similar to a 'collective camp society under an authoritarian rule'. Thus, individual discontent 
cannot escalate into social discontent, and no organised anti-governmental force can emerge. 
At the same time, surrounding countries, especially China, do not want to see the North 
collapse. Lim stated that "given such a perception, the Kim Dae-jung government rejected the 
containment policy towards North Korea. Containment policy can only work if the North 
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Korea's collapse is imminent. It can accelerate the collapse. However, if this is not the case, 
containment often results in prolonged dictatorship and a worsening of people's pain" (Lim 
Dong-won 1999). 
As demonstrated in chapter 4, it can be argued that the Kim Dae-jung government's 
positive view towards North Korea's future survival might have been influenced by the 
external change of Kim Jeong-iI's successful succession to his father, Kim II-sung, from late 
1997. Also, the emergence of the 1997 financial crisis and the following economic difficulties 
in South Korea greatly decreased Kim Dae-jung government's interest in the collapse of the 
North Korean regime, and thus in achieving sudden unification on its terms, because South 
Korea does not want to handle the collapse of the North at a time of financial difficulty. 
However, the fundamental difference between the current government and the 
previous Kim Young-sam government is that the "collapse" of the North and the sudden 
unification by the South are clearly not seen as being in the South's interest. Put differently, 
Kim Dae-jung's desires for peaceful coexistence and the rejection of sudden reunification 
were expressed even before the financial crisis in 1997. Regardless of the impact of the 
financial crisis, Kim Dae-jung government's peaceful coexistence policy would have operated 
under his leadership. President Kim Dae-jung himself has repeatedly declared his policy to be 
one of peaceful coexistence and criticised the former Kim Young-sam government's collapse 
policy towards North Korea as a very risky and destructive approach for all Koreans caused 
by lack of unification thought by the Kim Young-sam government (Kim Dae-jung 1997b). 
For instance, Kim Dae-jung (1994a: 39-40) delivered a speech before a Christian 
audience in Seoul on 23 August 1994: 
There is a point about which we cannot afford the slightest error of judgement. That 
is, we ought to understand most clearly and unequivocally that we should under no 
circumstances adopt a policy of absorption of North Korea in our attempt to unify the 
nation. Absorption is neither desirable nor possible. If we were to absorb North 
Korea, an economic calamity of the worst kind for South Korea would be 
unavoidable ... Besides, the seriousness of the "spirituaVpsychological" conflict has 
exceeded what was once predicted ... Our case is not even comparable [to the 
German case] because of the extreme hatred and hostility that have resulted from the 
nasty internecine [Korean] war. The problem, therefore, of the intensity of conflict 
that could be expected is beyond imagination. Will we be able to handle the 
enormous friction and conflicts, and will we be able to live in harmony? It will not be 
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possible. Reunification through absorption, therefore, should not be pursued for 
economic as well as spiritual reasons. 
Regarding the second assumption about the prospect of North Korea's economic 
reforms and openness, the Kim Dae-jung government believes that North Korea has been 
steadily undergoing reforms and opening, and there is no alternative for them. His optimism 
can be traced back to the nuclear crisis in early 1990s. It was based on the North Korean 
situation after the Cold War era. He argues that the reasons for North Korea's intention to 
improve relationships with Western countries, despite enormous political threats to the North 
Korean system, are as follows .. First, North Korea's economic situation is extremely bad. 
Second, Kim II-sung was very willing to settle problems with the West and the South before 
his death to ensure his son's take-over. Third, North Korea is somewhat confident that a 
policy of 'opening the door' could work, owing to the example of the Chinese economic 
opening-up and reform. Hence, the North Korean leadership sees that economic progress is 
possible without damaging socialism (Kim Dae-jung 1994a: 50-1). 
Kim Dae-jung's early perception continued to be the basis for his government's view 
of North Korea. North Korea has certainly shown positive signs for reforms and opening, 
however, it has been very slow, unlike the East European Communist countries. Thus, some 
people are sceptical about the prospect of North Korea's economic reform. They assume that 
the Pyongyang regime values most highly its own survival and that it fears that any 
meaningful reforms would have the same fatal consequence for itself as reforms had for the 
former socialist nations in Eastern Europe. Moreover, the ruling elite, especially the military, 
in North Korea may believe that survival does not necessarily require a change of direction; 
thus it will pursue a status quo strategy which involves tightening socio-political control by 
intensifying indoctrination and surveillance in the domestic arena and maintaining tensions in 
the Korean Peninsula. Thus, the current economic liberalisation of the North is minimal and 
limited to segregated areas such as special economic zones and tourist zones (Kim Choong-
nam 2000: 254-9). This view of Pyongyang's future choice is well reflected in the South 
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Korean opposition party's (GNP's) basic perception of North Korea, as discussed in chapter 
4. 
However, the Kim Dae-jung government saw North Korea as making progress 
slowly, and its reforms and opening as being inevitable. Lim Dong-won (1999), the Minister 
of Unification of South Korea at that time argued that North Korea is unavoidably undergoing 
a change now. Unlike the East European Communist bloc, North Korea seems to be going 
through the Asian Communist model as is the case with China or Vietnam, that is, a model of 
steady change of system. 
Also, Minister Lim gave the following examples in support of his interpretation. First, 
North Korea pursued a relationship with the United States which it once called an 
'archenemy', and relinquished its one Korea policy, as it joined the United Nations together 
with South Korea. Second, it sought to introduce Western capital and technology by 
establishing a special economic zone, and agreed on the North-South Basic Agreement that 
calls for reconciliation. Third, more recently, it revised the Constitution to introduce a 
socialist market economy. The Constitution has employed the idea of a self-supporting 
accounting system, and the concepts of cost, price, and profit, core concepts for a capitalist 
market economy. Moreover, more than 300 open markets have sprung up across North Korea, 
and cadre officials have begun to undergo training abroad to study market economy principles 
and capitalist economies (Lim Dong-won 1999). 
This optimistic view can be found in President Kim Dae-jung's reaction to Kim 
Jeong-iI's remarks in China. In fact, when Kim Jeong-il visited China in January 2001 for six 
days, Kim Jeong-it announced that the big changes have taken place in China because of 
Chinese reform and openness drive. Also, he said that the policies of the Chinese Communist 
Party were correct. Regarding these remarks, President Kim Dae-jung stated in a meeting of 
the National Security Council (NSC) that "this shows that North Korea is deeply interested in 
the Chinese-style reform and open-door policy and it is trying to become a second China, and 
politically North Korea will continue to uphold socialism, but economically, it may take the 
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road toward refonns and openness" (quoted in Far Eastern Economic Review, 8 February 
2001: 27-8). 
Regarding the third assumption about North Korea's military-first policy, some 
people are seriously worried not only about North Korea's intention, but also its capabilities. 
The opposition party and the conservative media groups in the South argue that North 
Korea's clandestine nuclear and missile program as well as continuing military 
aggressiveness towards the South well indicates the unchanging nature of North Korea's 
intention to unify South Korea by force. Also, even though the capability of the North Korean 
military is diminishing due to economic hardship, it is still capable of attacking Seoul and 
causing enonnous damage to South Korea. Thus, one-way economic aid provided by South 
Korea without receiving North Korea's concessions, such as substantial military cutbacks, 
will not induce North Korea toward economic refonns and openness as Kim Dae-jung 
wished, but gave it economic benefits to upgrade its military capability vis-a-vis South Korea 
(Chosunilbo, 15 September 2000). 
However, the Kim Dae-jung government saw North Korea's military-first policy and 
aggression in tenns of North Korea's survival tactics and domestic politics. Seoul's first 
argument is that in the face of economic hardship and diplomatic isolation in the post-Cold 
War era, Pyongyang's military aggressiveness is understandable. Kim Dae-jung saw the 
international crises caused by North Korea's development of nuclear weapons and missiles 
during the 1990s as signs of its economic and diplomatic insecurity rather than as a reflection 
of North Korea's unchanging intention of communi sing the South by force in the post-Cold 
War environment. He pointed out that North Korea's strategies for communi sing the South 
through the use of force began to change quietly in the early 1990s, giving the examples of 
Pyongyang's acceptance of simultaneous membership for the two Koreas in the UN and the 
recognition of two political entities on the Korean Peninsula, which Pyongyang had opposed 
over the previous forty years.62 
62 The two Koreas recognised each other as legitimate political entities through the signing of the 
"Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, and Exchange and Cooperation" in December 1991. 
207 
For instance, he stated in the US National Press Club on the 12th of May 1994 that "I 
am convinced that North Korea's goal in this adventure [of nuclear threat] is not to develop 
nuclear weapons but to realise its number one foreign policy objective: the normalisation of 
diplomatic relations with the United States. Pyongyang desperately hopes through diplomatic 
relations and economic cooperation with the West to escape from the hopeless economic 
situation and the extreme international isolation so that it can pass a stable regime" (Kim Dae-
jung 1994a: 12). 
The second argument is that North Korea's military provocations, such as the naval 
clash in the West Coast and several spy infiltrations while engaging with the South 
economically, could be regarded as bureaucratic routine operations or as a reflection of 
domestic political disputes between 'hard-liners' and 'moderates' in the North, rather than 
North Korea's unchanging principle of unification by force. It understands Pyongyang's 
continuing military provocations as routine operations regardless of the general trend of inter-
Korean relations because there are bureaucratic divisions in Pyongyang over South Korean 
policy. President Kim Dae-jung pointed out that the escalating tension in the Korean 
Peninsula, which was mainly caused by North Korean military routine operations that went 
wrong, only helped the hawkish position in the North. lie stated that: 
We must change our policies to strengthen the position of the moderate forces in 
North Korea and must not continue to pressure North Korea to the point where it feels 
that it has reached the end of its rope and where it might imagine that it has nothing to 
lose even launching a military attack against the South. We must adopt a positive 
policy which will strengthen the position of the moderates who advocate openness. 
We must not provide an excuse to the hard-liners who advocate military adventurism 
in the North (Kim Dae-jung 1993: 51). 
Moreover, he urged President Clinton to lift sanctions against North Korea for the 
purpose of encouraging "moderate elements" in Pyongyang. In fact, this is quite a different 
analysis from that of many people who assume that Kim Jong-il enjoys absolute power to 
coordinate the government organs, and that there are no policy conflicts inside North Korean 
agencies (New York Times, 2 June 1998: A3; LA Times, 10 June 1998: A4). 
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S.2.ii Flexible reciprocity: operational strategies 
Based on Seoul's perception of North Korea and due to the external and internal constraints 
on consistent engagement with North Korea, as demonstrated in chapter 4, the Kim Dae-jung 
government adopted three operational strategies for sustaining the sunshine policy. The most 
basic principle of these strategies is 'flexible reciprocity' in the sequential order of the inter-
Korean interactions. Lim Dong-won, a key figure in the sunshine policy, explained 'flexible 
reciprocity' as the following: (i) easy tasks first, difficult tasks later; (ii) economy first, 
politics later; (iii) non-governmental organisation first, government later; (iv) give first, take 
later (Hankookilbo, 12 March 1999). 
This represents a profound change in the management of inter-Korean relations. Past 
governments failed to overcome the inter-Korean stalemate precisely because of their rigid 
adherence to the principles of government first, civil-society later, political-economic linkage, 
and the primacy of rigid reciprocity, although they shared the rationale of engagement as the 
optimal policy towards North Korea. Thus, the sunshine policy can be characterised as being 
incremental, pragmatic and functionalist in dealing with the North. 
The first strategy is Seoul's adoption of the separation of economic exchanges from 
inter-Korean politics (Jeongkyungbunri). Previous governments were preoccupied with the 
primacy of politics and its linkage to the economy. However, such an attitude entailed 
structural barriers to the promotion of inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation, not only 
because of North Korea's continued military aggressiveness but also because of a negative 
backlash from South Korean society and at the international level. Temporary improvements 
in inter-Korean relations through socio-economic exchanges were instantly wiped out by new 
political constraints or sporadic military provocations by the North, producing a chain of 
distrust and hostility. 
The Kim Dae-jung government however is attempting to sever the mechanism of 
negative re-enforcement between the two by pledging itself to the promotion of economic 
exchanges and cooperation even if the North engages in military campaigns; for instance, the 
naval clash on the West Coast did not block the pursuit of economic exchanges and 
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cooperation. As discussed before, the principle of flexible reciprocity greatly enhances inter-
Korean economic cooperation and also non-governmental social and cultural exchanges. It is 
the functional flexibility that distinctively differentiates the sunshine policy from the previous 
governments' North Korean policy. 
For instance, despite the collapse of the Fertiliser talks in Beijing in April 1998, 
President Kim Dae-jung announced that in government level contacts, he would stick to the 
principle of reciprocity, but not in regard to contacts and aid at the private level (Korea Times, 
29 April 1998). It is believed that the Kim Dae-jung government was trying to negotiate 
simultaneously with both internal and external actors. It promised to the domestic public to 
keep the reciprocity rule at the governmental level. At the same time, it showed positive signs 
of flexible reciprocity in the position of the South Korean private sector towards Pyongyang. 
Another example was the response to North Korea's provocative naval action in the West Sea 
in June 1999. The Kim Dae-jung government carried out the necessary military response 
towards the North Korean naval forces, but did not permit this to contaminate the validity of 
inter-Korean exchange and cooperation. Thus, it could be considered that the military 
response towards North Korea was for domestic considerations, and the continuation of inter-
Korean exchanges was for Pyongyang. 
The second operating strategy is international collaboration on the engagement policy 
towards North Korea. Although Korean leaders have long understood that the Korean conflict 
and unification should be resolved by and for Koreans themselves, the Kim Dae-jung 
government recognised the importance of international collaboration with major actors 
surrounding the Korean Peninsula. Seoul seems to have three fundamental reasons for this 
international effort. 
First, it believes that international collaboration would help North Korea's openness 
and reform. The United States' active involvement in engagement in particular meant 
enhancing North Korea's change, because Seoul believed that North Korea's insecurity 
mainly came from the United State's unwillingness to give positive security assurances to 
North Korea. In fact, North Korea is still considered as a rogue state by US policy-makers. 
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Without resolving its insecurity, it would be difficult for North Korea to give up the military 
solution. Second, in the face of financial crisis and domestic resistance to large-economic 
projects in the North Korea, Seoul needed to find international financial support to enhance 
North Korea's opening and reform. Third, solid international cooperation and support is a 
means of expanding the President Kim's political manoeuvrability in maintaining his 
'sunshine policy' towards North Korea. For domestic support and legitimacy of its constant 
engagement policy towards North Korea, international support is absolutely necessary. 
For the management of the North Korean security problem at the international level, 
the Kim Dae-jung government has been calling for two practical measures: North Korea's 
diplomatic normalisation with the United States and Japan on the one hand, and the creation 
of a international milieu favourable to North Korea's economic opening and reform on the 
other. Hence, Kim Dae-jung proposed a 'package deal' to achieve these goals. In fact, Kim 
Dae-jung first proposed the 'package deal' as a way to resolve the North Korean nuclear 
problem. He argued that, in a package deal, the US should make the necessary concessions to 
North Korea such as the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, a 
positive guarantee of North Korea's security, including the suspension of Team Spirit, and the 
nuclear assurance towards North Korea, while North Korea would guarantee the transparency 
of its nuclear program (Kim Dae-jung 1994a: 72_3).63 
Given the frustrations of maintaining a Cold War structure on the Korean Peninsula, 
and the lack of US and Japanese will for engagement with North Korea, President Kim Dae-
jung again proposed a package deal between the US and North Korea when he became 
President of South Korea in 1998. According to deal, the US and the international community 
would lift existing economic sanctions on the North, and facilitate North Korea's access to 
international capital through its membership in multilateral lending institutions, such as the 
IMF, the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank, as well as foster the inflow of 
63 This source is a speech given at the American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C. on the 11th of 
May 1994. 
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private foreign investments in the North, while North Korea would stop developing nuclear 
and long-range missiles and exporting them to "rogue states" (Dongailbo, 7 May 1999). 
The third operating strategy is sending a coherent message to Pyongyang of its 
intentions for peaceful coexistence. The Kim Dae-jung government attributes the failure of 
previous engagement policies mainly to North Korea's intransigence; it does not, however, 
deny the contribution of previous South Korean governments to this failure; their inconsistent 
signals prompted the North to doubt the South's real intentions. For instance, when Kim II-
sung died in July 1994, although many South Koreans welcomed the news with some sort of 
disappointment because of the expectation they had that a North-South summit would be held 
in the same month, they soon got entangled in a polemic debate over the identity of Kim II-
sung. The Kim Young-sam government in the end named Kim II-sung an aggressor and anti-
national foe, after which outraged North Koreans refused to talk to the South (Kim Tae-hyun 
1999: 80). This may explain why the Kim Dae-jung government has repeatedly expressed a 
desire for reconciliation and dialogue with the North while renouncing any intention to 
undermine or absorb North Korea. As a foreign policy towards North Korea can be 
meaningful only when North Korea reacts positively, it is important to induce Pyongyang's 
positive response. 
Saving face (one's standing in the eyes of the group) is an important factor in non-
western society, and saving face can be an important cultural dimension in international 
relations, especially at the negotiation table (Cohen 1991: 24-5). In inter-Korean relations, 
provocative rhetoric and condemnation for each other's legitimacy have often cooled down 
relationships and created tensions between the two countries. Kim Dae-jung seems to know 
the importance of the cultural dimension to North Korea. He stated at the National Press Club 
in May 1994 that: 
To an Asian, face-saving is as important as saving his life. Instead of the give-and-
take method of the West, an East Asian, if he feels he is treated with indignity, he 
might reject the deal altogether, no matter how advantageous to him. To formulate 
policies based on an accurate understanding of these characteristics of the Asian 
sensibility is to assure the success of American foreign policy and of gaining friends 
in the Asian-Pacific region ... Face-saving is even more important in dealing with 
North Korea, a country ruled for five decades by one family with absolute authority. 
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We must make good use of this point in dealing with North Korean nuclear program 
(Kim Dae-jung 1994a: 15-6). 
It was quite clear that President Kim Dae-jung was making use of this point when 
dealing with Kim Jeong-it. For instance, in an interview with Japan's Broadcasting System 
(BS) on 9 February 2000, he said that General Secretary Kim Jeong-it had displayed the sense 
of judgement and insight of a leader. His statement is believed to have been conducive to 
extending the latitude of establishing policies to open-door policy advocates and the North 
Korean officials (Park Kun-young 2000: 19). His praise of Kim Jeong-it has been repeated 
despite criticism from conservative forces in the South. Moreover, after the two armed 
infiltration incidents on the East Coast, the Kim Dae-jung government announced that as of 
the 25th of July 1998, it would not use the term "sunshine policy." The government believed 
that the term might be taken by North Koreans as an another expression of the absorption 
plan, because the metaphor had generated some controversy including negative reactions in 
the North Korean media (Joongangi/bo, 25 July 1998). 
It is difficult to measure whether this strategy actually worked in terms of North 
Korea's response. However, it is clear that North Korea seems to understand the sincerity of 
the sunshine policy. For instance, North Korea became suspicious of the sunshine policy 
toward the North when fertiliser talks in Beijing were stalemated. The North denounced the 
principle of reciprocity as a tactic to aggravate inter-Korean division and confrontation. 
However, North Korea appeared to accept at least economic exchanges and cooperation. 
The above discussion demonstrates that President Kim Dae-jung's strong beliefs on 
the effectiveness of sunshine policy towards North Korea as a means to decrease the post-
Cold War North Korean security problems and induce North Korea to engage with the outside 
world and to adopt the principles of a market economy have influenced the current South 
Korean government's views of and related strategies towards North Korea. As pointed out in 
chapter 1, President Kim's beliefs about the sunshine policy can be used as 'information 
screens', which is one of the three causal pathways between beliefs and policy outcomes, to 
interpret the current Korean Peninsula security environments and incoming informations on 
213 
North Korean issue and thus to design the operating strategies. The major characteristics of 
the Kim Dae-jung government's views on North Korean information are summarised in Table 
5-2. 
Table 5-2: Information screens: the perception gap regarding North Korean Issues 
Entering Information 
Interpretation and solution of The other perceptions by 
the Kim Dae-jung government hard-liners in the US and 
South Korea -----------If-:-:~-_:__:_:__-_:_-_::_:.:__:~--_I_: ........ ---.. -..... --.--.. --------
North Korea's North Korea is a failed system, Kim Young-sam government 
however, it sees little chances saw that North Korea's 
continuing economic 
difficulties in 1990s the North collapse any time collapse could come very 
_____________ --I~s~o-o-n-.-----------~s:h-o--rt~.Ly-· ~-----~-----
Some of the US and South 
North Korea's prospect North Korea's economic reform 
of economic reform and is inevitable and is undergoing a 
opening change now. 
Korean scholars predict that 
for regime survival, 
economic opening-up and 
refonn will not be carried out 
_________ -+-........,-_~_:_--__:_____:_:__:__:_____:_._+_-b .... y-N-o...;,.rt=h .. !:~~~.~.:-----
There is bureaucratic division in 
North Korea's 
continuing spy intrusions 
toward South Korea in 
the middle of improving 
inter-Korean economic 
exchanges 
the North. These are routine 
operations going wrong. 
Economic engagement with the 
North can increase the political 
power of 'moderates' in the 
North, which is good for 
Pyongyang's voluntary 
economic reform. 
North Korea's unchanged 
unification policy towards 
South Korea. 
Engagement only helps 
North Korea's military 
upgrade. 
---.--------~~-It is a negotiation leverage to The ambition of North Korea 
North Korea's 
development of nuclear 
weapons and ballistic 
missiles 
acquire security guarantee and 
economic concession from the 
u.S. Also it is North Korea's 
is to acquire 
capability 
nuclear 
important export to acquire hard It is motivated by North 
_________ --Ir-c_u_rr_e_n_c-"--y ________ -t-_K_o_re_a.'s military. 
North Korea's 
tongmibongnam policy 
For regime survival, United 
States is No. 1 target for 
improving relationships. By-
passing the South is 
understandable. 
By-passing the South can not 
be neglected. Improving 
relationships between the 
two countries should be done 
after there is meaningful 
progress in inter-Korean 
Improving relationships relations. 
between the two countries is 
good for North Korea's changes 
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5.3 Control over the decision-making system 
Previous discussions showed two causal pathways through which President Kim Dae-jung's 
belief in the 'sunshine policy' influenced North Korea policy-making: as a 'road-map' and 'as 
an information screen'. One remaining causal pathways of the three introduced in chapter 1 is 
that beliefs playa role as decision-making rules. President Kim Dae-jung's conviction about 
the effectiveness of the sunshine policy towards North Korea could be related to his strong 
desire to control over the South Korean policy-making system through the sunshine policy. In 
principle the sunshine policy could be contested. Its argument could be found contradictory 
by officials in the government, for instance. However, President Kim Dae-jung's strong 
beliefs imposed a certain understanding of the sunshine policy and prevented this opposition, 
from within the government, from developing. This was one way in which rules could be seen 
to influence the process of domestic political debate as well. 
Particularly, under the South Korean presidential system, the President has enormous 
political power. Both the constitution and the top-down political culture of South Korea 
grants the President powers that allows him to be a key actor in foreign policy if he wants to 
be. Obviously not all presidents choose to play an active role in foreign policy; much depends 
on a president's interests and knowledge. However, when Kim Dae-jung took the oval office, 
he was determined to take charge of North Korea policy. President Kim's new staff working 
on North Korea policy were all people who shared the idea of a sunshine policy or were 
politically loyal to him. For example, he appointed Lim Dong-won as a Senior Secretary of 
Foreign Affairs and Security (SSFAS) to help him promote the sunshine policy. Even though 
Lim Dong-won was supposed to advise on the whole of foreign affairs to the President, he 
was chosen basically as the North Korea policy advisor, or more specifically, advisor on the 
'sunshine policy'. 
5.3.i Structure of the National Security Council (NSC) 
The central line of Kim Dae-jung and Lim Dong-won about making North Korea policy is 
well represented in the structure of the NSC. In fact, South Korea's national security and 
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North Korea policy decision-making is supposed to centre on the National Security Council, 
which consists of the President, the Minister of Unification, the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade, the Minister of National Defence, the Director of National Intelligence Service, 
and the Senior Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Security (SSF AS). In the previous 
government, however, the NSC was not working as a decision-making organisation, 
especially when dealing with the North Korea issue, because of there were policy disputes 
and dishannony between ministries. One theory about this was that dovish members, such as 
minister of the Unification (MOU) and the minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOF AT) 
were overridden by hawkish members, such as the Director of National Security Planning 
(NSP, currently NIS) and SSF AS. This was possible partly because some ministries are more 
powerful than others in tenns of their ability to gather resources and infonnation. But more 
importantly, President Kim Young-sam gave more policy leverage to hawkish members 
because he was quite sensitive to public sentiment over North Korea's military provocations 
(Kil Jeong-woo 1998). 
However, the Kim Dae-jung government reshaped and strengthened the National 
Security Council (NSC) as the core decision-making system. This body produced solid policy 
coordination among ministries, because Kim Dae-jung appointed key cabinet members who 
shared his basic assumptions and objectives, with Lim Dong-won as the key man. The 
purpose of reshaping the NSC system was to centralise decision-making in the Blue House on 
North Korean issues, and to prevent decision-making discord through bureaucratic politics. 
The core of the system was a network of interagency meetings through the NSC, chaired by 
Lim Dong-won. 
Lim Dong-won is generally known as the 'architect' or 'preacher' of the sunshine 
policy. Before he worked in the Kim Dae-jung government, he actively participated in inter-
Korean vice-minister level talks as a key member of the South Korean delegation, during the 
Roh Tae-woo government. During this period, he participated more than 70 times in the 
various rounds of inter-Korean talks as a key negotiator and became well known as a 
"moderate" North Korean specialist. After the defeat of 1992 South Korean presidential 
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election, Kim Dae-jung hired him, and Lim Dong-won worked as a secretary general of the 
Kim Dae-jung Peace Foundation for Asia Pacific Region (KPF), which is Kim Dae-jung's 
think tank for North Korea policy. Also, he was the project manager of the completion of Kim 
Dae-jung's ''Three-Stage'' approach to Korean unification plan in the 1990s that encompasses 
most of the contents of the sunshine policy (Kim Dae-jung 1997a). 
With the advent of the Kim Dae-jung government, Lim Dong-won worked as SSFAS 
from February 1998 to May 1999, as the Minister of MOU until December 1999, as the 
Director ofNIS until March 2001, and then again as Minister ofMOU, until he stepped down 
from the post when the National Assembly passed a no-confidence motion on the 4th of 
September 2001. However, President Kim appointed him again as a minister-level special 
advisor for the inter-Korean issue a week after. Thus, he is the only person who is still 
working in the minister level in several core ministries of North Korean policy-making. This 
means that President Kim Dae-jung and Lim are the only two persons who have served 
continually in the NSC. Moreover, it is generally known that the President privately consults 
with him in appointing cabinet members on North Korea policy, and that Seoul's North Korea 
policy is made almost totally by these two people. Hence, for example, it was reported that 
the US is listening only to these two people, rather than to other high officials to find out 
South Korea's intentions with regard to North Korean policy (Interview with a junior official 
at the MOFAT, London, December 2000). 
Moreover, Lim Dong-won took personal charge of a number of policy initiatives that 
were handled for the President outside the NSC system by a small group of advisors, such as 
the secret consultations with the North regarding the inter-Korean summit, coordination with 
the US and Japan regarding North Korea policy, and the invitation of high-level North Korean 
officials to the South. He became a presidential negotiator on North Korean issues, many of 
which would normally have been the business of the MOFAT. 
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S.3.ii The behaviour of related ministries on North Korea policy 
Along with President Kim Dae-jung's sunshine policy, the behaviour of ministries has 
changed. The MOU has been regarded as the ministry of 'moderates' on North Korean issues, 
but lacked in organisational and operational power. Even though the Kim Young-sam 
government upgraded the minister of unification as vice-prime minister, this was just a 
symbolic gesture. In the previous government, the minister of unification was supposed to 
direct and coordinate relating ministries in the unification-security committee, but the MOV 
has been relatively weak in tenns of political power. Because South Korea's North Korean 
policy focused on military aspects, such as the nuclear crisis and North Korea's other military 
provocations, it remained a symbolic agency without substantial inter-Korean interactions. 
The nuclear crisis and military provocation by the North gave power to NSP and MND to 
fonnulate North Korean policy. 
In fact, the MOU's power much depends on the increase of inter-Korean cooperation 
and exchanges, because it possesses regulatory power over South Korea's trade and 
investment as well as socio-cultural relations with North Korea. Thus, the Kim Dae-jung 
government's intention to increase interactions with North Korea helped the MOV's status in 
North Korea policy decision-making, where it played an important role in promoting South 
Korea's comprehensive engagement with the North. This is well reflected in Lim Dong-won's 
appointment as minister of the organisation twice in the current government. 
The other relatively moderate ministry of North Korean policy is MOF AT. The role 
of the MOFAT in North Korea policy is mainly in international coordination. This body is 
responsible for coordinating South Korean policy towards North Korea within the broader 
framework of US-South Korea and Japan-South Korea relations. In the Kim Dae-jung 
government, it advocates the sunshine policy abroad. However, officials in MOF AT point out 
that it does not necessarily shape basic policy toward North Korea, rather its role is to follow-
up the North Korean policy decisions made by in the government (Interview with a junior 
official with MOFAT, London, December 2000). Thus, it has a limited role in the 
international area rather than in the making of North Korean policy. 
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The role of the other two departments, which are the most conservative towards 
North Korean policy, is also worth examing. The MND and the Armed Forces are supposed 
to be conservative toward North Korea, who is still the "main enemy" for them. However, 
these organisations are very loyal to the current government's sunshine policy toward North 
Korea. One clear constant in the past, even in the post-cold war era, when South Korea was 
dealing with North Korean provocations, was the inconsistent application of reciprocity or 
counter-responses, characterised by immediate condemnation. However, when a North 
Korean submarine was discovered entangled in fishing nets off the east coast, in South 
Korean waters, together with other spying infiltrations by the North, president Kim Dae-jung 
maintained a "wait and see" attitude. confirming this attitude, the MND described the North's 
infiltrations as "low-level provocations, not serious commando-type operations" (Far Eastern 
Economic Review, 31 December 1999: 14). 
More serious change can be founded in the disagreement between South Korea and 
the U.S. on measuring North Korea's military threat. Major General Park Seung-choon, 
intelligence chief at the Joint Chief of Staff (JCS) of South Korea, argued that there was 
basically no difference in the estimates concerning North Korean military threats between 
South Korea and the United States. However, he admitted to disagreement in terms of 
perceptions of the North Korean threats. On the one hand, the US General Thomas Schwartz, 
Commander of United States Forces in Korea, spoke before the US Senate' Armed Services 
Committee on the 27 th of March 2001 and said that "the North Korean military training 
exercises held immediately following the inter-Korean summit in 2000 were the most 
extensive ever recorded" (Chosunilbo, 29 March 2001). He argued that Kim Jeong-il regime's 
military is bigger, better, and deadlier than it was at the time of his testimony the year before. 
South Korean military officials, on the other hand, took a different position. They argued that 
the North did engage in highly intensive military exercises near Yonpyong Island on the West 
Coast, but insisted that since the 2000 inter-Korean summit these training exercises have 
returned to the scale they used to be, and that military tensions have been reduced 
(Chosunilbo, 29 March 2001). 
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Moreover, the South Korean Army is engaging in mine-clearing operations aimed at 
re-building a portion of the Seoul-Sinuiju Railroad Line, and a highway from Panmunjom to 
the Southern boundary of the DMZ, and is currently doing ground-levelling work to re-link 
the inter-Korean railroad (Chosunilbo, 4 March 2001) One MND official said that "the 
Armed Forces are conservative in nature and this character is required to fulfil their given 
mission of defending the country against the enemy and it will take time for them to adopt to 
the new paradigm of North Korea policy ... But at the same time, they are born to serve 
superiors [the president] and show a surprising degree of flexibility when faced with a 
changing situation" (quoted in Korea Times, 25 June 1998). 
The other conservative institution involved in North Korea policy is the NIS 
(formerly known as the KICA and later the NSP). This body is responsible for gathering 
information and providing policy input for North Korea decision-making. However, as 
discussed before, this intelligence agency does more to change public perception through 
manipulating information and revealing North Korea's spy operations in the South, and thus 
influences policy outcomes regarding North Korea. In terms of North Korea policy, it sees 
South Korea's military up grading and its alliance with the U.S. as a priority in the face of an 
unreliable North Korea. 
However, according to a leaked document from NIS, under the Kim Dae-jung 
government the NIS seems to be going soft on North Korea compared with past behaviour. 
While, the former NSP under the Kim Young-sam government saw North Korea's policy 
towards the South as engaging with the US and isolating South Korea (Tongmibongnam 
policy), the NIS implies that the current North Korea's policy towards the South is one of 
defensive positioning while securing economic support from the South. The important point is 
that the NIS sees that North Korea is in a defensive position for the first time, and also 
recognises that it has the intention to engage with the South for economic interests 
(Shindonga, August 1999). 
Moreover, the changing behaviour of the NIS can also be illustrated by its secret 
negotiations with Pyongyang for the realisation of an inter-Korean summit. Lim Dong-won, 
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director of the NIS at that time, engineered pre-meetings and continues to manage the process 
of rapprochement with North Korean partners. The NIS is supposed to spy on the North and 
to prevent subversion in the South. However, it became an agency of communication with 
North Korea by establishing several avenues with the North. The Chosunilbo criticised Lim 
Dong-won that "the work of the director of the NIS is to protect the country from espionage, 
terror, and threats both foreign and domestic. This is supposed to be done, not greeting North 
Korea' spymasters"(quoted in Chosunilbo, 31 January 2001). 
Conclusion 
This analysis has demonstrated that Kim Dae-jung's unification ideas were a crucial factor in 
the current South Korea government's strong policy-making will toward active and consistent 
engagement with North Korea. While his long-evolving unification plan through peaceful and 
gradual engagement with North Korea was not given public hearing during the Cold War era, 
his ideas, however, became the foundation of the current Kim Dae-jung government's 
'sunshine policy'. 
Moreover, changes in the international environment and within North Korea in the 
1990s gave opportunities to Kim Dae-jung to develop a more detailed perception of and 
policies towards North Korea in order to facilitate his three-stage unification plan. By the 
1990s, he had already established most of the parts of the 'sunshine' policy that his 
government is now pursuing as its North Korea policy. Thereby, his firm belief in the 
'sunshine approach' towards North Korea played a great role as causal belief, information 
screen, and decision-making rule in formulating and implementing North Korea policy, as 
pointed out in the 'beliefs approach'. 
As set out in chapter 1, this thesis examined a range of variables that might have 
influenced Seoul's utilisation of business-track diplomacy under Kim Dae-jung government, 
in chapters 4 and 5. As a result, it was revealed that there are causal relations between beliefs 
held by top decision-makers and foreign policy outcomes in the South Korean foreign policy-
making process. Put differently, the conventional international structure analysis, which 
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emphasises the US influence on South Korean foreign policy-making, can not explain the 
North Korea policy choice by the Kim Dae-jung government. Rather, this study demonstrates 
that beliefs (as casual beliefs, information screens and factors of institutionalisation) held by 
the policy-makers of South Korea, which is a small state compared with surrounding 
powerful states, can be an important policy input and can produce a certain policy choice 
beyond what the traditional international system perspective on South Korean foreign policy 
analysis could predict. 
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Chapter 6. Case study of Hyundai Group's North Korea business: 
Centred on the Mt. Kumgang project 
This research has so far demonstrated Kim Dae-jung government's strong policy-making will 
of comprehensive engagement with North Korea, the important role of President Kim Dae-
jung's belief system towards the North Korean issue on Seoul's North Korea policy-making 
process, and South Korea's external and internal constraints for implementing active and 
consistent engagement measures towards North Korea. In addition to these aspects, this 
chapter will also show the importance of private sector's will and state'economic capability 
for utilising successful business-track diplomacy as discussed in chapter 1. In order to give an 
example that shows the present situation and the future implication of South Korea's overall 
utilisation of business-track diplomacy towards North Korea, this chapter investigates the 
South Korea based Hyundai Group's economic cooperation, centred on the Mt. Kumgang 
tourism project, with North Korea. 
As indicated above, one aim of this chapter is to demonstrate that in addition to Kim 
Dae-jung government's strong policy-making will of business-track diplomacy towards North 
Korea, the South Korean business community and the vulnerability of the North Korean 
economy also played an important role in enhancing inter-Korean economic cooperation 
through Hyundai Group's businesses with North Korea. The other aim of this chapter is to 
show the various constraints to Kim Dae-jung government's economic engagement with 
North Korea. As pointed out in chapter I, this study will show South Korea's limitated 
economic capability, which is an important factor in the effectiveness of business-track 
diplomacy towards North Korea, through the case study of Hyundai Group's overall 
difficulties in doing businesses with North Korea. 
The Hyundai Group was selected for the case study because it has been the most 
active private sector actor in North Korean business relations, and moreover, its Kumgang 
223 
tourism project has been considered a vivid example of the result of the Kim Dae-jung 
government's consistent sunshine policy. Through the case of the Hyundai Group's North 
Korean businesses, with special emphasis on the ongoing Mt. Kumgang project, this chapter 
will discuss the Kim Dae-jung government's private-led economic engagement with North 
Korea. 
6.1 Mt. Kumgang project before the Kim Dae-jung government 
The Mt. Kumgang tourism has provided more than 400,000 South Koreans with the chance to 
step on North Korean soil, after it was launched at a ceremony on the "Kumgang" cruise ship 
on 18 November 1998. It can be considered a historical event in terms of inter-Korean 
exchanges and cooperations and an illustration of what the Kim Dae-jung government aimed 
for. The tourism project was first negotiated in the North in January 1989, when Chung Ju-
young, Chairman of the Hyundai Group at that time, signed a memorandum of understanding 
with the North Korean counterparts. Thus, the Mt. Kumgang tourism project took almost ten 
years to come to fruition. 
Over the years, the project was occasionally suspended due to international and 
domestic political impediments. In 1989, Chung Ju-young visited North Korea and negotiated 
several joint projects including one to develop a major tourist resort known as the Mt. 
Kumgang project. However, the Roh Tae-woo government withdrew its permission for the 
project and made it clear that North Korea's nuclear issue should be solved first, before 
enhancing the private sector economic cooperation and contacts with North Koreans 
(Joongangilbo, 10 March 1992). Also, the Kim Young-sam government's inconsistent 
economic engagement with the North prevented South Korean firms, especially the chaebols, 
from initiating investment in North Korea. This is evident in the fact that there were no 
approved inter-Korean projects by prominent South Korean chaebols during the Kim Young-
sam government.64 
64 See Table 3-2 in chapter 3. 
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As discussed in previous chapters, the South Korean governments led by Roh Tae-
woo and Kim Young-sam believed that economic engagement with North Korea was should 
depend on inter-Korean political and military dialogues. Hence, economic engagement was 
conditionally pursued when Pyongyang recognised the legitimacy of the South Korean 
government and did not bypass South Korea on the Korean Peninsula issues. Thus, the 
sensitivity of inter-Korean political issues had a great impact on inter-Korean economic 
relations. Furthermore, previous South Korean governments were concerned over the possible 
diversion oflarge-scale investments towards North Korea's military build-up. 
In addition, the delay of the Mt. Kumgang project was also caused by the 
uncomfortable relationship between the Kim Young-sam government and the Hyundai Group. 
The tension began after Chung Ju-young, a founder of the Hyundai Group, decided to run for 
President as a candidate for the Unification People's Party (UPP), which was established on 
the lOth of January 1992, less than a year before the South Korean Presidential election on the 
18th of December 1992. However, he was defeated and came third after the winner, Kim 
Young-sam, and Kim Dae-jung. After the election, Chung Ju-young was prosecuted for a 
violation of the presidential election law. The charge was that Hyundai Heavy Industry's 
(HHO money (up to US$lO million) was illegally used for his campaign activities. He was 
sentenced for three years on 2 November 1993, though he was allowed to go on probation 
after that sentence (Chosunilbo, 10 February 1993; 2 November 1993). 
After that, Chung Ju-young, who had resigned as the chairman of the Hyundai Group 
In 1991 to contest the presidential election, could not return to the management of the 
company due to the Kim Young-sam government's political oppression. After the advent of 
the Kim Dae-jung government in 1998, he was able to return officially as the honorary 
chairman of the Group (Chosunilbo, 24 February 1998). 
One major political oppression against the Hyundai Group was the freezing of the 
capital supply of the Hyundai Group. For instance, the Hyundai Group borrowed from the 
Industrial Bank of Korea 140 billion won (up toUS$140 million) in 1990, and 250 billion won 
(up to US$250 million) in 1991. However, in 1992, when Chung Ju-young ran for president 
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against Kim Young-sam, the Hyundai Group was not able to get a loan from the bank. 
Moreover, the Hyundai Group's self-funding efforts, such as listing Hyundai finns on the 
Korea Stock Exchange or the issue of overseas bonds were also prevented by the Kim Y oung-
sam government's intervention. As a result of the so-called government's 'intentional 
financial shackle' on the Hyundai Group, it had to give-up several business projects, 
including the Mt. Kumgang project. For the sake of his company, Chung Ju-young had to 
make public his retirement from the Hyundai Group management on the 3rd of May 1994 
(Huh 1999: 128-131). 
This political oppression came to light when Chung Ju-young launched some heavy 
criticisms against former president Kim Young-sam, after he stepped down from the 
presidential office in 1998. In his autobiography entitled 'The Story Of My Life, Born In This 
Country,' he argued that because of his decision to run for South Korean president against the 
ruling party candidate, Kim Young-sam, in 1992, the Hyundai Group was discriminated 
against by the Kim Young-sam government and suffered from several economic 
disadvantages such as tax investigations, the prevention of bank loans, and unfair treatment in 
competitive bids (Chung Ju-young 1998). 
6.2 Actors' will of launching the Mt. Kumgang project 
As pointed out in chapter 1, actors' policy-making will both in the public and the private 
sectors is an important factor in implementing business-track diplomacy. The Mt. Kumgang 
tourism case proved that the involved actors' (the Hyundai Group, the North Korean 
government, and the Kim Dae-jung government) inter-Korean business-making will was a 
crucial factor for the realisation of the project. All factors - Hyundai Group founder Chung 
Ju-young's tenacity for North Korean businesses, especially the development of Mt. 
Kumgang areas, North Korea's willingness of economic engagement with South Korean 
private sectors, and the Kim Dae-jung government's adoption of the principle of the 
separation of economics from politics in order to enhance private-led economic engagement 
towards North Korea - contributed to the success of this project. 
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6.2.i lIyundai Group and Chairman Chung Ju-young 
Firstly, Mt. Kumgang tourism was possible because of Chung Ju-young's will for economic 
engagement with North Korea. In his memoirs 'The Story Of My Life, Born In This 
Country,' he pointed out his strong determination to accomplish the Mt. Kumgang 
development, saying that the "Mt. Kumgang development is our national project and 
contributes to promoting peace for our nation, moreover, it is my final destiny" (Chung Ju-
young 1998: 98). Like other South Korean businessmen whose home towns were in the North 
before the Korean War, and who were keen on inter-Korean business, Chung Ju-young, born 
in Tongchon near Mt. Kumgang, dedicated his remaining life to developing business with 
North Korea, and to helping North Korean people. 
After seeing the possibility of a joint venture between the Hyundai Group and North 
Korea on Mt. Kumgang tourism development of the 16th of May 1990, Chung Iu-young 
continued to show interest and never gave up on the project. Despite several obstacles, as 
discussed earlier, he believed that the deal reached with North Korean authorities was still 
valid and showed the will to drive it forward. For instance, Hyundai Research Institute (lIRI), 
the Hyundai Group's affiliated institute, argued that South Korean chaebols needed 
aggressive investments in North Korea. In this view, South Korean companies should provide 
financial contributions to the North rather than seek short-term profits, in order to earn 
recognition from the North Korean government and, thus, momentum for long-term inter-
Korean economic cooperation, although this required a huge amount of money (Cho Dong-ho 
1996). 
After the Kim Dae-jung government's promise of strong support for the Mt. 
Kumgang tourism project, Chung Ju-young reportedly said that he was willing to spend 10 
percent of his own money on the North Korean investment, and directed his sons to open a 
"North Korean channel" to re-negotiate the Mt. Kumgang project (Oh Min-soo 1998). On the 
14th of February 1998, Chung Mong-hun, the third son of Chung Ju-young, contacted North 
Korean officials in Beijing. After several pre-stage talks between Hyundai Group officials and 
North Korean counterparts, Chung Ju-young proposed a resumption of talks regarding the Mt. 
227 
Kumgang tourism project and other businesses, announcing his desire to donate 1,001 head of 
cattle to the North. 
With first 500 heads of cattle, he visited Pyongyang to discuss inter-Korean economic 
cooperation with the Asia Pacific Committee (APC) in the North, which is in charge of inter-
Korean economic cooperation in North Korea. Returning from the North on the 23rd of June 
1998, he announced that the Hyundai Group would launch its first cruise trip to Mt. Kumgang 
on the 25 th of September 1998. Thus, the Hyundai Group prepared to set sail, by charting two 
vessels from foreign countries, and started to refurbish Changjun, the nearest port to the 
mountain in the North. However North Korea's series of military provocations in the summer 
of 1998, which will be discussed later, hindered the deal. 
However, both the Hyundai Group and the APC in the North intended to make a deal 
on Mt. Kumgang tourism. Chung Ju-young dispatched top executives, including his son 
Chung Mong-hun, to Beijing for contacts with North Korean authorities. However, 
negotiations were not smooth. Thus, the Hyundai Group's promised schedule for a first and 
second take-off of the cruise, in September and October 1998, was postponed. It was reported 
that the continuing delay of the tour was caused by a disagreement on tour price between the 
Hyundai Group and North Korea, and the North Korean military authorities' discontent over 
opening up Mt. Kumgang and the Changjun port for the tour cruise to South Koreans 
(Interview with a junior official of the MOV, Seoul, August 1999). However, Chung Ju-
young did not give up on the project. He was able to visit North Korea and make his gift of 
the remaining 501 head of cattle and 20 sedans made by Hyundai Motors. lIe finally met the 
North Korean leader, Kim Jeong-ii, on the 30th of October, extended his stay in the North, and 
reconfirmed the project with Kim Jeong-il. 
In fact, the Hyundai' Group's eagerness to launch the Mt. Kumgang project was 
reflected in its generous financial contributions to the North. The basic nature of the Mt. 
Kumgang deal indicates that the Hyundai Group will hold the exclusive rights to develop the 
tourist site until the year 2030, in return for the payment of a total US$942 million through to 
March 2005, on a monthly basis. The schedule for the total payment of US$942 million to the 
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North is to pay a total ofUS$150 million by June 1999, which is US$25 million a month for 
six months, US$72 million over the next nine months, which is US$8 million a month until 
March of 2000, and US$720 million over the five years through March 2005, which is US$12 
million a month (Korea Times,S January 1999). 
In addition to this, the Hyundai Group offered 1001 head of cattle, 50,000 tons of 
corn and 20 Hyundai sedan cars, whose value amounts to 11 billion won (up to US$9 million) 
before the Mt. Kumgang tour project deal was reached with North Korea. The total sum of 
money provided to North Korea was at least US$8.5 million in 1998 alone, in addition to 
11,000 tons of corn donated through the Korean National Red Cross between 1997 and 1998. 
Moreover, the Hyundai Group promised to employ 500 North Korean workers at its oil 
refinery factories in Turkmenistan and the Libyan oil pipeline construction site. Privately, 
Chung Ju-young presented lots of gifts, such as a golden crane, a jewel-adorned picture, to 
Kim Jeong-il and other related North Korean officials, during his trips to North Korea in 1998 
(Korea Times, 4 and 5 November 1998). Without doubt, the conglomerate's various 
contributions to North Korea were regarded as part of its efforts to create the proper 
atmosphere for the successful implementation of Mt. Kumgang tourism with the North 
Korean government. 
However, industry insiders were hardly optimistic about business prospects unless 
foreign investment and tourists were attracted to the tour as soon as possible. Also, the 
business community was not convinced that Mt. Kumgang tourism was a business-oriented 
project and was concerned that the project might pose a burden on other companies seeking to 
start new businesses with North Korea because of the Hyundai Group's massive financial 
lobbies and promises to Pyongyang (Chosunilbo, 11 November 1998).65 Negative views on 
6S Most tour operators predicted that considering the tour's high price and the low demand in winter, 
the Hyundai Group will have to fmd new customers, such as foreigners. Because the competitiveness 
of Mt. Kumgang tourism was very low, considering that Hyundai charged around US$l,OOO for the 
five-day cruise, Hyundai would have to focus on a specific group of local tourists, mostly elderly 
citizens who were separated from their families in the North. However, this would be a short-term 
solution (Korea TImes, 18 November 1998). 
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the profitability of the Mt. Kumgang project also prevailed amongst Hyundai Group officials 
before the project started. 
But, Chung Ju-young's strong will towards the Mt. Kumgang project could not be 
disobeyed. His status in the Hyundai Group was such that he was not called 'chairman' but 
'king chairman' by Hyundai Group officials (Shindonga, March 1999). The Mt. Kumgang 
project was hardly understandable from a business point of view but was understandable in 
terms of the North Korea born and old businessman's strong commitment towards inter-
Korean economic cooperation. 
6.2.ii North Korea's business will 
Secondly, Mt. Kumgang tourism was possible because the North Korean government had a 
will to accept South Korean business exchanges, at least from private sectors. As pointed out 
in chapter 1, a target state's economic difficulties and so its vulnerability can increase the 
economic capability of the actors to utilise business-track diplomacy. As demonstrated in 
chapter 2, North Korea's severe economic difficulties and isolation in the 1990s provided the 
involved states, including South Korea with an opportunity to utilise business-track 
diplomacy towards North Korea. 
In fact, it was true that the North tried to attract foreign investment from the 1990s. 
The tourism industry was already targeted for foreign joint-venture businesses as early as the 
mid-1980s (Joongangi/bo, 5 July 1991). North Korea even designated 1993 as the North 
Korean tourism year to attract foreigners. However, efforts to attract foreign investment to the 
tourism industry failed. In fact, Pyongyang asked Japanese conglomerates to develop the Mt. 
Kumgang area for a tour and resort site, and actually received a basic agreement from some of 
them. But, these were not realised primarily because of their lack of confidence in the North 
Korean government, and the unabated political tension on the Korean Peninsula. To address 
this situation, the North began to pursue South Korean chaebols, which showed more interest 
than other foreign corporations in the Mt. Kumgang region. 
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North Korea made contacts with several South Korean chaebols including the 
Hyundai Group. For instance, the Kumgangsan International Group, an affiliated company of 
the Unification Church, was actively trying to start ferry tourism in the early 1990s, and the 
Daewoo Group had proposed a huge resort hotel with a capacity of 900 rooms in the Mt. 
Kumgang area (Joongangilbo, 21 October 1994). However, there were no other companies 
like the Hyundai Group, who showed strong will and had a comprehensive Mt. Kumgang 
development plan that required huge investment. It was reported that the North Korean 
authorities began to understand as a result of negotiations for the Mt. Kumgang tourism 
project that attracting direct investment from the US and Japanese companies was difficult, 
while South Korean capital was more accessible, and also necessary for attracting other 
foreign capital (Joongangilbo, 29 November 1994; Chosunilbo, 2 January 1998). 
North Korea's main reasons for pursuing the development of the tourism industry 
was to acquire hard currency in a short period of time without causing severe damage to its 
system. For instance, North Korea's total sum of exports in 1999 was US$637 million, and its 
net profit might not exceed Hyundai Group's promised payment of up to an average US$150 
million per year for Mt. Kumgang tourism. Also, North Korea does not need to invest its own 
money to develop the Mt. Kumgang area (KOTRA 2001a). An official from the Blue House 
pointed out that Hyundai's total payment ofUS$942 million in return for its exclusive right to 
develop the Mt. Kumgang area through to 2030 could make up for a food shortage in North 
Korea for 4 or 5 years. It is therefore unthinkable that North Korea would oppose this 
amazing deal (Interview with a national security advisor in the Blue House, Seoul, August 
1999). Thus, the tourist business was too profitable to be denied by North Korea. 
In addition to hard currency, the other reason was to reduce political risk due to 
opening to the outside world. For instance, North Korea introduced limited reform and 
openness policies to attract foreign investment in the Rajin-sonbong free trade area in 1991. 
However, foreign investment brought concerns over contamination, and the spread of 
capitalistic ideology through direct contacts between foreign employers and North Korean 
employees and citizens. In response to this concern, the North Korean authority omitted the 
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word 'free' from the title 'Rajin-sonbong free trade zone' in 1999, and it deepened the central 
government's control over the personnel management of foreign firms, the free trade market 
at Wonjongni, and commercial advertisements. 
Compared with these risks, tourism does not require many North Korean employees 
to manage business. For example, North Korea committed a minimal number of North 
Koreans for the Mt. Kumgang tourism business. Currently, people who have direct contact 
with South Korean tourists are officials of the Immigration Bureau and environmental 
watchers. Other related personnel, such as salesmen, nurses, cooks, bus drivers and those on 
subsidiary facilities, are mostly Korean Chinese living in north-eastern China (Chosunjok). 
Moreover, citizens around the Mt. Kumgang region as well as North Korean people of other 
regions have only limited to access to the tourist sites (Suh Bong-ko 2001). 
This does not mean that launching this project was an easy decision for North Korea. 
Especially, to open the Mt. Kumgang area, a protected military site, and the military port 
Changjun, to South Koreans was no easy political decision for Pyongyang, and should be 
regarded as a great change, despite the need for hard currency. For instance, Changjun, a port 
city nestling at the foot of Mt. Kumgang, has long been North Korea's naval base 
accommodating fleets of destroyers and submarines, often used for the infiltration of South 
Korea. The naval base would be relocated eventually to another area because it can no longer 
maintain the secrecy required of a military base. Military observers point out that the military 
importance of the Changjun port to the North is like that of the Chinhae port to the South, and 
to open the Chinhae port to North Koreans for tourism would be impossible considering its 
strategic importance (Korea Times, 24 November 1998). 
Pyongyang's difficulty is evident in the alleged confrontations between military 
authorities and the APC over the Mt. Kumgang project. For instance, while Chung Ju-young 
reached an agreement with APC on launching Mt. Kumgang tourism on the 23rd of June 1998, 
there were two unexpected military infiltrations by North Korea. A North Korean submarine 
was discovered on the South Korean east coast on the 2200 of June, and an armed North 
Korean solider was founded dead on the South Korean shore in July 1998. These 
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contradictory behaviours, almost simultaneously by the North, might reflect North Korean 
military authorities' discontent about Mt. Kumgang tourism, and their efforts to hinder the 
project. 
After two military infiltrations by North Korea, the mood about the Mt. Kumgang 
project calmed down. However, it was the APC, the North Korean counterpart of the Hyundai 
Group for the Mt. Kumgang project, which signalled to the Hyundai Group to resume talks 
over the project. This signal led to a series of talks between officials from the Hyundai Group 
and APC. However, negotiations between the two were not smooth. Thus, the expected 
schedule for two take-offs of the Mt. Kumgang trip cruise was postponed. Once again, it was 
reported that the most important reason for the delay was that Kim Yong-sun, the head of 
APC, was having a difficult time in persuading North Korean military authorities. They were 
reportedly displeased with having no leading role or control over the Mt. Kumgang project, 
and over the opening of Changjun port, which was an important naval base (C/wsunilbo, 23 
September 1998). 
6.2.iii Kim Dae-jung government 
Third, as discussed in previous chapters, President Kim Dae-jung's strong belief in the 
effectiveness of the sunshine policy and thus Kim Dae-jung government's flexible and 
consistent economic engagement posture towards North Korea greatly helped the realisation 
of the Mt. Kumgang project between the Hyundai Group and North Korea. When Kim Dae-
jung took the presidential office, the Hyundai Group resumed its North Korean businesses 
with small-scale joint projects, such as the import of freight trains made by North Korea in 
early 1998. In fact, all the Hyundai Group's businesses with the North had been suspended 
under the Kim Young-sam government. 
Regarding the Mt. Kumgang project, there was full support of the government under 
its sunshine policy. Before Kim Dae-jung took oval office on 28 February 1998, the 
Undertaking Committee of the Presidential Office of the incoming Kim Dae-jung government 
had already selected the Mt. Kumgang project as one of Kim Dae-jung government's one 
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hundred tasks for the next five years on the 12th of February 1998 (Chosunilbo, 12 February 
1999). The Kim Dae-jung government permitted the chairmen of chaebols to visit North 
Korea without any political preconditions on 1 April 1998. In fact, this had been banned 
during the Roh Tae-woo and Kim Young-sam governments because large-scale investment by 
South Korean chaebols was seen to help North Korea's military build-up.66 Chung Ju-young 
submitted an application to visit North Korea to the Ministry of Unification the week after. 
Following a series of dialogues between the llyundai Group and North Korea on the 
Mt. Kumgang tourism project, Hyundai announced that it had reached a deal with North 
Korea on the 23rd of June 1998, without asking for South Korean government's permission, 
then still necessary before any public announcement. The Hyundai Group instead submitted a 
project application on the 151 of July 1998 to the Ministry of Unification (MOV). However, 
there were no legal problems or confrontation between the government and the llyundai 
Group. One journalist pointed out that the Hyundai Group's violation of inter-Korean 
procedural law would had been a serious political problem during in the previous South 
Korean governments, because the Hyundai Group did not observe the principle of 
'government first and private sector later' on North Korean affairs to which previous South 
Korean governments had kept (Interview with a reporter of Shindonga by E-mail, 11 
December 1998). Moreover, in the final stage of the tour price negotiation between the 
Hyundai Group and North Korea, the MOU exempted the group from a series of taxes for Mt. 
Kumgang tourism through revising the Inter-Korean Exchanges and Cooperation Law. It is 
reported that the Hyundai Group benefited by up to 20% of the total tour cost from that 
decision (Chosunilbo, 23 September 1998). 
In fact, compared with the Hyundai Group's difficult relationship with the Kim 
Young-sam government, Hyundai Group's Mt. Kumgang project enjoyed from cosy relations 
with the Kim Dae-jung government. There is no doubt that the Kim Dae-jung government and 
the Hyundai Group shared common interests to realise the Mt. Kumgang project. As far as the 
President Kim Dae-jung government was concerned, since February 1998 when he took 
66 See Table 3-1 in chapter 3. 
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office, he put forward his sunshine policy regarding inter-Korean relations, as well as 
successive calls for government-level dialogue, but a breakthrough failed to materialise while 
North Korean provocations continued. In the face of no substantial results from the pledged 
sunshine policy in the first year of his presidency, Chung Ju-young's activities were a very 
effective way to press ahead with the sunshine policy. In fact, an official of the MOU pointed 
out that "the Mt. Kumgang program is a very important factor in terms of pursuing the 
sunshine policy. It is the only realistic means to this end and is expected to have a far-
reaching effect from a long-term perspective (Interview with a junior official ofMOU, Seoul, 
August 1999). 
Firstly, the Kim Dae-jung government's support of the Mt. Kumgang project can be 
seen as a calm response to Pyongyang's continuing military provocations. When two 
submarine incidents occurred right after reaching the Mt. Kumgang project deal between the 
Hyundai Group and North Korea on 23rd of June 1998, Hyundai's Mt. Kumgang projects 
narrowly averted cancellation due to a wave of protest from the conservative camp in the 
South. However, Hyundai's projects have survived all challenges and suffered only from 
partial delays, because the Kim Dae-jung government remained steadfast in their engagement 
policy toward North Korea. For instance, against the backdrop of the contradictory incidents 
of Chung Ju-young's first visit to North Korea to discuss the Mt. Kumgang tourism project in 
17-22 June 1998, and the discovery of a North Korean mini-submarine on 22 June 1998, 
Seoul announced that its principle of the separation of economics from politics would 
continue. The Blue House spokesman Park Ji-won even argued that the "Kim Young-sam 
government's handling of North Korea's military provocation and especially the submarine 
incident in 1996 was rough and Seoul needed to take a prudent attitude and not provoke 
Pyongyang." Moreover, the Ministry of National Defence (MND) postponed its usual 
warning issues to the North that such incidents inevitably bring about (quoted in Chosunilbo, 
23 June 1998). 
Moreover, within 20 days of the submarine incident, North Korea's armed infiltrators 
penetrated into the East coast of South Korean territory. This series of incidents shocked the 
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South Korean people. This time, the South Korean government pushed North Korea harder to 
make an apology than in the earlier incident. However, Seoul's engagement policy did not 
change. Lim Dong-won, in an interview with the Chosunilbo, said that "North Korea's 
infiltration was a routine operation, and these incidents were evidence that the hard-liners of 
North Korea wanted to interrupt inter-Korean cooperation. That is why more sunshine is 
needed to encourage moderate forces in the North" (quoted in CllOsunilbo, 13 July 1998). 
Even with growing criticism from the conservative media for the continuing soft 
stance towards North Korea's provocations, and an ongoing 'suspension campaign of Mt. 
Kumgang tourism' by conservative congressmen from both ruling and opposition parties, the 
South Korean government continuously leaned towards economic engagement with North 
Korea. The South Korean government reaffirmed its support for the Mt. Kumgang project 
based on the principle of separation of economics from politics. The MOU pushed the Mt. 
Kumgang project by announcing that the process of a South Korean visiting Mt. Kumgang 
would be simplified through a proxy tour agency, and by allowing a Mt. Kumgang 
development team from the Hyundai Group to visit North Korea frequently, without the 
government's express permission (Chosunilbo, 9 July 1998). President Kim Dae-jung argued 
that he would not link the demand for an apology from North Korea for its infiltration, to the 
Mt. Kumgang project. The issue of military security and inter-Korean exchanges go together 
because inter-Korean economic cooperation would help South Korean security in the long-run 
(Korea Herald, 14 August 1998). In fact, the response from the Kim Dae-jung government 
was quite different to that of former president Kim Young-sam in 1996, when the first such 
submarine incident occurred. President Kim Young-sam had indicated that an all out war 
could break out, and suspended all inter-Korean businesses until North Korea apologised for 
the incident. 
Secondly, the Kim Dae-jung government stood up against growing domestic concerns 
over the possible diversion of North Korean revenue from the Hyundai project to military 
purposes. According to the MND, North Korea imported military arms valued at US$106 
million from Russia and six other countries during 1995-98 (Park Kun-young 1999b: 101). 
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This amount of money could be covered by the Hyundai Group's payment ofUS$lS0 million 
in one year alone to North Korea for its exclusive rights over the Mt. Kumgang development 
for 30 years. In fact, the Hyundai Group is supposed to pay a total amount of US$942 million. 
However, Kang In-duk, the Minister of Unification at that time, stepped back and said that "it 
is up to North Korea what it does with the money because it is a business deal between 
Hyundai Group and North Korea, and it is not a matter we [the government] should take up" 
(quoted in Korea Times, 2 November 1998). This remark clearly reflected Seoul's intention to 
disregard these concerns. Beyond the Minister's remark over legal matters relating to North 
Korea's possible diversion of money into a military build-up, there was the Kim Dae-jung 
government's real perception of such concerns. 
In Seoul's new understanding of North Korea, it can be argued that North Korea's 
acquisition of hard currency through the Mt. Kumgang projects did not increase their military 
threat towards South Korea, even if the money was diverted into military build up. First, 
South Korea's military capability still far exceeds that of North Korea. According to SIPRI, 
for example, South Korea imported arms worth US$S.2 billion, and ranked as fifth in this 
category in the world from 1994 to 1998 (SIPRI 1999). South Korea's volume of imported 
arms was 48 times higher than North Korea's US$106 million. Second, North Korea's efforts 
towards military build-up are intended in self-defence rather than the so-called "liberation of 
the South by force". Considering the changes in the international environment in the 1990s, in 
which North Korea lost the military support of Russia and China while fearing continuing 
potential military threats from the U.S., North Korea's military build-up is understandable. 
Third, South Korea's excessive concern regarding a diversion of money from inter-Korean 
economic cooperation for military purposes would jeopardise the implementation of an active 
economic engagement policy towards North Korea (Park Kun-young 1999b: 99-102). 
It seems that with new beliefs on engagement and new perceptions of the North, the 
Kim Dae-jung government's priority in North Korean policy is to help North Korea's 
constructive transformation towards a market economy. Put differently, the military power of 
North Korea already holds Seoul hostage with its forward-deployed artillery. Thus, South 
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Koreans should engage North Korea in an attempt to reduce tensions and to support the 
North's self-reform, because the marginal increase in North Korea's threat capability that 
might be achieved through economic aid and cooperation is relatively small. 
Thirdly, government support for Mt. Kumgang tourism might also be detected in the 
suspicions and allegations over the Hyundai Group's benefits in domestic business. 
Compared with the Hyundai's disadvantage during the Kim Young-sam government, the 
public sees Hyundai gaining political favours from the Kim Dae-jung government. This is 
evident in the fact that the Hyundai Group has loomed large in the South Korean economy, 
leaving competing chaebols far behind with a series of take -overs of business divisions under 
the so-called "big deal" reform program initiated by the government, which involves swaps of 
major divisions among the nation's top five chaebols. For example, the merger of the 
semiconductor divisions between Hyundai Electronics Industries and LG Semi con, valued at 
US$8 billion in favour of Hyundai and Hyundai Motor's merger of Kia and Asia Motors 
valued at US$6 billion, have consolidated the Hyundai Group's external status as the No. 1 
chaebol of South Korea. Thus, the Hyundai Group is under suspicion of government-business 
collusion in return for its active business engagement with North Korea (Korea Times, 21 
April 1999; 5 August 1999). 
6.3 Impact ofMt. Kumgang tourism on engagement with North Korea 
6.3.1 Enlargement of inter-Korean cooperation 
6.3.l.a Private sector 
One of the impacts of the Mt. Kumgang project on inter-Korean relations was to increase 
inter-Korean cooperations and exchanges. After launching Mt. Kumgang tourism on the 18th 
of November 1998, the Hyundai Group intended to intensify its tourism by establishing the 
Hyundai Asan Corporation for North Korean projects on the 5th of February 1999. It increased 
the number of cruise vessels from one (Kumgang) to four (Kumgang, Bongrae, Poongak and 
Sulbong), and the number of tours in Mt. Kumgang area increased from one to four by the 
end of 1999. Also, to diversify events for tourists, it build the Onjunggak Pavilion for 
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purchasing North Korean goods and eating their foods, and the Mt. Kumgang Cultural Centre 
for enjoying North Korean cultural activities. Also, it opened huge public baths at Mt. 
Kumgang to attract tourists in the winter season (Hyundai Asan 2000b). 
Hyundai Asan plans to develop the Mt. Kumgang area into eight tourism zones -
Samilpo lake, Haegumgang and its neighbouring coastal area, Onjong-ni area, the Songbung-
ni area, the Changjun Port area, Inner Kumgang, the Tongchon area and Shijungho lake. It 
will build roads linking the eight areas, hotels, a beach area, a spa, a golf course and a ski 
range. In the first stage, until 2001, the cruises would last for three, five or ten days for a tour 
of the Mt. Kumgang area. In addition, related facilities have been built including a lounge 
building, performance hall, a spa, and small shops in the entry village to Mt. Kumgang. In the 
second stage, going through to 2005, Hyundai will construct a number of tourism-related 
facilities, including hotels, casinos, ski resorts, golf courses and a spa. During the remaining 
25 years until 2030, it will actively pursue the building of other facilities, including 
conventional halls, cultural centres, and human resources training institutes (llyundai Asan 
2000a). According to Hyundai Asan's plan, it will invest a total ofUS$400 million by 2005 to 
build hotels, golf courses, ski slopes and so on. It plans also to construct a ''Tongchun'' Light 
Industry Complex for the production of goods specific to the region. In addition, a project to 
assist the North's farming is already under way in the Mt. Kumgang region (Korea Times, 25 
October 1998). 
As Mt. Kumgang tourism progressed, the scale of inter-Korean cooperation was 
enlarged. As seen in Table 6-1, a total of 5 inter-Korean projects in addition but related to Mt. 
Kumgang tourism, were approved by South and North Korean governments. Also, the 
beginning of Mt. Kumgang tourism provided the momentum for numerous other inter-Korean 
socio-cultural exchanges. For instance, the two Koreas held two basketball matches, one in 
Pyongyang and one in Seoul in 1999, and the Hyundai group invited the North Korean 
acrobatic team to perform in Seoul in June 2000. Moreover, in order to expand social and 
cultural exchanges, the Hyundai Group and North Korea jointly constructed the Pyongyang 
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Hyundai Asan Gymnasium which will accommodate 12,000 people. Its ground-breaking 
ceremony was held in September 1999 (Hyundai Asan 2000c). 
Table 6-1. Approved inter-Korean projects related to the Mt. Kumgang project until 
2000 (both in economic and socio-cultural fields) 
Company Business Specifics 
Hyundai Merchant 
MarinelHyundai Engineering Engage in the Mt. Kumgang 
and ConstructionIHyundai tour and development 
Asan 
Korea Land Development of real estate 
and run a department store 
Hyundai Asan Construction of indoor gymnasium in Pyongyang 
Joint communication 
Hyundai ElectronicslKorea business for Mt. Kumgang 
TelecomlOnsei Telecom tour 
Uinbang Communication Mt. Kumgang international 
car rally for unification 
Korean Culture Foundation Mt. Kumgang Art Institute's Performance in the South 
Source: data based on MOU (2000b) 
Amount 
(US$ million) 
100.33 (not 
Date of 
Approval 
including payment 06/08/1998 
of942) 
0.6 28/08/1998 
34.2 20/09/1999 
0.13 1111111998 
1 1111111999 
0.1 29/1112000 
Meanwhile, the most important effect of Mt. Kumgang tourism on inter-Korean 
economic cooperation was that North Korea promised the Hyundai Group that it would create 
a mammoth industrial complex in the North Korean city of Kaesung, a West Coast city just 
70 Ian north of Seoul and 160 Ian south of Pyongyang. This project was broadly agreed in 
late 1998 between Hyundai and North Korea's National Economic Cooperation Committee. 
Founder Chung-ju young's frequent visits to North Korea and accumulated confidence over 
business between Hyundai and North Korea accelerated the completion of this industrial 
complex deal. 
However, tangible deal was not reached for two years. The establishment of an 
industrial complex was delayed by a dispute over the proposed location. Kim Jeong-il 
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reportedly expressed a preference for Shinuiju or Haeju over the Kaesung district, despite the 
latter's greater attractiveness, as it is located near North Korea's border and Seoul, allowing 
the possibility of a common inter-Korean industrial belt, as well as easy access to South 
Korea's infrastructure. This was probably caused by North Korea's concern with the possible 
side-effects of its opening, perhaps undermining its regime, and thus preferred a remote and 
more distant place from South Korea for an industrial complex, such as the Rajin and 
Sonbong economic zones. However, after the inter-Korean Summit in June 2000, North 
Korea started to change its stance. Finally, Hyundai Asan and North Korea reached an official 
agreement that Hyundai Asan could hold exclusive rights over the Kaesung Industrial 
Complex, and Kaesung was designated as an industrial economic zone on 22 August 2000. 
Although the Mt. Kumgang tourism project understandably attracted the most 
attention, the provision for the Hyundai Group's deVelopment of the Kaesung industrial 
complex may have more economic significance in the long-run, by encouraging investment 
by small and medium size South Korean firms. This project will be a test of whether inter-
Korean economic cooperation can move beyond the present stage of indirect trade and 
manufacturing and tourism, to investment cooperation in manufacturing. Furthermore, it is 
hoped that Kaesung will become a free and open industrial area, that creates the conditions 
for free and competitive investment, and thereby attracts foreign investments and companies. 
Put differently, it will be the North's experimental way of introducing a socialist market 
economy to rebuild its economy, while maintaining its regime (Centre for Reunification 
Economics 2000: 36-7). 
Hyundai Asan announced the blueprint of the Kaesung Industrial Complex in 
February 2001. It was aimed to build the area into a free economic zone, spanning some 27 
million square meters by the 2008. The development of the Kaesung industrial complex is 
expected to take more than eight years. In the first stage, companies are expected to focus on 
export goods such as textiles, clothing and footwear. Labour-intensive industries which do not 
require heavy facilities or imported raw materials hope to enter the area at this stage. In the 
second and third stages, heavy industries are expected to engage in this area. If implemented, 
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it would be the biggest industrial area in North Korea, and would also be one of the major 
industrial areas of East Asia. Industrial sources pointed out that it will employ some 160,000 
people, and circulate some US$42 billion annually (Hong Soon-jik 2001: 15-6). 
Table 6-2. Hyundai Group's plan of development of Kaesung industrial complex 
Industrial Area Residential Area 
Area No. of Employment Yearly Household Stage (Km) Finns (thousand Export (US$ Area (Km) (thousand persons) billion) persons) 
First 
(2001) 3.3 150 20 2 20.0 50 
Second 
10.0 450 60 6 6.7 43 (2002-4) 
Third 
(2005-8) 13.3 600 80 12 13.3 57 
Total 26.6 1,200 160 20 40.0 150 
Source: data based on Hyundai Asan Corporation, and quoted from Hong Soon-jik (2001: 16). 
6.3.i.b Public sector 
Enhancing inter-Korean cooperation also increases the role of the South Korean public sector. 
First, the government has to provide a comfortable inter-Korean environment for facilitating 
inter-Korean cooperations and exchanges. In regard to the ongoing Mt. Kumgang tourism, the 
government's active role was evident in the discovery of a North Korean spy boat, which was 
sunk by exchanges of gunfire between the two Koreas on 17 December 1998, a month after 
launching the first Mt. Kumgang tour. At that time, South Korean policy-makers decided that 
the Mt. Kumgang tourism should proceed despite the military tension (Korea Times, 18 
December 1998). This stance was continued throughout the Mt. Kumgang project whenever 
there were political and military tensions on the Korean Peninsula, such as the West Coast 
naval clash between the two Koreas in June 1999, which will be discussed later. 
Second, the public sector became an important actor in inter-Korean economic 
cooperation. For instance, the Kim Dae-jung government became actively involved in 
boosting Mt. Kumgang tourism. The Korean National Tourism Organisation (KNTO), a 
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public corporation of the South, was set its resources on promoting the tour program overseas, 
by running advertisements in foreign media and distributing promotional publications through 
its overseas branches. It developed a package program of a "national security tour" of Mt. 
Kumgang, plus ski tours and summer seashore reports, which were available in the Kangwon 
province in the South and studied other possible destinations for the new tourist project in the 
North. Also, foreign journalists and other influential figures would be invited to the tour, 
believing that the Mt. Kumgang tour of the North, one of the few remaining communist 
countries, has the potential to be internationally competitive (Korea Times, 18 November 
1998). 
Also, the Ministry of Education of the South provided selected teachers with a free 
excursion, and half price for all teachers, in kindergarten, elementary, middle and high school, 
from 1999. Also, it has plans to build a long-term program with the aim of enabling all 
360,000 teachers of the South to visit Mt. Kumgang (Korea Times, 13 June 1999). Moreover, 
the Hyundai Group has benefited from the alleged restraint on tax investigation into 
corporations which are involved in North Korean business. The Commissioner of the Office 
of National Taxation admitted as much when opposition party (GNP) members visited the 
Office (Chosunilbo, 16 July 2001). 
The enlargement of inter-Korean cooperation also brought an increase in the direct 
involvement of the South Korean government in North Korean projects, which Pyongyang 
had always opposed as part of the strategy of 'isolating the South Korean government'. Given 
the necessity of financial support for large-scale inter-Korean projects, Pyongyang seems to 
accept the involvement of the South Korean public sector. Moreover, the South Korean 
business community continuously demanded that the South Korean government be actively 
involved in inter-Korean economic issues, such as the signing of agreements on double-
taxation prevention and investment-guarantees as well as providing public financial support 
for telecommunications, electric power, logistics and other key pieces of infrastructure linking 
the two Koreas (Korea Herald, 10 March 2000). 
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For example, the Kaesung industrial project will need an enormous amount of money 
in the long-run. Industrial watchers pointed out that the Hyundai Group might need US$1 
billion for the Kaesung economic free zone for the construction facilities alone; the project 
also requires investments, especially given North Korea's weak infrastructure, such as 
electricity and transportation facilities. Thus, it was reported that even the minimal stages of 
the Kaesung economic zone require US$S billion (Yang Moon-soo 2000). For instance, Lee 
Yong-bum, an official of Korea Land Corporation (KOLAND), argued that it might need 
more than US$3 billion just to reconnect the South-North railroad, which is suitable for 
Kaesung industrial complex transportation (Lee Yong-bum 1999: 68). 
With this enormous financial burden, the Hyundai Group asked for the South Korean 
government's participation on this project, and North Korea permitted Seoul's involvement. 
Consequently, the state-run KOLAND of South Korea joined the project, taking charge of 
financing and planning the future development of the Kaesung industrial complex. While 
Hyundai and KOLAND will make key decisions together, the former's role is now limited 
mostly to construction and promotion, and the project has become more or less a government 
project, as KOLAND is a public company. Also, faced with the llyundai Group's financial 
difficulties, KNTO, a public agency, became a leading participant in the Mt. Kumgang 
tourism project in June 2001, which will be discussed later. Moreover, because inter-Korean 
economic cooperation requires the development of North Korean infrastructure, South Korean 
public firms would have to be deeply involved in North Korean projects, particularly in 
electricity and transportation projects. 
6.3.ii The effect on public support for engagement policy 
The second impact of Mt. Kumgang tourism is the contribution to the South Korean public 
perception of North Korea and of the engagement policy of the Kim Dea-jung government. 
Compared with the small number of South Korean visitors to the North, 2,405, during 
previous governments (1988-1997), Mt. Kumgang tourism alone contributed to a dramatic 
increase in the number of South Korean visitors to the North. As seen in Table 6-3, by the end 
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of April 2001, the number of Mt. Kumgang tourists soared to 401,760. With a growing 
number of South Koreans experiencing the visit to Mt. Kumgang in the North, their views on 
engagement towards North Korea became more positive. As discussed in chapter 4, domestic 
support is an important factor in Seoul's policy-making decision process, thus in policy 
outcomes in regard to North Korean issues. Thereby, it can be an important asset for a 
consistent engagement policy towards North Korea. 
Table 6-3. Numbers ofMt. Kumgang tourist (until30,h of April 2001) 
1998 1999 2000 30/04/2001 
Number of 10,554 148,074 213,009 30,123 
tourists (23 trips) (255 trips) (392 trips) (135 trips) 
Source: MOU (2001a) 
Total 
401,760 
(805 trips) 
The joint survey performed by Research & Research and The Institute for Far Eastern 
Studies (IFES) of Kyungnam University on October 1999, one year after the start of the Mt. 
Kumgang tourism, shows how much Mt. Kumgang tourism affected the South Korean 
public's attitude towards North Korea (Kang Won-taek 1999). It asked both visitors and non-
visitors to Mt. Kumgang for their opinions ofMt. Kumgang tourism's contribution, on several 
inter-Korean issues, as represented in the tables below. Moreover, because this project is a 
symbol of the Kim Dae-jung government's patient engagement policy towards North Korea, 
it may reflect South Korean public opinion on its North Korean policy as whole. 
As seen in Table 6-4, as to whether the Mt. Kumgang tour was helpful to the 
respondents in understanding North Korea, 71 percent of the visitors to Mt. Kumgang said 
"yes," while only 9.1 percent said "no." indicating that the Mt. Kumgang tour greatly helped 
them in understanding North Korea. 
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Table 6-4. Contribution to understanding North Korea by Mt. Kumgang tour (only 
visitors to Mt. Kumgang) 
Contribution to understanding North Korea 
Yes, it does 
No, it does not 
Difficult to judge 
Source: quoted from Kang (1999: 6) 
Percentage (%) 
71.0 
9.1 
19.9 
When questioned as to whether the Mt. Kumgang tourism project affected the 
exchange and cooperation between the two Koreas, 62.8 percent of the respondents replied in 
a positive manner, while 19.7 percent answered "no". There was a contrast, however, between 
the visitors and non-visitors. Among the Mt. Kumgang visitors, 71.9 percent of respondents 
recognised its positive impact on inter-Korean cooperation and exchanges, while only 53.5 
percent of non-visitors recognised it. The contrast widens when it comes to the negative 
responses. While only 6.1 percent of the visitors replied in the negative, a substantial 
proportion, 33.5 percent of the non-visitors said that Mt. Kumgang tourism did not contribute 
to exchange and cooperation between the two Koreas. 
Table 6-5. Contribution to inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation by 1\It. Kumgang 
tour 
Yes, it does 
No, it does not 
Difficult to judge 
Source: Kang (1999: 8). 
Visitor(%) 
71.9 
6.1 
22.0 
Visit to Mt. Kumgang 
Non-Visitor(%) 
53.5 
33.5 
13.0 
Average(%) 
62.8 
19.7 
17.5 
As to whether the Mt. Kumgang tours would contribute to changing the hostile 
attitude of North Korea toward the South, and lead to opening and reform, a total of 56.6 
percent said "yes", while 26.6 percent of the respondents said "no". There was also a sharp 
contrast between the visitors and non-visitors, especially regarding negative attitudes, with 
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only 8.3 percent of the visitors saying "no", while a substantial 45.2 percent, of non-visitors 
said "no". 
Table 6-6. Contribution to North Korea's change towards reform and opening by Mt. 
Kumgang tour 
Yes, it does 
No, it does not 
Difficult to judge 
Source: Kang (1999: 9). 
Visitor(%) 
67.l 
8.3 
24.6 
Visit to Mt. Kumgang 
Non-Visitor(%) 
45.8 
45.2 
9.0 
Average(%) 
56.6 
26.6 
16.8 
When asked whether the Mt. Kumgang tours would be helpful in changing the 
attitudes of North Korean people, 56.9 percent of respondents said that it would help to 
change the consciousness of the North Korean people in the long-run. However, unlike the 
above two questions, even a substantial portion of the visitors (28.6 percent) doubted the 
impact ofMt. Kumgang tourism on North Korean citizens' minds in the short term. 
Table 6-7. Contribution to North Korean people's change of consciousness by Mt. 
Kumgang tour 
Yes, it will in the long-term 
No, because of North Korean 
government's ideological training 
Difficult to judge 
Sources: Kang (1999: 13). 
Visitor(%) 
61.3 
28.6 
10.1 
Visit to Mt. Kumgang 
Non-Visitor(%) Average(%) 
52.5 56.9 
42.2 35.3 
5.3 7.7 
Overall, the survey showed that Korean people were favourable to the Mt. Kumgang 
project. In particular, consistent in the answers to various questions was the idea that visitors 
to Mt. Kumgang see the necessity of an engagement policy towards North Korea. While there 
is a possibility that it was mainly those with a positive attitude towards the Mt. Kumgang 
project who took the Mt. Kumgang tours, it is however clear that there is great possibility that 
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the Mt. Kumgang tours have influenced visitors' perception towards North Korea and inter-
Korean relations. For instance, even the opposition party (GNP) member Park Chong-ung, 
who had been critical of President Kim Dae-jung's sunshine policy, expressed, after going on 
the Mt. Kumgang tour, the view that such South-North contact would provide a decisive 
momentum for the improvement of ties between the two Koreas. He realised that it was 
possible that the North would change, if contacts with the South continued to expand (Korea 
Times, 26 November 1998). Moreover, public support for Mt. Kumgang tourism has 
continued in the face of Hyundai's financial difficulties in the year 2001. According to the 
Research & Research survey, 65.5% of the respondents said that the Mt. Kumgang project 
should be continued through South Korean government financial support or by other means 
(MOU 200Ic). 
6.3.iii Confidence-building between the two Korean governments 
Thirdly, the Mt. Kumgang tour project contributed to confidence building and to a decrease in 
military tensions between the two Korean governments. Considering that the Mt. Kumgang 
area is just 15 km away from the DMZ on the Korean Peninsula, and near the Changjun port, 
which was an important naval base, the opening of Mt. Kumgang and the port to South 
Korean tourists might have been considered a threat to military security for North Korea. 
Therefore, it can be regarded as a great concession by North Korean military authorities. At 
the same time, with the reality of continuing military confrontations between the two Koreas, 
and the possibility of a diversion of revenue into Pyongyang's military build-up, and thus 
growing domestic opposition, the Kim Dae-jung government's permission for Mt. Kumgang 
tourism was also a risky political decision. Both sides seemed to understand and to appreciate 
that agreement on the Mt. Kumgang tourism was not an easy political decision for either side. 
A clear example of the positive impact of Mt. Kumgang tourism on reducing inter-
Korean military tension was the two connected incidents that led to a temporary closure of 4S 
days ofMt. Kumgang tourism, from 21 June to 4 August 1999. The first incident was in early 
June 1999, when military tension increased in the Korean Peninsula due to North Korea's 
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military provocation towards the Northern Limit Line (NLL) of the West Coast of the Korean 
Peninsula. NLL has been an implicit sea border-line between the two Koreas. North Korea, 
however, wanted to change it, and North Korean military vessels crossed the line. Following 
South Korean warnings, an inter-Korean naval clash in the West Sea occurred for 10 minutes 
on 15 June 1999. North Korea suffered significant losses in the short naval battle: one torpedo 
boat sunk and five other ships were seriously damaged, together with heavy casualties 
including dozens of deaths. In contrast, five South Korean naval ships suffered slight damage 
and seven sailors were injured (Chosunilbo, 16 June 1999). 
The second incident came less than a week after the naval clash. It was the 
controversial case of Min Young-mi, a Seoul housewife who was detained for six days, while 
on tour at Mt. Kumgang, on charges of attempting to persuade a North Korean tourist guide to 
defect to the South. Seoul ordered the llyundai Group to cut a monthly payment to North 
Korea, and postponed the Mt. Kumgang tour until Min Young-mi was released and a new 
safety-net for Mt. Kumgang tourists established (Korea Times, 22 June 1999). 
Despite clear defeat in the naval clash and the overall tension in the Korean 
Peninsula, Pyongyang surprisingly obliged by releasing the detainee and negotiating a safety 
accord for Mt. Kumgang tourists. It was an apparent signal that North Korea would exercise 
self-restraint so as not to escalate the fire-fight into a large-scale war, and so as to continue 
the Mt. Kumgang project. After the Hyundai Group and North Korea's APC reached 
agreement on stepped-up safety guarantees for the future of the tour program, the South 
Korean government decided to authorise the resumption of the Mt. Kumgang tour program on 
5 August 1999. 
The main point of the safety agreement is that South Korean tourists who make 
"problematic" remarks while sightseeing would be fined and immediately deported to the 
South Korean cruise-ship without facing penalties such as detention in the North. Moreover, 
in the event they commit serious crimes against the North, they would be referred not to 
North Korean authorities but to a joint South-North Coordination Committee, a non-
governmental panel to be composed of three to four members each from the Hyundai Group 
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and North Korea. It was clear that new safety guarantees and guidelines for the tours 
represented a great progress. Thus, despite a series of incidents which heightened inter-
Korean military tensions in the summer of 1999, the ongoing inter-Korean economic projects, 
including Mt. Kumgang tourism, continued after a 45-day delay. Also, military tension 
created by the naval clash in the West Sea on June 15, 1999 was sure to be significantly eased 
with the breakthrough in talks between Hyundai and North Korea aimed at restarting its tour 
project. 
Some South Korean military experts said that North Korea would not launch another 
round of provocative acts after the miserable defeat on the naval clash on 15 June 1999 
because this had exposed the vulnerability of its navy, and because of the deployment of U.S. 
warship and planes in the South (Korea Times, 16 June 1999). However, the decrease of 
tension could be attributed to both governments' determination at that time. President Kim 
Dae-jung expressed his will to uphold his sunshine policy of engagement with the North. In 
the wake of the inter-Korean tension, he stated in no uncertain terms that his engagement 
policy would be maintained on the basis of firm national security in which North Korea's 
calm reaction after two incidents should be taken into account. 
Moreover, others suggest a more positive impact of the inter-Korean economic 
cooperation on decreasing inter-Korean conflicts. According to llyundai Asan officials, the 
Hyundai Group feared that the two incidents might have negative effects on its inter-Korean 
projects. However, immediately after the naval clash, Hyundai learned that the North had 
volunteered to separate the military confrontation from ongoing inter-Korean economic 
projects, promising verbal guarantees through contacts in Beijing, China (Korea Times, 22 
June 1999). In fact, it was true that North Korea accepted all of Seoul's demands right after 
Seoul ordered the Hyundai Group to cut off a monthly payment of US$8 million to North 
Korea and to postpone Mt. Kumgang tours, as well as sending a signal to the North that they 
have to even consider cancelling all South-North economic joint ventures. Even the Korea 
Times editorial (27 June 1999: 3) pointed out that: 
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Seoul was now in a position that threats to economic interests can change the 
obstinacy of hard-line communist ideologues in the North. This signifies a change 
from Pyongyang's traditional behaviour pattern. Until recently, North Korea had 
rarely compromised on political matters in the name of economic expediency. Seoul 
now has the option of using its economic leverage to deal with the intractable and 
capricious North Korea. 
It was, however, uncertain as to how much North Korea's deepening economic 
dependency on South Korea might change North Korea's behaviour. What was certain was 
that Pyongyang did not want to give up the tour project, which was its most reliable source of 
hard currency, or other examples of ongoing inter-Korean economic cooperation, despite the 
deepening tension in the summer of 1999. The Mt. Kumgang project was used as a signal for 
the two sides' intention after the naval clash, and thus prevented misunderstandings. With the 
difficulty of governmental level talks between the two Koreas during the crisis, Mt. Kumgang 
tourism provided an important dialogue channel between the Hyundai Group and the APC of 
the North, through which the two governments could also communicate. 
6.4 Financial crisis of the Mt. Kumgang project 
Despite the positive impacts of Mt. Kumgang tourism on inter-Korean relations as discussed 
above, Mt. Kumgang tourism was in serious danger. Unlike the frequent suspension of inter-
Korean businesses caused by inter-Korean political and military tension in the past, this was 
caused by both Hyundai Asan's financial trouble and the unprofitability of the tourism. After 
two and half years of the tourism project, the Hyundai Group began to feel frustrated at 
pouring money into the tourism project. It only paid a US$2 million monthly fee for the Mt. 
Kumgang project to North Korea in February 2001, instead of the promised US$12 million. 
Since then, it missed three successive monthly payments (March, April, and May of 2001) 
until the South Korean government offered a South-North Cooperation Fund (SNCF) loan. 
Although North Korea provisionally agreed to cut in half the monthly fee, as Hyundai Asan 
demanded, the company still owed US$22 million, instead of US$46 million (Joongangi/ho, 
31 May 2001). Despite Hyundai Asan's will to continue the tour project, it was no longer in a 
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position to even pay the monthly tourism fee to North Korea. Hence, Mt. Kumgang tourism 
was in danger of ending in 200 I if some sort of rescue plan could not be found. 
6.4.i Hyundai Group's financial woes and disintegration 
One reason for the crisis ofMt. Kumgang tourism was based on the Hyundai Group's broader 
financial troubles. South Korea's largest conglomerate was in serious financial difficulties. 
Group-wide restructuring hindered financial aid to Hyundai Asan. The llyundai Group's 
construction, financial, petrochemicals, shipping and general trading units all suffered from a 
liquidity problem from late 2000.67 Symptoms of the Hyundai Group's financial woes 
appeared in Hyundai Engineering Construction (HEC), a mother company of the lIyundai 
Group. HEC posted a net loss of nearly 3trillion won (US$2.3 billion) in 2000, and was on the 
verge of bankruptcy in late 2000. 
As part of efforts at a self-rescue plan for the IIEC, Chung Ju-young invested US$60 
million, from the sales of his 15.66 million shares in Hyundai Motor, into IIEC equity. 
Moreover, the Hyundai Group put on sale the JIyundai head-quarter building, which is 
estimated to be worth US$140 million, and sold the Hyundai owned Sosan Farm to private 
investors. Also, Hyundai Corp. downsized its organisation by closing down 13 of its overseas 
offices, reducing departmental numbers and retiring 20 of its 43 top executives (Korea 
Herald, 27, 28, 30 December 2000). 
The South Korean government was also involved in the rescue plan. The government 
endorsed a move by creditor banks to craft a 2.9 trillion won (US$2.2 billion) financing 
package, including a 1.4 trillion won debt-for-equity swap, for IIEC, the mother company of 
Hyundai Group. The Kim Dae-jung government kept saying that creditors would have the 
67 In addition, two factors caused for Hyundai Group's wider financial troubles. First, the Hyundai 
Group was just about the only conglomerate that was expanding instead of downsizing under the cosy 
relationship with Kim Dae-jung government even during the fmancial crisis. Hyundai had to raise 
money for new businesses. Second, new regulations after 1997 fmancial crisis pressured the Hyundai 
Group. Under the prevention of cross payment guarantees among subsidiaries in different industries, 
Hyundai Group had to resolve past problems to save its affiliates before the March of 2000 deadline at 
an estimated cost of up to US$1.7 billion. Also, it had to reduce debt from 578.7 percent to less than 
200 percent of its capital by the end of2000 under the new 'chaebol regulation' (interview with junior 
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final say in how to handle the company's debts, and that it would not become involved in 
Hyundai Group's financial problems. However, it was reported that the economic policy team 
of the government was ready to participate in the rescue efforts to save the finn from the 
beginning of the Hyundai Group's insolvency crisis (Chosunilbo, 29 March 2001). 
In fact, strong suspicions about the government's special treatment of Hyundai Group 
were raised because the original financial aid from the Hyundai Group's creditors, mostly 
Korean banks, was only in the value of 1.4 trillion won and took the form of debt-for-equity 
swaps rather than new money. However, the final rescue plan was increased two-fold on the 
original plan. Instead of forcing the ailing Hyundai companies to face market judgement as in 
the government's handling of the Daewoo Group, which had collapsed, the government 
influenced creditor banks to extend preferential loans so as to keep Hyundai afloat.68 
With continuing rescue efforts, the IIEC stayed afloat. However, problems for the Mt. 
Kumgang tourism continued. The Hyundai Group had established lIyundai Asan on 5 
February 1999 to concentrate businesses with North Korea. IIyundai Group affiliates, 
Hyundai Merchant Marine (HMM), Hyundai Heavy Industries (HIlI), and BEC provided 
most of the paid-in capital of US$391 million of the Hyundai Asan. The HMM has a 40 
percent equity stake in Hyundai Asan, and HEC and Ill-II each owned 20 percent stakes in the 
firm (Hyundai Asan 2000d). 
Because all the Hyundai Group affiliates involved in the Mt. Kumgang project were 
in serious financial trouble, they were not able to help the Mt. Kumgang project. For instance, 
HEC, once a mother company of Hyundai Group, was separated from the llyundai Group on 
1 August 2001. The Korea Exchange Bank, Korea Development Bank and other creditor 
institutions together held an 87 percent stake in HEC, while the stake held by the Hyundai 
official in the Fair Trade Commission of South Korea, Seoul, March 2001. Also see Korea Times, 4 
March 1999, and 21 April 1999). 
68 Korea Herald editorial (13 March 2001: 3) pointed out that 'the continuous cash infusions into 
Hyundai are triggering the deeper suspicion over alleged collusion between the government and the 
Hyundai Group. 
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Group was only 3 percent. Thus, the HEC no longer had links to the Hyundai Group in terms 
of the selection of board members and in-house transactions. Also, HHI, another Hyundai 
Group affiliate, would be spun off soon from the Hyundai Group (Korea Herald, 21 July 
2001). 
Most importantly, the HMM, which was the core financial line in providing 
promotion and sales services, and operating the cruise ships for Mt. Kumgang tourism for the 
past two and half years, had its balance sheet shift into red in 2000, with a loss of 406 billion 
won (US$300 million), compared with a profit of 211.2 billion won (US$160 million) in 
1999. Hyundai Asan creditor groups including the Foreign Exchange Bank, strongly 
demanded a halt to the money-bleeding tourism project, and were pressing the IIMM, which 
had lost a total US$227 million from the project, to give up its position as the holding 
company of Hyundai Asan (Joongangi/bo, 11 April 2001). 
Under pressure from the creditors, HMM for the first time cancelled 10 cruise tours to 
Mt. Kumgang scheduled for April 12-17 2001. At the end of May it withdrew its three ships, 
the Kumgang, the Pongnae, and the Pungak, and gave up the business of a speedboat 
"Sulbong" tour and the boat-hotel (Haegumgang) in the Changjun port (Joongangi/bo, 3 June 
2001). Finally, HMM completely withdrew from its Mt. Kumgang tour business by selling off 
Haegumgang, which had suspended its business since 2000 due to a shortfall in tourists, and 
its speedboat business, the Sulbong, to Hyundai Asan (Joongangi/bo, 10 July 2001). The 
reduction in scale of tour services indicated that the Hyundai group had reached the limits of 
its ability to continue the money-losing project. 
Furthermore, Hyundai Group's continuing disintegration also hindered support for 
the Mt. Kumgang tourism. Particularly, the death of Chung Ju-young on 21 March 2001, who 
had been a leading proponent of commercial exchanges between two Koreas, had a negative 
impact on the business will of the Hyundai Group to engage with North Korea. His death may 
in fact have provided the Hyundai Group with a way out of its risky North Korean ventures. 
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This turned out to be partially true. Company unity disintegrated along with his death. as he 
placed all the companies in the hands of his sons.69 
The problem for the continuation of Mt. Kumgang tourism is that the third son, 
Chung Mong-hun, who was charged with North Korean business, has taken over the BEC, 
HMM, HE! and Hyundai Asan, all of which are financially troubled companies. As indicated 
earlier, HMM had already withdrawn from the Mt. Kumgang tourism. The IIEC was 
majority-owned by creditor banks while the HEI was shortly to be renamed Hynix 
Semiconductor, after being on the verge of bankruptcy. In fact, the newly elected Chairman 
Park Chung-sup of the Hynix Semiconductor disavowed any connection with lIyundai (New 
York Times, 26 April 2001). 
Moreover, other Hyundai companies, taken by other sons, worried about their own 
balance sheets and cash flows, and would not come to the rescue of llyundai Asan's North 
Korean projects. For instance, Chung Mong-koo, the first son of Chung Ju-young, who took 
over the Hyundai-Kia Motor Group, currently the most profitable and financially healthy 
company of the fonner Hyundai affiliates, responded very negatively when the government 
suggested that he take part in the tourism business headed by his brother Chung Mong-hun. 
6.4.ii Profitability of Mt. Kumgang tourism 
The basic problem causing danger to Mt. Kumgang tourism is its continuing unprofitability. 
The nation's largest conglomerate has poured hundreds of millions of dollars in the North 
Korean project, but has yet to see any profits. Despite the lower-than-expected number of 
tourists to Mt. Kumgang, Hyundai Asan, a company funded by eight of the Hyundai Group's 
69 While the fIrst son, Chung Mong-koo, holds the Hyundai-Kia motor group, the HHI, the largest 
shipping group in the world and also one of the key holders of Hyundai Asan, will remain under the 
control of the fIfth son, Chung Mong-joon, and it will leave the Hyundai umbrella in 2001. Moreover, 
Chung Mong-keun has a stable position as chairman of Hyundai Department Store Company and 
Chung Mong-yoon is a chairman to Hyundai Marine and Fire Insurance. Both divisions have separated 
from the Hyundai Group. High offIcials at the group headquarters said that such splitting up of the 
group was inevitable and there was no Hyundai Group anymore (Interview with Hyundai Group 
officials, Seoul, February 2001). 
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firms, continued to invest into the tourist project, in line with group founder Chung Ju-
young's will. 
However, after two years of Mt. Kumgang tourism, profitability became the core 
issue. According to the deal between the Hyundai Group and North Korea, lIyundai Asan's 
total payment is US$942 million towards North Korea for six and half years, based on up to 
US$150 million a year. This amount was based on Hyundai Asan's early expectation of a 
break-even point, which required 500 thousands tourists to Mt. Kumgang a year, and for each 
tourist charged, US$300 went to the North Korean government (Korea Times, 10 October 
1998). 
However, the number of tourists who have taken llyundai Asan's cruise to North 
Korea stood at around 185,000 a year, which is far below the hreak-even point of 500,000 
tourists, and Hyundai Asan's early expectation of 600,000, meaning that it suffered a visitor 
shortfall averaged over 315,000 per year (see Table 6-3). Moreover, the number of tourists to 
Mt. Kumgang substantially decreased in the year 2001, mainly due to reductions in llyundai's 
tour service, and a loss of tourists' interest in Mt. Kumgang. In fact, lIyundai Asan has 
gradually reduced the number of tours from the maximum 41 tours a month to only 13 in May 
2001. The number of tourists to the Mt. Kumgang was less than one third of full capacity. 
Hence, compared to 13,000 tourists in January, 16,000 in February and 21,000 in March 
2000, in 2001, 6, 472 tourists were recorded in January, 7,349 in February and 10,443 in 
March (Joongangi/ho 24 May 2001). 
Moreover, early pessimistic views on attracting tourists were realised. Many tourism 
watchers had earlier pointed out that the competitiveness of prices on the Mt. Kumgang tour 
was so low compared with other destinations, even for South Korean tourists, that it would 
need better attractions and services not only for South Koreans hut also foreigners in the long-
run, though the South Koreans' inquisitiveness would lead to an increase of tourists in the 
short run (Lee Ki-wang 1998: 55-6). In fact, the continuing losses were caused in part by fact 
that Hyundai failed to broaden the appeal of the cruise to young Koreans and to foreigners. 
Most people on the tour were elderly Koreans, who were attracted by the sentimental value of 
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Mt. Kumgang, a cultural icon on the peninsula. Most young Koreans however said that they 
would prefer to take a tropical holiday rather than brave the long, cold North Korean winter 
(Interview with Mt Kumgang travel guide, Mt. Kumgang, September 1999). 
As a result, deficits from the project amounted to US$379 million from the start of 
the project on November 1998, until the end of 2000. The Mt. Kumgang tourism was also 
reportedly losing US$150,000 a day in 2001 (Joongangi/bo, 11 April 2001). lIyundai Asan, 
has already depleted 500 billion won (US$391 million) of its capital. 
Table 6-8. Balance sheet of Mt. Kumgang tourism from Nov. 1998 until year 2000 
Earnings 
Item 
-Tour cruise fee 
-Spa and sale of 
goods 
Total Earnings 
Total Balance Sheet: 
Amount 
(US$ Million) 
220 
13 
233 
Expenditures 
Item Amount 
(US$ Million) 
-Lump-sum payment for 
Mt. Kumgang tour right 330 
-Cruise rent fee 
-Tourism infrastructures 
such as a port, a spa, a 
performance hall, and a 
customer pavilion. 
Total Expenditures 
156 
126 
612 
612-233= Deficit of379 
Source: Data from Hyundai Asan and quoted from Hankookilbo (9 January 2001). 
6.4.iii Efforts to save Mt. Kumgang tourism 
6.4.iii.a Hyundai Asan's requests 
Despite Hyundai Asan's self-rescue efforts, such as reducing the number of its cruises and 
urging banks for loans in order to save Mt. Kumgang tourism, the situation continued to grow 
worse due to the Hyundai Group's financial woes and the profitability problem of the tourism. 
Hyundai Asan presented several contingency plans to both the South and North Korean 
governments. Firstly, Hyundai Asan expressed its hope to lease its newly-opened floating 
hotel, 'Haekumgang' to operate a casino business for Mt. Kumgang tourists. llyundai Asan 
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sent a letter to the Kim Dae-jung government on 25 December 2000 requesting a business 
licence for a casino operation aimed at attracting casino tourists. It argued that 'unless the 
government issues a casino permit for the Mt. Kumgang area, the company would probably 
cease its business there' (quoted in Korea Times, 26 December 2000). 
In the view of Hyundai Asan, the casino business was to attract foreigners, as well as 
South Korean tourists. In fact, North Korea had already sent a positive signal to Hyundai 
Asan. Hyundai Asan and North Korea's APe had agreed that the joint Mt. Kumgang tourism 
project included provisions for opening casinos in the North. The North promised llyundai a 
'legal collatera1'70 needed to establish the additional business (Korea Times, 26 June 2001). 
Thus, the casino issue was in the hands of the South Korean government. In fact, the 
idea of a casino for Mt. Kumgang tourists seemed to be quite appealing to Seoul officials, 
who thought that the new business might greatly help Hyundai Asan to overcome its financial 
problems, which stemmed from the expensive Mt. Kumgang project. At the same time, the 
opening the proposed casino would cause considerable controversy in the South because as 
most of the Mt. Kumgang tourists are South Koreans, they would also be the likely customers 
of the casino. Hence, the MOU, in charge of inter-Korean cooperation, ran into a dilemma 
over Hyundai Asan's request for a casino business to save the Mt. Kumgang tourism 
business. A senior official of MOU, for instance, stated that "if we give the go-ahead to 
Hyundai's plan to open a casino in its tourism complex in the North, it would help ease the 
conglomerate's liquidity crisis, but it would run squarely counter to the government's policy 
to ban gambling" (quoted in Korea Herald, 28 December 2000). Thus, Seoul stepped back 
and argued that it was not in a position to decide on the casino business, as the maritime hotel 
was on North Korean territorial waters, meaning that Seoul would not oppose the proposal as 
North Korea had already send positive sign to Hyundai Asan. 
However, this plan did not succeed because domestic criticism came thick and fast 
from the conservative circles, including the media and the opposition party. Especially the 
70 According to Park Kyung-yoon, the president of Kumgangsan International Group and North Korean 
business specialist, the North Korean government already had plans to induce casino facilities to 
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residents of the Kangwon province of South Korea strongly protested against the South 
Korean government's position that North Korea held the rights to approve Hyundai's plan to 
open a casino in its tourism complex in the North, and they formed an urgent committee to 
prevent Hyundai from building the casino (Joongangilbo, 24 April 2001). The reason behind 
the opposition was that the Chongsun county of the Kangwon province was authorised in 
2000 as the first and only casino in South Korea, to allow South Korean citizens to gamble, in 
an attempt to revitalise the region's economy, which had suffered after a local mine was 
closed. Hence, the Kangwon province people were worried about the negative impact of 
competition from the Mt. Kumgang casino business. 
Secondly, Hyundai Asan demanded that North Korea accept a new payment method 
based on the number of tourists instead of the US$6 million monthly fee. In fact, North Korea 
provisionally agreed to cut Hyundai's payment from US$12 million to US$6 million a month. 
However, Hyundai had even failed to pay this reduced monthly payment in February, March, 
April and May in 200 I, as it faced financial problems and the HMM, a core financial line for 
Hyundai Asan, withdrew from the project. Thus, it still had to pay an accumulated debt of 
US$22 million to North Korea, as pointed out earlier. And it still required at least 250,000 
tourists a year in the future, which was far more than the current trend, in order to reach 
break-even point. Thus, Hyundai Asan asked North Korea for a change in the payment system 
from a flat rate basis, to a number of tourists basis. After a series of negotiations between 
Hyundai Asan and North Korea, they finally agreed to Hyundai's demand on 9 June 2001. 
After the deal, Hyundai Asan remitted Mt. Kumgang tourism fees for June 2001 to its 
North Korean partners, the Asia-Pacific Committee. It said it sent US$399,200 via banks in 
Hong Kong. Although the new payment deal does not guarantee that a future deficit will be 
avoided, this was the first time that Hyundai has remitted fees for the tourism based on a per 
head fee per month, rather than a flat rate ofUS$12 million. A Hyundai Asan official said that 
the company would pay a US$IOO license fee per tourist until an overland route tour to the 
develop Mt. Kumgang as a tourism site as early as 1990 (Joongangilbo, IS July 1996). 
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Mt. Kumgang opens. When this starts, the fee will go down to US$SO per tourist (Korea 
Herald, 27 July 2001). 
Thirdly, Hyundai Asan demanded that North Korea realise the overland route tours as 
soon as possible. It would make the tour of Mt. Kumgang cheaper and easier. Compared to 
taking 15 hours from Donghae port in the east region of the South Korea to Changjun port in 
the North, on the overland road, by bus, it takes less than an hour to reach the Mt. Kumgang 
area. The reconnection of the overland road between South and North Korea would be just 
14km in length. Mass transportation would make the resort far more accessible and cheaper to 
visitors from the South, including for example, school excursions (Korea Hera/d, 9 March 
2001). 
Hyundai Asan and North Korea finally reached a deal to establish an overland tourist 
route between the two Koreas along with the above new payment condition, on 9 June 2001. 
The two sides agreed to open a 13.7km overland tourist route from South Korea's Paju to 
North Korea's Kosung, near Mt. Kumgang. Even though the exact date for construction and 
start of the overland tour is not certain, this certainly will give new strength to the project in 
the future. 
6.4.iii.b South and North Korean governments' efforts 
The agreement made on the 9th of June 2001 between Hyundai Asan and North Korea gave 
the Kim Dae-jung government political justification for the public sector's involvement in 
this project. Hence, KNTO, the public tourism promotion agency, announced on 20 June 2001 
that it would take part in resuscitating the so far unsuccessful business. It planned to raise 
funds, either from bank loans or the government's SNCF, to purchase Hyundai Asan assets, 
or assist Hyundai Asan to raise US$22 million to pay North Korea (Joongangilbo, 20 June 
2001). 
Then, the Kim Dae-jung government approved the use of the SNCF for the state-run 
KNTO to promote Mt. Kumgang tourism in the North. As a result, the MOU, which is in 
charge of managing the SNCF, confirmed a loan of 90 billion won (US$70 million) on 29 
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June 2001 (Chosunilbo, 29 June 2001). In fact, the government was trying to help the 
financially challenged Hyundai Asan through the SNCF. but was not able to do that because 
of legal limitations, such that the SNCF could not be used for loans to the top thirty chaebol 
groups of South Korea, as it was designed to encourage small and medium size companies to 
do North Korean business (Chosunilbo, 6 March 2001). However, the government found a 
way, through KNTO's participation, as KNTO was eligible for the loan. 
However, the Kim Dae-jung government seemed to be already planing public sector 
participation in Mt. Kumgang tourism as a contingency rescue plan. llyundai was highly 
questionable whether it was in any condition to commit nearly US$1 billion to North Korea, 
as was called for in the original agreement with the North. It was suggested that 'when 
questioned about this, Hyundai officials indicated that the government would "make it up to 
us", a claim that was verified in private conversations with government officials' (Noland 
2000: 116). 
In fact, this argument seems to be persuasive, considering Seoul's intervention efforts 
in the Mt. Kumgang project. In the early stages of the Mt. Kumgang crisis, Seoul tried to save 
Mt. Kumgang tourism through indirect support. The government allegedly delivered its 
opinion, during the fourth inter-Korean ministerial talks in mid December, that the North 
should settle for a 50% reduction of the US$12 million monthly fee in order to continue the 
business (Korea Times, 26 December 2000). 
However, Hyundai Asan continuously failed to pay the monthly license fees to North 
Korea in 2001 despite North Korea's approval of the half reduction in the fee, so the South 
Korean government needed a stronger contingency plan. Furthermore, the situation became 
critical when the Hyundai Group's founder Chung Ju-young died on 21 March 2001. 
Economic engagement towards North Korea was facilitated after Chung Ju-young convinced 
Pyongyang to let him run tourist cruises to Mt. Kumgang from November 1998. Even with 
the huge financial losses from the Mt. Kumgang tour business, it was the North Korean born 
Chung Ju-young who pioneered the project and that was enough to keep it afloat. However, 
his sons may have no such sentimental attachments to the business, and may withdraw from 
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an earlier commitment as they try to save their struggling companies. Likewise, they may 
excuse Hyundai from helping build a planned Kaesung economic special zone in the North 
(Korea Herald, 31 March 2001). 
This possible scenario posed a serious dilemma for the Kim Dae-jung government. 
Given the importance of engaging the North, Seoul probably set the contingency plans to save 
Hyundai's North Korean businesses. This included pressing other South Korean chaebols to 
pick up the slack and directing support through the state-run agency. The South Korean 
Deputy Prime Minister, Jin Nyum, reportedly mentioned, for the first time, the possibility of 
other private or state-run firms taking over the Mt. Kumgang project from llyundai Asan 
(Joongangilbo, 22 May 2001). Hence, Seoul asked other chaebols such as Samsung and the 
Hyundai-Kia Motor Group to take over the project, but these efforts failed. 
Thereby, the government decided to become directly involved in this project. 
However, it needed a justification for state involvement. The deal on 9 June 2001 between 
Hyundai and North Korea was such an excuse for the Kim Dae-jung government. According 
to an interview with Cho Hong-kyu, the President of the KNTO, in Chugandonga (South 
Korean weekly magazine), the Kim Dae-jung government already had a plan for public sector 
participation in Mt. Kumgang tourism. Cho Hong-kyu said that the KNTO consulted with the 
Ministries of Culture and Tourism, and of Unification, and with the NIS before they decided 
to join the Mt. Kumgang business with Hyundai Asan. But the KNTO did not review, and had 
never considered, the profitability of the participation in the tour, but decided to participate 
because the MOU guaranteed the provision of the SNCF to KNTO even before it made its 
decision (Chugandonga, 5 July 2001). In fact, his remark contradicted the government's 
announcement that the decision was independently made by the KNTO, and that assistance 
from SNCF to the agency was strictly on the grounds of the profitability of the project. This 
should be enough circumstantial evidence to ascertain that the Seoul already had a plan for 
the state agency's participation in the Mt. Kumgang business in case other options were not 
available. 
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In fact, the Kim Dae-jung government's will to utilise public sector massive 
investment towards North Korea was evident on various occasions. For instance, in response 
to domestic criticism of Seoul's revocation of its principle of 'the separation of the economics 
from politics', by allowing KNTO's participation on the Mt. Kumgang tourism, the MOU 
(2001c) redefined the principle of Jeongkyungbunri.1t argued that: 
[t]his principle is aimed at the improvement of inter-Korean relations and the increase 
of economic cooperation between the two Koreas, and thus the South Korean 
government set the principle that inter-Korean political and military tensions would 
not be factors for the limitation of inter-Korean economic exchanges. The principle, 
however, does not means that public sector cannot be involved in inter-Korean 
economic exchanges. Because early stage of inter-Korean economic cooperation by 
private sectors can bring financial difficulties and problems, South Korean 
government's financial support will be desirable in order to achieve its policy 
objectives towards North Korea. The government's financial help through South-
North Cooperation Fund was based on the fact that the improvement of Mt. Kumgang 
tourism through the realisation of overland route tour and designation of Mt. 
Kumgang tourism zone, which is guaranteed by North Korea, would decrease the 
security threat from North Korea. 
North Korea also seemed to worry about the possible cancellation of the Mt. 
Kumgang projects. For instance, Song Ho-kyung, vice chairman of the North Korean APC, 
said that he hoped Hyundai would continue its North Korea projects after the death of the 
Hyundai Group's founder Chung Ju-young. He sent Mr. Chung's family a message from Kim 
Jeong-il in which the North Korean leader expressed the hope that the Chung family would 
take over and carry on North Korean projects (Joongangilbo, 26 March 2001). More 
importantly, North Korea was ready to cooperate with the South Korean side, both with 
Hyundai Asan and the South Korean government, in order to continue this project. For 
instance, it accepted all the rescue-proposals that Hyundai Asan and South Korean 
government requested, such as the fee reduction and the opening of the casino, and it finally 
agreed to on an over-land tour, and to an adjustment of the tour fee on the 9th of June 2001. 
6.5 South Korea's limited economic capability for pursuing business-track diplomacy 
As pointed out in the model of business-track diplomacy, a state's economic capability is an 
important prerequisite along with policy-makers' will in order to actually perform business-
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track diplomacy towards a target state. While the Mt. Kumgang case demonstrates that the 
actors' strong policy-making will towards the realisation of the project certainly contributed 
to an increase in inter-Korean cooperation and to a decrease in tensions, this case reveals, at 
the same time, South Korea's limited economic capability to implement deeper economic 
engagement with North Korea. 
The first implication is that South Korean private companies, even the chaebols, 
cannot pursue alone large-scale inter-Korean projects. As seen in the Mt. Kumgang tourism 
case, the Hyundai Group, the prominent chaebol of South Korea, could not sustain the large-
scale economic project without the prospect of profitability. As pointed out in chapter 4, 
especially after the financial crisis, the South Korean business community became more 
financially conservative, limiting risky investments and new businesses. As seen in the 
Hyundai case, the profitability of the North Korean venture became an important standard for 
South Korean firms in doing business with North Korea. 
Moreover, South Korean chaebols were deeply influenced by foreign finance. The 
problem was that foreign investors were likely to avoid investment in South Korean 
companies that are heavily involved in risky North Korean businesses (Yang Un-chul 2001). 
Even the rumour of this could hurt a company who might have engaged in a large-scale North 
Korean project. For instance, Chung Mong-ku, the chairman of the llyundai-Kia Motor 
Group, said that they would take all possible legal action against such a report, including 
filing complaints with the Press Arbitration Commission, and asking for financial damages 
against a possible decline in corporate value (Joongangi/ho, 9 April 2001). 
Secondly, raising finance at the governmental level for large-scale inter Korean 
cooperation is also not easy. As South Korea's private sector needs outside financial support 
for long-term North Korean projects, South Korean government could be one of the sources. 
In fact, as inter-Korean economic exchanges grow and become large-scale, requiring massive 
financial support, the Kim Dae-jung government believes that the public-sector's active 
involvement in inter-Korean projects will be necessary, and so the government will go 
beyond the principle of the separation of economics from politics. 
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Especially since the June summit between the two Koreas in 2000, the Kim Dae-jung 
government has pursued a long-term and enlarged inter-Korean economic community, and 
recognised that the South Korean government will need to be actively involved in order to 
achieve this end. The crucial reason behind this policy is that the activities of the private 
sector are insufficient. Economic exchange based on private sector involvement alone can 
only playa limited role in reconstructing and transforming North Korea into a more market-
oriented economy and society, thereby deepening the interdependence between the two 
economies. 
However, government level involvement in inter-Korean economic cooperation is not 
easy. The Mt. Kumgang tourism case has shown that the Kim Dae-jung government was 
stuck in a dilemma between conflicting interests: it wants to see the Mt. Kumgang business 
continue as a symbol of its engagement policies, but faces difficulties in extending financial 
support to private firms. Even when Hyundai Asan faced financial difficulties, and failed to 
pay the license fee to North Korea, putting the entire project on the brink of cancellation, the 
government could not take any relief measures, such as providing financial support, giving 
permission for the casino business, or bringing other chaebols to take over the Mt. Kumgang 
project. 
Only after Hyundai Asan and North Korea made a deal on 9 June 2001, which looks 
more promising in terms of the profitability of the project, could the KNTO participate in the 
project and provide financial support. However, if Mt. Kumgang tourism was continuously to 
drain money without improving its prospect of profitability, then the public sector's 
involvement would be in a difficult position in the future. An official of MOF AT pointed out 
that unless major issues were addressed by North Korea to help Hyundai Asan's Mt. 
Kumgang business, the government could not take any measures politically (Interview with a 
junior official of the MOFAT, London, December 2001). 
Seoul's difficulty has much to do with the strengthening of domestic actors in the 
South Korean policy-making process. Domestic pressure came from the predominantly 
conservative media and the opposition party's criticisms of the government, which started in 
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the early stages of the Hyundai Group's financial trouble. Their arguments were that the 
government's financial assistance towards the Hyundai Group, who did not seem to care 
about economic logic, and the group's losses from the Mt. Kumgang project, played a role in 
the group's economic difficulties. The media pointed out that the project influenced 
negatively the national economy both directly and indirectly; Hyundai's North Korean 
business was not only a matter of inter-Korean relations but also closely related to the 
national economy. For example, the conservative newspaper Chosunilbo argued that the 
financial assistance provided to HEe would in the end become a burden on the public, and 
that Hyundai's liquidity problems were linked to its ventures in the North (CJ/Osunilbo, 27 
December 2000). 
Regarding the government's attempt to bring other chebols into the Mt. Kumgang 
project, as discussed earlier, conservative media groups such as Chosunilbo and Dongailbo 
also raised objections. A Dongailbo editorial said that: 
Hyundai Motor holds considerable foreign equity. lienee, ifllyundai Motor knuckles 
under to any government pressure to undertake North Korean programs, the situation 
will be complicated. Foreign investors' trust in the Korean government and the 
Hyundai auto firm would plummet and the nation's economy would face a crisis with 
the prospective non-viability of the nation's largest car makers. The goal of any 
enterprise is to make profits. The decisions on new businesses should be made on the 
basis of feasibility and own analysis of profitability. From this standpoint, llyundai 
Motor's rejection of the alleged government offer to take over the North Korean 
projects is quite natural and even courageous. At the same time, all other enterprises 
may well learn from the example set by Hyundai Motor. Whenever they face this 
kind of government pressure. Whatever projects the government may promote in the 
name of the people, it should not undertake them in this manner. The general public 
will never concur on any government tricks that run against market principles or any 
irregular policy measures (Dongailbo, 9 April 2001). 
When its intervention became a troublesome issue, the government had to sit back 
and claim that it never officially advised or requested the Hyundai Motor to do anything, 
though Hyundai Motor officials felt more or less coerced, and said that 'we will stake out our 
company's fate on opposing if [taking-over of the Mt. Kumgang project] (quoted in 
Joongangilbo, 10 April 2001). 
Thirdly, attracting foreign investment for North Korean businesses is not easy. In the 
Mt. Kumgang tourism case, the Hyundai Group knew that it needed outside financial support 
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even before it faced financial trouble. Thus, it tried to attract foreign capital to develop the 
Mt. Kumgang business in the long-term. It held investment explanation sessions and road 
shows in the United States and other advanced industrialised countries to attract capital for 
the project. Also, Hyundai Asan requested the World Tourism Organisation (WID) to engage 
in studies on a marketing program for attracting foreign investment and tourists to Mt 
Kumgang tourism (Korea Times, 9 May 1999). 
However, as the Hyundai Group's financial situation got worse, and Mt. Kumgang 
tourism proved to be unprofitable. it failed to attract any investment from overseas. It might 
be true that even if the Hyundai Group had enjoyed a healthy financial status. it would have 
been difficult to attract foreign investment because Mt. Kumgang tourism required heavy up 
front investment with returns occurring at a far slower pace. For instance, the llyundai Group 
has tried in vain to conclude a US$l billion investment deal with a group of Japanese 
financial institutions even before it faced financial problems, but it has not succeeded yet. 
Moreover. the U.S. corporations have limited themselves to fact-finding missions in the North 
(Joongangilbo. 7 November 2000). 
Beyond North Korea's poor prospect of luring foreign capital. as pointed out in 
chapter 4. the difficulty of inviting foreign capital into North Korean businesses is also due to 
the US and Japan's lack of political will towards economic engagement with North Korea. 
Thus. possible ways of boosting foreign capital into North Korea remain unrealised. For 
instance, the US has not lifted its economic sanctions toward North Korea, and Japan could 
not resolve the normalisation and the 'compensation money' issues with North Korea, while 
international financial organisations. such as the IMF. the IDRD, and the ADB did not admit 
North Korea's membership. due to US influence. Thus US and Japan's business 
communities' economic engagement has been limited by continuing political and military 
tension between North Korea and their governments. 
Fourthly. North Korea's lack of experience and general knowledge about capitalism 
has also caused the slowdown of the inter-Korean cooperation. For instance, North Korea's 
policy control over Mt. Kumgang tourism reduces the attractiveness of the tourism. The 
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North's policy of opening the mountain to South Koreans is based on an 'internal isolation' of 
the tourist sites. In fact, South Korean tourists called it a 'hedgehog tour.' North Korea set up 
fences with barbed wire on both sides of the 10lan road from the naval port to the entrance of 
Mt. Kumgang and military guards were spotted on major parts of the passage. Furthermore, 
residents in the small village of Onjong-ni, one of the gateways to the mountain, put up brick 
walls, apparently designed to completely insulate their houses from the tourist activities 
outside. 
Thus South Korean tourists expressed discontent with the limitations on free 
movement in the tourist site and on free contact with North Korean people. However, North 
Korea has not been keen to meet these complaints, mainly because Hyundai promised the 
lump-sum payment to North Korea regardless of the number of tourists. Thus, the biggest 
problems is that the Northern partner of the joint venture, lacks a proper incentive in the 
profitability of the tourism (Yoon Sang-ruI2000). They tend to show no interest about how to 
improve conveniences and services provided to the tourists, and service improvements 
usually take quite a long time to get the approval of their higher authorities even on small 
details. 
One thing that the Hyundai Asan people in charge of customer service are most 
concerned about is that they are not in a position to solve the problems tourists raise 
concerning the sightseeing course, as many of them require the North's approval. The tourists 
want to talk with North Korean people, or try their foods on their visit to Mt. Kumgang. It is 
also impossible to accept various entertainment programs made for the tourists by the 
sponsoring organisations for sightseeing of Mt. Kumgang as long as they are to be done in the 
North's territory. The North sticks to their principle of limiting the sightseeing to the scenery 
of the Mt. Kumgang, though there are South Korean organisations that want to hold religious 
or other events on the course. However, there are too many restrictions on the sightseeing of 
Mt. Kumgang: no smoking, no photographing (in certain areas), and so on. In other words, 
most South Korean tourists want to meet various North Korean cultures and have individual 
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activities freely rather than merely see Mt. Kumgang (Interview with officials of llyundai 
Asan and Mt Kumgang tour guide, September 1999). 
North Korea's lack of a sense of capitalism and their sensitivity about internal 
stability will cause problems in the future for inter-Korean economic cooperation. For 
instance, even though the North Korean authorities provided I1yundai with exclusive rights to 
develop the Kaesung economic zone, there wilt be difficulties such as raising funds from 
outside, the poor infrastructure of North Korea, and Pyongyang's excessive interference in 
economic activities. In fact, most South Korean companies are worried that the North Korean 
government will use its power to prevent 'capitalist contamination', through limitations on 
South Korean companies' activities, even in the economic free zones. However, considering 
North Korea's concern over political stability, this problem would not be easy to solve. The 
chronology of the Mt. Kumgang project is summarised in Table 6-9. 
Table 6-9. Chronology ofthe Mt. Kumgang project 
Date 
15/0111989 
16/05/1991 
12/02/1998 
14/0211998 
17/06/1998 
23/06/1998 
27/10/1998 
18/1111998 
Event 
Chong Ju-young and North Korea reached an agreement to develop the Mt. 
Kumgang tourism project. 
North Korea announced that the deal with llyundai Group was not valid 
because of South Korean government's intervention. 
The Undertaking Committee of the Presidency of Kim Oae-jung announced 
the Mt. Kumgang project as one of 100 agendas of the incoming Kim Oae-
jung government. 
Chung Mong-hun, the third son of Chung Ju-young, contacted North Korean 
officials in Beijing to restart Hyundai's North Korean businesses. 
Chung Ju-young took the first trip to Pyongyang with a gift of 500 heads of 
cattle to negotiate Mt. Kumgang project. 
Hyundai Group announced that Mt. Kumgang tourism would be launched on 
25 September 1998. 
Chung Ju-young made his second trip to Pyongyang with the remaining SO I 
heads of cattle. 
Hyundai Group's 'Kumgang' cruise ship took off towards Mt. Kumgang for 
the first time. 
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05/02/1999 
15106/1999 
Hyundai Group established the 'Hyundai Asan' corporation in order to 
concentrate North Korean businesses. 
There was a naval clash on the West Coast between the South and the North 
Korean military. 
20/06/1999 North Korea detained South Korean housewife, Min Young-mi, under 
charges of spying operation during a Mt. Kumgang tour. 
21106/1999 The Kim Dae-jung government ordered the llyundai Group to stop Mt. 
Kumgang tourism. 
30/07/1999 Hyundai Group and North Korea reached an agreement on the safety-net 
measures for the Mt. Kumgang tourists. 
05108/1999 Mt. Kumgang tourism was resumed under Kim Dae-jung government's 
approval. 
22/08/2000 Hyundai Group and North Korea reached an agreement that llyundai Group 
develop Kaesung Industrial Complex as economic free zone. 
February 2001 Hyundai Asan began to fail to pay in the monthly license fee to North Korea. 
2110312001 The Hyundai Group founder Chung Ju-young passed away. 
26/0312001 North Korea provisionally accepted llyundai Asan's proposal of the half 
reduction of the Mt. Kumgang monthly payment. 
09/0612001 Hyundai Asan and North Korea agreed on overland tour, designation of 
special tourism zone for Mt. Kumgang, and monthly payment of USSI 00 per 
person. 
20/06/2001 
29/06/2001 
Conclusion 
The state-run tourism promotion agency, KNTO, announced it would take 
part in the Mt. Kumgang project. 
The Ministry of Unification of South Korea confirmed a USS70 million loan 
from South-North Cooperation Fund as KNTO demanded. 
The Hyundai case has demonstrated how the decision-makers' will has contributed to the 
realisation of the Mt. Kumgang project. This is an example of the importance of strong 
policy-making will of both government and private sector in South Korea to utilise business-
track diplomacy towards North Korea. These factors, such as the IIyundai Group founder 
Chung Ju-young's individual will to pursue North Korean businesses, North Korea's 
willingness to engage in South Korean business in the face of economic hardship, and the 
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Kim Dae-jung government's consistent engagement policy towards North Korea all helped 
the start of Mt. Kumgang tourism. Furthermore, the ongoing Mt. Kumgang project actually 
contributes to the positive development of some of the issues in inter-Korean relations, such 
as an enlargement of inter-Korean cooperation and contacts, a boost of South Korean public 
support, and an increase in confidence between the two Korean governments. 
However, it is also apparent that South Korea's economic capability alone could not 
perform and maintain large-scale inter-Korean economic cooperation. That means although 
South Korea could changed its policy towards active engagement with North Korea largely 
due to President Kim Dae-jung's strong beliefs on his 'sunshine policy' as discussed in 
previous chapters, Seoul's limited economic capability affected not the implementation of 
business track diplomacy but the successful utilisation of business-track diplomacy towards 
North Korea. Also, for Seoul this disadvantage will be an obstacle for its future engagement 
with North Korea. 
This difficulty in the South has been demonstrated in the crisis of Mt. Kumgang 
tourism two years after its start. Because North Korean business requires up front investment 
and slow returns, South Korean companies need outside help either through foreign 
investment or the South Korean government's financial support. However, several limitations 
on North Korean business hindered foreign investment, including the US and Japanese 
governments' lack of policy-making will for economic engagement with North Korea, as 
discussed in chapter 4. Also, the South Korean government was no longer in a position to 
intervene in private business and to control economic policy, in order to put economic 
capacity into engagement with North Korea. Moreover, North Korea's lack of experience 
with the market economy and its sensitivity over regime stability also played a role in limiting 
economic engagement with North Korea. Therefore, this case study showed both optimism 
and the obstacles to success of Seoul's future business track diplomacy with North Korea as a 
viable long-term security policy. 
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Conclusion 
The introduction to this thesis laid out three inter-linked questions about the viability of 
comprehensive engagement policy by South Korea regarding post-Cold War North Korean 
security problems, the requirements and obstacles for the implementation of consistent 
engagement by South Korea, and the utility of economic engagement as a Post-Cold War 
global security policy. This concluding section recapitulates the central arguments of the 
research in order to draw out the answers to these three questions and thus extract the main 
theoretical and practical implications of the argument developed here. 
The viability of South Korea's economic engagement with the North 
First, the emphasis is placed upon the viability of South Korea's economic engagement with 
North Korea in order to achieve security objectives. This thesis has analysed the case of South 
Korea's security policy regarding the post-Cold War North Korean security problems by 
using the model of business-track diplomacy, in order to answer the above question. 
First, this study demonstrated that Seoul's comprehensive engagement approach is 
applicable to the changing nature of the North Korean security problems after the end of the 
Cold War (see chapter 2). The pattern of inter-Korean security relations since the division of 
Korea in 1945 has been inter-Korean conflict and confrontation along with great power 
geostrategic conflict and the Cold War political structure. Ensuring stability on the Korean 
Peninsula relied heavily on military and strategic alliances based on balance of power politics. 
In many ways, this balance of power and containment approach appears unchanged in the 
post-Cold War era, as South and North Korea continue their efforts to surpass each other, 
while regional powers act to obtain influence in the Korean Peninsula and to ensure their own 
perceived national interests. 
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However, at the same time, it became apparent that the post-Cold War North Korean 
security problems are based on the possibility that North Korea might implode or explode 
with possible inter-Korean military conflict in the future. These dangers were generated by 
factors such as external diplomatic setbacks and internal economic difficulties, rather than by 
its military capability and aggression towards South Korea, as in the Cold War era. Evidently, 
North Korea is willing to engage with Western countries, including former enemies, such as 
the US and Japan, in order to secure its regime, and has even began to engage with South 
Korea in economic cooperation, a move that had been unthinkable during the Cold War era. 
Moreover, for South Korea, rapid German unification in 1990 provided the lesson that 
gradual unification was desirable because the sudden unification of Korea would involve 
enormous social and economic costs. Hence, South Korean governments proposed a gradual 
unification plan, with emphasis on peaceful inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation, as the 
official North Korea policy in the 1990s. 
Second, the policy change identified by the Kim Dae-jung government, towards the 
execution of comprehensive engagement with North Korea, demonstrates that it is possible to 
use this type of policy in the service oftong-term security purposes (see chapter 3). Although 
there is still opposition from international and domestic actors, the inescapable reality is that 
the US, South Korea, and Japanese policy-makers at least recognise the difficulty of using 
military power to counteract North Korea's military adventurism, and acknowledge North 
Korea's desire to engage with them. 
In this regard, the Kim Dae-jung government's engagement measures, such as 
persuading the US and Japanese governments to pursue engagement with the North, Seoul's 
calm reaction toward North Korea's military provocations, and various inter-Korean 
activities, not only helped to decrease tensions on the Korean Peninsula, and increased mutual 
confidence between the two Koreas, but also demonstrated the possibility of Seoul's 
utilisation of this type of security policy towards North Korea. 
Consequently, the Kim Dae-jung government placed comprehensive engagement as 
one viable strategic tool, alongside military capability available for post-Cold War North 
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Korea policy. Thus, a long-term engagement with North Korea does offer the prospect of 
avoiding the costs of a sudden collapse of North Korea, the potential for peaceful coexistence 
and confidence building between the two Koreas, and possibly, the peaceful unification of 
Korea. 
North Korea may well persist with occasional threats of military aggression and 
brinkmanship for the sake of regime survival, or display greater resilience in the form of 
isolation, and thereby continue to upset the regional security picture and to harm overall inter-
Korean relations. However, the most perceptible trait in its security behaviour in the 1990s 
and especially since the Agreed Framework in 1994, has been to moderate its security threats 
and to seek tentative engagement with the outside world, and even with South Korea, through 
economic cooperation. Thus, the use of economic, social and cultural engagement with North 
Korea should be a key means in avoiding future crises, and in achieving mechanisms to 
decrease tensions in the Korean Peninsula. Most importantly, as South Korea's ultimate 
security objective regarding North Korea is peaceful reunification, these comprehensive 
engagement measures are worth pursuing regardless of North Korea's military-first policy. 
Policy-making will: South Korea's 'sunshine policy' towards North Korea 
As discussed in chapter 1, this thesis took seriously the importance of the policy-making will 
of both government and private actors for the utilisation of business-track diplomacy. The 
research then, has examined whether South Korean governments put enough policy-making 
energy into implementing business-track diplomacy towards North Korea in the 1990s. The 
analysis in chapter 3 looked at the different North Korea policy approaches of the Roh Tae-
woo, the Kim Young-sam, and the current Kim Dae-jung government. 
Even though all the South Korean governments after the end of Cold War recognised 
the need for engagement with the North, the previous South Korean governments were more 
sensitive to North Korea's continuing military provocations, such as nuclear development and 
military excursions into South Korea. Under the principle ofjeongkyungyeonkae the first two 
governments limited not only South Korea's inter-Korean activities, including those in the 
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economic, social, and cultural fields, but also hampered international efforts to engage with 
the North. In particular, the Kim Young-sam government often used the 'North Korean card' 
for domestic political considerations, which resulted in an inconsistent engagement with 
North Korea. 
In contrast to the limitations of the previous South Korean governments' engagement 
policy towards North Korea, the current Kim Dae-jung government has displayed strong 
policy-making will to utilise a security policy based on comprehensive and consistent 
engagement. This boosted the South's non-governmental organisational activities with North 
Korea by liberalising the regulations over inter-Korean exchanges, and reacting calmly to 
North Korea's continuing military provocations toward South Korea. Moreover, the current 
South Korean government encouraged international engagement with North Korea so that the 
North could come out of isolation and voluntarily open-up for political and economic reform. 
For instance, the Kim Dae-jung government has encouraged the US and Japanese 
governments to take initiatives towards normalising their relationships with North Korea, and 
also to be more active in their economic engagement with North Korea. 
Along with Kim Dae-jung government's strong policy-making will of engagement 
with North Korea, this research revealed that private sectors' will of economic engagement 
with a target state is also important for the implementation of economic-based security policy. 
As seen in the case of the Mt. Kumgang project, the Hyundai Group's will of initiating 
cooperative business with North Korea was essential to the realisation of Mt. Kumgang 
tourism. Especially, the Hyundai Group founder Chung Ju-young's individual will of 
pursuing North Korean businesses was a significant part in the success of the project. 
Thereby, this study suggests that cooperative partnership between the public and private 
sectors is useful and needed for the utility of business-track diplomacy. 
The importance of policy makers' policy-making will to use economic engagement 
could be an important factor to consider in the evaluation of the prospects for the change of 
the current immobilism of the US and Japanese governments' passive stance toward 
engagement with the North. As shown in chapter 4, policy-makers in the US and Japan, in 
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spite of their potential political and economic power, did not show the necessary political will 
to engage with the North, despite their recognition of the need for a soft-landing approach 
regarding the post-Cold War North Korean security problems. 
South Korea's engagement with North Korea can have demonstrative effect and 
encourage the political leaders of regional powers to show greater willingness for 'soft-
landing' approaches toward North Korea. However, the North Korean issue, and especially 
economic engagement with the North, may not be a policy priority for the regional powers 
and their political leaders, because this would require them to overcome the constraints that 
arise within their domestic political games. Nevertheless, at a nonnative level, this study 
suggests that South Korean political leaders should have a strong political will to pursue 
active engagement with North Korea in order to encourage the international community to 
engage with North Korea, and to avoid strengthening the hard-line position towards North 
Korea. 
The role of beliefs on foreign policy-making: the impact of the beliefs held by KIm Dae-
jung on North Korea policy-making 
As set out in the Introduction and in chapter 1, this study goes even further by asking what are 
the important factors for explaining Kim Dae-jung government's great commitment to active 
and consistent engagement with North Korea. Thereby, this thesis reviewed several 
approaches to foreign policy analysis (FPA) and employed three approaches (international 
system, domestic, and beliefs approach) to identify the crucial factors for the policy change 
under the Kim Dae-jung government. 
As shown in chapter 4, both the international and the domestic political environments 
were not favourable for the Kim Dae-jung government to conduct active engagement with 
North Korea. It seems that at present US politicians, the bureaucratic, and the business 
communities lack the interest to use a security policy based on comprehensive engagement. 
The US priorities in North Korea mainly focus on North Korea's military threats, and it lacks 
a commercial appeal. Consequently, the pace of the US's engagement with the North is slow 
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and limited compared to its potential economic power to help North Korea's economic system 
changes. 
Like the US, Japan, another powerful economic player, could not translate its 
economic capability into a national engagement policy towards North Korea.71 Not having 
strong political and business interests, and concerned over the US-Japan military alliance, 
Japan has taken a passive attitude towards engagement with North Korea. Rather, US-Japan 
policy-makers put their energies into the rehabilitation of their military alliance following the 
Cold War and the North Korean nuclear crisis. In particular, North Korean military 
aggression seems to be used to a certain extent as an excuse for a strengthened US-Japan 
military alliance, whose aim may be to preempt more dangerous potential security threats 
from China in the Far East. 
Moreover, South Korean domestic opposition to active engagement with the North 
still exists. Although South Korea's democratisation contributes to the rise of more 
progressive ideas towards North Korea among domestic actors and the public in general, as 
seen in the election of Kim Dae-jung as president of South Korea, anti-North Koreanism still 
prevails in conservative circles. Opposition to active engagement with North Korea by 
conservatives, such as the majority opposition party and prominent media groups, along with 
North Korea's continuing military provocations and infiltrations towards South Korea can 
still effectively influence public opinion, and thus limit Kim Dae-jung government's 
consistent engagement with the North. 
However, as examined in chapter 5, President Kim Dae-jung's long-prepared 
principles regarding Korean reunification and strategies for North Korea policy had the most 
crucial impact on South Korea's execution of comprehensive engagement with North Korea. 
Because he has held principles about Korean reunification based on peaceful coexistence, 
exchanges and a gradual approach, for 30 years, he is willing to promote engagement as the 
optimal North Korea policy. Moreover, the changing nature of the post-Cold War North 
71 Drifte (1998: 5) describes Japan's immobilism, its inability to use economic power for other political 
goals, as the 'paradox ofunrealised power'. 
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Korean security problems, and thus the new opportunities for engagement with North Korea, 
encourage him to do so actively. 
Armed with strong causal beliefs and perceptions on the North Koran issues, 
President Kim Dae-jung used his political power to dominate South Korea's policy-making 
system in pursuit of his 'sunshine policy'. Thus, President Kim Dae-jung's beliefs on 
sunshine policy greatly influenced South Korea's policy-making process and actual policy 
outcomes regarding the North Korea agenda. As a result, the Kim Dae-jung government is 
eager and able to enhance economic cooperation with the North, as demonstrated throughout 
this thesis, including the Mt. Kumgang tourism case. It can be argued that despite constraints 
from international and domestic forces, the Kim Dae-jung government could successfully 
operate the sunshine policy to enhance economic interdependence between the two Koreas. 
Even if South Korea is a relatively smaller state, compared to the US and Japan, its decision-
makers' strong policy-making will could influence their state's decision-making process and 
international relations to some extent. 
Of course, some may argue that the most important factor for the prospect of inter-
Korean relation is still the direction of the US policy towards the Korean Peninsula. For 
instance, it is claimed that the current cool relationship between the US, South and North 
Korea was caused by the policies adopted by the hard-line George W. Bush administration in 
US, and that President Kim Dae-jung's sunshine policy became powerless from early 2001. 
Moreover, a series of incidents, such as the September 11 terror attacks on the US, and Bush's 
remarks accusing North Korea of being part of "an axis of evil" in January 2002 solidified 
President Bush's anti-terrorism, anti-WMD policy, and also his policy of containment 
towards North Korea. It further strained the relationships between the US, South and North 
Korea, and thus damaged President Kim Oae-jung's sunshine policy. In fact, it is true that the 
US is powerful enough to influence North Korea's behaviours, and thus overall inter-Korean 
relations and the effectiveness of Seoul's engagement approach with North Korea. In other 
words, Pyongyang sees the inter-Korean relationship as dependent on its relations with the 
US. 
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However, as pointed out in chapter 1, this study is not concerned with the final 
effectiveness of a policy choice. Rather, it seeks to identify the impact of beliefs held by 
decision-makers on the policy choice. In other words, despite external and internal obstacles 
to the sunshine policy, President Kim Dae-jung still believes that his "sunshine" policy of 
reconciliation and cooperation with North Korea is the sole alternative for maintaining peace 
on the Korean Peninsula and for preparing for its eventual reunification. 
For instance, at the recent summit between President George W. Bush and Kim Dae-
jung in Seoul on 20th of February 2002, Kim Dae-jung invited President Bush to the Dorasan 
Station, a South Korean side rail station for the relinking of the South-North railway, and 
argued that active engagement with North Korea would diminish the tensions between South 
and North Korea. Also, he asked President Bush to reopen dialogues with North Korea as 
soon as possible (Korea Times, 21 February 2002). lienee, he does not give up his 
engagement approaches towards North Korea, even though Seoul has recently faced great 
difficulties in pursuing its engagement with North Korea. 
Future implications: Emerging obstacles and opportunities for South Korea's 
engagement policy towards North Korea 
This study also points out that the constraints from international and domestic environments 
are limiting the effectiveness of business-track diplomacy towards North Korea. The first 
problem is the lack of economic capability in South Korea, which is the other criterion for the 
effectiveness of business-track diplomacy along with the policy-making wilt, to enhance 
North Korea's economic reforms and ultimately to ensure its economic interdependence with 
South Korea. 
As discovered in the Mt. Kumgang case, the economic capability of South Korea's 
private sector, even the chaebols, has decreased. Largely due to the financial crisis, the South 
Korean business community became financially conservative and profit-oriented. by limiting 
risks of new investment and businesses. Thus, unprofitable large-scale North Korean 
businesses would not be welcomed by the South Korean business community in the future. 
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Moreover, governmental involvement in North Korean businesses would not be easy either. 
Engaging in unprofitable inter-Korean economic exchanges could be a political burden for the 
South Korean government. Finally, North Korea's lack of general knowledge of, and will 
towards, a market economy also contributes to limit the involvement of the South Korean 
business community. 
The second problem centres on how to forge a national consensus in South Korea. A 
national consensus on active engagement with North Korea has not been established, mainly 
because of ideological and political disputes. The rationale of engagement with North Korea 
is still a domestic political matter between the ruling and the opposition party, and an 
ideological one between the divided South Korean public (South-South Conflict). For 
instance, the opposition GNP, with the support of ULD, President Kim Dae-jung's former 
coalition partner, passed a no-confidence motion against Unification Minister Lim Dong-won, 
Kim Dae-jung's top aide in charge of North Korea policy on 4th of September 2001, and 
criticised Kim Dae-jung government's sunshine policy as a failure.72 
Along with this, conservative media groups portray critically the South Korean 
government's economic and political concessions toward North Korea. Such a fractured 
foundation for national consensus has undermined Seoul's consistent engagement policy 
toward North Korea. National consensus is vital to the engineering of the engagement policy 
since it is by and large predicated on a trade-off between economic and political concessions 
in the short term and peace and security gains in the long-run. 
The third problem is the US's passive role in the 'soft-landing' policy towards North 
Korea. The US is undoubtedly the most important player in terms of economic and military 
capability in the Korean Peninsula. In particular, because the US is the main target for North 
Korea's post-Cold War diplomacy to secure its survival, the US's policy towards North Korea 
is an important factor in the relationships between countries in the Korean Peninsula. 
72 Lim Dong-won stepped down as Minister of Unification after attacks by opposition party members 
holding him responsible for pro-communist acts allegedly committed by some members of the South 
Korean delegation to the North during the joint Liberation Day festivities on ISth of August 2001. 
However, President Kim Dae-jung reappointed him as a minister-level special advisor for inter-Korean 
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However, internal policy-making problems in the US are causing the limitation of the 'soft-
landing' policy toward North Korea. 
It became clear that the advent of Bush administration is posing more barriers to 
confidence-building on the Korean Peninsula. Its critical view on North Korea has already 
undercut South Korea's sunshine policy, straining Seoul-Washington-Pyongyang 
relationships. Cooled relations between South Korea and the U.S., as well as North Korea and 
the U.S., further deteriorated on 29 January 2002 when President Bush included North Korea 
in parallel with Iran and Iraq in "an axis of evil", arming to threaten the peace of the world. 
Moreover, recent press reports of leaked Pentagon documents on the 9th of March indicated 
that the US had drawn up the contingency plan for nuclear strikes against North Korea along 
with Russia, China, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria (Internationailleraid Tribune, 11 March 2002). 
In response to this, North Korea declared on 14 March 2002 its intention to resume its 
nuclear weapons programme. Pyongyang argued that the US gave specific assurances in the 
Geneva AF in 1994 that it would not use nuclear weapons against North Korea. Thereby. 
Pyongyang would review all agreements with the US including AF in 1994 and its voluntary 
suspension in 1999 oflong-range missile tests (Financial Times, 15 March 2002). 
Accordingly, the South Korean government expressed its concern that Bush's 
remarks and his military approach could destabilise the Korean Peninsula. Unification 
Minister, Chung Se-hyun, even argued that "the North Korean nuclear weapons pointed out 
by George W. Bush are not for the purpose of attacking the South. but to serve as a 
bargaining chip when negotiating with powerful countries" (quoted in Dongai/bo 4 February 
2002). Some other high-ranking officials suggested that the U.S. should not drive North 
Korea into a comer. 
However, this is not to say that South Korea's engagement policy will necessarily be 
constrained in the future and that the concept of business-track diplomacy is not viable. This 
study revealed that Kim Dae-jung government's strong political will greatly helped the 
prospect of inter-Korean cooperation and gave the international community room for 
relations a week later. 
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engaging with North Korea in the post-Cold War era. Also, the active inter-Korean exchanges 
and cooperation, and especially the 2000 summit between the two Koreas, definitely 
contributed to the popularity and validity of the sunshine policy. 
Recent public opinion surveys in South Korea revealed that many people still support 
Kim Dae-jung's sunshine policy despite the cooled relationship between US, South Korea, 
and North Korea. A survey, conducted by the South Korean weekly magazine Sisa Journal, 
showed that about 60% of those interviewed did not agree with President George W. Bush's 
stance regarding North Korean issues (Sisa Journal, 7 March 2002). Also, in a survey of 300 
South Korean opinion leaders, including professors, business people and professionals, 153 
respondents considered President Kim's sunshine policy towards North Korea as a 
noteworthy achievement of the current Kim Dae-jung government.7) 
Therefore, it is possible that whoever will be the next president of South Korea in 
2003 and thereafter, he or she has to carry out some kind of engagement policy towards North 
Korea. However, in order for South Korea to achieve its security objectives, consistent and 
effective engagement with North Korea is essential, and its effectiveness will lie in future 
domestic and international consensus for it. As pointed out in the belief approach section, the 
comprehensive engagement approach towards North Korea should be embedded as a nonn. 
However, because these issues could not be easily solved and required patience, 
South Korean policy-makers should make efforts to establish both international and domestic 
support for the need for comprehensive engagement with North Korea, in order to bring peace 
on the Korean Peninsula. 
The implications on security policy and foreign policy-making (FPA) 
The above findings from the Korean case provide valuable lesson to IR theory. security 
studies and foreign policy analysis (FPA) field. First, the emphasis is placed upon the utility 
of a state's economic engagement with a target state in order to achieve security objectives. 
73 This survey was conducted by the Citizens' Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ) of South Korea, 
Quoted from Korea nmes (4 March 2002) 
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The examination of the global security agenda has revealed that in the post-Cold War era 
there are increasing doubts about the effectiveness of military power as the means for 
ensuring peace and preventing conflicts. Faced with the rise of a range of low-intensity 
conflicts, terrorism, ethnic and economic generated insecurity problems, policy-makers have 
considered economic-based and comprehensive approaches to security. Furthermore, the 
review of the South Korean policy-making debate regarding North Korean security problems 
in the post-Cold War era demonstrates that there exists a strong desire for alternative and 
comprehensive conceptions of security, and a fundamental acceptance of the utility of 
economic engagement for security purposes. 
This study constructed and employed the concept of "business-track diplomacy" in 
order to test the theoretical and empirical possibilities of a state's utilisation of economic 
engagement with a target state to deal with the post-Cold War security problems. Regarding 
the question of IR theory and security studies, it is arguable that the concept of business-track 
diplomacy and comprehensive engagement to security policy, while showing difficulties in 
effective implementation of this type of policy, and far from providing solutions to deal with 
every security issues, does open new ways for the understanding of security issues and 
provide new security approaches beyond the balance of power strategies and military based 
containment approaches. 
The model explores, in the Korean case, both the need and the opportunity for 
involving states, especially South Korea, in active engagement, even with North Korea, who 
was usually viewed as a very hard target for engagement and as a country whose security 
problems have been regarded as military-oriented. Thereby, the business-track diplomacy 
model presents a perspective that may help policy-makers and scholars to perceive security 
problems with flexibility and move beyond conventional military perspectives to security. 
Thus, by employing the concept of business-track diplomacy, this study has 
demonstrated that an alternative and comprehensive approach to security issues based on 
economic engagement that is applicable to inter-Korean relations and beyond can be 
intellectually robust and practically viable. The major benefits of a business-track diplomacy 
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model are that, first of all, it has the capacity to analyse the empirical evidence about a state's 
actual use ofthis type of policy towards a target state for security purposes, and secondly, it is 
able to generate further policy-making lessons including requirements and obstacles that 
policy-makers need to anticipate if they are to engage in successful business-track diplomacy 
in the future. 
In particular, along with the importance of the government's policy-making energy 
towards engagement as long-term security policy, this model presented the significant role of 
the private sectors to peace and security. Even though private sector activities might attract 
little attention from the mass media, they can help not only to relieve the economic pressure 
of poverty and the needs of the people and nations that can lead to conflicts but also to build 
mutual confidence on both sides by providing communications channels and thus decreasing 
misunderstanding. Thereby, as demonstrated in the Mt. Kumgang case, they do playa role 
behind the scene in helping to shape the course of future engagement. It can be argued that 
private sectors may not have "the capacity to propel the ship but they can help navigate and 
sound warnings to change course to safer water" (Chung Ok-nim 1999b: 125). 
In turn, the lessons of the post-Cold War North Korean security case could be 
applicable to other post-Cold War security issues. For example, the Asian financial crisis of 
1997-8 demonstrated the impact of the state economic crises on their domestic political and 
social stability and thus on regional security. Moreover, economic difficulties in the former 
Soviet Republics from 1998 brought domestic instability and greater insecurity for the region. 
Thus, policy-makers understand the need for economic engagement in order to prevent global 
and regional insecurity. The case of US's war on terrorism showed the need of US's active 
political and economic engagement toward countries surrounding Afghanistan in order to 
carry out its war operation. Also, recent discussions in the US over the lifting of economic 
sanctions against Cuba and former Soviet Republics, and also the acceptance of China's 
joining of WTO could be seen as instruments for decreasing instability and confrontations, 
and bringing peace around world. 
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Meanwhile, to take the question of the foreign policy analysis (FPA) field, the 
contribution ofthis study is to have shown the importance of beliefs in foreign policy-making. 
By showing the different policy outcomes under the different South Korean governments 
towards North Korea in spite of fairly similar international and domestic environments, this 
study went beyond the rationalist models' assumptions that "actor's preference and causal 
beliefs are given, and attention focuses on the variation in the constraints faced by actors" 
(Goldstein and Keohane 1993: 4). In other words, foreign policy outcomes could be different 
based on what decision-makers believe. Such beliefs then function as road-maps, information 
screens, and can playa part in the process of policy institutionalisation. Especially, the 
situations, such as North Korea's future, which involve uncertainty and are ambiguous, 
increase the probability of the role of policy-makers' beliefs on policy-making. 
Furthermore, the application of the beliefs approach is all the more important because 
it presents an alternative perspective on South Korea's foreign policy analysis (FPA) by 
showing the impact of beliefs held by the political leader on South Korean foreign policy-
making process and by building a theoretical picture that goes beyond the international 
structural point of view. The beliefs approach helped to demonstrate that even in the case of 
South Korea's security policy-making concerning North Korean security problems, usually 
viewed as exclusively military-based and US-centred, a state such as the relatively small 
South Korea could have room to enhance economic engagement with North Korea and to 
promote international support for the policy. 
Finally, the beliefs approach revealed that it was the belief in a certain interpretation 
of the security problems and their solutions which determined the patterns of security 
behaviour. Thus, state security policies are not an invariable reaction to the total reality of the 
structure, but they are products of human beliefs regarding causes and solutions. In tum, this 
finding indicates that policy-makers' beliefs on different approaches to security could help the 
emergence of alternative approaches to the same security environment. 
It is more interesting in the case of Korea, where military alliance politics and 
containment approaches have often been seen as invariable realities even in the post-Cold 
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War era, that active and consistent engagement with the North became one of the beliefs that 
addressed the post-Cold War North Korean security problem. Then, the embedding of the 
belief about the need of comprehensive engagement to international and domestic actors 
could be considered an important factor for successful engagement approaches. 
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